Dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the test site on Novaya Zemlya.
under the general editorship of the scientific director of the RFNC VNIIEF, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.N. Mikhailova
Institute for Strategic Stability Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom).
Federal Office of Biomedical and Extreme Problems under the Ministry of Health and Social Development Russian Federation

Institute for Strategic Stability, 2004
This publication may not be reproduced, transmitted, distributed or used for commercial purposes in any way.

PART 1

DEPARTMENT UNDER THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NAVY

To create a domestic nuclear fleet, it was necessary to solve many complex scientific, technical and organizational problems. The essay is devoted to the organizational and technical measures taken in the Navy in 1949 - 1954 to find ways to implement the achievements of nuclear physics in naval armaments and ship power engineering.

The test of the first atomic bomb in the USSR took place on August 29, 1949. Ten days later, on September 8, the Minister of the Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky ordered the fleet to start developing new weapons. To do this, it was prescribed to form a special department under the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The department was assigned the number 6 and it reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief, and with the formation of the Naval Ministry - from February 22, 1950 to March 15, 1953 - to the Naval Minister. The department was literally attached to the minister, occupying 4 rooms and the office of one of his deputies. This emphasized the importance of the department, whose activities were regulated by a special regime of secrecy.

The department was created to ensure the development of atomic weapons for the fleet, methods of their use in combat operations at sea, as well as the protection of fleet facilities from enemy atomic weapons. In the course of his activity, the personnel of the department had to deal with other issues. When formed, the department consisted of twenty officers and four employees. Captain 1st rank Pyotr Fomich Fomin, who previously worked as deputy head of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Navy, was appointed head.

The staffing structure of the department included the following areas:

• ship - chief captain 2nd rank A. V. Selyanin;

• weapons - chief captain 1st rank N. P. Dashkov;

• scientific and technical - chief captain 2nd rank A.N. Voshchinin;

• fortification - chief Colonel E.N. Barkovsky;

• operational-tactical - chief captain 2nd rank S. S. Satunin;

• chemical-radiation - chief major V. G. Markovsky;

• aviation - chief Colonel BM Burashev;

• Medical - Head Colonel V.V. Chumakov.

Initially, Captain 1st Rank M.A. Moryakhin was engaged in the selection of personnel, and from January 1951, Major A.V. Kazakov. As the tasks expanded, the structure and staffing of the department changed. Four years later, by the time the department was reorganized into management, its number had tripled.

The status of the 6th department was determined by the Regulation, which was approved on July 3, 1950 by the Minister of the Navy, Admiral I.S. Yumashev. It was written in it: “The 6th department under the Naval Minister is on the rights of the Directorate of the Naval General Staff.”

The initial period of the department's work was difficult, since none of the officers and employees of the department had either a special education in atomic and nuclear physics or work experience in these areas. There was no information about the design and operation of nuclear charges, except for scanty information about explosions at the Semipalatinsk test site, which was conditionally called Training Ground No. 2. There was also no developed concept of what kind of nuclear weapons our fleet needs. It was not clear how to defend against this formidable weapon. Only on submarines could a recommendation be given - to dive to a depth, that is, to hide under the water column. And here an important role was played by the high general engineering and military training of naval officers and the skillful selection of personnel.

Service in the 6th Department under the Minister of the Navy (6th Department of the Navy) required special responsibility, burdened with high secrecy. The officers in the shortest possible time had to master a large amount of physical and technical knowledge in the field of the use of nuclear energy, participate in complex experiments and tests. In addition, the employees of the department had to be healthy and young, able to long time work with creators nuclear weapons, participate in its testing and operation in the fleets.

All candidates selected for positions to work in the 6th department were agreed on admission with the relevant department of the USSR State Security Committee, and after agreement they signed a non-disclosure agreement on military and state secrets that would become known to them in the course of work.

Giving preference to qualified young people, graduates of higher educational institutions were appointed to serve in the Department. For example, lieutenants V. L. Serebrenikov, Yu. S. Pivovarov, L. A. Kashnikov arrived from the Higher Engineering and Technical School, and O. G. Kasimov, A. A. Kurmaev, L. L. Kolesov. But most of all there were officers who graduated from the Naval Academy of Shipbuilding and Armament. A. N. Krylova. These are captains of the 3rd rank B.M. Abramov, E.A. Nikolaev, N.N. Zhukov, Lieutenant Commander V. A. Timofeev. I also ended up in the Department of the VMAKV them. A.N. Krylov.

Many of these officers subsequently became candidates of technical sciences, and captain 2nd rank Yu. S. Yakovlev defended his doctoral dissertation without interruption from service.

The high business qualities and professionalism of the officers selected at that time to work in the field of nuclear weapons are evidenced by their promotion, as well as the assignment of high military ranks. So, in the process of further service, P.F. Fomin, A.N. Voshchinin, Yu.S. Yakovlev, N.G. Kutuzov, E.A. Shitikov, lieutenant general - E. N. Barkovsky, rear admirals - I. G. Ivanov, V. V. Rakhmanov, B. A. Kokovikhin.

The officers who arrived at the department for service independently studied all the material available at that time on atomic topics. First of all, they studied the book by M. I. Korsunsky “The Atomic Nucleus”, studied material from the American magazine “Nucleonics” and scanty intelligence reports on US nuclear weapons. We selectively studied reports on tests of naval equipment at the Semipalatinsk test site, as well as the report of Captain 2nd Rank A. M. Khokhlov, who was present at American tests of atomic weapons and ships in the waters of the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean in 1946.

Some strokes of the activity of that period cause a smile today. While studying, they often wrote down in top secret notebooks various information from open textbooks on atomic physics, popular brochures telling about the principles of the atomic bomb.

The period of self-training for officers lasted about a year. After that, a period of teaching others and establishing contacts with the scientific world and designers began.

P.F. Fomin sought and strengthened ties with prominent scientists of the country M. A. Lavrentiev, M. A. Sadovsky, A. P. Aleksandrov, N. N. Semenov, E. K. Fedorov and others. The officers of the department established contacts with researchers from institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Thus, business ties were established between the Navy and research institutes and design bureaus.

The acquired knowledge was brought to the attention of the officers of the Naval General Staff and the central directorates of the Navy, within the limits of the permissible. The 6th department organized and conducted a large series of lectures for admirals and officers of the central office on physical principles and the design of nuclear charges, the features of their operation and combat use. Particular attention was paid to the damaging factors of nuclear explosions. Separately, a number of lectures were prepared and conducted by officers of the department for the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and his deputies. These classes with a small group of honored combat admirals took place in a simple business atmosphere and aroused great interest in them, the speakers were asked many questions. Most of the classes were conducted by physicists O. G. Kasimov, A. A. Rakov, L. L. Kolesov. Screenings of films shot during full-scale tests at the Semipalatinsk test site were organized. A sector of naval weapons was created at this training ground, it was led by Captain 2nd Rank A.P. Novikov. For all tests, the personnel of the sector exhibited ship weapons and marine equipment on the experimental field to test for explosion resistance.

Naval equipment was tested at different distances from the center of the battlefield and was subjected to damage of varying degrees. Many samples were installed on the field during the tests of the first atomic bomb in August 1949 and the hydrogen bomb in August 1953. They tested ship artillery mounts, command and rangefinder posts, torpedo tubes, anti-submarine bombers, sea anchor mines, mine defenders and other equipment. Based on the test results, a general report was compiled (by hand, for reasons of secrecy) and private reports for each type of equipment. Based on the reports, recommendations were made to the developers of ships and weapons - to improve their anti-nuclear protection (PAZ); builders - to increase the security of naval bases (Naval Base); physicians - to develop measures for the prevention of radiation sickness. The employees of the department A. N. Voshchinin, E. N. Barkovsky, A. V. Selyanin, Yu. S. Yakovlev, A. A. Enkov, I. G. Ivanov, N. P. Dashkov, A. A. Puchkov, I. I. Voronin, S. D. Ivoninsky, V. L. Serebrenikov, V. G. Markovsky.

Already at the stage of land tests, the uneven strength of ship elements was revealed under the influence of various damaging factors atomic explosion. Together with the operators, they developed anti-nuclear warrants so that two large ships would not be hit by one medium-power atomic bomb. Realizing that the calculations were made with great approximation, the distances between the ships in the warrant were determined with a margin.

To train the personnel of the ships in actions in the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons, the senior officer of the department, Captain 2nd Rank V. I. Bushkin, designed an explosion simulator and received a copyright certificate. The time has come for a more purposeful impact on combat training fleets in conditions of use by a potential adversary of nuclear weapons.

As a matter of priority, it was necessary to transfer all available information on nuclear weapons to the personnel of the fleets and future officers of the fleet. To this end, the necessary documents were developed for the organization of special training for cadets of naval schools, they were approved by the command of the Navy.

Thus, under the leadership of the 6th Department of the Navy, a system was organized for training personnel on the basics of the design of nuclear weapons, issues of their use in combat operations at sea, and methods of protection against the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion.

It became clear that shipboard nuclear weapons were needed. First of all, attention was paid to naval artillery surface ships, torpedo weapons of submarines, missile weapons of the Navy and Navy aviation.

For torpedo weapons, they prepared a TTZ for a nuclear munition for a torpedo being developed and issued a TTZ for the warhead of an anti-ship aircraft cruise missile.

The 6th Department of the Navy also oversaw the development of the Strela cruise missile for coastal installations designed to protect naval bases. However, in October 1953, the Minister of Defense of the USSR freed the 6th department from work related to aviation cruise missiles, since a department of atomic weapons was formed in the office of the commander of the aviation of the Navy and the post of assistant commander of the aviation of the Navy for special weapons was introduced. It was occupied by Lieutenant General P.N. Lemeshko

The problem of nuclear warheads of cruise missiles was taken seriously later, when V.N. Chalomey began to create cruise missiles for the Navy. The first studies on the most cruise missile for a submarine began in 1954. Subsequently, cruise missiles were widely used in the domestic fleet.

In September 1952, a new era began in Soviet shipbuilding. At the initiative of A.P. Alexandrova, I.V. Kurchatov and N.A. Dollezhal Stalin signed the decision to create a nuclear submarine. Work on it was carried out in strict secrecy, their financing was carried out through the MSM. This did not allow the fleet to make any demands on the boat during the design process, i.e. for more than a year, the fleet specialists did not actually participate in the work on the first nuclear submarine. Fleet specialists - officers of the 6th department of the Navy - were involved in the design of a nuclear submarine by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of July 28, 1953. The general leadership was assigned to P.F. Fomin. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet N.G. On January 15, 1954, Kuznetsov ordered "the organization and management of all work on object 627 to be entrusted to the 6th department." The staffing of the submarine under construction was entrusted to P.F. Fomin. The appropriate officers were selected by shipbuilding specialists in the fleets. So, Boris Petrovich Akulov was appointed the first mechanical engineer for the experimental submarine K-3 with a nuclear reactor. Other specialists were also selected, among whom was the future Hero of the Soviet Union, assistant commander of the boat, Lev Mikhailovich Zhiltsov.

In July 1954, the development of the technical design of the nuclear submarine was completed. Commander N.G. Kuznetsov decided to consider it by an expert commission of fleet specialists. The commission was headed by Rear Admiral A.E. Eagle, who later commanded the Northern and Baltic fleets. The commission included a group of specialists from the 6th Department of the Navy. They reviewed the design of a control, protection and heat control system for a nuclear power plant (NPP). The officers of the department I.D. worked in the commission. Dorofeev, B.M. Abramov and Yu.P. Babin.

The 6th department organized and staffed the control and receiving apparatus at all enterprises of the Soviet Union that participated in the creation of nuclear power for the submarine. The department formed two crews (except commanders) of this boat and organized special training officers of the electromechanical warhead (BCh-5).

The last generalized documents on the nuclear boat, which are stored in the archives of the 6th department, refer to the period of preparation of the draft government decree on the technical design of the boat. The department was firmly of the opinion that instead of one large torpedo tube, it was necessary to place traditional tubes with a significant increase in the number of torpedoes. A. A. Enkov, Yu. K. Simonov, V. I. Koshkin, B. M. Abramov, S. I. Krylov worked in the shipbuilding direction of the 6th department during this period.

After the approval of the technical project 627, the nuclear specialists of the fleet were left with questions of dosimetric control in the compartments of the submarine. F. A. Kurmaev was engaged in them.

On August 9, 1957, the Project 627 submarine was launched, and on January 17, 1959, the fleet was accepted into trial operation. In the creation of the first nuclear boat, there is a certain contribution from the officers of the 6th department of the Navy.

The second important area of ​​activity of the department in the field of shipbuilding was the anti-nuclear protection (PAZ) of ships. The department prepared the "Temporary basic requirements for anti-nuclear protection in the design of surface ships of the Navy", put into effect by order of the Commander-in-Chief of July 17, 1954. Officers of the 6th Department of the Navy Yu. S. Yakovlev, V. V. Rakhmanov, V. A. Timofeev took an active part in their development.

The Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry has sent out "Temporary Basic Requirements..." to all the Central Design Bureaus and research institutes of the industry to guide the design of new ships.

A new 10-year plan for military shipbuilding was being prepared, and clarity in the combat stability of ships, especially surface ships, in conditions nuclear war did not have. It was necessary to speed up the testing of ships with an atomic explosion.

The 6th Department of the Navy began preparations for testing ships of various classes for the impact of damaging factors of a full-scale underwater atomic explosion. It included organizational measures, scientific and methodological developments and hardware.

A special place in the activities of the department was occupied by military radioactive substances (WRM). In the late 1940s and early 1950s, information appeared about work in the United States on the use of radioactive substances to defeat enemy personnel in combat, including on ships. Research work on the BRV has also begun in our country. Waste from nuclear production and fuel elements could be used as a BRW. A mixture of these radioactive materials with a binder in the form of sticky formulations received a code name - the drug "SK".

In pursuance of the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of July 29, 1950, they planned research and development work on the “SK” problem. In the Medical Research Institute of the Navy (No. 17) and the Chemical Research Institute of the Navy (No. 10), special units were created - the 1st direction and the 15th direction, which in a special respect were subordinate to the head of the 6th department under the Commander-in-Chief. These areas were respectively headed by Doctors of Medical Sciences S.S. Zhikharev, and then by G.A. Zadgenidze, and Doctor of Chemical Sciences V.V. Kesarev.

Thematic plans for the special directions of NII-10 and NII-17 were developed with the participation of specialists from the 1st Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which was headed by B. L. Vannikov.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR, by a decree of July 1, 1952, entrusted the Naval Ministry with carrying out special ground tests.

The tests were carried out in order to determine the degree of impact of the BRV on the personnel (experimental animals were used), the scale and duration of radioactive contamination of the external surfaces and internal spaces of the ship, weapons and equipment. Their main task was to develop measures to protect against BRW, including methods of decontamination. Despite the lack of experience with a significant amount of radioactive substances, the tests were carefully prepared and passed with all precautions. For each section of the tests, research methods, measurements of radiation levels and the density of radioactive contamination were developed. Medical research was carried out in a specially built radiation-biological laboratory and on a dedicated ship. The undermining of these products was led by P.F. Fomin.

In the event of the use of BRV by a potential adversary, recommendations were developed on the means of group and individual protection of personnel and methods for decontaminating contaminated surfaces. At the same time, tests have shown that it is not advisable to create weapons with BRV for the fleet. Officers of the 6th Department of the Navy G.A. took an active part in the events with the BRV. Stetsenko, O.G. Kasimov, A.A. Rakov, L.A. Kashnikov and others. Research work in the 6th department of the Navy on the subject of the BRV was headed by A.N. Voshchinin.

Participant of work with the BRV G.A. Stetsenko spoke about an attempt to use them in aviation: “In the 15th direction of Institute No. 10 of the Navy, a simple device was made with an active cobalt bar, placed for transportation in a lead container. They took him to the airport. Remotely installed this source in the cargo compartment of a prototype of the Tu-104 aircraft and “enlightened” it. We measured the radiation doses at the crew accommodations. Then we calculated the weights and dimensions of the radiation protection devices. And gasped! ... Difficult, heavy, cumbersome, and the combat effectiveness is small. As they say, more expensive. G.G. participated in these tests with me. Sergienko. An analysis of the research carried out in the Navy, including full-scale tests of the BRV, showed that it is not advisable to create weapons on their basis, but it is necessary to work out methods and means of combating radioactive contamination.”

In December 1956, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, decided to completely stop work in the field of airborne missiles at the institutes of the Navy.

In the autumn of 1953, important events took place in the combat training of the army and navy. The order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR of November 5 "On the preparation of the Armed Forces for actions in the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons" was issued. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy ordered the head of the 6th department to organize the development of guidelines, and this work "begin immediately."

For the further development of naval weapons and shipbuilding, the Navy needed to have a specialized research institute and a testing ground for testing naval nuclear weapons, as well as ships for the effects of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion.

In December 1952, Admiral N. E. Basisty, First Deputy Minister of the Navy, submitted a report to N. A. Bulganin, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, with a draft resolution on the establishment of such a research institute. To begin with, the Central Research Laboratory No. 14 of the Navy was created. In 1955, Institute No. 16 of the Navy was created on the basis of TsNIIL-14. The organizer of these scientific institutions and research in them was Yu.S. Yakovlev. In the same period, in 1954, on Novaya Zemlya, they began to create a testing ground for testing nuclear weapons and ships for the impact of the damaging factors of these weapons. During the creation of the test site, the first chiefs of its Experimental and Scientific Department were also officers of the 6th department V.P. Akhapkin, S.N. Sablukov, V.V. Rakhmanov, O.G. Kasimov. Through its alumni, the department pursued a unified scientific and technical policy on the nuclear weapons of the fleet.

Assessing the activities of the 6th Department of the Navy in the period 1949-1954, it should be noted that he was the initiator of revolutionary changes in the domestic fleet, as a result of which the fleet later became nuclear. Therefore, if we determine the beginning of the scientific and technological revolution in the fleet, the first milestone is the date of the formation of the 6th department under the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

Summing up the results of the activities of the 6th Department of the Navy, one cannot fail to say a few words about its creator, captain of the first rank, engineer P.F. Fomina. He was born on 01/05/1904. in the village of Terekhovo, Tver region. The family was peasant, with many children. Started working early. The thirst for knowledge of life led a fourteen-year-old boy to study in Petrograd. He fell by chance into a professorial family. In the future, this family taught him, gave him higher education and a ticket to a great life. In the formidable 1919, a fifteen-year-old youth cannot imagine himself outside the turbulent events of the revolution and goes to the Civil War. Was wounded and demobilized.

Fomin came to the fleet voluntarily during the first Komsomol mobilization in 1922. Further study was multi-stage. The first stage ended with a secondment to the Naval Preparatory School in Leningrad to prepare for admission to the higher educational institution of the fleet. They became the Naval Engineering School and its shipbuilding department. Five intense years of study at the school laid a rich foundation for his knowledge and were the basis for comprehending a complex profession.

After graduating from college, a brilliant graduation, for two years P.F. Fomin worked as a junior military representative in the Commission for Supervision of the Construction and Repair of Ships of the Black Sea Fleet in Nikolaev. In Sevastopol, he became a senior military representative - a promising commander of a growing fleet.

As already an experienced specialist, P.F. Fomin was transferred to Moscow in March 1931, to the Naval Shipbuilding Department, where he became an assistant to the head of the shipbuilding department, at the same time being a senior military representative for a group of Moscow factories and TsAGI, fulfilling fleet orders.

A creative nature, Fomin, although burdened with considerable official duties, worked through the elements of ships at night. One of the projects was approved as an invention, and for it the author, on the orders of the Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, received a reward of 10,000 rubles. The money was considerable at that time, and they helped the young family to settle down and settle down in the capital.

In 1935, a restless young specialist seeks admission to the faculty of military shipbuilding of the Naval Academy. K.E. Voroshilov, who trained specialists in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering and shipbuilders proper. The training of shipbuilders was carried out under the leadership of Alexei Nikolaevich Krylov. If after school P.F. Fomin received the title - ship engineer, then after graduating from the academy - shipbuilding engineer. The group in which he studied consisted of only a few people, so Academician Krylov knew all his students well.

When the second wave of mass arrests was transferred to Leningrad in 1938 from Moscow, A.N. Krylov tried to quickly distribute his pupils among factories and institutions without an official graduation ceremony from the academy. At his suggestion, Fomin was sent as a Commissioner of the Naval Shipbuilding Department to Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

Pyotr Fomich came to the plant when it had not yet been completed, but was already building submarines, leaders, destroyers, and the hulls of two light cruisers were laid on it. The Pacific Fleet was commanded by the young flagship Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, the future People's Commissar of the Navy, who played a significant role in Fomin's fate.

The officers who served at that time in Komsomolsk later admitted that they went through a real school with Fomin not only in shipbuilding, but also in the ability to get out of the most seemingly unsolvable situations from an engineering point of view.

In 1944, Fomin was offered to move to the apparatus of the Central Committee of the party and supervise military shipbuilding from Moscow. To the surprise and disappointment of the family, who lived in Komsomolsk in difficult housing and living conditions, he refused this job.

Instead of Moscow, Fomin was appointed Commissioner of the Shipbuilding Department in Nikolaev, liberated in March 1944, where he began his officer service. On the way from the Far East to a new duty station, the family stops in Moscow. For two months, Fomin has been discussing in all instances the problems of restoring military shipbuilding in the south of the country, carefully examining the documents saved before the surrender of Nikolaev to the Germans, and preparing draft decisions on Nikolaev plants.

He reported on the deplorable state of enterprises to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR A. N. Kosygin. The task was to quickly restore the Nikolaev plants named after. A. Marty and them. 61 Communards. Unfinished ships transferred to the eastern ports of the Black Sea during the war - 2 cruisers, 2 leaders, 4 minesweepers, a destroyer and a submarine - were to be returned for completion to the city of their laying.

At the beginning of the implementation of the post-war 10-year plan for military shipbuilding (1946 - 1955), the question arose sharply: to build ships according to projects previously mastered in production with the introduction of partial changes or according to qualitatively new ones. The positions of the fleet and industry diverged sharply. The fleet, of course, was in favor of building ships according to new designs that fully took into account the experience of the past war. The industry considered such a program unrealistic. During the most heated debate, in March 1946, Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov decided to transfer the experienced practitioner P.F. Fomin to Moscow as a member of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Navy. Soon he became the head of the Shipbuilding Section, and then the deputy head of the NTC.

When the Shipbuilding Department of the Navy exhausted its arguments and possibilities in a protracted dispute with shipbuilders, the Commander-in-Chief sent P.F. Fomin to Leningrad with broad powers to resolve issues of building ships according to new projects, in particular, patrol ships(TFR).

Acting extremely assertively, P. F. Fomin assembled an expert commission to review the project of the patrol ship 29bis, which included well-known shipbuilders: Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Yu. A. Shimansky, Professor V. G. Vlasov, Professor I. G. Khanovich and other specialists. Although the experts did not have a consensus, Fomin convinced the members of the commission to sign a conclusion: “Project 29bis does not meet ... the requirements for this type of patrol ships in terms of stability, unsinkability, seaworthiness and strength.” Such a conclusion, of course, required a transition to a new project.

The Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry creates its own commission, which supports the project 29bis. P. F. Fomin organizes the conclusions of the research institutes and the central administrations of the fleet about the unsuitability of this project for mass construction. The commanders of the fleets also give a conclusion about the low seaworthiness of the operated patrol boats. The new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral I. S. Yumashev, submits all materials to the government.

Fomin's persistence in holding the line of the fleet and defending his interests before the shipbuilders knew no bounds. This question reached Stalin. It was here that Fomin made many enemies as a “obstinate shipbuilder”. In the end, the watchtowers under the 29bis project were not built.

In September 1945, the Navy's proposals for post-war shipbuilding were considered at a meeting with Stalin. It was attended by members of the Politburo of the CPSU (b) L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov and N. A. Bulganin. The shipbuilding industry was represented by People's Commissar I. I. Nosenko and his deputy A. M. Redkin, and the Navy was represented by People's Commissar N. G. Kuznetsov, his deputy L. M. Galler and the head of the Department of the Naval Academy S. P. Stavitsky . Of interest is the attitude of I.V. Stalin to the fleet after the appearance of nuclear weapons.

And here, for the first time, Stalin expressed his attitude towards battleships: “The British have serious bases overseas. The loss of these bases is tantamount to death, and they need to have battleships in the required quantities. On the contrary, we have all the raw material bases within the country... This is our great advantage. Therefore, we do not need to copy England ... Another thing is, if you are going to “go to America”, then you need to have this ratio.”

But still, Stalin could not completely abandon the battleships, since he did not think of having a “squadron without a battleship”. Considerations of prestige also played an important role. Therefore, the Secretary General nevertheless proposed to build three battleships - one laid down since the pre-war period in Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk), and in three or four years to start building two more battleships.

With regard to aircraft carriers, Stalin's position is often distorted, presenting him as a principled opponent of this class of ships. Actually it is not. The Secretary General did not object to aircraft carriers, but did not include them in the number of ships of priority construction. In this regard, the dialogue between Stalin and Kuznetsov is typical when discussing post-war shipbuilding. The People's Commissar of the Navy, moving away from the original request, asked to build 4 large and 4 small aircraft carriers. Stalin replied: "Let's wait with both." Kuznetsov argued that "we have the weakest sector with aircraft carriers." To this, Stalin stated his position: "At this stage, we can do without them, since they are not needed at all in the Black and Baltic Seas, and in the Far East we now have the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin." True, in the future, Stalin, apparently having in mind the need for aircraft carriers of the Northern Fleet, asked the question: “Maybe we will build two pieces of small ones for now? - and after a short discussion he summarized: - Let's build two pieces of small ones.

And yet the commission of the Politburo (it included L. P. Beria, N. A. Voznesensky, N. G. Kuznetsov, I. I. Nosenko, A. I. Antonov, I. F. Tevosyan, D. F. Ustinov and A. M. Redkin), who prepared the final text of the decree on the ten-year plan for the construction of the Navy, did not include aircraft carriers in it. The leaders of Sudprom insisted on this, believing that the country was not yet ready to build such fundamentally new ships. Characteristically, in disputes between sailors and shipbuilders, before the war and during it, Stalin invariably supported the military, and after the war, industry.

Compared with the previous methods of compiling shipbuilding programs, I.V. Stalin after the war began to take more into account the production and economic capabilities of the country. This is one of the reasons for the reduction of the ten-year plan for the construction of the Navy. Aircraft carriers were not included in it - the leaders of Sudprom insisted on this - the country is not yet ready to build such fundamentally new ships.

When the Personnel Department presented a list of candidates for the post of head of the new department of the Navy, conditionally named the sixth, Fomin was not on it. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral I.S. Yumashev himself entered his last name and ordered to coordinate his candidacy with General V.A. Bolyatko, who was in charge of atomic affairs in the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR. He had no objections. So Fomin became the head of the atomic department at the Civil Code of the Navy.

P.F. Fomin knew how to select people, idlers did not stay with him, he tried to encourage the hardworking more often. He brought up independence in subordinates, explaining that everyone should solve most of the issues in their specialty at the level of the head of the department. A man outwardly strict, stern, who loved clarity and clarity in everything, in a military way he was a demanding leader, but at the same time he had a sense of humor and was comradely accessible to his subordinates. As a rule, he was surrounded by many friends - both of his age, and especially of the youth that he gathered around him. He found the most talented, original thinking, highly educated in the navy, in schools, in physical and technical institutes. Wherever Fomin worked, his team was well-coordinated, disciplined and as efficient as possible. Among ourselves, we called him affectionately and respectfully - “Fomich”.

Although the 6th Department of the Navy turned out to be extremely diverse in terms of the composition of specialists, service experience, marital status, Fomin managed to put together a team, the cohesion of which was confirmed both by deed and by time.

An interesting detail was noted by Colonel S.L. Davydov in the behavior of the officers of our team at the Semipalatinsk training ground: “Ahead, like a flagship, was a dense, short stature, then captain of the first rank, Pyotr Fomich Fomin, walked firmly with his head held high, not turning either to the left or to the right, and behind him so his subordinates, employees of the 6th Directorate of the Navy, strictly paced.

P.F. Fomin prepared carefully, worried and smoked a lot until the justifications for new proposals were polished, and then he went ahead. When I assumed the post of head of department, Pyotr Fomich recommended trying to report to the Commander-in-Chief one on one and explained why: in such an environment, S.G. Gorshkov often consults before making a decision, and sometimes he corrects the document himself. He rarely does this in front of strangers.

In his new position, in the department under the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Fomin immediately developed good relations with prominent scientists. The academics quickly recognized Pyotr Fomich and this created his authority among the nuclear scientists. The closest contacts were established with the developers of nuclear weapons N. L. Dukhov and K. I. Shchelkin. On tests of nuclear charges on Novaya Zemlya, he dealt with N. I. Pavlov, Yu. B. Khariton, E. A. Negin. Especially close relations were with G. A. Tsyrkov. In 1951, Fomin was awarded the rank of Rear Admiral.

With the transformation of the department into a directorate in 1954, he became the first head of the 6th Directorate of the Navy.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR, by a decree of April 13, 1955, ordered the Navy to test nuclear charges and ships on Novaya Zemlya. Responsibility for preparing for the tests was assigned to Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov and Rear Admiral P. F. Fomin. But Nikolai Gerasimovich soon had a heart attack, and all responsibility fell on Pyotr Fomich. He began to be assisted by the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral N.E. Bassist, who flew in advance to Novaya Zemlya.

A lot depended on these tests, including the prospects for the fleet: the intensive development of nuclear weapons gave rise to doubts among the country's leadership about the advisability of building surface ships.

As you know, the fleet successfully coped with the first nuclear tests in sea conditions. The scientific and technical results of testing the target ships were summarized by a commission headed by P.F. Fomin. It included V. I. Pershin, M. V. Egorov, B. G. Chilikin, V. F. Bezukladov from industry, and A. K. Popov, A. I. Larionov, V. A. Sychev from the fleet. For these tests, Fomin was awarded the second Order of Lenin.

In April 1956, he led the Special Northern Expedition to select and equip the combat field on Novaya Zemlya for testing super-powerful nuclear charges, as well as low-power charges (they proposed to transfer them from the Semipalatinsk test site to Novaya Zemlya). The expedition landed on the uninhabited coast of the northern island of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and did a lot of work in the Arctic to survey the territory and create a new battlefield for air tests, including the most powerful charges. Six years later, Fomin shared his experience of landing personnel and heavy equipment on an unequipped shore in stormy conditions in a note addressed to N.D. Sergeyev.

The highest density of tests of nuclear charges occurred in October 1958 (17 explosions), September - November 1961 (26 explosions) and August - December 1962 (36 explosions).

P.F. Fomin took part in all critical tests, including the detonation of the most powerful 50-megaton bomb in the world, live firing with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and several types of torpedoes. As a rule, P.F. Fomin was the first deputy chairman of the State Commission, responsible for all landfill affairs, including the safety of testing.

P.F. Fomin paid much attention to the scientific and technical activities of the Novaya Zemlya test site, which was headed by combat commanders. Under him, methods for conducting air, underwater, surface and underground tests were mastered. On Novaya Zemlya, only one ground explosion of medium power took place, in which the radioactive contamination of the area was the largest compared to other types of explosions.

During this period, we basically achieved qualitative parity in nuclear weapons with the United States. For a series of tests P.F. Fomin was awarded the third Order of Lenin.

Thus, the shipbuilder P.F. Fomin led the nuclear armament of the fleet due to the ability to defend the interests of the fleet, great independence in work, constant striving for a new, impeccable biography from the point of view of the Soviet authorities, as well as the ability to work with people. Of no small importance was the fact that his business qualities were known to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, I.S. Yumashev and S.G. Gorshkov.

The objective factors include the interconnection and mutual influence of shipbuilding and nuclear weapons. In shipbuilding, the complex problem of building ships according to new designs, taking into account their anti-nuclear protection, has arisen, and in charge building, the creation of small-sized nuclear weapons for ship samples of torpedo, anti-submarine and missile weapons.

The name of Pyotr Fomich Fomin will worthily go down in the history of military shipbuilding and in the history of the creation of the country's nuclear weapons.

It was necessary to equip the fleet with nuclear weapons and prepare its forces for combat operations in the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy. New tasks were set for the department, partially functional responsibilities changed. It was necessary to organize the operation of nuclear weapons at all stages of their life cycle, ensuring their safety and security.

In accordance with the directive of the General Staff of April 5, 1954, the 6th Division was reorganized into the 6th Directorate, reporting not to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, but to his first deputy. The activities of the 6th Division and the 6th Directorate of the Navy at different times were led by prominent naval commanders and shipbuilders: Admiral I.S. Yumashev (1949 - 1953), Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov (1953 - 1954), N. E. Basisty (1954 - 1956), Admiral A. G. Golovko (1956 - 1960), Admiral N. V. Isachenkov (1960 - 1965), Admiral P.G. Kotov (1965 - 1986). The head of the 6th Directorate of the Navy was subordinate to them.

Since 1956, the most important issues on nuclear weapons were decided by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov. Among the chiefs of the Main Staff of the Navy, Admirals of the Fleet N.D. Sergeev, G.M. Egorov, V.N. Chernavin.

The heads of the 6th Directorate of the Navy were Vice Admirals P.F. Fomin (1954 - 1966) and A.N. Voshchinin (1966 - 1975). I took over from A.N. Voshchinin in February 1975. Vice Admiral G.E. Zolotukhin took office as head of the Department on December 1, 1982. The Deputy Heads of the Department in different years were Rear Admiral A.N. Voshchinin, Major General E.N. Barkovsky, Lieutenant General P.N. Lemeshko, Rear Admiral A.I. Kisov, Rear Admiral S.S. Andreev, captain 1st rank E.T. Nikitin. The maximum in the system of the 6th Directorate was 12 admiral posts: three - in Moscow, four - in the fleets, four - at the Novaya Zemlya training ground and one at the Institute in Leningrad.

During its formation, the 6th Directorate was the central body of the Navy for the development of new types of nuclear weapons, the solution of operational-tactical and technical issues related to its use, as well as the protection of naval facilities from it.

In the reorganization certificate prepared in March 1955, it was indicated that the 6th Directorate was in charge of development:

• operational-tactical assignments and tactical and technical assignments for the design of marine samples of atomic weapons;

• operational-tactical and technical issues of the fleet's use of nuclear weapons;

• organizational, technical and engineering measures for anti-nuclear protection of naval bases and ships;

• measures for the combat training of the personnel of the fleet for actions in the conditions of the use of atomic weapons and their implementation through the bodies of the Main Staff of the Navy;

• plans for research and development work on the use of nuclear weapons in the fleet and PAZ issues;

• shipboard dosimetric equipment.

In addition, the Department was entrusted with the organization, preparation and testing of atomic weapons in sea conditions, as well as the continuation of tests of naval equipment at the land range of the Ministry of Defense.

In 1955, the 6th Directorate was subordinate to: Scientific Research Institute No. 16 (Leningrad), Scientific Testing Ground for Testing Weapon Samples (Priozersk), Marine Scientific Testing Ground for Testing Nuclear Weapons on Novaya Zemlya, Detachment of Ships special purpose, serving the MO range. Later there were reorganization measures.

Five years later, the system of the 6th Directorate of the Navy included the State Central Training Ground No. 6 MO, Training Center Navy, bases in Moscow and Severodvinsk, Reserve group of assembly teams. He was also subordinated in a special respect to the sixth departments of the Combat Training Directorate of the Navy, the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding of the Navy and under the head of the VMUZ, the departments of special weapons of the Northern, Pacific, Baltic, Black Sea fleets and the Kamchatka military flotilla, the Marine branch of the 12th Central Research Institute with a training ground on Lake Ladoga (only as a executor of orders on marine scientific topics ), Department No. 6 of the Naval Academy, Department of Weapons of Naval Educational Institutions.

For security reasons, the departments in the 6th Directorate itself had no names, except for numbers. Due to multiple reorganizations, department numbers have changed. Therefore, it is advisable to highlight the actual areas of work, and not the numbers of departments. There were six such major areas: the development of nuclear weapons, the testing of nuclear charges, the nuclear-technical support of fleets, the combat use of nuclear weapons, capital construction, radiation and medical support, as well as personnel and regime work.

Legally 6 the Naval Directorate was not a customer of nuclear weapons, but actually played the role of a customer at the stage of nuclear warhead development: from conception (preparation of a draft government decree on the creation of a new nuclear warhead) to adoption (by government decree). These draft resolutions were prepared by the Navy. At the stage of the order and serial production, the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense was the customer of the nuclear warhead.

By the time the 6th Directorate of the Navy was formed in April 1954, aircraft samples were tested in the USSR. nuclear bombs large medium and small calibers, which could be single-handedly allocated to the fleet for use in naval operations.

The problem was to create new types of charges that could be used in relatively small ship weapons.

The second problem was the choice of reliable and efficient nuclear charge carriers. By this time, the first developments of samples of ship-based missile weapons appeared. In all respects, they were suitable for nuclear equipment, but they required an increase in reliability, which was not high for the first samples. The exception was ship-based ballistic missiles, which were immediately developed with a nuclear warhead.

In the mid-1950s, when choosing the order of equipping naval weapons with nuclear munitions, a torpedo was put in first place, then a ballistic missile, and then there was a cruise missile for firing at coastal targets. In this order, they were adopted by the fleet.

Thanks to the perseverance of the sailors and the active work of the designers, the domestic model of a torpedo with a nuclear weapon was put into service before the American one. The chief designer of the torpedo is G.I. Portnov, Chief Designer of the nuclear combat charging department - N.L. Spirits. The theoretical development of a charge for a torpedo was headed by E.I. Zababakhin and M.N. Nechaev, design - V.F. Grechishnikov.

On the next year after the formation of the Directorate, by decree of the Government of July 19, 1955, intensive studies began in a new direction - on the warhead with a nuclear charge for a ship-based ballistic missile with a firing range of 150 km and research work on the warhead with the same nuclear charge, but with firing range of more than 400 km.

In 1955, a binary design thermonuclear bomb was tested, which opened up new possibilities for designing powerful charges, including for naval weapons.

During the first five years of the functioning of the 6th Directorate of the Navy, three nuclear weapons were put into service with the fleet. In 1958, the fleet received a special combat charging compartment for a torpedo. At the beginning of 1959, a ballistic missile warhead was put into service. In the middle of the same year, it became part of the armament of the fleet. warhead to a cruise missile. In addition, two samples were in the final stages of development. The load on the personnel of the weapons testing department increased.

After the transfer of supervision over the project 627 of the nuclear submarine to the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding of the Navy, work related to shipbuilding began to wane, and, conversely, the activities of the Directorate in the fleets increased. Then the department was headed by a specialist in combat training, captain 1st rank P. I. Abolishin, who during the war served as the flagship signalman of the torpedo boat brigade of the Baltic Fleet. The volume of work on weapons has increased dramatically. The division of functions between “developers” and “operators” was brewing.

Rear Admiral P. F. Fomin, in his report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy dated February 18, 1957 “On the activities of the 6th Directorate of the Navy in the period from 1950 to 1956 and tasks for the next 5-year period,” proposed the creation of a full-fledged department of special weapons in the Directorate. This petition in the part of the department of special weapons was granted only three years later. An independent department for the development of nuclear weapons began to function in 1960 (before that there was a direction). The Department of Nuclear Weapons was headed by Rear Admiral A. N. Voshchinin.

Alexander Nikolaevich Voshchinin in 1937 graduated with honors from the artillery department of the VVMU. M. V. Frunze. He served as a military representative at defense industry plants, including in Leningrad at the famous Bolshevik plant during the blockade of the city by German troops. In 1943 he was transferred to Moscow to the Artillery Directorate of the Navy as a senior officer, and in April 1949 he became a senior officer of the 6th Directorate of the Ministry of Defense with service in the naval equipment sector at the Semipalatinsk training ground. He participated in the first atomic bomb test on August 29, 1949. From May 1950, Voshchinin was a senior officer, and then head of the scientific and technical direction in the 6th department under the Minister of the Navy. A year before the formation of the 6th Directorate, an experienced and efficient captain of the 2nd rank rightly became the deputy of Rear Admiral Fomin. An analysis of archival documents of that time shows that the most important of them were executed personally by Voshchinin.

In 1960, the 6th Directorate was reorganized, air bases for nuclear weapons were transferred to its jurisdiction. Lieutenant-General P.N. is transferred to the department. Lemeshko. Together with him came the chief engineer for air bases of nuclear weapons P.F. Maikov. Since then, the air bases have been under the jurisdiction of the 6th Directorate of the Navy. In the same year, Fomin's deputy, Major General E. N. Barkovsky, was appointed deputy commander of the Northern Fleet for construction and the post of second deputy head of the 6th Directorate of the Navy was abolished.

Intensive orders for new types of nuclear weapons and their development by the Navy were accompanied by a constant increase in the volume of work and, as a result, the burden on the armed forces. The officers of the Directorate, who led the work on the creation of nuclear weapons, were almost constantly on the road, torn between commissions, meetings of chief designers and lengthy tests of weapons systems with nuclear warheads. This situation made it difficult to coordinate all the work to equip the fleet with nuclear weapons and caused delays. Therefore, an increasing number of specialists had to be attracted to participate in the tests, from which later working groups began to be organized and formed in the areas of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, torpedo and anti-submarine weapons. The backbone of these groups consisted of officers from the Directorate, the Reserve Group of Assembly Brigades, TsNII-16, and the Central Operational and Technological Bureau (CETB).

The work of these groups was supervised and all activities for the creation of nuclear weapons were coordinated by experienced officers of the Directorate. Four - B.A. Sergienko, B.M. Abramova, A.G. Mokerov and me - were awarded the honorary title of laureate of the State Prize of the USSR.

As a result, the scope of duties and responsibilities was more clearly defined, contacts and interaction with the developers of combat weapons improved, primarily with research institutes, design bureaus and Central Design Bureau of Minsredmash, Minobshchemmash and Minsudprom. Life has confirmed the correctness of this organizational form.

In connection with the increase in the volume of work on the creation of shipboard nuclear weapons, the aforementioned reserve group of assembly teams was formed with the main task of ensuring testing of experimental and serial nuclear warheads. A group of assembly teams was successively led by captains of the 1st rank B.A. Sergienko, G.V. Smorodinov, Colonel A.K. Krapivkin. Excellent officers of the Office of A.G. came out of this unit. Mokerov, V.N. Bitkov, A.D. Sanin (subsequently all became heads of the department of the Administration, candidates of sciences), V.V. Zavialov, L.A. Nechin, B.S. Kalinin (Ph.D.), D.F. Dulnev, N.E. Kravchenko. The most experienced specialists were V.V. Krasnov, V.I. Zubko, V.T. Babochkin, E.P. Krikunov.

The Department of Testing Nuclear Charges of the Directorate worked together with the Experimental and Scientific Unit (ONCh), later renamed the Scientific Test Unit (NIT) of the Novaya Zemlya test site. In those years, only officers of the 6th Directorate of the Navy were appointed commanders of this unit. The scientific and testing activities of the test site were led by V.P. Akhapkin, A.V. Selyanin, O. G. Kasimov, V. V. Rakhmanov, A. A. Puchkov, S. N. Sablukov, A. F. Pozharitsky. Almost all of them at different times also headed a department in the 6th Directorate of the Navy. In this department, as in no other, there was a rotation of personnel between Moscow and Novaya Zemlya. Moreover, one of the departments of the NIC was transferred to the Directorate. It was headed by V. A. Timofeev.

Only during a full-scale test at the test site could the charge's performance be tested. We do not know of a military charge created without testing, without new measurement methods, depending on the purpose and design of the charges.

During full-scale tests, the military was primarily interested in the power of the charge, and then other characteristics and more subtle things. Simultaneously with the characteristics of the charge from the range, registration of all damaging factors at various distances from the epicenter of the explosion was required. In a number of tests, the explosion resistance of naval equipment and ships was tested in various types of nuclear explosions, including underwater ones. A special article is the testing of charges for nuclear safety.

Air and underwater tests on Novaya Zemlya were extremely uneven: 1955 - 1, 1957 - 4, 1958 - 22, 1961 and 1962. - 63. In 1956, 1959, 1960 and 1963. There were no tests at all. Since 1964, underground tests began at this test site, which, of course, were carried out more evenly due to the large amount of preparatory work.

The basis for the tests were the decrees of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the drafts of which were prepared by the 6th Directorate of the Navy and the 5th Main Directorate of Minsredmash. In particular, the Department prepared resolutions:

• on the establishment of the landfill dated 31.07.1954;

• on ensuring the conduct of tests dated 13.04.1955;

• on the testing of a special torpedo charge dated 25.08.1955;

• on testing the most powerful product dated March 17, 1956;

• on the preparation and conduct of a physical experiment and the final stage of state tests of a torpedo dated April 15, 1957, and others.

It was a lot of work, since many points of the draft resolutions, especially those related to material support, had to be coordinated with the relevant departments.

For each test, the Department compiled a program of physical measurements. Organizations of the Minsredmash and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR participated in this work. The next level of preparation for testing: measurement techniques and measuring equipment, which were often unique. Some of the methods were borrowed from the Semipalatinsk test site, but many were created using the scientific potential of the Central Research Institute-16 of the Navy. For the first test in 1955, equipment was brought from all over the country, then the test site began to manage mainly with its own equipment. At least, standard methods were guaranteed to be provided by polygon complexes.

In the history of the Novaya Zemlya test site, there was only one ground explosion, which gave a noticeable radioactive contamination of the area. Therefore, it can be argued that, from an environmental point of view, the 6th Directorate acted at the subordinate test site more prudently than other test sites in the world, where ground explosions were carried out with severe contamination of the area in the test area. For example, the most powerful American explosions were ground or driven (the charge was placed on a barge). Although, from the standpoint of today, something could have been done better at the Novaya Zemlya test site. In particular, to increase the height of the nuclear explosion in a number of tests.

Since the advent of nuclear weapons, several trends in relation to the power of charges can be seen. According to this criterion, the following stages can be distinguished: 1949 - 1951. - period of fixed capacities, 1952 - 1962 - a period of growth in the power of charges, 1963 - 1975. - period of relative power stabilization, 1976 - 1990 - a period of significant power limitation.

There was not a single test on Novaya Zemlya in which officers of the 6th Directorate of the Navy did not participate. According to government decrees, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the Minister of Medium Machine Building were responsible for testing at the Novaya Zemlya test site. In fact, during the tests, the Commander-in-Chief was represented by the head of the 6th Directorate of the Navy, and the Minister - by the head of the 5th Main Directorate of the MSM, who involved institutes of various departments in the tests. The head of the Department, organizing tests at the test site, primarily relied on his specialists from the department for testing nuclear charges.

At one time, almost only candidates of sciences A. A. Rakov, L. L. Kolesov, O. G. Kasimov, V. A. Timofeev, V. P. Kovalev, F. A. Kurmaev worked in this department, who defended themselves at the institutes of the Academy Sciences. This fact speaks of the high qualification of the officers of the Directorate. The scientific and technical policy of the test site was completely managed by the Department, relying on the employees and scientists of TsNII-16, which was led by the Honored Worker of Science and Technology of the RSFSR, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Vice Admiral Yu.S. Yakovlev, who made a great contribution to the development of applied hydrodynamics, to the creation of the theory of an underwater nuclear explosion, to the study of the effect of an underwater shock wave on naval facilities. His erudition allowed him to lead research in related areas related to naval armaments. Yu.S. Yakovlev managed to educate and educate many scientists, to create his own scientific school. Its peculiarity consisted in the wide mathematization of research and in the widespread practice of using model tests. Per scientific activity Yu.S. Yakovlev was awarded the State Prize of the USSR, he was awarded two Orders of Lenin and other awards.

If at the Semipalatinsk test site the role of the scientific supervisor for a long time was performed by Academician M.A. Sadovsky, there was no such person at the Novaya Zemlya test site, with the exception of the tests of 1955, when Academician N.N. Semenov. To some extent, these duties were performed by Professor Yu.S. Yakovlev. As we have already mentioned, Yu.S. Yakovlev was once the first head of the nuclear tests department in the 6th Directorate of the Navy.

Of the employees of TsNII-16, the greatest scientific contribution to the formation and development of nuclear weapons of the fleet was made by B. V. Zamyshlyaev (later a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences), N. N. Suntsov, A. K. Pertsev, V. I. Filippovsky, B. N. Zherdin, G.K. Eltyshev, E.L. Peshkur, K.P. Weiner and others.

The fact that at the very first nuclear test the Administration, the Institute and the test sites introduced a lot of new things into the methodology and instrumentation of tests is evidenced by the submission of their works for the Stalin Prize, signed in 1955 by Academician N.N. Semenov and Admiral S.G. Gorshkov. Prizes were not awarded, but a significant group of test participants were awarded. I was then awarded the Order of the Red Star.

The 6th Directorate of the Navy systematically issued information bulletins about the testing of ships and naval weapons at the Novaya Zemlya test site. They came out of two types: describing specific tests or dedicated to individual damaging factors of a nuclear explosion based on the results of a series of tests. Bulletins were sent to interested organizations of industry and the fleet. Only in the Ministry of the shipbuilding industry they were received by 37 scientific and design organizations. For the command of the fleets, the leadership of research institutions showed films about the testing of nuclear weapons. There were seven such full-length films commissioned by the Office.

The nuclear weapons being worked out at the test sites began to enter the armament of the army and navy. The first to ensure the operation of nuclear weapons in the Navy was headed by Captain 1st Rank P.I. Abolishin, captain of the 1st rank V.I. became his deputy. Koshkin. The main tasks of the department were to create nuclear weapons bases in the fleets, train officers, create guidelines for the fleets on storage, operation and preparation for combat use nuclear weapons. The difficulty of the work was that there was still no experience of operating nuclear warheads in naval bases, and even more so on ships.

The only guiding documents were the mentioned order of the Minister of Defense “On the preparation of the Armed Forces for operations in the conditions of the use of atomic weapons” and the directive of the General Staff of November 3, 1953 on this issue, but they did not at all affect the operation of nuclear weapons, did not touch on specific organizational issues. associated with this sophisticated weapon.

Development began with the creation of departments at the Higher Naval Educational Institutions and the training of officers entering the formation of combat support units. Among the teachers, an experienced teacher and scientist Colonel N.S. Levchenya, head of the 6th department of the VMAKV named after V.I. A.N. Krylov. Subsequently, the department was headed by Honored Workers of Science and Technology of the RSFSR Professor N.N. Suntsov and M.S. Mamsurov, associate professor V.P. Sokolov. At one time Professor Yu.S. Yakovlev.

The first nuclear weapons bases were created by the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and belonged to this department, and not to the Ministry of Defense. To organize the storage of nuclear weapons in the Minsredmash system, a special Main Directorate was created, headed by N.P. Egorov. But, of course, the Ministry of Defense should have used these ammunition, if necessary. Therefore, such a situation could not exist for a long time. The Ministry of Defense began training specialists from the officer corps, the first teachers were from Minsredmash.

On March 12, 1956, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the training of a group of officers of the Ministry of Defense to manage the operation of nuclear weapons in the troops. From the Navy, the list included the Head of the 6th Directorate P.F. Fomin, his deputy A.N. Voshchinin, and the deputy head of the department V.I. Koshkin. I, at that time a senior officer of the department, also got on this list.

In studies, they tortured listeners with the requirements of knowing almost by heart a lot of instructions for the final preparation of special products. Errors were excluded. The difficulty was that it was necessary to know by heart - which operations are performed according to which instructions and in what order. Discipline among the students was maintained strict. The Muscovites, accustomed to command, did not like such orders.

When leading cadres were trained, nuclear weapons began to be transferred from industry to the military. The first units equipped with nuclear weapons served as the basis for the independent training of specialists in nuclear weapons by the fleet, primarily teachers for the Navy.

The first order for naval nuclear weapons dates back to December 1954. The 6th Directorate of the Navy, based on the fact that torpedoes will be issued to nuclear and diesel submarines, determined the need for nuclear weapons. The plan to prepare for equipping units with nuclear weapons began to be carried out in advance, before the weapons were delivered to the fleets.

After conducting a preliminary reconnaissance of the fleets, they began to prepare instructions on how and where to store naval nuclear weapons. In addition to the adapted structures, it was supposed to prepare for the reception of weapons and new objects made according to individual projects. They were supposed to become basic and ensure the acceptance of the entire range of special items of the Navy.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy approved the proposals of the 6th Directorate and on July 18, 1956 signed an order to build nuclear weapons bases in the fleets. In the first stage of construction, it was supposed to build bases in the Northern and Pacific fleets.

An important step in the formation of a system for the operation of nuclear weapons in the Navy was the creation in 1958 of departments of special weapons in the fleets. Combat officers Hero of the Soviet Union A.I. became the heads of departments. Kisov (Pacific Fleet), A.V. Dudin (SF), M.N. Sadovnikov (ChF), A.P. Borzakovsky (BF).

In the first half of the 60s, a system was formed that included all the organizations created in the Navy and was capable of not only ensuring the combat readiness of the fleet in the bases, but also creating conditions for the constant combat service of ships in the oceans.

Nuclear weapons appeared - it was necessary to deal with their issues combat use in armed struggle at sea. Research work began in advance, even before the first samples of naval nuclear weapons appeared in the fleets. This work was headed by the head of the department, captain of the 1st rank B.A. Kokovikhin.

The essence of this problem is reflected in the order of the Civil Code of the Navy dated October 17, 1953. In accordance with it, it was required to create guidelines for the actions of the fleet in the event of the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy: instructions on conducting naval operations in the conditions of the use of atomic weapons, on anti-nuclear protection of ships and naval bases, on conducting naval combat in the conditions of the use of atomic weapons, ” Memo to the foreman and sailor about atomic weapons.

At TsNII-16, the development of the manual was led by Captain 1st Rank L.L. Novospassky, Hero of the Soviet Union. On the part of the Office, this work was carried out by Captain 1st Rank I.I. Voronin and Colonel A.K. Krapivkin, who also involved other specialists of the Department in consultations and reviewing.

The Operational Directorate of the Main Staff of the Navy often involved specialists from the 6th Directorate of the Navy to make calculations for the use of nuclear weapons and to assess the impact of various damaging factors on naval facilities.

In the 6th Directorate, medical radiation research was also supervised. The main problems were the study of the impact of radiation (instantaneous during an explosion, induced activity on a ship and radioactive contamination of the terrain and water area) on personnel, as well as ensuring dosimetric control on nuclear submarines. The Navy already had scientific organizations dealing with medical and radiation issues related to nuclear explosions, and their work had to be directed and coordinated.

In 1954, at TsNIIL-14, a department of radiation research during an atomic explosion in sea conditions was created, headed by Captain 1st Rank V.P. Moshkin.

The scope of the work of physicians is evidenced by the fact that during the experiment in 1955 on Novaya Zemlya, a large number of animals placed in open and closed combat posts participated in field tests.

Medical and radiation scientific directions preserved in TsNII-16, formed in 1957 on the basis of three institutes. The Institute was completely subordinate to the head of the 6th Directorate of the Navy until 1960, when it was transferred to the system of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and became the Naval Branch of the 12th Central Research Institute, fulfilling the orders of the fleet.

In the 60s, the topic of radiation safety was gradually transferred to the Chemical Service of the Navy. Then the department was disbanded, but some questions on its profile remained. For example, the radiological situation on Novaya Zemlya after the tests of nuclear weapons was monitored by another department of the Directorate.

At first, the command of the Directorate of Capital Construction paid the most attention. Indeed, there was a large amount of construction work ahead. It was necessary to create a full-fledged scientific test site on the sparsely populated Arctic islands, create an experimental base on Lake Ladoga, place and equip objects in the center and build many objects in the fleets. The head of this direction was Colonel E.N. Barkovsky, and after his appointment as head of Spetsstroy-700 - Colonels S.I. Zubov, I.D. Buchkin, V.L. Serebrennikov.

During the development of Novaya Zemlya, the problem of building large structures in permafrost conditions became acute. Despite the difficulty of erecting buildings on such soil, none of them collapsed during numerous hurricanes. They were not affected by frequent nuclear explosions either.

We must not forget the heroic work of the builders before the first test of a nuclear charge for a torpedo. In eight months of 1955, the following were built in the test area: 6 coastal instrument stations, 5 coastal optical stations, 2 coastal relay stations for control automation, 8 coastal instrument stands for sampling air and precipitation, hydraulic engineering, engineering and experimental facilities for antiamphibious defense. Recording devices are located at all objects. At the same time, the following laboratories were built in the main base of the test site: radiochemical, physical-technical, medical-biological, film-phototechnical; special facilities for the assembly of nuclear charges and the preparation of torpedoes; service premises; storage, residential and household premises. An airfield was built and put into operation in the Rogachev Bay area with a metal strip for basing a fighter jet aviation regiment, a mixed special forces squadron and a transport aviation squadron.

Special construction was carried out in zone “A” (Chernaya Bay), zone “B” (Belushya Bay), zone “C” (Rogachevo), zone “D” (Mityushikha Bay and Matochkin Shar Strait), zone “E” (Bashmachnaya Bay ). In addition to technical facilities, settlements were built everywhere, and in Belushya and Rogachev even with five-story houses. Builders have mastered the construction of structures on piles to avoid thawing of the soil under them, which could lead to the destruction of buildings. Berths have been built in all these places, and the most different type. Any ships and vessels could approach them. The construction of berths in the Matochkin Shar Strait was very difficult because of the strongest ice drifts. Still, they managed to make the berths so strong that the ice that climbed over the top could not destroy them.

V. L. Serebrenikov, E. F. Kolosov, L. F. Druchin put a lot of effort and knowledge into the creation of underground structures for testing nuclear charges. For this part of the construction work, R.P. Kachaev became a laureate of the USSR State Prize.

Unique structures of the social sphere were created on Novaya Zemlya. On the initiative of A. N. Voshchinin, they built an exemplary secondary school with a winter courtyard that allowed children to play even football, a swimming pool with a gym where swimming and volleyball competitions are held. The builders put a lot of effort into the construction of the Orbita station, thanks to which television and telephone communication with the mainland came to the island.

Most of the structures at the Novaya Zemlya test site were equipped with non-standard equipment supplied by the 6th Directorate of the Navy.

The 6th Directorate of the Navy was entrusted with the state examination of projects for the nuclear weapons bases of the fleets. It was carried out by specialists from the capital construction department, consulting with officers from other departments if necessary.

Organizational, staffing, personnel work and planning of general events in the 6th Directorate of the Navy were successively headed by Captain 1st Rank V.N. Malkevich, Colonel A.V. Kazakov, Colonel N.S. Prutskov and Captain 1st Rank V.I. Afonkin. P. A. Cherny was in charge of regime issues for a long time. The personnel training system developed gradually and in a peculiar sequence.

The first in 1956 was the training of specialists at the Naval Academy. It is worth recalling that at different times graduates of the academy served in the system of the 6th Directorate, who graduated with a gold medal: B. A. Kokovikhin, N. N. Suntsov, V. A. Timofeev, V. V. Balabin, V. P. Sokolov, V. K. Steshenko, A. P. Chausov, A. G. Landov, V. N. Bitkov, V. I. Kasyanov and others. However, the academy could not satisfy all the requests of the 6th Directorate of the Navy.

In 1967, they organized the training of specialists in nuclear weapons at the Black Sea Higher Naval School. P. S. Nakhimov in Sevastopol. Later, a special department was created at the school, captain of the 1st rank P.G. became its head. Klyuchkin. The management supplied educational products, visual cut models of individual units, control and measuring equipment to the department and organized a special, well-equipped laboratory.

The personnel training system has become logical and complete. All curricula and programs of the school and the academy were mutually agreed, did not duplicate or repeat each other.

When underground tests began in 1963, the Department of Mining and Underground Works was assigned to the Directorate from the test site. He supplied the landfill with equipment, mostly non-standard. The head of the Mining and Underground Works Department reported to the head of the Capital Construction Department. The supply department was successively headed by P. I. Ivushkin, V. I. Malygin, N. V. Yakovlev, A. M. Anzin, S. S. Tsekhmistro, E. M. Lomovtsev, S. I. Kuzin. The department was mainly engaged in Novaya Zemlya and, to a lesser extent, naval facilities, although there were successful acquisitions in this direction. For example, it was possible to order in the GDR lightly assembled, voluminous, with lifting equipment, warm facilities "Plauen", which were used both in the fleets and at the landfill for storage of equipment.

As a result of the activities of the 6th Directorate in the 50s, it was possible to create a stable system for the development and testing of naval nuclear weapons, providing the forces of the fleet with nuclear weapons with their trouble-free operation in naval bases and on ships. This system has continued to improve over the years. But the requirements laid down in the initial period of increased strictness in the handling of nuclear weapons remained unshakable, and today the safety of nuclear weapons continues to be the primary task of nuclear scientists.

"The Navy needs to have its own test site for naval nuclear weapons on Novaya Zemlya."

Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov N.G.

Did you know, What is the falsity of the concept of "physical vacuum"?

physical vacuum - the concept of relativistic quantum physics, by which they understand the lowest (ground) energy state of a quantized field, which has zero momentum, angular momentum and other quantum numbers. Relativistic theorists call the physical vacuum a space completely devoid of matter, filled with an unmeasurable, and therefore only an imaginary field. Such a state, according to relativists, is not an absolute void, but a space filled with some phantom (virtual) particles. Relativistic quantum field theory claims that, in accordance with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, virtual particles are constantly born and disappear in the physical vacuum, that is, apparent (seemingly to whom?), particles: the so-called zero-point oscillations of fields occur. The virtual particles of the physical vacuum, and therefore, itself, by definition, do not have a frame of reference, since otherwise Einstein's principle of relativity, on which the theory of relativity is based, would be violated (that is, an absolute measurement system with a reference from the particles of the physical vacuum would become possible, which, in turn, would unequivocally refute the principle of relativity, on which SRT is built). Thus, the physical vacuum and its particles are not elements of the physical world, but only elements of the theory of relativity that exist not in the real world, but only in relativistic formulas, violating the principle of causality (they arise and disappear without a reason), the principle of objectivity (virtual particles can be considered, depending on the desire of the theorist, either existing or non-existing), the principle of actual measurability (not observable, do not have their own ISO).

When one or another physicist uses the concept of "physical vacuum", he either does not understand the absurdity of this term, or is cunning, being a hidden or obvious adherent of the relativistic ideology.

It is easiest to understand the absurdity of this concept by referring to the origins of its occurrence. It was born by Paul Dirac in the 1930s, when it became clear that the negation of the ether in its pure form, as a great mathematician did, but a mediocre physicist, is no longer possible. Too many facts contradict this.

To defend relativism, Paul Dirac introduced the aphysical and illogical concept of negative energy, and then the existence of a "sea" of two energies compensating each other in vacuum - positive and negative, as well as a "sea" of particles compensating each other - virtual (that is, apparent) electrons and positrons in a vacuum.

However, such a formulation is internally contradictory (virtual particles are unobservable and they can be arbitrarily considered absent in one case, and present in another) and contrary to relativism (that is, the negation of the ether, since relativism is simply impossible with the presence of such particles in vacuum). Read more in -> - Karim_Khaidarov.

Born on August 1, 1955 in the village of Grechentsy, Letichevsky district, Khmelnytsky region. In 1972 he entered the Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineering School, after which he was sent to the Pacific Fleet. There he went from the group commander to the commander of the electromechanical warhead of a nuclear submarine. After graduating from the Naval Academy (1988), he continued his service in Kamchatka as deputy head of the electromechanical service of the division. In 1998, from the post of Deputy Commander of the Submarine Flotilla for Operation and Repair - Head of the Operation and Repair Service, he was appointed Head of the Department for Operation and Repair of Ships - Deputy Head of the Main Technical Directorate of the Navy. Since the end of 2003 - Head of the Main Technical Directorate of the Navy (since December 2006 - Technical Directorate of the Navy).

- Nikolai Dmitrievich, how did the Navy's Technical Directorate begin in its current form?

You can name such dates. In August 1952, a cardinal decision was made to form the Main Technical Directorate of the Navy, and in April 1953 Glavtekhupr was already reorganized into the Technical Directorate of the Navy. A year later, on the basis of this directorate, the Main Directorate of Ship Repair Plants (GUSRZ) of the Navy, the Directorate for the Operation of Ships (UEK) of the Navy, the Technical Directorate (TU) of the Navy and the Directorate of Technical Supply (UTS) of the Navy were formed with their subordination to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy - Chief of Armaments and ship repair (VIS).

In 1958, the UEC of the Navy and the TU of the Navy were merged into one department - the Technical Department of the Navy (the Department of Technical Supply was included in the Tekhupr earlier). In 1960, the TU Navy included the skipper supply department, which had previously been part of the Logistics of the Navy. At the same time, it was reorganized into the department of the skipper service of the Technical Department of the Navy. And in 1969, the Technical Department was transformed into the Main technical management Navy, subordinate directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. At the same time, the post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Operations - Head of the GTU of the Navy was introduced.

As far as we know, a lot of perturbations fell on Tekhupr during the years of perestroika - at the end of the eighties of the last century. How did all this affect him?

It can be said with confidence that by the mid-80s the GTU was a full-fledged central body of the Navy with high authority both in the center and in the fleets, with good traditions. However, by that time, as you said, perestroika had begun in the country. 1987-1988 became a time for a thorough reorganization of the bodies and control system of the electromechanical service of the Navy both in the center and in the fleets. First of all, the Department of Ship Equipment of the GTU of the Navy was reorganized into the Logistics Support Service with a noticeable and completely unreasonable reduction in staffing. Then the GTU of the Navy itself was reorganized into the Main Directorate for Operation and Repair (GUER) of the Navy. It was based on the previously existing structure of the GTU of the Navy, with some reductions in numbers. They included in the GUER the services of rocket-artillery, mine-torpedo and radio-technical weapons, removing them from the corresponding departments subordinate to the head of shipbuilding and weapons of the Navy.

All this was done in order to improve the organization of the complex repair and technical support of the Navy ships. However, the GUER could not really become a single body responsible in the complex for the technical support of the ships. He did not know the issues of navigational weapons, means of communication and chemical economy. They remained under the jurisdiction of the respective departments. The rocket-artillery, mine-torpedo and radio-technical services turned out to be divorced from the ordering departments. Other unfortunate phenomena also emerged.

In 1993, the MTO service was again reorganized into a department, but not of ship equipment, but with a different name (MTO). The GUER itself was again transformed into the Main Technical Directorate of the Navy. It included the Technical Directorate of the Navy, the Directorate of Logistics, organizational planning and financial departments, and a secret department.

On October 1, 1992, the position of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy - Head of the Main Directorate of the Navy was abolished, which removed the Main Directorate of the Navy (and, consequently, the GTU of the Navy) from direct subordination to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. On December 1, 1994, changes again took place in the GTU of the Navy. The Naval Technical Directorate was renamed the Operations and Repair Directorate, and the Logistics Directorate reverted to the Ship Equipment and Materials Directorate. And only on December 1, 2006, the Main Technical Directorate of the Navy was again renamed into the Technical Directorate of the Navy.

What are the tasks facing the Naval Technical Directorate today?

The main goal is to ensure the technical readiness of the Navy ships. To achieve it, a whole range of tasks is being solved. The following can be identified as the main ones: maintaining and restoring the serviceable condition of ship equipment, energy systems, hulls, providing ships with military-technical equipment, ship repair materials, ship equipment and many other measures, without which the ships will not be able to solve their tasks.

The Technical Department of the Navy pays special attention to the technical combat readiness of nuclear submarines, the fight against accidents and the prevention of equipment accidents on ships of the fleet. It is also difficult to overestimate the importance of ensuring the nuclear safety of ships with a nuclear power plant (NPP) throughout life cycle ship - from its delivery to the fleet to complete disposal. Moreover, in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Technical Department of the Navy is the only organization dealing with the problems of dismantling nuclear ships.

What problems affect the activities of the Naval Technical Directorate today?

First of all, and this is a common problem for all the Russian Armed Forces, is insufficient funding. About half of the ships of the total ship composition of the fleet have extended overhaul periods and are operated with various restrictions. For some ships, the overhaul periods cannot be extended due to their technical condition, and they are objectively subject to exclusion from the Navy.

The problem of extending resource indicators has become one of the priorities. To solve it, ship design bureaus, shipbuilding and ship repair enterprises of the industry are involved, methods and methods are found that lead to a certain increase in the number of ships capable of performing tasks without restrictions on tactical and technical characteristics.

The lack of funding for ship repair leads to an increase in its duration and, accordingly, an increase in cost. In the issue of providing ships with military equipment, ship repair materials, ship equipment, there are also certain difficulties associated with incomplete financing. At present, the provision of the fleet with the main types of weapons and military equipment is about 89% of required amount, and the level of procurement and maintenance of the repair of the main types of weapons and military equipment and military-technical equipment does not fully compensate for the natural loss of material resources.

How do you think these problems can be solved?

To solve these and many other problems, measures are being developed and implemented in practice that allow them to be overcome and to fulfill the tasks facing the TU of the Navy. I will name the most significant of them.

First of all, the organization of effective control over the technical condition of the ship. Timely reliable information makes it possible to make a rational redistribution of appropriations according to the priorities set by the Navy command. Methods are being introduced for in-place diagnostics of weapons and military equipment, which make it possible to detect possible malfunctions in a timely manner and prevent them at the level of the element base of machines and mechanisms, which gives a tangible economic effect. The same methods make it possible to switch to a system of maintenance of ship equipment according to its actual condition, which also gives serious savings in money and the ability to use them, solving other problems of maintaining and restoring the technical readiness of the ships of the fleet.

Specialists of the Technical Department of the Navy are developing a mechanism for the transition to the supply of ships of the fleet with military-technical equipment as needed, reasonable adjustments are made to prices for ordered products, which achieves significant savings in spending budget funds.

And how are the problems of technical support for the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov" being solved?

For the domestic fleet, this ship is unique. He remained the only one capable of carrying on board and ensuring the use of fighter and attack ship aviation. The experience of technical support of this type of ships began in the mid-seventies, when the lead ship of this project, the TAKR "Kyiv", was accepted into the USSR Navy, and accumulated during the period of operation of it and all subsequent ships of the series.

The commissioning of the Kuznetsov historically coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent protracted underfunding of technical support for both the entire Navy and this ship in particular. For this reason, and also considering that domestic aircraft carriers were built in Ukraine, in Nikolaev, and a large number of design organizations and factories throughout the USSR, there were many problems associated with the repair of both the entire ship and individual equipment. The solution of these problems required significant financial costs, the efforts of the military administration of the Navy and the Northern Fleet, design organizations, ship repair enterprises and factories.

But that's all behind. The ship is again technically sound, capable of performing any tasks anywhere in the oceans. A modern aircraft carrier is an expensive but most durable ship. With skillful maintenance and competent operation, timely and high-quality repairs, it is able to serve the country for decades, protecting the territory, vital interests:

What is the Naval Technical Directorate today? Who works here, serves?

First of all, our management is a team of professional specialists, the most experienced and qualified mechanical engineers. They served on submarines and surface ships, shipyards and reactor recharging plants of the Navy, in the technical departments of the fleets and in the electromechanical services of the formations and associations of ships. Despite material and social difficulties, each of them fulfills his duties with honor. More than half of the officers are graduates of the Naval Academy.

The pride of management is its best, most experienced specialists. Among them are Rear Admiral Andrey Vladimirovich Stepanov, captains 1st rank Oleg Alexandrovich Glushkov and Valery Leonidovich Lyubimtsev, employees Tamara Ivanovna Bukina, Tamara Grigorievna Kochetkova, Tamara Vasilievna Shikalova, Nina Nikolaevna Ozhereleva.

However, we also have a real personnel problem - officers who have extensive experience in serving on ships and ships of the fleets do not have a great desire to be transferred to: Moscow. The reasons are obvious: the absence of any housing, the inevitable need to wait for it for many years, low (compared to commercial structures and civil servants) monetary allowance, high prices in the capital: It is even more difficult with civilian personnel. Even unskilled housing and communal services workers in Moscow do not have such salaries as those of management employees. But work in the central body of military control requires high qualifications and experience. Therefore, the staffing of the Technical Directorate of the Navy is very not an easy task, which has to be solved literally every day, and every officer and employee is cherished.

The purpose and nature of the activities of the Navy require the presence in its composition of various branches of forces capable of solving both offensive and defensive tasks in remote and coastal areas.

The Navy consists of two components: naval strategic nuclear forces (NSNF), general-purpose naval forces (MSON), as well as support forces, special troops and fleet services.

The Navy includes four types of forces: submarine forces; surface forces; naval aviation; coastal troops of the Navy.

Type of force - an integral part of the type of the Armed Forces, including units and formations that have their own combat means, weapons and equipment. Each type of forces has its own combat properties, uses its own tactics and is intended to solve operational, tactical, operational-tactical tasks. The branches of forces, as a rule, operate in a certain geographical environment and are capable of conducting combat operations independently and jointly with other branches of the forces.

Under present-day conditions, the main arms of the Navy, capable of most successfully solving the main offensive missions of the fleet using conventional and nuclear missile weapons, are submarine forces and naval aviation.

Naval strategic nuclear forces are an integral part of the country's strategic nuclear forces. They are represented by strategic missile submarines (rplSN) and are used in the operations of strategic nuclear forces according to the plan of the Supreme High Command.

Naval general-purpose forces include all types of forces of the Navy, are used to solve operational and tactical tasks, to conduct systematic combat operations.

The Coastal Forces, as a branch of the Navy, unites formations and units of the Marine Corps, Coastal Rocket and Artillery Troops (BRAV), and in certain regions of the Russian Federation, groups of coastal troops (Coastal Defense Troops).

Support forces, special troops and fleet services include forces air defense fleet, formations and units of special troops and services (reconnaissance, naval engineering, chemical, communications, radio engineering, electronic warfare, rocket technical, technical support, search and rescue, hydrographic), formations, units and institutions of the rear. The composition of the Russian Navy is shown in fig. 2.

Organizationally, the Navy of the Russian Federation consists of associations, naval bases, separate formations, units and institutions.

The Russian Navy is headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, who is one of the Deputy Ministers of Defense. The supreme body of the Navy, the Main Headquarters of the Navy and the Directorate of the Navy, is subordinate to him.

An association is a large organizational formation, consisting of formations and units of various branches of the Navy forces, capable of solving operational (sometimes strategic) tasks independently or in cooperation with other branches of the Armed Forces. Depending on the composition and scale of the tasks to be solved, formations can be operational-strategic, operational and operational-tactical.

The regionally deployed operational-strategic formations of the Russian Navy include: Northern, Pacific, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, as well as the Caspian Flotilla. The basis of the Northern and Pacific Fleets are strategic missile submarines and multi-purpose nuclear submarines, aircraft-carrying, landing and multi-purpose surface ships, mine-sweeping ships and boats, diesel submarines, coastal missile and artillery troops and attack aircraft. The basis of the Baltic, Black Sea Fleets and the Caspian Flotilla is multi-purpose surface ships, mine-sweeping ships and boats, diesel submarines, coastal missile and artillery troops and attack aircraft.

The operational formations of the Navy include fleets(a flotilla of heterogeneous forces, a flotilla of rpl SN, a flotilla of multi-purpose submarines) and naval air force.

The operational-tactical formations of the Navy include squadrons (operational squadron, squadron of diverse forces, squadron of multi-purpose submarines, squadron of amphibious assault forces).

The regional deployment of the Navy requires the maintenance and development of independent basing infrastructures, shipbuilding and ship repair, all types of support, the basis of which is the historically established system of cities - naval bases in Russia.

A naval base (Naval Base) is a well-equipped and defended area of ​​the coast with the water area adjacent to it, which provides basing, comprehensive support, deployment and return of fleet forces. It includes, as a rule, several base points, as well as forces and means to maintain a favorable operational regime in the designated 8MB operational area of ​​responsibility.

The composition of formations and naval bases is not permanent. It is determined depending on the purpose, the nature of the tasks performed, the areas and directions in which they operate, as well as the conditions of the theater of operations.

A formation is a permanent organizational formation of ships and units capable of independently solving tactical tasks and participating in solving operational tasks. The composition of compounds is determined by their regular structure. Designed for purposeful combat training and ease of control. The division is the main tactical formation. Brigade and division ships - tactical formations.

A division (brigade) of submarines, as a rule, consists of submarines of the same class (subclass). For example: a division of strategic missile submarines, a division (brigade) of torpedo submarines. Divisions (brigades) of surface ships consist of one or more classes (subclasses) of ships. For example: a division of rocket-but-artillery ships. A battalion as a tactical unit is a formation of rank 111 and IV ships. For example: a division of minesweepers, a division of missile boats, etc.

A tactical unit is a military formation capable of independently solving tactical tasks. Parts are: ships of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd rank, groups of ships of the 4th rank, regiment (in naval aviation, Marine Corps, BRAV).

Part, in turn, consists of military units - small military formations. Typical units: combat unit (service), ship of the 4th rank, squadron, air unit, battalion, company, platoon, etc.

Special troops and services designed to support the combat activities of the Navy and solve their inherent special tasks are organizationally reduced to formations, units, subunits and institutions that are part of associations, formations and units of the Navy, and are also under central subordination. For example: division of reconnaissance ships, military construction detachment, battalion chemical protection, a communications center, a radio engineering company, an electronic warfare squadron, an arsenal, bases and warehouses, a shipyard, a rescue ship brigade, a hydrographic detachment, an automobile company, a group of naval support vessels, etc.

The organizational structure of the Russian Navy is shown in fig. 3.

The qualitative and quantitative composition of the troops (forces) of the fleets (flotillas) must correspond to the level and nature of threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in a particular region.

The variety of tasks solved by the fleet necessitates the specialization of ships, i.e. the construction of ships with certain qualities, which led to the need for their classification.

All ships and vessels in the Navy are divided into groups. The criterion for division is purpose. Five groups are distinguished: warships, combat boats, special-purpose ships, naval support vessels, raid vessels and support boats.

warships and combat boats, i.e. the first and second groups determine the combat composition of the Navy and are designed to solve precisely combat missions.

The group of special-purpose ships includes special-purpose submarines, control ships, training ships, reconnaissance ships.

The group of offshore support vessels includes vessels for combat training, medical support, radiation safety and chemical protection, transport, rescue, navigation and hydrographic support.

The group of offshore support vessels includes vessels designed to support the activities of the fleet in the roads and harbors. To them from-; basic rescue vessels, self-propelled and non-self-propelled maintenance vessels, basic dry-cargo and tankers, tugboats, raid boats, etc.

Within the groups, ships and ships of the Navy are divided into classes. The criteria for dividing into classes are the tasks to be solved and the main weapon. So, for example, submarines are divided into two classes, and surface ships into five classes.

Within the classes, combat ships and special-purpose ships are divided into subclasses. The criteria for dividing into subclasses are displacement, type of power plant, narrower specialization, cruising range.

Depending on the tactical and technical elements and purpose, as well as to determine the seniority of commanders, the legal status of the officers and the standards of logistics, warships are divided into ranks. The Russian Navy has four ranks of ships. The first is the highest. The division into classes and ranks is determined by the Regulations on the Classification of Ships and Vessels of the Navy.

6 depending on the design features of the ships of one and of the same subclass differ in types and designs.

The classification of the ship composition in different states has its own characteristics and is not constant. As the fleet develops, with a change in its tasks and armament of ships, new classes (subclasses) appear, and obsolete ones are excluded from the composition of the fleet. Thus, after the Second World War, in most states, the class of battleships and subclasses of escort aircraft carriers were excluded from the fleet, and the subclass of patrol ships was excluded from the US Navy. With fleet equipment missile weapons a class of rocket ships appeared.

the future of the fleet lies in multi-purpose, versatile ships capable of effective fight with air, surface, underwater and coastal targets. Therefore, the number of ship classes will be reduced. At the same time, there are specific tasks that require the use of special materials and design solutions in the construction of ships, for example, mine-ladder, landing ships, some special-purpose ships, the universalization of which is impractical.

The Communications Department of the Navy originates from the Communications Department of the Navy, created in pursuance of the order of the People's Commissar of the Navy dated January 31, 1938 and in accordance with the "Regulations on the People's Commissariat of the Navy", approved earlier. The communications department was part of the People's Commissariat of the Navy and was one of the divisions of its structure. On April 19, 1939, the department was reorganized into the Communications Department of the NK Navy, in which five departments were formed: organizational, radio and hydroacoustics, wire communications and electronic construction, special equipment and a supply department, warehouses and workshops. The Department also included a financial department, general and combat units.

At the training camp of the leadership of the Navy Communications Service (2003)

Throughout its existence, the Directorate of Communications, depending on the change in the structure of the command and control bodies of the Navy, was renamed the Directorate of Communications of the Naval Forces, the Office of the Chief of Communications of the Navy, the Directorate of Communications of the Navy.

Initially, the Communications Directorate of the Navy dealt with the issues of arming the Navy with communications equipment, developing regulatory documents on the organization and combat use of communications, directing the combat training of communications services for fleets, flotillas and communications units of the Navy of central subordination.

The Communications Directorate also determined the prospects for the development of communications in the Navy, developed tactical and technical specifications for the design and creation of new communications equipment and planned to equip maritime theaters with them, placed orders for their manufacture in industry, supervised the acceptance of finished communications equipment and its implementation on fleets. At the same time, ways have always been worked out for the most economical and effective solution to the problems of creating new information facilities, building and functioning of the Navy's communications system. In addition, the Directorate developed the states, tables and standards for armament by means of communication for ships and coastal facilities. His particular concern was the organization of the training of signalmen of officer and senior categories for ships, formations and coastal units.

Consideration of plans for the construction of a naval communications system

The development of radio and wire means of communication was carried out by the Directorate jointly with the Scientific Research Institute of Communications of the Navy, created with its direct participation in 1932, scientists from civilian research institutes and the engineering and technical staff of industry.

The activities of the Communications Department have always been a prologue to the start of large-scale work on the development of information technology today. In 1927-1934, the Blockade-1 radio weapon system was developed, and based on the experience of its operation in 1934-1940, the improved Blockade-2 was developed. The control and receiving apparatus created under the Directorate did a great deal before the war. creative work, linking the customer (Management) even more closely with the industrial enterprises of the country that manufacture communication equipment. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the fleet was provided with means of communication, and during the fighting they proved to be quite reliable.

Report at the exhibition of new means of communication

Since 1943, intensive development of a new system of radio equipment of the R (Victory) series began, which was put into service in 1949. It was high-reliability equipment operating in an extended frequency range, in high-speed, ultra-high-speed and direct-printing modes. It had an increased frequency setting accuracy, which ensured searchless and non-tuning communication. At the same time, searches were made to increase the stability of communications with surface ships in remote areas of the World Ocean and with deep-submerged submarines.

The correctness of the organizational structure, the direction of work and the small size of the Directorate were confirmed by the dynamics of the development of communications in the Navy during the war and peaceful construction.

The first post-war stage (1946-1956) of the improvement and development of the Navy's communications system was marked by the re-equipment of ships and coastal centers with equipment of the Pobeda series, the construction of the first 1000 kW SHF radio station, several 200 kW shortwave radio stations, and the arrival of the first samples of SBD equipment to the fleet. The Communications Department of the Navy in these and subsequent years (1956-1965), when the sailors-signallers faced a task that had never been equal in complexity - the creation of a special permanent long-range operational communication system of the Navy, played its leading role. Under his organizing leadership in 1956, unique fundamental research was carried out, which formed the basis for the revolutionary transformation of the communications system of the Navy, the development of promising technical means and the construction of a whole series of new coastal communications facilities.

Management of the Communications Department of the Navy with representatives of industry and science

Scientific and technological progress and the increased capabilities of industry allowed the Directorate of Communications in 1966-1985 to begin creating a global communications system for the Navy. During this period, modern automated communications equipment systems, special towed antennas for submarines were put into service, secret communications were introduced everywhere, regiments of a backup communications system and territorially separated zonal communications centers were formed, including those abroad. The network of high-power radio stations is being expanded, the construction of the country's first ultra-low-frequency communication center with deep-submerged submarines is being prepared, and the pace of work on creating a marine component of space communications is increasing.

At the same time, the Communications Directorate of the Navy is concentrating its efforts on solving issues of increasing the stability of control of submarine missile carriers, creating effective automated systems combat control, large-scale automation of communication processes, promising funds and communication complexes.

At the SDV radio station after its modernization

At the same time, the Communications Directorate of the Navy is concentrating its efforts on improving the stability of control of submarine missile carriers, creating effective automated combat control systems, large-scale automation of communication processes, and advanced communication facilities and complexes.

With the commissioning of the VLF center, the network of VLF radio stations and space facilities, the communication system and the automated control system of the Navy becomes a permanent, global one. Being the basis of the combat command and control system for the forces of the Navy, it is simultaneously used to solve general federal (SEV), interdepartmental (FPS) and interspecific ("Monolith", "Vyuga") tasks.

At a meeting with Academician Kotelnikov V.A.

The great merit of the leadership and the Communications Department of the Navy as a whole lies in the fact that each employee of his team perfectly understands the tasks of the Navy's communications and his personal mission for their implementation.

As a result of strict personnel selection, the most promising, talented officers are sent here, those who solve these problems first, who lay the foundation for more advanced communications equipment and at the same time solve not only special, technical, but also no less complex organizational and scientific problems. Today, these functions are successfully performed by the current administration. Over the years, Rear Admirals V.V. Isopolsky, P.A. Sokolov, A.S. Golubkov; captains of the 1st rank: K.A. Belonogov, N.I. Yastrebtsev, M.F. Filippov, R.A. Tserin, V.T. Nechu-kin, G.B. Afanasiev, E.P. Prokofiev, B.P. Nikitin, G.P. Emasev, V.G. Perekhodnikov, A.V. Shustikov, A.V. Leonov, B.M. Koveshnikov, V.S. Vasilevna. Komarov, V.P. Chugunov, A.A. Samorukov, A.A. Borshevsky, S.A. Jury, A.V. Karelov, V.P. Korobkov, V.I. Osipov, A.I. Lesnykh, V.I. Sabelnikov, V.V. Gekov, V.V. Molodtsov, V.I. Listwin; colonels: N.A. Cherepov, N.E. Techte-lion; employees: V.O. Makarova, V.V. Morinova, L.N. Zaglodina and many, many others.

A difficult period of reforming the Armed Forces is now going through the Communications Service of the Navy, led by Vice Admiral A.G. Dolbney. But despite all the difficulties of the current stage, the Communications Directorate manages to maintain the necessary elements of the system in constant readiness, maintain experienced and train new personnel, and solve the main task of ensuring combat command and control of the Navy.

Naval strategic nuclear forces in the Soviet Union and later in Russia were never an independent branch or branch of the armed forces, but were organically part of the Navy. Naval strategic nuclear forces are a combination of strike, control, support and maintenance subsystems.

The strike subsystem is made up of strategic missile submarines, missile systems on them and ballistic missiles of these complexes. The control subsystem is a set of means and points for delivering signals and commands to the submarine missile carriers. The supporting subsystem includes surface ships, multi-purpose submarines, aviation, fixed surface and underwater surveillance systems, and other means that are tasked with ensuring the combat stability of strategic submarines. The maintenance subsystem is a branched infrastructure of points and means designed to maintain the technical readiness of strategic missile carriers, their equipment and weapons.

Structure of the Navy

Navy is one of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The Navy includes the Northern, Pacific, Baltic, Black Sea Fleets, the Caspian Flotilla, and other units. The direct leadership of the Navy is carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, who is also the Deputy Minister of Defense.

The Commander-in-Chief is subordinated to the Main Staff of the Navy, which exercises operational control and plans the long-term activity of the fleet. The main subdivisions of the General Staff of the Navy include operational, reconnaissance and organizational-mobilization directorates, as well as communications directorates, anti-submarine warfare services, air defense, and electronic warfare. The Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy is the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

The Deputy Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy also include:

First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy,

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for armaments, head of shipbuilding, armament and operation of the Navy. The Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for armaments is subordinated to the Main Technical Directorate of the Navy, the Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy, the Directorate of Rocket and Artillery Weapons of the Navy, the Directorate of Anti-Submarine Weapons of the Navy, radio-technical and other departments and services,46

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Combat Training, Head of the Combat Training Department of the Navy,

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Logistics, Head of the Logistics Department of the Navy.

In addition, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy directly reports to the commanders of the Northern, Pacific, Black Sea, Baltic Fleets and the Caspian Flotilla, the commander of the Navy's aviation and the chief of the coastal troops of the Navy.

The organization of fleet command is in many respects similar to the organization of the Navy. The fleets include flotillas, squadrons, naval bases, brigades, and separate divisions.

Strike subsystem of naval strategic forces

Strategic missile carriers are organizationally united into tactical formations-divisions of the same type of strategic submarines (there are from 5 to 10 SSBNs in the division). Operational formations—flotillas—comprise one or more divisions of strategic missile carriers. The flotilla may also include divisions of multi-purpose submarines. By mid-1995, the Russian Navy had seven divisions of strategic submarines. Four divisions were part of the Northern Fleet, and three were part of the Pacific Fleet.

A division of heavy SSBNs of project 941 (Typhoon) operated in the Northern Fleet as part of the 1st submarine flotilla (Nerpichya base), as well as two divisions of strategic submarines of projects 667BDRM, 667BDR and 667BD as part of the 3rd flotilla (Yagelnaya base). The remaining Project 667B (Delta I) strategic submarines were part of the division based in Ostrovnoy.

On the Pacific Fleet two divisions of the SSBNs of project 667B (Delta I) and project 667BDR (Delta III) were part of the flotilla of nuclear submarines (Rybachy base in Kamchatka). The division of strategic submarines (in Pavlovsky Bay) included SSBNs of project 667B (Delta I).

The end of the service life of second-generation submarines (projects 667B and 667BD), as well as Russia's fulfillment of obligations under the START-1 Treaty, will lead to a significant reduction in the strike subsystem of naval strategic forces. As a result, by the beginning of the next millennium, the Russian naval strategic forces will most likely have no more than three divisions of strategic missile carriers, two of which will be based in the Northern Fleet, and one in the Pacific.

Management of naval strategic forces

Distinguish operational and administrative management of strategic submarines. Issues related to combat training, material and technical support of the fleet are entirely under the jurisdiction of the fleet and are resolved administratively through the relevant departments and services.

During the period when strategic submarines are performing combat patrols in a given water area or on combat duty in a base, as well as during a threatened period, operational control is exercised. During this period, the commander of a missile submarine reports directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (through the Main Headquarters of the Navy and the Headquarters of the Fleet). The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy directs the combat service of strategic missile carriers in accordance with the operational plan of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The goals and security of a nuclear strike (the number of SSBNs on combat patrols in given areas and on combat duty at base points) are determined by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, which also transmits the order of the Supreme High Command on the use of nuclear weapons.

Ensuring the combat stability of naval strategic forces

Ensuring the combat stability of naval strategic nuclear forces is usually understood as a set of measures, including:

Ensuring the safety of SSBNs at crossings and in combat patrol areas;

Carrying out operations to search for, divert enemy assets from SSBNs and oust them from the patrol areas of strategic submarines;

Protection of SSBNs at base points from attacks from the air, from the sea, land and from sabotage;

These tasks are carried out in conjunction with other tasks of the Navy, and practically all the forces of the combat strength of the fleets take part in their implementation. Measures to ensure the protection of strategic submarines are primarily aimed at increasing their survivability and increasing the effectiveness of naval strategic forces in a situation of armed conflict. The greatest emphasis is placed on anti-submarine defense of SSBN routes and patrol areas.

During the crisis period, the forces of the Russian Navy will be tasked with implementing a number of offensive measures aimed at weakening the potential of the enemy. In particular, such measures may include creating a threat to aircraft carrier groups, sea and ocean communications, coastal installations and strategic submarines. Multi-purpose submarines are called upon to play a central role in solving these problems. Taken simultaneously in different areas of the world's oceans, these measures will make it possible to divert anti-submarine forces and means of a potential enemy and thereby reduce the threat to Russian SSBNs. In addition, the Navy will have to carry out operations to search for and destroy enemy multi-purpose nuclear submarines in the patrol areas of Russian SSBNs.

Among the measures to ensure the combat stability of naval strategic forces, the defense of strategic missile carriers at their bases occupies a special place. The importance of this task is due to the fact that during the period when there are no military operations and there is no threat of attack, most of the Russian strategic submarines are in bases. The defense of strategic submarine bases is provided by the deployment of air defense units designed to provide protection against aircraft and cruise missiles. Coastal defense troops (naval infantry and coastal missile and artillery troops) provide protection against possible landings and attacks from land.