Technical means of electronic warfare.

Since I do not know EW technology very well, or rather, I have only a general idea about it, I give the floor to Major General Igor Burakov, since 2001 - Head of the EW Service of the Ground Forces. And although it is not directly related to the Strategic Missile Forces, the equipment used in the electronic warfare of both the Ground Forces and the Strategic Missile Forces is often the same:

"- You have already said about the structure of your troops. And what can you say about the means that are in service with the EW units?

Each level has its own means, which differ in range, emitter power, and radio frequency at which they operate. For some time, for example, our Spetsnaz radio battalions were armed mainly with communication radio stations of the RAT and SCR-399 type with R-328r and R-328s control and management devices. As well as jamming stations R-330. In the 60s, new means appeared (the R-325, R-325M, R-330, R-330A jamming station and the R-100, R-110 and R-102 radio stations with a control and control device).

Radio engineering battalions were armed with SPB-1 radar jamming stations and R-814 aircraft control VHF radio communication stations with Arfa-3 prefixes. Subsequently, new radar jamming stations of the type SPB-5, SPB-7, SPO-8 and SPO-10, as well as aircraft radio stations R-824, R-834 and R-834 with Arfa-3 prefixes, were received.

In 1976 - 1977 kits of electronic warfare units of the front, army and army corps were developed. They were engaged in the suppression of short-wave communications at the operational and operational-tactical level, covering objects and troops of the front.

As for the 80s, the formation of new electronic warfare units was significantly hampered by the limited supply of jamming stations for airborne radars from industry (SPN-30, SPN-40, and in subsequent years - SPN-2, SPN-3 and SPN-4). In the second half of the 90s, developments were completed and fundamentally new models of radio interference technology for space radio communications were put into service. But the end of the century was perhaps the most difficult in terms of the arrival of new technology. And only since about 2000, the situation gradually began to improve.

And Colonel V.S. speaks directly about the level of technical equipment of the electronic warfare units of the 50th missile army. Kuznetsova [6]:

“...... The heads of the EW of the Military Districts (Belarusian, Leningrad, Baltic, Moscow Air Defense District, Baranovichi Air Defense Corps), meeting me at their headquarters, said: “The rich owner has arrived!”. I even sometimes had, of course, with the permission of the General Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces and the commander of the army, to transfer, according to the relevant documents, some samples of this equipment (for example, reconnaissance equipment) to the districts as mutual assistance ... "

Colonel V.S. Kuznetsov :

“... In the late 70s and all 80s, the personnel of our missile army knew how to practically act to overcome missile defense(ABM) of the United States, to defend against high-precision weapons (WTO) of the enemy, counteracted foreign technical intelligence (ITR), knew how to work in conditions of radio interference to our means of communication, i.e. in the entire frequency spectrum of "white noise" ... "

The following is a description of some of the technical means of electronic warfare, which were in service with the 23rd separate electronic warfare battalion. Only open data found on the Internet are given. I would be grateful for clarifications and additions ...

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Radar stations P-15 (1RL13) and P-19 (1RL134)

Radar P-15

The P-15 decimeter range radar was developed by VNIIRT (Moscow) and is designed to detect low-flying targets. Development started in 1952, adopted in 1955. It is used as part of radar posts of radio engineering formations, control batteries of anti-aircraft artillery and missile formations of the operational level of air defense and at control points of air defense of the tactical level.

The P-15 station is mounted on one vehicle together with an antenna system and is deployed to a combat position in 10 minutes. The power unit is transported in a trailer.

Radar P-19

The P-15 and P-19 stations were produced at the Murom Plant of Radio Measuring Instruments (MZ RIP), and the introduction of the P-15 into production (the design bureau of the plant began processing technical documentation) took place as early as 1956. Subsequently, the P-15 was repeatedly modernized: P-15M , P15M2, P-15MN, P-15N, P-15U. In fact, one of the upgrades of the P-15 can be considered the P-19 with its modifications: P-19-2, P-19-5, P-19Sh, P-19Sh3, P-19Sh3-1. Currently, both stations are out of production, but can be upgraded.

According to some reports, the station 1RL13 also has the name "Path" (although I met the name "NEBO-SV" in one source), and 1RL134 - "Danube-15".

The station has three modes of operation:

Amplitude;

Amplitude with accumulation;

Coherent-pulse.

The station has protection from active, frequency-targeted interference - by quickly tuning to one of four frequencies, and from passive interference - a compensation circuit from dipole interference and local objects.

Radar P-15

In 1970, the P-15MN radar was tested, on which flickering equipment and ground-based radar interrogator (NRZ) equipment were additionally introduced. In the early 70s, the P-15MN radar was largely transferred to a new element base and equipped with a new NRZ. As a result of this modernization, the station was named P-19 (1RL134) and was put into service in 1974.

The P-19 radar is intended for conducting reconnaissance of air targets at low and medium altitudes, detecting targets, determining their current coordinates in azimuth and identification range, as well as for transmitting radar information to command posts and to interfaced systems. It is a mobile two-coordinate radar station placed on two vehicles.

The first vehicle accommodates receiving and transmitting equipment, anti-interference equipment, indicator equipment, equipment for transmitting radar information, simulating, communicating and interfacing with consumers of radar information, functional control and equipment for a ground-based radar interrogator.

Radar P-19

The second car houses the radar antenna-rotary device and power supply units.

Complex climatic conditions and the duration of operation of the P-15 and P-19 radar stations have led to the fact that by now most of the radars require resource recovery.

The only way out of this situation is the modernization of the old radar fleet based on the Kasta-2E1 radar.

The modernization proposals took into account the following:

Keeping intact the main radar systems (antenna system, antenna rotation drive, microwave path, power supply system, vehicles);

Possibility of carrying out modernization in operating conditions with minimal financial costs;

The possibility of using the released P-19 radar equipment for the restoration of products that have not been upgraded.

As a result of the modernization, the P-19 mobile solid-state low-altitude radar station will be able to perform the tasks of airspace monitoring, determining the range and azimuth of air objects - airplanes, helicopters, remotely piloted aircraft and cruise missiles, including those operating at low and extremely low altitudes, against the background of intense reflections from the underlying surface, local objects and hydrometeorological formations.

The radar can be easily adapted for use in various military and civilian systems. It can be used for information support of air defense systems, air force, coastal defense systems, rapid reaction forces, aircraft traffic control systems civil aviation. In addition to the traditional use as a means of detecting low-flying targets in the interests of the armed forces, the modernized radar can be used to control airspace in order to prevent the transportation of weapons and drugs by low-altitude, low-speed and small-sized aircraft in the interests of special services and police units involved in the fight against drug trafficking and arms smuggling .

The upgraded radar is all-weather and can be operated in various climatic zones.

Main characteristics:

	P-15	P-19
View area in azimuth, deg.	360	360
Instrumental range, km	10-160	160
Height viewing area, m	up to 6000	up to 6000
Review rate, s	6, 12	6, 12
power, kWt	310	310
Receiver sensitivity, W	2 x 10-14	2 x 10-14
DND width in azimuth, deg.	4,5	4,5
Frequency range (waves)	decimeter	decimeter

Reconnaissance and radar countermeasure station SPN-30 (1RL237)

SPN-30

NOTATION

Brief: SPN-30(Station Jamming - 30)

Customer index: 1RL237

NATO: paint box

PURPOSE

It is designed for electronic jamming (REW) in the extended operating frequency range of existing ones, including those that have undergone modernization of air-based radars to protect ground and air facilities. Provides suppression of the main beam and side lobes of the following classes of airborne radar:

Side view;

Reconnaissance and strike complexes;

Weapon control;

Providing flights at low altitudes;

Multifunctional.

The station generates the following types of interference:

Quasi-continuous;

Multiple-pulse or response in time;

Noise sighting in frequency and conjugate in spectrum.

SPN-30

As a result of modernization, the SPN-30 station acquires a modern look, speed, reliability, maintainability increase, weight and size characteristics improve, and power consumption decreases.

The upgraded station includes:

Antenna machine;

Control machine;

Power station;

Set of cables and harnesses;

Operational documentation.

Active jamming station SPN-40 (1RL238)

SPN-40

NOTATION

Brief: SPN-40(Station Interference - 40)

Customer index: 1RL238

Analysis of armed conflicts of the late XX - early XXI centuries. shows that electronic warfare(electronic warfare, or in Western terminology, electronic warfare) is becoming one of the key elements of modern warfare. Organizationally, electronic warfare is one of the components of information operations.

The essence of electronic warfare is to temporarily or permanently reduce the effectiveness of the use of enemy reconnaissance means, weapons, military equipment by electronic or fire suppression (destruction) of its electronic equipment, control systems, reconnaissance, communications. Thus, electronic warfare can include both temporary disruption of the operation of enemy electronic systems by jamming, and the complete destruction of these systems (fire damage or capture). EW also includes measures for electronic protection (REZ) of its information systems and electronic intelligence.

The saturation of the modern battlefield with information systems determines the extremely important role of electronic warfare in modern and future wars. The experience of recent military exercises has shown that even if one of the opposing sides has an overwhelming superiority in high-precision weapons, it cannot guarantee victory if its control structures are suppressed by electronic warfare.

The objects of the main impact during EW operations are:

• elements of command and control systems for troops and weapons;
• means of intelligence;
• systems of storage, processing and distribution of information;
• radio electronic means;
• automated systems, databases and computer networks;
• personnel involved in decision-making and management processes.

The increasing role of electronic warfare in modern warfare is determined by two factors.

First, an increase in the scale and depth of operations, the saturation of troops modern means automation, control and intelligence led to a sharp increase in the share of supporting forces in operations. According to Western experts, in modern combat operations, about 2/3 of all forces solve the tasks of reconnaissance, control, electronic warfare, support, etc.

Secondly, the increase in the capabilities of the forces and means of electronic warfare to influence systems combat control enemy. Modern systems Electronic warfare systems are very versatile: they can be used to the depth of both a single combat operation and the entire theater of war, at any time of the day, use lethal and non-lethal weapons, operate as part of various multi-purpose integrated systems (combat control, communications, computer support for intelligence, fire defeat, combat enemy combat control systems), provide comprehensive protection for their control systems and even use enemy computer networks in their own interests.

Now the further improvement of technical means and methods of electronic warfare is proceeding very rapidly. First of all, this concerns the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain. The armed forces of these countries and the NATO Allied Forces have a well-established methodology for the simultaneous or staged strikes against the enemy using fire weapons, electronic warfare, strategic and tactical camouflage, disinformation and psychological warfare.

EW DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO COUNTRIES

In the mid 80s. of the last century, the US Armed Forces and NATO Allied Forces developed the concept of "combat countermeasures against communication and control systems" (Command, Control, Communications Countermeasure, CCCCM). In the early 90s. on its basis, the concept of combating combat control systems was developed. At the same time, the creation of an integrated system of combat control, intelligence, communications, computer support and electronic warfare began. As the forces and means of electronic warfare developed, the the new kind information warfare operations - "network warfare" or "cyber warfare", that is, the disorganization of the enemy's combat control systems through the impact on his computer, local and global computer networks.

The development of electronic warfare in the US Armed Forces and NATO Allied Forces can be divided into three stages.

First stage- until 1980, when electronic warfare played a small role in hostilities. EW operations were of a supportive nature and consisted of jamming enemy reconnaissance and communications equipment, as well as simulating the operation of various electronic equipment in order to mislead the enemy about the real combat situation.

Second phase– 1980-1993 Creation of the concept of the integrated use of forces and means of electronic warfare to influence the enemy's combat control and communications systems. It implied the coordinated use of electronic countermeasures, reconnaissance, disinformation and fire damage to combat enemy electronic systems. However, the imperfection of automation equipment, the low bandwidth of communication channels and the lack of an integrated command and control system did not allow using the full potential of electronic warfare in combat operations.

Nevertheless, already during the electronic warfare, she played one of the key roles. Here, electronic warfare was used within the framework of a single concept worked out by the American troops during the Green Flag exercises.

In particular, a day before the start of the air offensive operation of the anti-Iraqi coalition, ground-based electronic warfare systems of the allies began jamming Iraqi communication channels. The operation itself began with an attack by American helicopters on two Iraqi air defense early warning stations. This created a hole in the Iraqi air defense, into which aircraft immediately rushed to strike at targets in Iraq. In the early days of the air operation, American F-4G aircraft with HARM high-precision anti-radar missiles, as well as EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft, which “blinded” Iraqi radar stations with interference, were actively used to suppress Iraqi air defenses. At the same time, American RC-135, TR-1 and E-8 reconnaissance aircraft took tight control of Iraqi airspace. Having lost their "eyes" in the form of radars, Iraqi ground-based air defenses and fighter aircraft were completely blinded and disorganized, and within a few days they ceased to represent a real combat force.

During the ground offensive, the EW of the US ground forces ensured the suppression of Iraqi radio networks to the depth of the division.

Third stage The development of electronic warfare began in 1993 and continues to the present. An operational-strategic theory of "information warfare" was created. EW technical means have been significantly improved: their automation has been completed; integrated communications, intelligence, control and electronic warfare complexes were created; the creation of promising types of non-lethal electronic warfare weapons using electromagnetic (for example, the American U-bomb tested in 1999 during the war against Yugoslavia; when this bomb explodes, a powerful electromagnetic pulse, striking radio-electronic control, reconnaissance and communications devices in a large radius), and other types of energy; ensuring user access at the tactical level to global databases, issuing target designations to weapons and electronic warfare equipment in near real time.

Thus, if at the first stage, electronic warfare was one of the types of support for strike forces, at the second - integral part combat operations of each branch of the armed forces, then on the third - a component of the information war and one of the components of the military potential.

EW DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES OF RUSSIA

EW has a long history in Russia. For the first time, the suppression of enemy radio networks by interference to disrupt the coordination of artillery fire was successfully used by Russian signalmen as early as 1904. Also during the First World War, Russian radio communications were used to interfere with the operation of German radio networks.

During the Great Patriotic War, electronic warfare was already carried out on an ongoing basis. On December 16, 1942, the State Defense Committee of the USSR issued a resolution "On the organization in the Red Army of a special service for driving German radio stations operating on the battlefield." In pursuance of this resolution, the head of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR A.M. Vasilevsky the next day issued a directive "On the formation of a special group and special divisions of radio interference." A special term is introduced - "RPD" (electronic suppression).

After the war, there was a rapid improvement in radio communications, radar and airborne radars of aircraft and ships, and the creation of missiles with radar homing heads. At the same time, it became necessary both to reduce the effectiveness of the use of weapons and electronic systems of the enemy, and to protect their radio networks and electronic systems from suppression. For this, the 1950s developed and delivered to the troops special means EW: radio interference transmitters, dipole and corner reflectors. For the purpose of the qualified use of electronic warfare in the Soviet army, a special electronic warfare service was created during the same period.

In the future, to equip EW units, protect aircraft, helicopters, ships, tanks and other military equipment, automated EW systems began to be created, including reconnaissance equipment, jamming in various wavebands and equipment for analysis, information processing and control.

In 1962, the term "BRESP" (fighting by electronic means of suppression) was introduced, and the electronic warfare service began to be designated by the same term. Among the tasks of the BRESP service were nuclear and fire damage, electronic suppression and capture of enemy electronic objects ( command posts, communication centers, radar, etc.). At the same time, there was a certain discrepancy between the tasks and capabilities of the BRESP units: they only had the means of jamming, but not of fire destruction and capture of enemy targets. These tasks were under the jurisdiction of the operational departments of the headquarters.

Since the early 1960s new powerful means of fire destruction of radio-electronic objects appeared - missiles that aim at radio emission. In 1963, the US Armed Forces received an aircraft missile of the "air" development class - "radar" "Shrike". Similar models of weapons are being created in the USSR: in 1965, the Soviet Long-Range Aviation received the KSR-11 missile, in 1968 - Kh-22P, and in 1972 front-line aviation received the Kh-28P missile. The adoption of these missiles was very relevant for the reason that Soviet aircraft jamming stations were significantly inferior to American ones in terms of power, frequency range and speed, and fire damage to enemy radars could compensate for this shortcoming.

In 1969, the term "EW" was introduced, which is used in the Russian Armed Forces to this day. Accordingly, the BRESP bodies were transformed into an electronic warfare service, which, in addition to the functions of electronic warfare, was also entrusted with the tasks of ensuring the electromagnetic compatibility of electronic systems in order to ensure stable command and control of troops and weapons. True, in 1976, instead of electronic warfare, the term EPD (“electronic suppression”) was introduced, but it did not take root, and in 1977 was again replaced by electronic warfare.

In order to conduct research and train qualified personnel in the field of electronic warfare, an extensive network was created in the USSR scientific centers and educational institutions. In 1960, the leading institute for electronic warfare was established - 21 Research Institutes (now 5 Central Research Institutes). In research institutes, at test sites and centers combat use weapons and military equipment of the branches of the Armed Forces, specialized departments and laboratories were created. In the interests of electronic warfare, specialists from such institutions as 30 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, State Research Institute of the Air Force, 4 PPI and PLS of front-line aviation, 43 PPI of Long-Range Aviation, Air Force Engineering Academy. N.E. Zhukovsky.

In 1980, the Voronezh Higher Military Engineering School of Radio Electronics (later the Voronezh Military Institute of Radio Electronics - VIRE) was established, which trains qualified technical specialists in the field of electronic warfare. A number of military universities were also created, graduating specialists in the field of electronic warfare in Kyiv, Kharkov, Minsk, Riga, etc., but after the collapse of the USSR, their potential was lost for Russia. In fact, WIRE remained the only specialized Russian military university graduating EW specialists for the army. However, in 2006, for unknown reasons, this educational institution was attached to the Voronezh Military Aviation University as an electronic warfare department.

The training of junior EW specialists for all types and branches of the troops, reserve officers, as well as foreign cadets is carried out in the Tambov Interspecific training center(TMUC), founded in 1962.

Practical experience Soviet electronic warfare specialists received during the wars in Korea, the Middle East and Afghanistan.

During the first Chechen campaign, the fighting in Dagestan and the subsequent counter-terrorist operation on the territory of the Chechen Republic, Russian electronic warfare units took an active part in the hostilities.

The illegal armed formations on the territory of Chechnya created an extensive control and communications system, including cellular, trunk, radio relay, shortwave and ultrashortwave, cable and satellite communications. The tasks of the Russian electronic warfare units were to open and suppress the communication systems of illegal armed formations, as well as to collect information through radio intelligence about the number and location of militant detachments, the plans of the Chechen command, etc.

The actions of the EW forces gave good results. Often, during radio communications, the militants themselves indicated the location of their bases, accumulations of manpower, etc. These data were immediately implemented Russian troops in the form of artillery and air strikes on the indicated places. Here is just one episode.

03/20/1995. From the radio interception of the conversations of the Chechen commanders:

"- Where are you?

We are coming to you.

Tell the guys to drive through the Mesker-Yurt intersection and come to us.”

Artillery hit the concentration of militants and equipment in the area of ​​the indicated intersection, as a result of which 2 armored personnel carriers and two vehicles with militants were destroyed.

During the assault on Grozny in the period from December 10 to 20, 1999, electronic warfare units completely revealed the defense system and the strength of the enemy forces defending the southeast of the city only through radio reconnaissance. By such actions, EW specialists greatly facilitated the conduct of operations by shock units and helped save many lives of Russian soldiers. Being under constant pressure from electronic warfare, detachments of Chechen fighters gradually lost control and coordination of actions, which played an important role in the outcome of hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

During the "five-day war" with Georgia, the Russian EW forces also acted quite successfully. According to the Latvian military expert Brigadier General of the Reserve Karlis Krustinles: “Georgia has problems both with air defense and with the interconnection of units. There were situations when combat units communicated with each other using messengers, because any communication stopped working. The Russian army prepared in advance to suppress not only electronic communications and radars, but also ordinary telephone communications.

Opposition was also conducted to electronic intelligence conducted from NATO ships in the Black Sea.

In the "five-day war" it became obvious that the question of advantage in air war- this is largely a matter of electronic warfare. As it turned out, in the first days of the war, the electronic warfare in the Russian group was not very well established. The forces of radio and electronic intelligence of the Russian Air Force were transferred to the GRU General Staff. However, the latter provided virtually no assistance to the air force, as a result of which they did not have reliable information about the location. Aircraft participating in hostilities did not fully meet the requirements of electronic protection against air defense systems. All this led to losses in aviation from anti-aircraft fire, including the most painful - the Tu-22M3 long-range bomber.

After the shock of the first losses, representatives of the Air Force High Command intervened, who developed recommendations for the crews of aircraft and helicopters participating in combat sorties. A significant place in them was given to electronic protection measures. In particular, not to use in combat operations aircraft that did not have individual electronic warfare equipment, to withdraw from the attack by Su-25 aircraft during the massive shooting of heat traps, to use attack aircraft only under the cover of group means of protection by electronic warfare aircraft and helicopters. After that, the losses in aviation ceased. However, according to experts, the Russian Air Force has serious gaps in the field of electronic warfare, both in terms of personnel training and technical equipment, and in a collision with really strong air defense, losses would be many times higher.

In 2009, units and subunits of electronic warfare were transformed into a separate type of troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including formations, units and subunits of electronic warfare as part of operational-strategic commands.

According to O. Ivanov, the former commander of the EW troops, today the effect of EW means is becoming comparable to the use of modern high-precision weapons, and in some respects even surpasses it. At the same time, Russian electronic warfare systems are not inferior to foreign counterparts. In addition to the modernization of existing ones, new multifunctional complexes are being created, some of which can be attributed to technological breakthroughs. According to O. Ivanov, great opportunities are now opening up for electronic warfare. True, he himself, which is strange, in July 2011 voluntarily resigned from the post of commander of the EW troops at the age of 45, when, it would seem, great prospects for successful career and professional growth opened up. According to some experts, among the reasons for the resignation is disagreement with the provisions of the military reform being carried out in Russia, in particular, with the introduction of a new electronic automated system command and control of the troops of the ESU TZ, which the military criticizes for numerous shortcomings laid down at the level of the terms of reference.

GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND MEANS OF EW

The goals for electronic warfare in modern war become not only the disorganization of the enemy's combat command and control systems, but also depriving him of the opportunity to use information about the combat situation, ensuring that the enemy is preempted in making combat decisions, and reducing his losses during combat operations.

In accordance with the views of the American command, the main element of electronic warfare is an electronic attack using ground-based and air-based electronic warfare, as well as portable and thrown behind enemy lines.

Means of electronic attack are conditionally divided into two types: non-destructive and destructive impact.

Non-destructive - these are means of electronic interference, electronic disinformation, infrared countermeasures (false thermal targets and stationary generators of pulsating infrared interference designed to combat air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles equipped with infrared homing heads). The tasks of these means: suppression or incapacitation of radio-electronic or opto-electronic systems, reconnaissance, communications, navigation means; imitation of the operation of radio-electronic systems in order to mislead the enemy; overloading enemy communications systems; impact on its personnel serving radio-electronic systems or participating in command and control processes.

Destructive means are means of directed energy (electromagnetic weapons), high-precision weapons and ammunition with homing heads for electronic radiation.

It is worth dwelling on the weapon of directed energy in a little more detail. These systems are also called magnetrons, and in Western terminology - active electronically scanned arrays (AESA). This weapon affects the electronic systems of enemy equipment with microwave waves, disabling them. With it, you can completely turn off the on-board electronics of the aircraft, stop the engine of a car or ship, etc. When exposed to large area this weapon can act as non-destructive.

Directed energy weapons entered service with the US Armed Forces relatively recently. They are equipped with the latest American aircraft: the F-35 (although it electromagnetic weapons is defensive in nature and is intended to incapacitate enemy missiles) and carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft Boeing EA-18G Growler. The latter can carry five hanging containers with EW weapons, including AESA equipment. The EA-18G was successfully used to suppress Libyan air defenses in 2011. There are plans to install directional energy emitters on ships and ground combat equipment. Prototypes of non-lethal directed energy weapons designed to influence a person (crowd dispersal, etc.) have also been created.

Speaking of directed energy weapons, one should also mention the US testing of laser weapons to fight ballistic missiles, but at the end of 2011 this program was closed.

The tasks of destructive means of electronic attack are: suppression, defeat, destruction of enemy means of reconnaissance, navigation, control, electronic systems of military equipment and weapons; defeat of enemy personnel involved in the maintenance of these systems.

An important element of electronic warfare is the electronic protection of its troops. It includes three areas:

• direct protection of electronic systems (protection against enemy interference, atmospheric interference, weapons induced by radio emission, means of directed energy, electronic disinformation);
• ensuring electromagnetic compatibility at command posts and in combat formations of troops (protection of radio-electronic systems of friendly troops from mutual interference, including from means of electronic attack used against enemy radio electronic equipment);
• electronic protection during information operations (protection of information circulating in combat control systems, information protection of reconnaissance equipment, electronic attack and electronic protection).

In the interests of electronic protection, complex technical control is carried out. Its task is to control the ability of the enemy to collect intelligence information from electronic systems.

Comprehensive technical control includes:

• radio control - control over information circulating in their radio networks;
• radio-technical control - control of the enemy's ability to collect information about the technical parameters of his RES;
• radar control - control over the fact that the power, nature, direction and types of radiation of their RES do not exceed strictly established standards in order to make it difficult for the enemy to collect information about them (electronic masking);
• electron-optical control - control over the possibility of obtaining information by the enemy with the help of television cameras, receiving thermal radiation;
• acoustic and hydroacoustic control - control of the possibility of obtaining information by the enemy by receiving sound signals propagating in air and water.

Programming and reprogramming of electronic warfare equipment during a combat operation, although not a component of electronic warfare, directly affects its effectiveness. Their tasks are: ensuring the timely targeting of electronic warfare equipment to priority targets; restructuring of electronic warfare equipment in connection with the requirements of the situation; achieving the highest efficiency of their use in terms of power, direction, type of electronic attack (defense) when the object of attack (defense) changes the parameters of electromagnetic radiation and performs a maneuver; redundancy and timely replacement of electronic warfare equipment when they fail.

EW DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

Based on the experience of military operations at the beginning of the XXI century. the main trends in the field of electronic warfare for the near future can be identified:

• the use of electronic warfare forces in conjunction with combat control systems in information operations;
• the transition from solving individual tasks to the integrated conduct of electronic warfare in the interests of the entire grouping of troops;
• adoption of new universal electronic warfare equipment with significantly expanded frequency range and functionality;
• an increase in the number of targets simultaneously controlled, hit, suppressed by one EW complex;
• expansion of the list of EW targets in connection with the creation of directed energy weapons;
• creation of electronic warfare systems with an open construction architecture, the functionality of which can be changed by adding additional modules.

Russia has put "an umbrella of a very cunning system" over Syria

Russian electronic warfare systems have proven to be highly effective and can be considered as an asymmetric weapon for new generation wars.

The withdrawal of the main Russian forces from Syria did not save USA and their allies in NATO from a headache, writes Military Review. The work of Russian electronic warfare means is being actively discussed in the Western community. The reason for such close attention, apparently, is that Russian technology capable of closing large areas where modern high-tech weapons and military equipment are becoming ineffective.

This is very disliked by those who previously widely and successfully used their electronic warfare equipment in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, Libya, and the Balkans. But the advantage that amused our "friends" in this area is a thing of the past, writes the Russian portal.

The Americans themselves were the first to announce this. In particular, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges (Commander of US Forces in Europe), Ronald Pontius (Deputy Chief of Cyber ​​Command), Colonel Jeffrey Church (Head of the EW Department of the Ground Forces), Philip Breedlove (at that time Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Allied Forces in Europe).

With reference to the latest edition Daily OSNet reported that in the zone of operation of the Russian military grouping, American troops and their NATO allies became blind and deaf on the ground, in the air and in space - in a "bubble" with a diameter of about 600 kilometers. Earlier, according to Breedlove, Moscow “blew” such “bubbles” over the Black and Baltic Seas. He also spoke about the breathtaking capabilities of Russian electronic warfare systems, which are capable of creating vast areas А2/AD (anti-access/area denial).

They should be understood as zones of guaranteed prohibition for the enemy's access and any opposition to the use of his own weapons. Everything, as in the famous song of Edita Piekha: “I don’t see anything, I don’t hear anything, I don’t know anything, I won’t tell anyone anything.”

And what actually happened? At one time, we did not hysteria about the use of Western electronic warfare systems in Yugoslavia or Iraq. Apparently, there are good reasons for such a nervous reaction of our sworn friends. Only a real effect could cause a breakdown of those who do not even think about the possible superiority of Russia in some military matters.

Situation control levers

With the escalation of the ongoing electronic warfare today, it would be foolish not to use our capabilities to protect the Russian group and inflict maximum damage on terrorist formations. After the destruction of our plane by a Turkish fighter, the deputy CEO in charge of foreign economic activity JSC "Concern of Radio Engineering" Vega " Lieutenant General Evgeny Buzhinsky stated: “Russia will be forced to use means of suppression and electronic warfare”.

What exactly do we have in Syria?

The first can presumably be called a ground mobile complex "Krasukha-4", which serves to set up broadband active interference to suppress radio-emitting means of reconnaissance and data transmission of space, air and ground-based at ranges of 150-300 kilometers. The complex is effective for countering radio-electronic means (RES) of reconnaissance satellites of the type Lacrosse and Onyx, AWACS and Sentinel aircraft, as well as drones.

With a high degree of probability, we can talk about the use of the Khibiny aircraft multifunctional electronic warfare complex, which became widely known after it completely crushed reconnaissance and control facilities, as well as the Aegis missile defense system of the American destroyer Donald Cook in the Black Sea. "Khibiny" can be a group means of protecting aircraft from all existing anti-aircraft and aviation assets defeat. In this capacity, the complex proved itself from the best side in 2008 during the operation to force Georgia to peace.

In September, two electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft of the Il-20 type arrived at the Khmeimim airbase. With a complex of various sensors, antennas and other optoelectronic means, these machines are capable of solving assigned tasks for 12 hours of flight in any weather and climatic conditions, day and night. It was also reported about the transfer of complexes to Syria "Borisoglebsk-2", which today are considered one of the most difficult in the world in their class.

Other advanced electronic warfare equipment could also be used to create an electronic umbrella on the border with Turkey. To suppress radars, disrupt the operation of guidance, control and communications systems - complexes such as "Lever", "Moscow", "Mercury", "Chopper". The latter is based on the Il-22, which is equipped with side antennas and a cable with a transmitter that unwinds in flight for several hundred meters. Along with these electronic warfare equipment, disposable targeted jamming transmitters could also be used to protect our aircraft and helicopters.

It cannot be ruled out that they can be used to combat radio-controlled land mines, improvised explosive devices and precision weapons, as well as to violate cellular communication and in the VHF range of the EW complex "Infauna" and small-sized jammers of the type "Forest". The media reported on a likely demonstration of the capabilities of active jamming stations "Lever-AB" and "Vitebsk". The first can be installed on any military equipment and suppress enemy control systems and air defense systems.

According to the chief of the electronic warfare troops of the RF Armed Forces, Major General Yuri Lastochkin, the developed means make it possible to provide the possibility of radio reconnaissance and radio suppression of communication systems for collective use, covert, selective blocking of subscriber terminals for cellular communications of the enemy. Experts believe that electronic warfare systems approximately double the capabilities of ground troops and increase the survivability of aviation by 25-30 times.

This song can't be silenced...

Taking into account the potential and purpose of our electronic warfare equipment, one of the main tasks in Syria was to cover the Russian military group and the Khmeimim airbase from possible air and ground strikes, as well as to protect personnel and equipment from being hit by radio-controlled land mines and improvised explosive devices.

The effectiveness of the solution in this case is closely related to measures to protect their RES from technical reconnaissance and electronic countermeasures. The need for this is due known facts transfer of intelligence information to the armed opposition and terrorist formations by special services Turkey, USA, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Other, no less important tasks of electronic warfare systems are constant monitoring of the electronic situation in the areas of deployment of their group and the Khmeimim air base and strict compliance with the rules of electromagnetic compatibility to ensure the normal functioning of their own electronic equipment.

To ensure high-precision fire destruction of command posts and other important objects, the problem of determining their location was solved by establishing the coordinates of the radio-emitting means located on them. It is also known about the suppression of ground and space-based radio communications, drone control channels and data transmission from them.

Finally, an important condition for the reconciliation of the warring parties was the information confrontation on the air using electronic warfare.

Thus, Syria turned out to be a training ground where important experience was gained in real combat conditions, including in the confrontation with the RES of the developed countries of the West. It made it possible to identify the strengths and weak sides of our technology, to become the basis for further improvement of the possibilities and methods of its application. Much, for obvious reasons, remains outside the scope of public information. But what is already known allows us to draw some conclusions.

The first and, probably, the main one: electronic warfare equipment is one of the main asymmetric means of waging wars of a new generation. In the West, they are stubbornly called hybrid and are trying to shift their authorship to Russia. Today we are accused of allegedly being the first to wage such a war, which resulted in the annexation of Crimea. But much earlier, there was a “non-contact” aggression of the Western coalition led by USA, as a result of which a unified Yugoslavia. And it was the hybrid wars, planned and unleashed by the same forces, that turned out to be the cause of the current deplorable fate Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, situations in Syria and the catastrophic refugee situation in Europe. It is obvious.

The main capabilities of electronic warfare equipment should be hidden from potential adversaries as much as possible, and the tactics of their use should be based on surprise. This will not allow taking preventive measures, and in combination with the principles of mass, focusing on the main direction (priority objects), it will ensure the achievement of the set goals.

Extremely important and the fact that the basis for the creation of our electronic warfare equipment should be domestic components. Otherwise, as experience shows, this can become our sore spot, which will not fail to hit with sanctions by opponents. A vivid example of this is the state and combat readiness of the main models of Syrian equipment, which today is 50% or less.

With further improvement of domestic electronic warfare means, it is imperative to increase their selectivity and purposefulness of the impact on the enemy's RES. This will minimize the negative impact on the operation of their electronic systems.

At present, one of the main directions should be considered the active development and creation of electronic warfare equipment with millimeter and terahertz operating frequency ranges. Today they are being actively mastered by manufacturers of new-generation RES and high-precision weapons. What will it give? So, if in the lower bands there can be 10 working channels, then at a frequency of 40 GHz there are already hundreds of them. Therefore, to "close" them, more sophisticated automated electronic warfare tools will be required.

Another important conclusion: The West is concerned about our successes in this area and stimulated to improve their electronic warfare equipment, methods of their application. There is no doubt that our “friends” will find finance for this, especially in the context of the ongoing anti-Russian hysteria. Therefore, the very valuable combat experience gained should be used to the maximum by the military and electronic warfare equipment manufacturers for its further development and maintaining its leading position.

Russia drew the right conclusions from the war with Georgia in 2008. The current successes confirm this. Today, according to Yuri Lastochkin, our electronic warfare equipment surpasses foreign analogues in terms of range, nomenclature of targets, and other parameters. At the same time, the share of modern weapons and military equipment in the EW troops is 46%. According to the state defense order, about 300 basic and more than a thousand small-sized electronic warfare equipment were delivered.

Some in the West, not without a share of gloating, savored the information about the latest Turkish electronic warfare system "Coral" (koral), which, they say, will nullify the capabilities of our S-400 air defense system. Without a shadow of embarrassment, they took on faith the statement of the General Staff of the Turkish army that it would disable all Russian radar systems in Syria. Indeed, "Coral" with a range of about 150 kilometers is designed to suppress modern ground, sea and air-based radars.

But, firstly, those who are at least a little familiar with the specifics of our anti-aircraft missile systems can say that they are created taking into account possible electronic countermeasures. Secondly, confirmed evidence of the capabilities of the Coral has not yet appeared. Thirdly, highly effective anti-jamming measures have already been implemented in the S-400 air defense system, which will not allow us to drown out our means.

In a report by the US Army Office of Foreign Studies armed forces it was noted that today Russia has a great potential for electronic warfare, and the political and military leadership understands the importance of such means of warfare. “Their growing ability to blind and disable digital communication systems can help them (Russian. - A.S

There are situations in the life of military pilots when one has to either operate directly over the territory of a strong enemy with powerful air defense, or resist with one friendly link against a more advanced enemy squadron.

Imagine a situation when, by bad luck, a flight of four Su-34s is forced to confront, for example, eight F-22As, and support for more suitable Su-35s or Su-30SMs is far away due to the current operational situation in the air. It’s unpleasant, but there is a chance of a successful confrontation: the Su-34 without any special “equipment” can conduct long-range air combat thanks to a powerful radar with PFAR and good maneuverability. And if the Su-24M link, for example, finds itself in a similar situation, the outcome may be sad.

In order to avoid large losses, as well as to suppress AWACS and multifunctional combat radars of the enemy, specialized electronic warfare systems in various form factors and architectures are being developed, as well as electronic warfare aircraft themselves, which are increasingly in demand by the air forces of many states every year.

The United States, traditionally, was very scrupulous about the electronic warfare of its aviation, this is quite understandable by the status of a real world "aggressor", while our Air Force has a greater potential for electronic warfare of the ground component - the air defense forces and the RTR, i.e. electronic protection of ground defensive systems from air strikes.

EA-6B, in addition to the AN / ALQ-99 complex, can also have a direct fire effect on the enemy radar of the Kharm PRLR

Therefore, it is absolutely clear why the United States is not limited to the creation of relatively inexpensive and effective container-based electronic warfare systems, like Russia, but has mastered a whole family of electronic warfare aircraft of different generations: from the EF-111 "Raven", which at the end of the 70s was the "master" of breaking through weakened air defense the enemy for the impunity invasion of strike tactical fighter-bombers into the airspace of states objectionable to the Americans, to entire airborne EW command posts and psychological suppression based on the military-technical cooperation C-130 "Hercules", called EC-130E "Commando Solo", capable of suppressing air defense systems, conducting strategic intelligence and have a detrimental effect on the human psyche by undermining state broadcasting channels, introducing its own more powerful radio channel with depressing information and pro-American propaganda. Only a few operators manage the radio-electronic complex of this Western "monster".

Now let's focus on the main topic of the article - electronic warfare aircraft. The carrier-based EA-6B Prowler is considered to be a recognized "veteran" in this area, which has been successfully operated for more than 46 years, this aircraft in various modifications managed to participate in most military conflicts conducted in the interests of the United States.

The latest and most advanced version of this aircraft is the EA-6B "Prowler ADVCAP" (Advanced Capability), which provides for the installation of an updated electronic complex presented by powerful complex active noise interference ALQ-99F (V) and the RTR AN / ALP-42 station, which also performs the function of the SPO (exposure warning system) and transmits the coordinates of radiation sources to the ALQ-99F (V) digital computer. Also, two electronic warfare subsystems receive coordinates from the RTR AN / ALP-42 station:

The AN / ALQ-126 complex, which generates response interference of an impulse type to disrupt the “capture” of aircraft in the nearest link and directly to the Prowler of the PARGSN, ARGSN and MRLS enemy air defense systems;

The AN / ALQ-92 system is designed to suppress tactical radio communication channels and data exchange between enemy fighter aircraft and AWACS aircraft, as well as other means of system linkage operating in the frequency range (VHF) or 0.03 - 3 GHz.

The ALQ-99F(V) active jamming complex is capable of delivering noise, barrage and targeted jamming with frequencies from 64 MHz to 40 GHz in PPS and ZPS using two antennas coupled to a 4Pi digital computer and two transmitters with a power of 1000 W / MHz and a gain of 13 dB each. Amplifiers for the transmitter of certain frequencies are powered by a universal generator of the UUEU type. The data on the 4Pi digital computer comes from the on-board computer of the AN/AYK-14 type system.

In 1993, information appeared about the integration of another AN / ALQ-149 active jamming station into the AN / ALQ-99 containers, the transmitting antenna arrays of which were installed directly in the first container. The price of the new subsystem was about 800 thousand dollars, and the need for the installation was to cover the middle and lower frequencies of the meter range in order to successfully suppress the AWACS radars of the P-14 Lena type and others.

In fact, the EA-6B "Prowler" electronic warfare aircraft became one of the most effective and popular in the Air Force along with the F-4G "Wild Weasel" and F-111A "Raven", the latter distinguished themselves in Operation Desert Storm, presenting an advanced strike echelon of MRAU, which in a matter of hours "turned off" the outdated Iraqi AWACS system.

Having served in the US Navy until November 2014, the Prouler, while still remaining at an advanced level of technology in terms of avionics, began to “physically” become obsolete: the thrust of two Pratt Whitney J52-P-408 turbojet engines was 10,000 kgf, but the airframe design limited top speed 1100 km / h, and a large mass created a thrust-to-weight ratio of no more than 0.5, so the aircraft could not independently emerge victorious from close combat imposed by enemy fighters, the EPR of the "interference" also left much to be desired.

Therefore, on November 15 of this year, a flight of Prowlers from the VAQ-134 Garudas electronic warfare squadron (deck-based, aircraft carrier USS D. Bush) made a farewell ferry flight to the US Navy's Whidbey Island airfield, completing its deck history. The Prowler was replaced by a 2 times faster, more maneuverable and high-altitude electronic warfare aircraft EA-18G "Growler", which was originally created on the basis of a two-seater F / A-18F, but optimized for the use of electronic warfare systems.

At the core of the Growler is the same AN ​​/ ALQ-99F (V) CAP, but unlike the outdated RTR AN / ALP-42 information station, the latest AN / ALQ-218 (V) 2 (LR700) system is installed on the new aircraft , which in the passive mode has an azimuth resolution of the direction finding of radiation sources 2 , and a range resolution of about 8%. This RTR is capable of providing clearer target designation to the main AN / ALQ-99F (V) CAP, as well as tracking MRLS with fast digital frequency hopping without disrupting the direction finding of coordinates.

Airborne tactical information exchange and electronic warfare on the aircraft EA-18G

Instead of an active jamming station for enemy tactical communication channels AN / ALQ-92, an AN / ALQ-227 (V) 1 is installed, which is partially an autonomous system, since it has its own omnidirectional antenna and can operate independently of the RTR station AN / ALQ-218 (V )2.

In addition to all the innovations, the aircraft has a powerful radar with AFAR AN / APG-79, which can detect a fighter with an EPR of 3 m 2 at a distance of 160 km; Growler", for this reason, for normal radio communications and radar operation, the INCANS electromagnetic compatibility module was introduced into the Growler equipment, which optimizes the frequency resonance of the aircraft's electronic systems. When you need powerful spot suppression of a small area radio equipment the enemy can also use the AN / APG-79 antenna array.

In addition to the “interference” and anti-radar effects, the Growler can carry out an air superiority operation with absolutely no problems thanks to a powerful radar with AFAR

American airborne ECM systems are among the best, especially when used against older types of air defense systems and radars. What can our domestic defense industry oppose against the electronic "killers" from the United States?

Russia, which has focused on ground-based electronic countermeasure systems of the SPN-2, SPN-4 types and a mobile automated electronic warfare system to cover the early warning radar, AWACS and air defense systems, has developed only one of the most advanced in several modifications for different carriers:
L-175VE "Khibiny-10V" - for high-precision front-line fighter-bomber;
L-265M10 "Khibiny-M" - for the super-maneuverable fighter of the 4 ++ generation;
L-265 "Khibiny-U" - for a two-seat highly maneuverable Su-30SM fighter;
KS-418E "Khibiny" - for the Su-24MK.

Su-34 with a full set of Khibiny-10V, including a group countermeasures container

This complex is a system of two containers installed at the wingtips for self-defense, and for group electronic warfare - a third container on the central ventral pylon, with a more powerful emitter capable of creating barrage and noise interference for a friendly link or squadron with a significant removal of reconnaissance and fighter aircraft and enemy ground or ship air defense positions.

The Khibin RTR module has a surveillance frequency range of 1200 - 40000 MHz, and a jamming station of 4-18 GHz for self-defense containers, and 1-4 GHz for group protection containers. Thus, the EPS of self-defense containers (wingtips) completely suppress the entire frequency range of firing target designation and illumination radars (G, H, X, Ku, J), and the EPS of group protection containers suppress the ranges (L, E, S), which makes it possible to achieve suppression detection and target designation radars, which will give out false information on the composition of the group “hiding” behind interference.

It is worth noting the disadvantage of the complex, which consists in small viewing angles of the front and rear hemispheres (90 per hemisphere), the American AN / ALQ-99 has an all-angle view. According to the logic of things, the advanced equipment of the Su-34, Su-35 and Su-30SM is capable of ensuring high-quality and accurate operation of the Khibiny and covering the defended air connection from the Patriot or Standard-2 (3) air defense systems, as well as jamming, covering the flight of the Kh-58 PRLR or tactical KR-PKR of the Kh-59MK2 (X-35U) type, which was actually confirmed in the operation of two Su-34s that destroyed the key Georgian radar and air defense systems Buk-M1 and S-125.

To date, the Khibiny is one of the most effective electronic warfare systems, but the American SAP AN / ALQ-99F (V) with its RTR systems attached to it is in no way inferior to our system, and even surpasses it in terms of accuracy, so the Khibiny needs to be finalized , which is carried out as part of the Kaluga NIRTI project called "Tarantula".

/Evgeny Damantsev/

Russia is actively developing and producing electronic security equipment (EW) designed to combat combat control systems. Electronic warfare complexes suppress and disable radio-electronic means of command and control of troops and weapons. In our country, 18 enterprises that are part of the Radioelectronic Technologies Concern (KRET) are engaged in the creation of electronic warfare.

Electronic warfare systems are the technical basis for information warfare. They neutralize control systems by suppressing, disabling and destroying electronic equipment. Electronic warfare systems are used in the sky, on the ground and in space.

KRET was established in early 2009 to conduct the development and production of aviation, land and sea radio-electronic complexes, as well as military and civilian systems. It is part of the Rostec State Corporation, which owns 100% of the concern's shares.

TYPES OF ELECTRONIC COMBAT SYSTEMS

Electronic warfare systems can be divided into several groups. These are means of suppression (REP), means of protection (REZ) and means of intelligence (RER).

REB means create active and passive interference, apply decoys and traps to disrupt the operation of electronic systems and facilities.

REZ means eliminate or weaken the impact of electronic weapons on their radio-electronic objects, and also protect against unintentional mutual radio interference of electronic intelligence.

RER means are designed to collect intelligence information by receiving and analyzing electromagnetic radiation.

The use of all electronic warfare means increases the efficiency and increases the survivability of military equipment. The main buyer and customer of electronic warfare systems produced by the KRET concern is the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

EW SYSTEMS PRODUCED BY KRET

In accordance with the decree of the President of the country, by 2020 in Russian army there should be at least 70% of new generation equipment. In 2013, the Ministry of Defense adopted seven unique electronic warfare systems produced at KRET enterprises.

The station of electronic intelligence and control "MOSKVA-1" is designed to scan the airspace. Having found equipment equipped with radio elements, the station transmits the received data to the means of electronic warfare, air defense and the Air Force to neutralize targets. Unlike conventional radars, Moskva-1 operates in passive radar mode - it captures the target's own radiation, while remaining invisible to the enemy.

As part of the state order for 2013, 10 multifunctional jamming systems "KRASUHA-4" were delivered to the Ministry of Defense. The system is produced by the Bryansk Electromechanical Plant (BEMZ). This complex is capable of completely covering areas of land several hundred kilometers from radar detection, suppressing the action of enemy aviation radars and communications.

KRET also supplied the RF Armed Forces with more than 10 MERCURY-BM multifunctional jamming stations. They are designed to protect personnel and equipment from being hit by artillery shells and rockets equipped with radio fuses. "Mercury-BM" was developed by the All-Russian Research Institute "Gradient".

In addition, several unique PRESIDENT-S aviation complexes and active jamming stations SP-14/SAP-518 were delivered. These systems interfere with aircraft homing missile systems, causing the fired missiles to deviate from their intended target. "President-S" was developed and released by the Research Institute "Ekran". The complex is designed to protect helicopters, military transport aircraft.

The means of electronic protection called "AVTOBAZA" was developed by the All-Russian Research Institute "Gradient" and released by the Novgorod NPO "Kvant". The complex is designed for passive detection of radiating radar systems and transmission to the automated control point of the coordinates of operating radars, their class and frequency range numbers. Several such complexes are currently in service with the Russian army.

PLANS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS

The SAP-14/SAP-518 stations provide protection for the Su-34 4+ generation fighter-bomber, the Su-35S 4++ generation super-maneuverable multi-purpose fighter, and the Su-27SM fourth-generation multi-role highly maneuverable all-weather fighter. Universal devices are produced by the Kaluga Research Radio Engineering Institute (KNIRTI).

The means of electronic protection called "AVTOBAZA" was developed by the All-Russian Research Institute "Gradient" and issued by the Novgorod NPO Kvant. The complex is designed for passive detection of radiating radar systems and transmission to the automated control point of the coordinates of operating radars, their class and frequency range numbers. Several such complexes are currently in service with the Russian army.

PLANS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS

KRET enterprises are constantly working on new electronic warfare systems. 12 air and ground systems are under development. In particular, by order of the Ministry of Defense, experimental design work is being carried out to create unique complex"Khibiny-U".