Institute- a number of rules that perform the function of limiting the behavior of economic agents and streamlining the interaction between them, as well as appropriate mechanisms for monitoring compliance with these rules.

Types of institutions:

1. In terms of origin socio-economic institutions can be divided into:

*natural

*artificial.

An institution is natural if its emergence and formation was not preceded in time by a plan - an ideal normative model that existed in the mind of the subject or was fixed in a symbolic form.

Artificial include institutions formed by human actions, carried out in accordance with the ideal normative model. The artificial involves anticipating actions, not reacting to them after the fact.

2. The level of formality and are divided into

*formal

*informal.

They rely on formal and informal rules.

Formal institutions are obligatory for execution by all or certain citizens; for their failure to comply, the authorities (state, leader) apply appropriate sanctions. Failure to comply with informal institutions may result in sanctions in the form of a change in attitude on the part of other people. The structure of formal institutions includes political and economic institutions, contracting institutions, etc. Special organizations are created to perform the functions of formal institutions.

3. By type of occurrence and delimited to:

*primary (backbone, basic)

*secondary (derivatives), in particular primary and secondary contracts. This is due to the fact that the action of the mechanism, having ensured compliance with the rules, involves a set of actions that regulate another set of rules.

Allocate and tertiary.

4. Internal and external institutions

The reason is the need to distinguish between institutions and organizations when defining one object. For example, the characteristics of an organization in terms of structure are internal institutions, while the rules within which they interact with other organizations can be defined as external institutions.

5. By areas of functioning single out the institutions of the market, firms, households, the state, the economy, politics, ideology, ethics, etc.

6. By prevalence

* Universal institutions (property law);

* Group institutions (law on commodity exchanges, rules, common among students);

* Single institutions (specific contract for the purchase of a complex product).

7. By the status of certain participants institutions can be divided into:

* Focused on specific, specific participants;

* Oriented to indefinite participants - everyone who can carry out the actions organized by this institution.

The intersection of these classifications gives 4 types of economic institutions:

1) Formal structure for indefinite participants;

2) Formal structure for certain participants;

3) Informal structure for undefined participants;

4) Informal structure for certain participants.

Type 1 includes constitutions, laws and regulations, customary law, ordinances, model provisions and general contracts,

To the 2nd - organizations created for its known future members, single contracts for a specific transaction, etc.

The third type covers the norms, customs, codes, habits that existed or are being "implemented" in various sets of economic agents.

In the 4th are considered informal organizations, for example, clubs, as well as norms and routines for certain groups of people.

However, the problem exists in (in classification) to determine the angle of view or criteria for classification. The matrix method is used to systematize institutions.

The search for institutional equilibrium is carried out along the main diagonal.

The meta-institution is the stabilizer, the initiator of new prototypes (Kingdom, House of Lords), directs all the rest.

Backbone - Institute of Economics. Ideology, property, traditions.

Economic organizations, institutions, agreements, etc. form a single structure, which can be called institutional structure society. Three-level research scheme proposed by Williamson.

Three-level research scheme

At level 1 - individuals, or economic agents;

At level 2 - various institutional agreements in the form of markets, firms;

At the 3rd level - the institutional environment, including the backbone rules of the game.

According to Williamson, the institutional environment is the rules of the game that determine the context in which economic activity takes place. Basic political, social and legal rules form the basis of law, exchange and distribution. The institutional environment determines the nature of relations and connections between economic entities that form institutional agreements. An institutional arrangement is a contractual relationship or governance structure that unites economic units and determines the way they cooperate and/or compete. The institutional arrangement affects the functioning and types of economic organizations.

Institutions originally arise on the basis of human instincts and the simplest needs; contributing to their satisfaction, they acquire a self-sustaining character and, according to the feedback principle, form stereotypes of thinking.

Formal rules include a set of political (legislative, legal) rules, economic rules and contracts.

* Political rules in a broad sense define the hierarchy of the state, its basic decision-making structure and the characteristics of control over the "agenda".

* Economic rules define property rights. Contracts define the conditions, rules for the exchange.

The function of the rules is to, given the initial abilities of the exchanging parties, facilitate the exchange, be it economic or political.

Informal restrictions cannot be precisely determined. They are some generalization of rules that help solve the endless problems associated with the exchange, but which are not considered within the framework of formal rules. They are more stable over time, they are much more difficult to change. They allow people to exchange without thinking about each step and without a detailed analysis of all the nuances of the transaction being concluded. Practice, tradition, and culture are words by which the permanence of informal restrictions can be defined. They consist of a general agreement that contributes to solving problems of coordination, with all parties having an interest in having all economic agents support this tacit agreement (for example, the rules of the road). Informal restrictions include norms of behavior that are generally accepted (eg norms of behavior, certain relationships in the family, business, etc.), as well as codes of conduct (eg honesty). Agreements themselves contain some kind of coercion. After all, the rules and norms of behavior are supported by the fact that the second party, in case of their failure to comply, can carry out retribution, or there is some third person who can use his powers and apply some social sanctions. The effectiveness of these norms of behavior will depend on the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism.

Functions of institutions.

Institute- a number of rules that perform the function of restricting the behavior of economic agents and streamline the interaction between them, as well as the corresponding mechanisms for monitoring compliance with these rules. The following can be distinguished functions institutions:

1. Structural and backbone. The market model is a system of institutions arranged and connected in a certain way.

2. Regulatory (only through institutions can the economic system be regulated).

3. Distribution. (The distribution of not only some factors of production, but also information. There is always an underproduction of institutions in society, so any system has a relative effectiveness.)

4. The presence of institutions reduces transaction costs (i.e., the costs of searching and processing information, evaluating and specifically protecting a particular contract).

5. Institutions form the certainty of behavior and thus reduce risks. Institutions provide predictability for the results of a certain set of actions (i.e., social reactions to these actions) and thus contribute to economic activity sustainability.

Economic behavior as decision making. Within the framework of economic theory, the behavior of economic agents - actions aimed at the rational use of limited resources - is considered as a sequence of decision-making acts. An economic agent, based on its objective function - a utility function for a consumer, a profit function for an entrepreneur, etc. - and the available resource constraints, chooses such a distribution of resources between possible areas of their use that ensures the extreme value of its objective function.

Such an interpretation of economic behavior is based on a number of explicit and implicit premises (which are discussed in detail in the final chapter of the textbook), among which it is important to highlight one here: the mentioned choice the option of using resources is conscious in nature, i.e., it involves knowledge agent as the goal of his actions, and the possibilities of using resources. Such knowledge can be both reliable, deterministic, and include knowledge of only some probabilities, but in any case without information about the purpose of the action and resource constraints, the choice of the variant of the action (use of resources) is impossible.

The information necessary for making a decision can either already be in the memory of an economic agent (individual) or be specially collected by him to select a course of action. In the first case, the decision can be made immediately, in the second case, a certain period of time, necessary to obtain (collect, purchase, etc.) the necessary data. In addition, obtaining the necessary information (in addition to what is already in the memory of the individual) inevitably requires the expenditure of resources, i.e., the incurring of certain costs by the agent.

Restrictions in decision making. This means that the constraints that arise within the framework of the decision-making task that mediates economic action include not only "standard" constraints on the available material, labor, natural, etc. resources. They also include restrictions on the available information as well as time limit- by the amount of that period of time during which it is necessary to optimally (from the point of view of a particular objective function) allocate resources.

If the time for collecting the necessary information in the presence of other restrictions (for example, on funds for its acquisition) exceeds the maximum allowable, the individual is forced to make a decision with incomplete information obviously losing in efficiency use of the resources available to him.

Let us suppose that the government has announced a competition for the executor of a very lucrative contract, setting a limited time for submission of proposals, and announcing that the winner is determined not only by the criterion of price, but also by the criterion of the quality of the project for the execution of the contract. In such circumstances, a firm that fails to develop a detailed contract execution plan within a given timeframe may be at a loss, despite adequate ability to perform the contract on the merits.

Obviously, in this example, the time limit determines the increased costs of other resources for its implementation. If a company, for example, did not strive to develop a business plan only with its own (limited) resources, but hired third-party specialists to develop it (naturally, incurring high costs), it would enter the competition with better documentation and could become its winner. In other words, this example demonstrates some "interchangeability" of time and resource constraints.

Consider, however, another example: suppose that a worker is given the task of turning a piece on a lathe. Obviously, this task involves the performance of a whole series of separate actions, each of which, in principle, can perform many different ways: the workpiece from the place of their storage to the machine can be carried quickly or slowly, in a straight line or in another line, the workpiece can be fastened by tightening the nuts with more or less force, it can be cut with different cutters, the cutting speed can also be selected in a fairly wide range, etc. e. If our employee decided to optimize all his actions by explicitly setting and solving the appropriate resource allocation problems, it is easy to guess that, having received the task last year, he would still solve such problems this year. The fact is that, say, only the optimization of cutting modes requires setting up hundreds of experiments to obtain the necessary data, and the formulation, for example, of a criterion for optimizing the trajectory of an individual's movement in general is a task that is not clear how to solve. This example also highlights the importance of this type of constraint, such as limited calculative abilities of people, the impossibility of carrying out long-term and large-scale calculations by them without appropriate tools.

Let's take another example. Let a group of citizens wishing to jointly engage in business in Russia seek to register as a legal entity. She can prepare some set of documents which, as it seems to her is quite sufficient for this, having spent your efforts, time and money on it, and come with it to the registration authorities. If this set does not comply with the requirements of the law, these authorities will naturally not register such entity. Our group of citizens can repeat their unsuccessful attempts for an indefinite period, using, in essence, the method of trial and error, but not succeed. After all, the

above limited calculative and predictive abilities will not allow them to guess which documents and in what form must be submitted to the registration authorities in order to obtain the desired status.

The above provisions, examples and reasoning clearly show that real economic agents - business entities - make decisions not only on the basis of incomplete, limited information about resources and how to use them, but are also limited in processing capabilities and processing this information to select the best course of action. Thus, real economic agents, according to the terminology proposed by Herbert Simon, are boundedly rational subjects.

Bounded rationality is a characteristic of economic agents, problem solving choice in conditions of incomplete information and limited opportunities for its processing.

Meanwhile, of course, no normal person in the situations outlined above with the processing of a part on a lathe or the preparation of documents for registering an enterprise, it does not set and solve the problem of sequential optimization of each of its actions, or prediction of a set of requirements for documents. Instead, people use samples(templates, models) behavior.

So, in relation to the example of making a technological decision, instead of calculating the optimal trajectory and speed of movement from the warehouse of blanks to the machine, the worker goes as used to walk: habit is typical and common sample behavior. Instead of experimentally discovering the best cutting conditions for a material with which he has not yet worked (if there is already experience in working, then habit is in effect), the worker will take advantage of reference book, in which the optimal modes of processing of various materials are recorded.

For the example of preparing documents for registering an enterprise, instead of "experimental" identifying the requirements for this set, people use legal documents, for example, the text of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Part 1, Chapter 4) and other regulations.

It is easy to see that such an entry in a directory or a provision of a normative act (and also a habit, if one tries to reconstruct it logically) is finished model rational (optimal) action:

if the current situation is S, proceed as A(S).(1.1)

This implies that the method A(S) is such that the resulting result is the best possible from the point of view of the decision criteria typical for situation S.

Regardless of whether there is a ready-made pattern of behavior directly in the memory of the individual (it was developed on the basis of own experience, a series of trial and error, or obtained in the learning process, also does not matter), or found in external sources of information, its application occurs according to a completely standard scheme:

situation identification;

selection of a template of the form (1.1), including the identified situation;

Action in a manner that matches the pattern.

If we compare the above stages with the stages of the decision-making process, there is an obvious saving effort(and therefore saving resources and time) when determining which action to take. Adding to this the fact that the listed actions are often performed unconsciously, in an "automatic mode", it is easy to come to the conclusion that

Patterns and patterns of behavior are means of saving resources within the framework of the tasks of determining best ways actions.

The distinguished characteristic of the behavior models used by economic agents in the course of rationalizing the use of their limited resources to determine how to use them implicitly assumes that individuals either use internal models (habits) or choose some external models to follow (to follow). them). At the same time, following patterns and patterns, in full accordance with the provisions of economic theory, they behave rationally, maximize their utility (value, value, etc.).

However, direct observation shows that there are other patterns and patterns of behavior in life, following which hinders individual to maximize his utility function.

Let us consider one more example, which this time is not conditional, but quite specific. In Western universities, when conducting written exams, there are often no teachers or other faculty members in the classrooms. It would seem (from the point of view of a typical domestic student), created ideal conditions for cheating, using cheat sheets, etc. However, none of the examinees behave in this way. The explanation (more precisely, its first, superficial layer) is very simple: if one of those taking the exam decides to do this, his colleagues will immediately inform the teacher about it (“they will inform” or “trick”, as they say), and the dishonest student will receive a well-deserved zero score (if not expelled at all).

On the part of students who write honestly in their papers, such behavior (“whistleblowing”) will be simply following a habit that, like many other habits, has a completely rational basis. Indeed, depending on the results of the exams, students receive an appropriate rating, and depending on the rating, the demand for graduates from employers is formed. Consequently, a student who uses a cheat sheet or cheats on an exam gains an unreasonable competitive advantage in hiring and determining his salary. By reporting his misbehavior, other students eliminate, thereby, an unscrupulous competitor, which is a completely rational action.

At the same time, for those of the examinees who have insufficient knowledge to pass the exam successfully, the mentioned habit of others is clearly hinders take action that can bring to him benefit. At the same time, being confident that the deception will be revealed (which threatens with a significant loss of usefulness), such a student, despite the skill, will still refrain from trying to get an inadequately high score.

In this situation, it can be said that he follows the pattern or pattern of behavior - however against your will, rationally comparing the benefits and costs of deviation from this model, actually imposed on him by others.

Models or patterns of behavior that speak of how one should behave in a given situation are commonly called rules or norms.

Summarizing the above, we can conclude that in real life In addition to the resource, time and informational restrictions on the choice of courses of action and methods of using resources known from economic theory, there are other types of restrictions associated with the existence of norms or rules1.

Norm (rule). The study of norms, primarily social ones, i.e., those that operate in society and its individual groups, and are not individual habits, has traditionally been (and is) engaged in by philosophers, sociologists, and social psychologists. In neoclassical economic theory, which is the core of all modern economic science, this category is absent. The explanation for this, in the light of the above information explanation the emergence of rules is quite transparent: if the information about the decision-making situation is complete, free and instant, there is no need for the emergence of rules and, moreover, for their introduction into economic theory.

Since, nevertheless, there are rules in reality, and they significantly affect the behavior of economic agents, their costs and benefits, this phenomenon deserves a fairly detailed and close study.

The most general category within the discussed range of concepts is the concept social norm.“Social norms are the most important means of social regulation of behavior. With their help, society as a whole and various social groups that develop these norms present their members with the requirements that their behavior must satisfy, direct, regulate, control and evaluate this behavior. In the most general sense of the word, normative regulation means that an individual or a group as a whole is prescribed, "given" a certain - proper - type of behavior, its form, one or another way of achieving a goal, realizing intentions, etc., "given" a proper form and the nature of relations and interactions of people in society, and the real behavior of people and the relations of members of society and various social groups are programmed and evaluated in accordance with these prescribed, “given” standards - norms, ”wrote the Russian philosopher M.I. Bobneva2.

The presence in society of norms as patterns of behavior, deviation from which gives rise to the punishment of the violator by other members of society, limits, as noted, the choice for the individual, preventing the implementation

1 In principle, the concept of norm and the concept of rule can be distinguished, but such a distinction is purely “tasteful” in nature, so we will not do this here, assuming that the respective terms are synonyms. The use of one or the other of them will be further regulated only by the stylistic Social norms and regulation of behavior, M.: Nauka, p. Z.

tions of his striving for rationality. “Rational action is result-oriented. Rationality says, "If you want to achieve goal Y, take action X." On the contrary, social norms, as I understand them, not result oriented. The simplest social norms have the formula "Take action X" or "Don't take action X". More complex norms say: "If you take action Y, then take action X," or: "If others take action Y, then take action X." Even more complex norms might say, "Take action X because it would be nice if you did." Rationality is inherently conditional and future-oriented. Social norms are either unconditional or, if conditional, they are not future-oriented. To be social, norms should be shared by other people and to some extent be based on their approval or disapproval of this or that type of behavior,” Yu. Elster noted3.

It should be noted that the "formulas" of social norms given by J. Elster are their abbreviated expressions that do not reflect logical structure appropriate type of expression. The latter includes:

description of the conditions (situations) in which the individual is obliged to follow the model;

a description of the pattern of action;

a description of the sanctions (punishments that will be applied to an individual who behaves not in accordance with the model, and / or rewards that the individual who follows the model will receive when in the appropriate situation) and their subjects; the subjects of sanctions are also called guarantors norms.

It is important to emphasize here that the term “description”, used to characterize the structure of any norm, is understood quite broadly: it can be any sign construction, from spoken or thought words to notes on paper, stone or magnetic media. In other words, the above structure is characteristic of any norm - both existing (as a sign model of proper behavior) only in the minds of a group of people or in the form of a record of a researcher of their behavior, and recorded in the form of a certain official text and sanctioned by the authorities of the state or the leadership of any organization.

AT logical research usually a more complex characteristic of the norms is considered. When analyzing them, they distinguish: content, application conditions, subject and character norms. “The content of a norm is an action that can, must or must not be performed; application conditions - this is the situation specified in the norm, upon the occurrence of which it is necessary or permissible to implement the action provided for by this norm; the subject is the person or group of persons to whom the norm is addressed. The nature of the norm is determined by whether it obliges, allows or prohibits the performance of some action, ”wrote the Russian logician A.A. Ivin4.

Such a characterization of norms does not contradict their complete logical structure introduced above. The fact is that from the point of view of economic analysis,

3Elster Y. (1993), Social Norms and Economic Theory // THESIS, vol. 1, no. 3, p.73.

4Ivin A.A. (1973) The logic of the rules M.: Publishing house of Moscow State University, p.23.

the character of the norm - binding, prohibiting or allowing - is not its essential feature. After all, any norm, regardless of its nature, in the implementation of economic action acts as a certain selection limiter. Even a norm that clearly provides new opportunities does so only for a relatively limited circle of the latter, adding to the set of acceptable alternatives, but by no means making it universal, comprehensive.

The restrictive nature of any norm is very important for understanding many forms of economic behavior observed in practice. If the agent sees that his action A is capable of bringing him a significant benefit, but is prohibited by some norm N, he may well have incentive to break this norm. How is the decision usually made in this case? If the expected benefit from the breach, B, exceeds expected costs of violation, C, then it turns out to be rational break N. The expected costs of a breach depend on whether the perpetrator is identified and punished, so behaviors such as deceit, misinformation, cunning, etc., will help reduce the likelihood of punishment.

Behavior aimed at pursuing one's own interest and not limited by moral considerations, i.e., associated with the use of deceit, cunning and cunning, is usually called opportunistic behavior in economic theory.

However, the violation of this or that rule, being individually beneficial, can lead to negative externalities, i.e. impose additional costs on other individuals, which in total may exceed the individual benefit of the violator (for example, the costs associated with the increase in uncertainty that is generated by deviations individuals from the expected ways of acting in a “normalized” situation). Therefore, from the point of view of maximizing value, such violations are undesirable. Sanctions act as a means of preventing them - certain punishments for violation of the norm, i.e. actions aimed at reducing the usefulness for their object, for example, by imposing some additional costs on it. The subject of sanctions is the guarantor of the norm - an individual who identifies a violation and applies sanctions to the violator.

Quite often, breaking a rule can, however, lead to value maximization. Suppose a merchant has agreed with a wholesaler to buy from him a batch of 100 teapots at a price of 200 rubles. This agreement led to the emergence of some temporary rule of their mutual behavior. Having hired a truck for 1000 rubles, he arrives at the wholesaler, and finds that the teapots have already been sold to that other merchant, for example, at a price of 220 rubles. a piece. This violation of the agreement (a temporary rule formed by two private individuals) created an increase in value of 2,000 rubles, but imposed a cost of 1,000 rubles on the first merchant. The total balance still remains positive, but there are negative externalities - direct losses of one of the subjects of the rule. These losses will obviously be eliminated if the wholesaler reimburses the defrauded buyer for his costs, but does the wholesaler have an incentive to do so? Such incentives will arise if the original rule is secure, i.e., if there is some guarantor that will force the wholesaler to either fulfill the first agreement (which is not economically rational) or compensate the costs of the first merchant. In the latter case, violation of the rule will lead to an increase in cost, and there will be no negative external effects, i.e., there will be a Pareto improvement in the initial situation.

Thus, in view of the above,

The norm includes: situation B (conditions for applying the norm), individual I (addressee of the norm), prescribed action A (the content of the norm), sanctions S for failure to comply with order A, as well as the entity applying these sanctions to the violator, or norm guarantor G.

It is obvious that this complete the structure (or formula) of a norm may often not exist in reality. In other words, she is only logical reconstruction, model a complex set of behavioral acts, subconscious ideas, images, feelings, etc.

Institute as a unit of analysis. The norm formula given above describes a wide variety of different rules, from individual habits that often change under the influence of circumstances to centuries-old traditions, from school rules signed by its headmaster, to state constitutions adopted by referenda by the majority of the population of the country.

Within the framework of this variety of rules, it is important to distinguish, at this stage of the analysis, two large classes that differ in the mechanisms for forcing them to be executed. In general enforcement mechanism we will refer to the set consisting of its guarantor (or guarantors) and the rules of its action governing the application of sanctions to identified violators of the "basic" rule. On this basis, the set of various rules is divided into:

matches its addressee I; such rules have been described above as habits; they can also be called stereotypes of behavior or mental models of behavior; for habits interior a mechanism for forcing them to comply, since the addressee of the rule imposes sanctions for their violation;

Rules in which the guarantor of the norm G notmatches its addressee I; such rules are characterized external a mechanism for forcing them to comply, since sanctions for violating such rules are imposed on the violator from the outside, by other people.

Accordingly, the concept of institution can be given the following definition:

An institution is a set consisting of a rule and an external mechanism for forcing individuals to comply with this rule.

This definition differs from other definitions widely used in the economic literature. For example, Nobel Prize winner in economics Douglas North gives the following definitions:

“institutions are the “rules of the game” in society, or, more formally, the man-made restrictive framework that organizes relationships between people”5, these are “rules, mechanisms that ensure their implementation, and norms of behavior that structure repetitive

5 North D. (1997), M.: Nachala, p.17.

interactions between people”6, “formal rules, informal restrictions and ways of ensuring the effectiveness of restrictions”, or “humanly invented restrictions that structure human interactions. They are formal restrictions (rules, laws, constitutions), informal restrictions (social norms, conventions and codes of conduct adopted for oneself) and mechanisms for forcing their implementation. Together, they determine the structure of incentives in societies and their economies.

Summarizing these definitions, A.E. Shastitko interprets the institution as

“a number of rules that perform the function of restricting the behavior of economic agents and streamline the interaction between them, as well as the corresponding mechanisms for monitoring compliance with these rules”9.

In practice, any of these definitions can be used, if we clearly remember the fact that the mechanism for enforcing the "basic" rule within the framework of the institution is an external mechanism, specially created by people for this purpose.

Attention to the definition of the concept of an institution is important because institutions represent the basic unit of analysis institutional economic theory, and their totality is subject this theory. Obviously, a clear definition of the subject of research is necessary for the systematic presentation of any scientific theory. At the same time, separating the content of one concept from those similar to it is also important from a purely practical point of view, since it guarantees against erroneous transfer of conclusions made in relation to one objects and situations to other, different objects and situations.

To clarify the importance of this role of a rigorous definition of the concept of institution, let us pay attention to the following points. The behavior of economic agents following a particular rule demonstrates a certain regularity, i.e. is repetitive. However, it is not only existing institutions that lead to repetitive behavior of individuals, but also other mechanisms having a natural origin, that is, not at all not created by humans.

The existence of an institution suggests that the actions of people depend from each other and affect each other, that they cause consequences (externalities, or in other words, external effects) that are taken into account by other people and by the acting economic agent himself. Natural mechanisms, as a result of their objective existence, lead to similar results, but repetitive actions turn out to be the consequences of decisions made by individual economic agents. independently of each other and without taking into account the possible sanctions that the guarantor of one or another rule may apply to them.

6North D. (1993a), Institutions and Economic Growth: A Historical Introduction// THESIS, v. 1, issue 2, p.73.

7North D. (19936), Institutions, Ideology and Economic Efficiency// From plan to market. The future of the post-communist republics, L.I. Piyasheva, J. A. Dorn (eds.), M .: Catallaxy, p. 307.

8North, Douglass C. (1996), Epilogue: Economic Performance Through Time, in Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, Lee J. Alston, Thrrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C North (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 344.

9Shastitko A.E. (2002) M.: TEIS, p. 5 54.

Let's look at a few hypothetical examples. People living on the upper floors of high buildings, wanting to go outside, use elevators (if they break down, they go down the stairs), thereby demonstrating the unconditional repetition of their behavior. None of them (with the exception of suicides) jump out the windows: a person understands that such an act of his will be “punished” by the law of gravity. Is it possible to speak of the noted regularity as an institution? No, because the mechanism of "punishment" of deviation from general order action has nothing to do with the creation of it by people.

In a competitive market, prices for homogeneous products, showing a certain dispersion, nevertheless, have the same level. The seller who sets twice the price in such a market will definitely be "punished" by ruin. Is it possible to speak here about the existence of the institution of establishing an equilibrium price? No, because buyers who avoid buying goods at an overpriced price do not set themselves the goal of punishing the relevant merchant at all - they simply accept (independently of each other) rational decisions, the unplanned result of which is the “punishment” of such a seller.

People tend to eat regularly: a person who deviates from this regularity risks sacrificing his health. Is regular nutrition an institution? The reader who reads the above examples will confidently answer “no”, but he will be only partially right: there are situations in life in which regular eating is an institution! For example, the regularity of feeding children in the family is supported by various punishments for those who evade from the elders; the regularity of meals for soldiers in the army is supported by the formal norms of the charters; the regularity of feeding patients in hospitals is ensured by sanctions from the staff. Thus, the same observed behavior can be either the result of a rational choice (say, a creative worker in the process of creating a work of art forces himself to break away from work in order to eat) or habit (the bulk of people who eat regularly), and the result of an action social institution.

The importance of distinguishing patterns of behavior between those determined by institutions and determined by other causes is associated with a correct understanding of values ​​of institutions in the economy and other spheres of society, with the solution of practical problems of improving the welfare and efficiency of resource use. If analysis shows that some mass actions are irrational, the source of this can (and should) be sought both in the realm of objective causes and in the realm of institutions that regulate behavior.

The value of institutions. From observations of economic life, it is easy to see that the laws adopted by the state power that determine certain rules for the implementation of various economic transactions - the conclusion of contracts, accounting, advertising campaigns, etc. - most directly affect both the structure and levels of costs, and the efficiency and results of economic activity of enterprises.

Thus, tax incentives for venture capital stimulate risky investments in the innovation process - the most important resource for economic growth in the modern economy. Prohibited use in countries European Community aircraft engines with excessive noise levels can cause tangible negative consequences for the domestic aircraft industry and tourism. Various options for resolving conflicts between employers and employees, in particular those related to the participation or non-participation of trade unions in them, can significantly change the situation on the labor market. The rules of tariff and non-tariff regulation of exports and imports, along with the ratio of prices in the domestic and world markets, directly affect the incentives for the implementation of relevant operations, etc.

The rules mentioned (and others similar to them) are, as is easy to see, forms of state regulation of the economy, i.e., conscious actions of the state and its individual bodies aimed at changing the behavior of economic agents. Obviously, some special

no further proof of the influence of the institutions formed and conditioned by such actions is needed. Another question is more relevant more often: why the introduced rules do not affect on the real behavior of economic agents and the economy as a whole, or affect completely not this way, as intended by their authors?

From the point of view of economic theory, the legally established rules of economic activity are nothing more than a special type of restrictions on the possibility of using resources, or resource restrictions, and the latter, of course, affect economic results.

However, the same direct observations of economic processes do not give a clear answer to another question: do the rules (both introduced through laws and formed in the past in some other way) affect the economy? not being forms of state regulation, ways of conducting economic policy? In other words, do all institutions matter for the functioning and development of the economy, or only those that directly prescribe or limit the actions of agents in the distribution and use of resources?

The question of the significance of institutions, their impact on economic growth and efficiency of the economy, is repeatedly discussed in the classic works of researchers who laid the foundations of a new institutional economic theory.

Thus, in the already mentioned book by D. North "Institutions, institutional changes and the functioning of the economy" there are many historical examples that clearly demonstrate the diverse nature and scale of such an impact.

One of the most striking examples of this kind is the explanation by D. North of the sharp divergence in the economic power of England and Spain that occurred in modern times, after a long state of approximate equality of their forces in the 16th-17th centuries. In his opinion, the reason for the growth of the English economy and the stagnation of the Spanish economy was not the resources as such (Spain received more of them from the American colonies than England), but the nature of the relationship between the royal power and the economically active nobility. In England, the power of the crown in the field of seizure of income and other property was significantly limited by the Parliament, which represented the nobility. The latter, thus having reliable protection of its property from power encroachments, could make long-term and profitable investments, the results of which were expressed in impressive economic growth. In Spain, the power of the crown was purely formally limited by the Cortes, so that the expropriation of property from potentially economically active subjects was quite possible. Accordingly, it was very risky to make significant and long-term capital investments, and the resources received from the colonies were used for consumption, and not for accumulation. As a long-term consequence of the basic political and economic (constitutional) rules adopted in these countries, Great Britain became a world power, and Spain was transformed into a second-rate European

Institutions that were by no means ways of state regulation of the economy, in this example, proved to be powerful in Spain. restrictions on business activity, which actually suppressed economic initiative. In the newest Russian history period 1917–1991 in this respect can be characterized as decades during which the economic initiative

The issue of the influence of the level of property protection on economic decisions and economic development will be considered in more detail in Chapter 3 of the textbook.

was suppressed not only indirectly, but also formally legally: in the Criminal Code of the USSR, private entrepreneurial activity was interpreted as criminal offense. At the same time, the political institutions of Great Britain acted as powerful accelerators of economic growth.

The above examples, which demonstrate the economic significance of seemingly non-economic institutions, have one feature: they are all in fact only possible interpretations observable social processes.

In this regard, the evidence obtained in the studies of the second half of the 1990s, which used the technique of econometric analysis to conduct cross-country comparisons and identify the impact of various factors on economic growth, is of particular importance for convincing evidence of the economic significance of various groups of institutions. To date, about a dozen such large-scale and expensive projects have been completed, which, differing in details, show a statistically significant positive relationship between the indicators of economic growth of countries and the “quality” of institutions functioning in them: the higher the indicators of the latter, the higher and more stable, in general, demonstrated indicators of economic growth.

Here is a brief summary of the results of one such study conducted by the staff of the World Bank11. It compared data for 84 countries for the period 1982-1994, characterizing, on the one hand, their economic growth, and, on the other hand, the quality of the economic policy pursued and the degree of protection of property rights and contracts. The growth rate of real GDP per capita was used as a measure of economic growth. The quality of economic policy was assessed by three indicators: inflation rate, tax collection and openness to foreign trade. The degree of protection of property rights and contracts as an expression of the quality of the institutional environment in the country was measured by the indicator developed in the International Guidelines for Country Risk Assessment. This indicator includes numerous assessments of the security of property rights and contracts, grouped into five groups: the rule of law, the risk of expropriation of property, the refusal to fulfill contracts by the government, the level of corruption in power structures, and the quality of the bureaucracy in the country.

At the first stage of the study, F. Kiefer and M. Shirley built a typology of countries according to the values ​​of these qualitative indicators, highlighting two gradations for each of them - a high level and a low level, then determining for each of the formed four groups of countries the average values ​​of the economic growth indicator . It turned out that in countries with a high quality of economic policy and a high quality of institutions, economic growth rates amounted to about 2.4%; in countries with a low quality of economic policy and a high quality of institutions - 1.8%; in countries with high quality policies and low quality institutions - 0.9%; in countries with low quality of both factors -0.4%. In other words, countries with inadequate economic policies but a high-quality institutional environment grew on average twice as fast as countries with an inverse combination of quality levels of the corresponding factors.

At the second stage of this study, an econometric equation was constructed that links the growth rate of real per capita income with indicators characterizing political and institutional indicators, investment activity, and the level of quality of the labor force in the country. This more subtle analysis showed that the qualitative conclusions obtained on the basis of a typological comparison are fully confirmed quantitatively: the degree of influence of an institutional indicator on the growth rate of real souls

11 Keefer, Philip and Shirley, Mary M. (1998), From the Ivory Tower to the Corridors of Power: Making Institutions Matter for Development Policy, World Bank (mimeo).

output income was almost twice as high as the degree of influence of political indicators.

So, based on theoretical provisions and empirical evidence, we can conclude:

"Institutions Matter"

Douglas North

Coordinating and distributive functions of institutions. Through what mechanisms do institutions acquire and realize their economic significance? To answer this question, it is necessary to characterize the functions that they perform in economic life, in the activities of economic agents.

First of all, as noted earlier, institutions limit access to resources and the variety of options for their use, i.e., they perform the function restrictions in the problems of making economic decisions.

By limiting possible courses of action and lines of conduct, or even prescribing only one permissible course of action, institutions also coordinate the behavior of economic agents who find themselves in a situation described by the conditions for applying the relevant norm.

Indeed, the description of the content of an institution operating in a certain situation gives each of the economic agents in it, knowledge about how his counterparty should (and most likely will) behave. Based on it, agents can and most likely will form their own line of behavior, taking into account the expected actions of the other side, which means emergence of coordination in their actions.

We emphasize that the condition for such coordination is awareness of agents about the content of the institute, regulating behavior in a given situation. If one of the subjects knows how to behave under certain circumstances, and the other does not, coordination may be disrupted, as a result of which the participants in the interaction may incur unproductive costs. A typical example is the rules of the road: a driver who does not know them, when crossing his path with the main road, may try to pass without letting cross-traffic pass, which, in turn, can lead to a collision of cars.

The performance by institutions of the function of coordinating the actions of economic agents generates and causes the emergence coordination effect. Its essence is to provide savings for economic agents at the cost of studying and predicting behavior other economic agents that they encounter in different situations.

Indeed, if the rules are strictly observed, there is no need to make special efforts to predict how the partners will behave: the range of their possible actions is directly outlined by the current institution.

Thereby,

the coordinating effect of institutions is realized through reducing the level of uncertainty the environment in which economic agents operate

Reducing the level of uncertainty external environment, provided by the existence of institutions, allows you to plan and implement long-term investments, seeking to create more value. In addition, the money saved on research and prediction of the behavior of counterparties can also be used for productive purposes, enhancing the coordination effect. On the contrary, in an uncertain environment, in the absence of existing institutions, economic agents not only face low expected benefits from the planned investments (which, obviously, can lead to their refusal to implement), but are also forced to spend funds on various precautionary measures in the implementation of economic measures, for example - for the insurance of transactions or their individual components. Thus, the coordination effect is one of the mechanisms through which institutions have an impact on the efficiency of the economy.

It should be noted here that the coordinating effect of institutions arises and manifests itself as a factor positively affecting the economy only if the institutions agreed among themselves according to the prescribed directions of actions of economic agents. If a different rules, coinciding in the conditions of their application, determine mismatched types of behavior, the uncertainty of the external environment for economic agents increases if there is no “meta-rule” in the totality of institutions that regulates the actions of conflicting rules.

For example, in systems of national laws, such a meta-rule is usually present in the form of a provision that in the event of a conflict between national and international law the norms of international law apply; in the event that a state administration body adopts two conflicting by-laws, it is generally accepted that the one adopted later should be applied, etc.

Therefore, the coordination effect inherent in any individual institution, when considering the totality of the latter, may not be observed if the institutions are not coordinated with each other (see also the section of this chapter "Variants of the correlation of formal and informal rules").

Any institution, by limiting the set of possible courses of action, therefore influences resource allocation economic agents, performing a distributive function. It is important to emphasize that the allocation of resources, benefits and costs is affected not only by those rules that directly relate to the transfer of benefits from one agent to another (for example, tax laws or rules for determining customs duties), but also by those that do not directly address these issues.

For example, the introduction of urban land zoning, according to which in certain areas only housing construction and the construction of trade and service enterprises are allowed, while in others industrial construction is possible, depending on the capacity of the respective territories, can significantly affect the direction of investment activity. Establishing complex rules for issuing licenses to engage in certain types of entrepreneurial activity can significantly reduce the influx of start-up entrepreneurs into it, reduce the level of competition in the relevant market, increase prices for the good traded on it, and ultimately redistribute buyers' funds.

In addition to a variety of specific distributional consequences, any institution is also characterized by some general, “typical” distributional effect: by limiting the set of possible ways of action, it either directly switches resources to their allowed subset, or at least increases the costs of implementing prohibited ways of action, by including in them the composition of the expected damage from the application of punishment (sanctions) to the violator of the rule.

The scale of the distributive consequences of the institution's actions can vary within very wide limits, and the connection between these scales and the content of the norm, with its "proximity" to the processes of the functioning of the economy, is far from direct.

For example, discussed in the winter of 2001-2002. changes in the rules of the Russian language, if adopted, could cause serious economic damage, causing significant additional costs for almost all economic agents, diverting their resources to studying new rules, reprinting codes of laws, official forms, texts of instructions, etc., dooming secondary school graduates to relearning the rules they have learned, diverting their attention from other subjects, requiring the reprinting of all textbooks, publications of classics of literature, etc. on the other hand, it switched it into the sphere of managerial activity, significantly changing the entire structure of preferences in the labor market. The long-term consequences of these redistributions are now faced by the Russian economy, which is experiencing a clear shortage of small enterprises.

Thus, the impact of institutions on the distribution of resources, benefits and costs is the second mechanism that determines their economic significance.

Formal and informal rules. The description of any functioning institution with varying degrees of completeness is contained in the memory of individuals who follow the rules included in it: the addressees of the norm know how they should behave in the corresponding situation, the guarantor of the norm knows what violations of the norm are and how to respond to them . Of course, all this knowledge may be incomplete, and also differ from each other in some details.

In addition, the content of the institute can also have an external representation - in the form of a text in a particular language.

For example, an ethnologist studying the customs and behavior of a newly discovered tribe of Indians in the Amazon basin may describe the existing forms of interaction between members of the tribe and publish them in a scientific journal. Similarly, the rules governing the behavior of agents in the shadow sector of the economy can be described and published. E. De Soto's book "Another Path", which analyzes the functioning of the shadow sector of the Peruvian economy, is a classic example of such a description.

Along with this kind of description of the customs followed by various groups of people, the content of institutions is also presented in the form of other texts - laws, codes, sets of rules, instructions, etc.

What is the fundamental difference between these two groups of texts? Publications containing descriptions of customs are the result of initiatives

the work of researchers, they are of no use to anyone are not obligated. Publications containing the texts of laws and regulations are official publications on behalf of states, or registered, i.e. recognized by the state, private organizations (for example, the internal regulations of a university or a trading company), and they oblige all to whom they refer, to comply with the rules of conduct contained in them.

However, the knowledge of customs by members of the tribe or illegal entrepreneurs very strictly obliges both of them to behave in accordance with the norms prevailing in these groups: apostates are expected to have serious sanctions applied to them by other members of these groups - those who discover significant, with its point of view, deviation from the "correct" behavior. Since the behavior of the members of these groups is actually monitored by all their other members, it is clear that the probability of detecting a violation is high, which determines the rigidity of the implementation of this type of rules.

On the contrary, knowledge of officially adopted laws and instructions does not mean at all that the citizens of the state or employees of the organization will strictly comply with them. After all, control over compliance with such norms is usually not carried out by all citizens or employees, but only by a part of them that specializes in performing the functions of a guarantor of the relevant rule - employees law enforcement or executives of the organization. Thus, the probability of detecting a violation may be lower than in the previous case.

The rules that exist in the memory of members of various social groups, in the role of the guarantor of which is any member of the group who noticed their violation are called informal rules

Rules that exist in the form of official texts or verbal agreements certified by a third party, in the role of guarantors of which individuals act, specialized on this function are called formal rules

These definitions differ from the more widely accepted definitions, according to which formal rules are those approved by the state or any organization recognized by the state. Accordingly, all other rules are called informal. This understanding of formal and informal goes back to sociology, in which the state is a special phenomenon that differs sharply from other social phenomena.

In the framework of the new institutional economic theory, the state is one of many organizations, which, of course, has significant differences from other organizations, but these differences are not fundamental. Therefore, in the proposed definitions of formal and informal rules, the distinguishing feature is the presence or absence of people's specialization in the implementation of the function of enforcement of the rules.

At the same time, the proposed definitions do not contradict the “sociological” understanding of formality, since the specialization in enforcement of rules follows logically from the fact that the relevant rules are established or recognized by the state.

Ways to enforce rules. Formal and informal institutions differ not only in these characteristics, but also in other features. Chief among them are the ways or mechanisms to enforce these types of rules.

Regardless of the type of rules, the general logic of any rule enforcement mechanism can be characterized as follows:

(A) The guarantor of the rule observes the behavior of its addressees and compares their actions with the behavior model defined by this rule;

(B) In the event of detecting a discernible deviation of the actual behavior of agent X from the model, the guarantor determines what sanction should be applied to X in order to make the latter comply with the corresponding rule;

(B) The Guarantor applies a sanction to the agent, ordering his current and future actions.

This the simplest circuit the actions of the rule enforcement mechanism can be refined and complicated in terms of describing stages A and B. So, at stage A, the guarantor can not only directly observe the behavior of agents, but also receive information from other subjects who accidentally noticed deviant actions X; at stage B, he may discover not the process of breaking the rule, but the consequences of such a violation; in this case, the guarantor faces an additional task - the search for the intruder and his identification.

Above, a classification of the mechanisms for enforcing rules for execution was given, dividing them into internal and external. The logic of the rule enforcement mechanism, highlighting its components, makes it possible to build theoretical typology possible specific mechanisms for such enforcement. Like any theoretical typology, it can be built on the basis of particular classifications of variants of each of the selected components of the mechanism under discussion. Let's take a closer look at these classifications.

Rule guarantor. This role can be played, as noted above, by (1) either any member of the group in which the institution operates, or (2) an individual (several individuals or an organization) specialized in performing the function of a guarantor, or (3) both at the same time.

The behavior model of the addressees of the rule. Such a model can be (1) formal, fixed in the form of an official text, the exact knowledge of which is both in the memory of the recipients and in the memory of the guarantor of the institution, or (2) informal, existing only in the memory of people, or (3) exist formally and at the same time in the form of people's knowledge of the real practice of implementing the rule, different from a formal order.

The last case, as observation shows, is the most typical, frequent case of the existence of formal institutions. The practice of their existence may differ from formal prescriptions for several reasons, ranging from the impossibility of foreseeing in the formal norm all the variety of real situations, and ending with the deliberately inaccurate and incomplete fulfillment of the norm by its addressees, which, however, is not punished by guarantors, for example, due to their bribery with side of the perpetrators. This practice of executing formal rules can be called their deformalization.

Comparison of actual behavior with model. It can be carried out by the guarantor of the rule both (1) based on its own discretion (its own understanding of what constitutes a punishable deviation from the norm), and (2) in accordance with a certain formal rule (a list of violations).

Choice of sanction. It, as in the previous classification, can be carried out (1) in accordance with the free decision of the guarantor, or (2) be prescribed by some formal rule that assigns its own specific sanction to each possible violation of the norm.

set of sanctions. This classification can be built in various ways, for example, by dividing sanctions into social and economic, formal and informal, one-time and long-term, etc. Obviously, in the aggregate, such separate classifications will determine a certain typology of sanctions. However, for the purposes of describing the mechanisms for forcing rules to be enforced

ing, a different, simpler way is more productive: the formation empirical classification of sanctions that directly generalizes the practice of their application:

public condemnation, expressed in disapproval of an act by a word or gesture, loss of respect or deterioration in the reputation of the sanctioned subject;

official condemnation, in the form of an oral or written comment made by the formal guarantor of the rule; such a censure, in particular, may contain the threat of a subsequent more serious sanction, which will be applied to the offender in the event of a repeated violation of the rule;

money penalty, imposed on the offender;

forceful termination of the initiated action;

coercion (or its threat) to repeat the committed action, but according to the rules - in cases where the violation committed is not irreversible;

restriction of the violator in some of his rights, for example, a ban, under the threat of a more severe punishment, from engaging in a certain type of activity;

deprivation of liberty(imprisonment);

the death penalty.

The listed types of sanctions can also, in some cases, be applied jointly, in the form of various integrated sanctions.

Implementation of the sanctions. The chosen sanction can either (1) be directly imposed at the site of the violation by the guarantor himself, or (2) be carried out by other entities or organizations, or (3) combine both of these methods (for example, a policeman separates or restrains the fighters, applying sanctions of type (4), and the court subsequently awards a monetary fine to the detainees, i.e., applies a sanction of the type (3)).

Options for the correlation of formal and informal rules. The above characteristics of formal and informal rules and ways of forcing individuals to comply with the rules allow us to discuss the issue of ratio options formal and informal rules. The importance of this discussion stems from the fact that informal rules are often understood as non-rigid, violations of which are quite possible and permissible, while the formal ones are interpreted as hard, strictly enforced, since their violation is necessarily associated with the punishment of violators.

Meanwhile, since enforcement of formal rules presupposes specialized activities of guarantors carried out by them on the basis of remuneration for their labor efforts, the success of this activity is largely determined by the incentives of guarantors for the conscientious performance of their official duties. If such incentives are small, the formal rules may actually be less rigid than the informal ones. Therefore, the question of the relationship between formal and informal rules operating in the same situations becomes important for a correct understanding of the observed facts.

We will consider this relation first in statics and then in dynamics. AT static two options are possible: (i) formal and informal norms correspond to each other; (II) formal and informal norms do not correspond (contradict) to each other.

Case (I) is ideal, in the sense that the behavior of the recipients of formal and informal rules is regulated by all possible guarantors acting in concert, so that the probability of inappropriate behavior in regulated situations can be assessed as minimal. We can say that the formal and informal rules in this case mutually support each other.

Case (P) seems to be more typical, since many formal rules introduced either by the state or by the leaders of various organizations are often aimed at realizing their narrow interests, while informal rules shared by various social groups meet the interests of their participants. Of course, the contradiction between such interests is by no means inevitable, but it is quite probable.

In appropriate situations, the actual choice by addressees of uncoordinated norms of one of them (and, consequently, the choice in favor of violating the other) is determined by balance of benefits and costs adherence to each of the compared norms. At the same time, along with the direct benefits and costs of each of the actions, such balances also include the expected costs of applying sanctions for violating the alternative rule.

Correlation between formal and informal rules in dynamics is more complex. Here are the following situations:

a formal rule is introduced on the base a positively proven informal rule; in other words, the last formalized, which makes it possible to supplement the existing mechanisms for forcing it to be executed also with formal mechanisms; an example of such a correlation can be medieval codes, in which the norms protected by the state, the norms of customary law, which were guided by the townspeople in resolving conflict situations, were recorded and acquired the force;

a formal rule is introduced for opposition established informal norms; if the latter are assessed negatively by the state, the creation of a mechanism for forcing behavior that differs from that implied by informal rules is one of the options for the state to act in this area; a typical example is the introduction of bans on duels, which were practiced among the nobility until the first half of the nineteenth century;

informal rules push out formal, if the latter generate unjustified costs for their subjects, without bringing tangible benefits either to the state or directly to the guarantors of such rules; in this case, the formal rule seems to “fall asleep”: without being formally canceled, it ceases to be an object of monitoring by the guarantors and, due to its harmfulness to the addressees, ceases to be executed by them; examples are the numerous precedent-setting court decisions in the US states, taken on individual conflict cases and subsequently forgotten, such as the ban on peeling vegetables after 11 pm;

12. emerging informal rules contribute to the implementation introduced formal rules; such situations arise when the latter are introduced in a form that does not clearly and fully characterize the actions of either the addressees or the guarantors of the rule; in this case, the practice of implementing the "spirit" of the introduced formal rule (if, of course, its implementation is generally beneficial for its addressees) develops and selects such informal behaviors that contribute to the achievement of the goal of the original formal rule - deformalization of rules; examples are the norms of relationships in organizations, which are actually developing “around” formal instructions aimed at achieving the goals more effectively.

In general, as can be seen from the analyzed situations, formal and informal rules can both contradict each other, compete with each other, and mutually complement and support each other.

Williamson's chemo. Discussion of the concept of an institution, its relationship with the concept of a norm (rule), as well as other general issues related to the role of institutions in determining economic behavior, allows us to move on to characterizing the entire aggregates institutions within the economic system as a whole. To solve this problem, it seems useful to take as a basis the three-level analysis scheme proposed by O. Williamson, modifying its interpretation in some way (see Fig. 1.1). This scheme visually represents the interaction of individuals (the first level) and institutions of different types: those that represent institutional agreements(second level), and those that are components institutional environment(third level).

Figure 1.1. Interactions between individuals and institutions

Institutional environment

Institutional agreements

In accordance with the terminology proposed by D. North and L. Davis,

Institutional agreements are agreements between economic units that determine the ways of cooperation and competition.

Examples of institutional agreements are, first of all, contracts - exchange rules voluntarily established by economic agents, rules for the functioning of markets, rules for interaction within hierarchical structures (organizations), as well as various hybrid forms of institutional agreements that combine signs of market and hierarchical interactions (they will be discussed in more detail in later sections of the tutorial).

Institutional environment - a set of fundamental social, political and legal rules that define the framework for establishing institutional agreements

The components of the institutional environment are the norms and rules of the social life of society, the functioning of its political sphere, the basic legal norms - the Constitution, constitutional and other laws, etc. A more detailed description of the components of the institutional environment will be presented in subsequent sections of this chapter. In principle, it would be possible to include the components of the institutional environment directly in the above scheme, but this would significantly complicate the entire presentation, without bringing tangible benefits in terms of clarifying the content of interactions.

Consider the main connections between the blocks of the scheme, indicated in the above figure by numbers.

As a general remark to all the types of influences described below, it should be emphasized that all influences, influences, etc. in the economy, strictly speaking, are carried out, according to the principle of methodological individualism (see the final chapter for more details), only individuals. This means that when we talk, for example, about influence of institutional arrangements on each other(below, item 2), this expression has essentially metaphorical character and is used simply for brevity. Using strict language, one should speak here about the impact of individuals who have concluded one institutional agreement on other individuals when some other institutional agreement is formed between them. However, such an overcomplication of the presentation, in view of the remark made, would, of course, be superfluous.

1. The impact of individuals on institutional arrangements. Since institutional arrangements, by definition, are voluntary agreements preferences and interests of individuals play a decisive role in the emergence (creation) of certain institutional agreements(of course, within the limits determined by the institutional environment).

Depending on what behavioral premises the researcher accepts—that is, depending on how the researcher interprets the economic agent—the explanations for the observed institutional arrangements will also be different. For example, if we assume that individuals have the completeness of all the information necessary for making decisions, including the perfect prediction of future events, as well as the perfect ability to perform inference and perform optimization calculations, it becomes impossible to explain the existence of many types of contracts. It becomes incomprehensible why individuals spend time and resources on their preparation, if the aforementioned complete knowledge should initially give them an answer - it is worth implementing

to influence some long exchange or it is not necessary. If we assume that knowledge is not complete, and computational capabilities are not perfect, the role of contracts becomes quite clear - such (temporarily established) rules bring certainty into the unknown future, streamline future interactions of economic agents. The issues raised will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter of the textbook.

Influence of institutional agreements on each other. The content of this type of relationship is quite diverse: the behavior of individual organizations affects the nature of a changing market (say, building barriers to entry can bring the market closer to a monopolistic one), comprehensive agreements predetermine the types of more private contracts, the rules for the actions of contract guarantors affect the choice of types of contracts concluded by economic agents, and the nature of the market (for example, its segmentation) - on the structure of the company, etc.

Influence of the institutional environment on institutional agreements. The content of this connection follows directly from the definitions of the institutional environment and institutional agreements: the rules that are part of the institutional environment determine the disparate costs of concluding various institutional agreements. If some type of them is prohibited by general rules, then the costs of individuals who decide, despite the prohibition, to conclude such an agreement anyway, increase (for example, the costs of hiding information are added); the expected benefits of such an agreement are also reduced, since the likelihood of success is reduced, etc.

Influence of institutional agreements on individual behavior. Although institutional agreements are entered into by economic agents voluntarily, unforeseen circumstances may change the decision-making situation in such a way that following, for example, a previously concluded contract, may turn out to be unprofitable for an individual. However, the termination of the contract by one party may cause losses to the other party, and in amounts exceeding the benefits of the first (for example, if the second party has already made non-switchable investments). Under these conditions, the existence of a mechanism for forcing a contract to be executed (for example, a judicial one) clearly affects the decision of the first party, thus preventing the occurrence of unjustified social losses.

Influence of institutional agreements on the institutional environment. The most typical way of such influence is closely related to the distributive effects of institutions: an institutional agreement that provides tangible benefits to its participants can form a so-called special interest group - a set of individuals interested in maintaining and increasing the benefits received. For this purpose, under certain circumstances, such a group is able to influence, for example, the legislative process in order to achieve the adoption of a law that consolidates the benefits received by formalizing the previous private agreement.

In economic theory, this mode of action refers to rent-oriented behavior, the analysis of which was paid much attention to by such well-known economists as J. Buchanan, G. Tulloch and R. Ackerman.

Influence of the institutional environment on individual behavior. Such an impact turns out to be fundamental rules both directly (for example, the Constitution of the Russian Federation is a direct action law, i.e. a citizen can directly go to court if he believes that someone violates his rights guaranteed by the Constitution), and through institutional agreements, also formed, as noted above, under the influence of the institutional environment.

The influence of the individual on the institutional environment. Individuals influence the institutional environment in two main ways: firstly, through participation in the elections of the legislative bodies of the state that adopt laws, and secondly, through the conclusion of institutional agreements, the content of which, as noted above, is also capable of influencing the institutional environment.

Not all of the considered interactions are currently studied in economic theory to the same extent. At the same time, the described scheme is a useful tool for a systematic representation of institutions and their interactions through individual behavior. In fact, we will encounter the relationships outlined in it throughout the presentation of the content of the foundations of the new institutional economic theory in this textbook.

Hierarchy of rules. The three-level structure shown in fig. 1.1, in a visual form reflects the hierarchical nature of the relationship of socially protected rules operating in society and the economy. At the same time, the division of the entire set of institutions into the institutional environment and institutional agreements is only the first approximation to the actual correlation of the mentioned rules in terms of subordination, the degree of influence on each other and the rigidity of determining the behavior of economic agents.

The idea of ​​subordination (subordination) of rules is given by the ratio of any zaveta and normative acts adopted on its basis by executive authorities, or by-laws: the law defines the principles, strategies of behavior, while the by-laws specify these principles into action algorithms. For example, taxation legislation determines the income tax rate, and the instruction fixes the rules for calculating the amount of taxable profit, linked to specific accounting forms, accounts, etc. A long-term contract concluded by two firms regarding their interaction in the field of research and development fixes, that firms will jointly conduct research in which they are interested; at the same time, for each specific research project, a special agreement is concluded that fixes such points as the subject and purpose of the project, the forms of participation of the parties, the amount of funding, the distribution of copyrights, etc.

The subordination of rules is, as follows from the above examples, a widespread phenomenon that takes place both within the institutional environment and in the totality of institutional agreements. The examples given also demonstrate the general principle meaningful order rules: a norm of a lower order clarifies and reveals the content of a norm of a higher order. The latter, more general, outline the framework, the details within which regulate more particular norms.

Of course, not all rules are interconnected by similar content-logical relationships. A significant part of them in this regard do not correlate at all with each other, that is, with regard to their pairs, it cannot be said that one rule is more or less general than the other. For example, the rules of the road and the rules for calculating income tax are not comparable within the framework of the principle of content-logical order.

However, any rules become comparable if, as a basis for comparison, we choose such a characteristic of them as costs of introducing (or changing) rules having under the costs not only monetary costs, but also the totality of the efforts of economic agents, including psychological costs, as well as the time required to introduce or change the institution12.

With this approach, the more general, standing higher in the hierarchical ladder, are the rules, the costs of changing or introducing which are greater than those of the rules compared with them.

The "economic" hierarchy of rules is strongly correlated with their content hierarchy (of course, if the latter exists). Thus, it is obvious that the costs of drafting and adopting a Constitution through a referendum are higher than the corresponding costs for laws, which, in turn, are higher than those for by-laws. Therefore, the convenience of the economic hierarchy of rules lies primarily in the fact that it allows you to compare and order such rules, between the content of which there is no semantic connection.

Now, based on the division of the entire set of rules into those that form the institutional environment, and those that represent institutional agreements, as well as from the introduced ideas about the hierarchy of rules, let us consider in more detail the content of the institutional environment and institutional agreements.

supra-constitutional rules. All components of the institutional environment are rules that determine the order and content of the "subordinate" rules. Such "meta-rules" can be both formal and informal. The most general and difficult to change informal rules that have deep historical roots in the life of various peoples, are closely related to the prevailing stereotypes of behavior, religious ideas, etc., and are often not realized by individuals, i.e., they have passed into the category of stereotypes of the behavior of large groups of the population , are called above constitutional rules. They determine the hierarchy of values ​​shared by broad sections of society, the attitude of people to power, mass psychological attitudes towards cooperation or opposition, etc.

The supra-constitutional rules are among the least studied, both theoretically and empirically. In fact, with regard to them, there are only separate speculative constructions and disparate

12 In this case, the cost of time does not necessarily correlate with the cost of money, since changes in the rules of behavior are also influenced by natural forgetting of information, not associated with special expenses incurred for this purpose.

actual observations of researchers (mainly philosophers and sociologists) that do not allow for a rigorous logical reconstruction of this layer of the institutional environment.

Probably the first (at least the most famous) work devoted essentially to the study of supra-constitutional rules was the book by Max Weber "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism", in which this German sociologist convincingly showed the influence of religious behavioral attitudes and moral values ​​inherent in Protestantism, on the relationship and rules of interaction between economic agents and their attitude to work, i.e., the rules of labor behavior.

constitutional rules. In economic theory constitutional It is customary to call the rules of a general nature, structuring the relationship between individuals and the state, as well as individuals among themselves. In fulfilling these functions, constitutional rules, firstly, establish the hierarchical structure of the state; secondly, they determine the rules for making decisions on the formation of state authorities (ministries, departments, agencies, etc.), for example, voting rules in democratic states, inheritance rules in monarchies, etc.; thirdly, they determine the forms and rules for controlling the actions of the state by society.

Constitutional rules can be both formal and informal. For example, the rules for the succession of power in monarchies may take the form of an unwritten custom or tradition, while the rules for voting in elections of the legislature of a state may take the form of a carefully written law.

Constitutional rules, as a special layer of the institutional environment, can be distinguished not only at the state level, but also at the level of other organizations - firms, corporations, non-profit foundations, etc. Their function in them is performed, first of all, by charters, as well as various corporate codes , mission statements, etc. The identification of such local, intra-organizational rules with constitutional ones is possible on the basis of functional understanding of the latter, since from a legal point of view, the relevant documents have, of course, nothing to do with the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state.

In this regard, it is necessary to draw attention to the significant difference between the economic and legal understanding of constitutional rules, which prevents the establishment of mutual understanding between representatives of the respective branches of science. If, as follows from the above, the economic understanding of constitutional rules is very broad and is in no way connected with the form of representation of the corresponding rules (recall, they can be informal), then the legal understanding of the constitution has a much stricter and narrower meaning. For example, the rules of inheritance of power in monarchies mentioned above, which take the form of custom or tradition, are legally irrelevant to the constitution, as well as intra-company codes, mission statements of non-profit organizations, etc. This distinction must be kept in mind by economists when reading legal research affecting issues of constitutional law.

economic rules and property rights. Economic rules are called directly defining forms of organization of economic activity, within which economic

agents form institutional agreements and make decisions about the use of resources.

For example, economic rules include quotas for the import or export of certain products, prohibitions on the use of certain types of contracts, legally established deadlines for the validity of patents for inventions, etc.

Economic rules are the conditions and prerequisites for the emergence property rights: the latter arise when and where and when rules are formed in society that regulate their choice of ways to use limited goods (including resources). In this connection, it can be said that when we study property rights, we study economic rules, and vice versa.

Probably, one of the first economic rules that regulated economic activity were the rules defining the boundaries of territories where primitive tribes searched for and collected edible plants and animals. This rule determined the property rights of the tribe in the corresponding territory: within its borders, gathering could be carried out without hindrance, while outside it a member of one tribe could collide with representatives of another, which would result in a conflict over who owns the found plant or caught animal.

Confirmation that the "rule of the territory" could be one of the first economic rules is the fact that many animals leading a (relatively) sedentary lifestyle have such territories (ethologists - specialists who study animal behavior - call them revirs). ). Some of the animals (for example, dogs, wolves) mark the boundaries of their revere in a certain way, while the marks serve as signals for other individuals of the same biological species that the territory is “occupied”, “belongs” to one of the other individuals.

Property rights define those actions in relation to an object that are permitted and protected from obstacles to their implementation by other people. From this point of view, we can say that the situation of choice is determined by property rights.

Property rights are those permitted and protected ways of using scarce resources that are the exclusive prerogative of individuals or groups.

Essential to understanding property rights is, on the one hand, their specifications, and on the other - blur.

Ownership specification is the creation of an exclusivity regime for an individual or group by defining a subject of law, an object of law, a set of powers that this subject has, as well as a mechanism to ensure their observance.

In order to understand the property rights specification, it is important that who (what the guarantor) provides it and how it is carried out broadcast law (if it is allowed at all).

When it comes to formal rights, they are usually specified state. At the same time, within an enterprise, for example, certain formal property rights can be specified by its management. Along with the formal impersonal specification, which is based on the daily practice of interaction between economic agents, i.e., the guarantor is any member of the group noticing the violation. It refers usually to informal property rights that exist as a consequence of the existence of informal rules.

The most important function of the property rights specification process is to give the latter properties exclusivity.

The right of ownership is called exclusive if its subject is able to effectively exclude other economic agents from the decision-making process regarding the use of this right

The exclusivity of a property right does not mean that it belongs to individual i.e. to a private person. A group of people, an economic organization (legal entity), and finally, the state can have exclusive rights. These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, which deals with the analysis of different ownership regimes.

The exclusivity of property rights is economically important because it creates incentives for the efficient use of resources: if the subject's property rights to the result of using his resources are not exclusive, he has no incentive to maximize this result, since all or any part of it can go to another.

For example, if the farmers of a settled tribe are regularly raided by nomads who take most of their crops and leave enough grain so that the farmers just do not starve to death, there is no incentive for the farmers to strive to maximize the productivity of the land. They will tend to grow only the bare minimum of grain, spending the “freed up” resources on other purposes, such as securing their rights by hiring armed protection, or simply spending their time in idleness.

In a sense, the reverse of the specification process is erosion of property rights. This term refers to the practice of violating the exclusivity of rights, leading to a decrease in the value of the object of the right for the subject, since the expected income stream must be discounted at a higher interest rate (taking into account the risk of expropriation). The regular raids of nomads, which figured in the previous example, just represent a form of erosion of farmers' property rights to crops. Thus, the actual level of exclusivity of a given ownership right is a function of the process of specification/dilution of ownership.

Contracts. As noted above, contracts (agreements) are the most typical types of institutional agreements. In terms of the latter, a contract can be defined as a rule structuring in time and / or space the interaction between two (or more) economic agents regarding the exchange of property rights on the basis of obligations voluntarily assumed by them as a result of the agreement reached13.

In principle, any rule can be interpret like a contract. For example, the relationship of a slave owner and a slave, despite their obvious inequality of rights, was subject (especially in the late period of the existence of slave ownership) to quite certain rules. Accordingly, these rules can be interpreted like some exchanges: the master provided the slave with housing and food in exchange for his work; the master restricted the freedom of the slave in exchange for his protection from

13 The topic of contracts is discussed in detail in the 5th chapter of the textbook.

encroachments of other, perhaps more cruel, masters, etc. Of course, since the mentioned rules were by no means the result of a voluntary agreement (with the exception of the conscious sale of oneself into slavery by a previously free citizen), the identification of such “exchanges” is precisely a possible interpretation of the rules of slavery . An expanded interpretation of contracts, similar to the one given, is called contract approach to the analysis of economic institutions.

The essential points of a contract as a rule that distinguish it from other types of rules are:

Consciousness and purposefulness of the development of this rule by its addressees (contract parties); other rules may be formed without prior thought or design, by trial and error;

voluntariness, mutual benefit of participation in the contract of its parties; other types of rules may be highly asymmetric in terms of the distribution of costs and benefits;

the limited effect of this rule only by its addressees - the parties to the contract; other types of rules - for example, state-imposed laws - apply not only to legislators, but to all other citizens;

the direct connection of the contract with the exchange or other transfer of property rights (for example, a donation agreement of any property that does not imply a “counter” movement of other property from the beneficiary to the donor); other kinds of rules may not directly affect transfers of property rights.

Contracts are rules that "serve" (i.e. coordinate) various exchanges. Market exchanges are considered to be the most common form of exchanges, but in general, the variety of types of exchanges is much wider.

We will call an exchange the alienation and appropriation of property rights for certain goods between two or more agents, due to their conscious interaction.

Alienation and appropriation of property rights means their redistribution. The exchange is such a redistribution of property rights, which is associated with the adoption of decisions by its participants. The results of the redistribution of property rights (exchange) obviously depend on how, under what conditions, its participants make decisions. It is important to distinguish between these conditions, or decision-making situations, on the basis of selectivity and symmetry. On the basis of selectivity, the whole set of exchanges can be divided into selective ones, where the subjects have the opportunity to choose the counterparty, subject and proportions of the exchange (in particular, the price), and non-selective ones, where such an opportunity is absent. On the basis of symmetry, exchanges are divided into symmetrical and asymmetric. Within the framework of the first group, the possibilities of choice are the same for the parties; within the framework of the second group, they are not the same.

Combining these features, it is easy to obtain a theoretical typology that includes 4 types of exchanges, of which two are asymmetrically selective and

asymmetrically non-selective - actually describe one asymmetric type of exchanges.

An additional variety in the typology of exchanges is introduced by the sign "guarantor of exchange" - a subject or social mechanism that protects the new distribution of property rights to the object (s) of exchange. The following options are distinguished here: (1) one of the participants in the exchange; (2) both participants in the exchange; (3) third party - an individual or a private organization; (4) the state represented by one or more state law enforcement organizations; (5) tradition, custom. In this case, a typical case is the protection of the exchange simultaneously or sequentially by several guarantors.

For example, for market contracts that correspond symmetrically to selective exchanges, a typical case is their multi-layered protection, which includes all the listed types of guarantors, some of them in several different versions. Thus, to prevent violation of the agreement under option (3), the following are used: large and reputable trading companies, associations of enterprises, arbitration courts, as well as criminal organizations; under option (4) - representatives of the regional administration, regional legislative assemblies, as well as courts14.

Since contracts are consciously developed rules that structure the interactions of their parties for some (finite or indefinite) period of time, each contract can be considered as joint activity plan these sides. If any rule provides the agents who know it with only some descriptive information about future possible actions of other economic agents (in situations regulated by the relevant rule), the contract, being a set of mutual obligations, carries normative, directive information about actions that must be committed parties in the future.

Of course, like other rules, contracts may not be enforced, i.e., violated (torn) by the party that considers that the benefits from the rupture (i.e., from switching the violator's resources to another type of activity) exceed the costs associated with sanctions imposed on her for failure to fulfill her obligations. However, the probability of violating the contract can generally be estimated as less than the probability of violating other rules. After all, the contract is developed and concluded purposefully; this means that its parties have the opportunity to take into account their own interests in this joint action plan. On the contrary, many rules are focused on the realization of the interests of their developers, while completely different economic agents must comply with such rules. If such rules impose excessive unproductive (for them) costs on the latter, and enforcement is not too tight, or the sanctions are small, the rule will not be enforced with a high probability.

Rules and rights. In the section Economic Rules and Property Rights, we defined property rights as derived from economic rules. This ratio is maintained for any rights and rules. Any right of an individual (or organization) is the ability to freely carry out certain actions, in particular, actions in order to

14 The classification of exchanges is described in more detail in the book: Tambovtsev V.L. (1997) The state and the transition economy: the limits of manageability, M.: TEIS.

or other object (property). This possibility is a direct logical consequence of the rule that such actions are not subject to sanctions by the guarantor of this rule. Actions punished within the framework of forcing the rule to be executed do not constitute the content of anyone's right.

When an individual acts in accordance with a rule, that is, becomes its addressee, he automatically acquires the rights inherent in this role. This means that, in performing the actions permitted by the rule, he will not meet with any opposition and, therefore, will not have to bear the costs necessary to protect himself from such opposition. This means that, from an economic point of view, rights are means of saving resources in the process of taking action.

Of course, individuals can perform actions to which they have no rights. However, as noted above, they may be subject to sanctions and incur losses. Therefore, the expected benefits from taking such an action will be less than if the individual had the right to do so.

It can thus be concluded that it is rights are another (in addition to the effect of coordination) specific social mechanism with the help of regulations provide cost savings.

Conclusion

The content of this chapter, devoted to the basic concepts of the new institutional economic theory, of course, does not exhaust all the problems associated with them. A number of important, but more "subtle" issues, remained outside its scope. These include, for example, issues of diversity forms of description of institutions and their comparative advantages for solving various theoretical and applied problems, problems explanations origin of institutions (discussed in part in Chapter 6) and predictions the emergence of new institutions, etc. Many of these problems are only discussed in current scientific research, there are no generally accepted solutions for them, which is an obstacle to including them in a textbook, while others are sufficiently developed, but are of a private nature, and considered in the framework of training at the master's level.

Basic concepts of the chapter

Bounded rationality

Behavior pattern

Norm (rule)

Opportunistic behavior

Rule Enforcement Mechanism

15 Unless, of course, this rule contradicts some other rule shared by an individual who also claims the benefits with which the first individual acts. See above for the relationship between formal and informal rules.

Institute

The restrictive function of the institution

Institute coordinating function

The distributive function of the institute

Formal rules

informal rules

Institutional environment

institutional agreement

Hierarchy of rules

Supra-constitutional rules

constitutional rules

economic rules

Contracts

Ownership

Exclusive ownership

Ownership specification

Erosion of property rights

Review questions

Is information a constraint on economic decision making?

What is the relationship between limited information and the emergence of habits?

Do patterns of behavior always maximize utility?

Is breaking a rule always undesirable from an economic point of view?

Is every rule an institution?

Does the presence of regularity in behavior always mean the existence of a corresponding institution?

Is it true that any institution creates a distributional effect?

How do formal rules differ from informal ones?

How can formal and informal rules be related in statics and dynamics?

What is the logic of the rule enforcement mechanism?

What is included in the institutional environment?

What are institutional agreements?

What types of rules are, from an economic point of view, constitutional rules?

What are rights?

How are rules and rights related?

What are property rights?

What is the main function of a property rights specification?

Is it true that the exclusivity of property rights is possible only when their subject is an individual?

What is an exchange and how can exchanges be classified?

Questions for reflection

How, with the help of what research procedures, can one single out among the various observable regularities in people's behavior those that are due to the existence of institutions?

Are institutions public goods? If they are, what is the overall effect of underproduction of public goods for them?

Is the state always interested in a clear specification of property rights?

Literature

Main

North D. (1997) Institutions, institutional changes and the functioning of the economy, Moscow: Beginnings, preface, ch. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7.

Eggertsson T. (2001) Economic Behavior and Institutions, M.: Delo, ch. 2.

Additional

North D. (1993a), Institutions and Economic Growth: A Historical Introduction// THESIS, v. 1, issue 2, p. 69–91.

Tambovtsev V.L. (ed.) (20016), Economic analysis of regulations, M.: TEIS, ch. 1–3.

Shastitko A.E. (2002) New Institutional Economics, M.: TEIS, ch. 3, 4, 5.

Elster Yu. (1993), Social norms and economic theory // THESIS,vol. 1, no. Z, pp.73–91.

The rules in question are a mechanism for compensating for our ignorance of the consequences of particular actions, and the importance we attach to these rules is based both on the magnitude of the possible damage they are designed to prevent and on the likelihood of damage that is possible if they are not observed. It is clear that these rules can only fulfill their function if they are applied for a long time. This follows from the fact that rules of conduct contribute to the formation of order, since people follow these rules and use them for their own purposes, for the most part unknown to those who made these rules or have the authority to change them. Where, as in the case of law, some rules of conduct are consciously set by the authorities, they will only serve their purpose if they form the basis of individual plans of action. Thus, the maintenance of spontaneous order through the enforcement of rules of conduct must always be oriented towards long-term results, in contrast to the rules of the organization, which serve known specific tasks and must, in essence, strive for predictable results in the near future. Hence the striking difference between the approach of the administrator, who is necessarily concerned with particular known consequences, and that of the judge or legislator, who must be concerned with maintaining an abstract order and neglecting concrete, foreseeable consequences. Focusing on specific results inevitably leads to focusing only on short-range goals, because special results can only be foreseen in the short term. This gives rise to conflicts between special interests, which can only be resolved by a powerful decision in favor of one side or the other. Thus, the predominant orientation towards visible short-term effects gradually leads to a dirigiste organization of society as a whole. Indeed, if we focus on immediate results, freedom is doomed to perish. A nomocratic society must limit the use of violence to the task of enforcing rules that serve the long-term order. The idea that a structure whose observable parts do not appear to have a purpose or form a recognizable plan, and where the causes of events are unknown, is a more effective basis for the successful pursuit of our goals than a deliberately created organization, and that our advantage that changes are taking place whose causes are unknown to anyone (because they reflect facts that are generally unknown to anyone) - this idea is so opposed to the ideas of constructivist rationalism, which has dominated European thought since the 17th century. that it gained general recognition only with the spread of evolutionary or critical rationalism, which recognizes not only the possibilities but also the limits of reason, and recognizes that this reason itself is a product of social evolution. On the other hand, striving for the kind of transparent order that meets the requirements of the constructivists must lead to the destruction of an order that is far more inclusive than any that we could consciously create. Freedom means that to some extent we entrust our destiny to forces that are beyond our control; and this seems unbearable to those constructivists who believe that man can be the master of his own destiny - as if it were he who created civilization and even reason.

More on the topic Rules can only perform their functions with prolonged use:

1. Abstract rules of fair conduct can only define opportunities, not specific outcomes.

Institute in a market economy in the very general view is a relatively stable manifestation of a complex of economic, legal, social and moral and ethical relations,

Institutions, according to the definition of T. Veblen, are fixed in traditions, informal norms, and then in written law. They form the basis of social organizations that mediate economic processes.

Representatives of the "new institutional economics" define institutions as norms of economic behavior arising directly from the interaction of individuals.

R. Coase, the founder of the neo-institutional direction of economics, studied the influence of institutions on the economy based on the principles of rationality and individualism. He proposed the practical use of the concept of "institution" and introduced a new term "transaction costs", by which he understood all the costs arising from the transaction. He proved that developed market institutions reduce transaction costs, which positively affects the economy as a whole.

The representative of modern institutionalism, D. North, defines institutions as the rules of the game in society , or, to put it more formally, the human-made bounding boxes that organize interactions between people.

Rules- these are generally recognized provisions that prohibit or allow certain types of actions of one individual (or group of people) in relation to others. A rational choice is possible only when generally accepted rules are used; if they are ignored, the transaction becomes impossible.

economic rules determine the possible forms of organization of economic activity, in which individual individuals or groups cooperate with each other or enter into competitive relations. The economic rules are the rules of ownership and responsibility.

The rules reflect the same, repeatable relationships and actions that allow you to make a rational choice. For example, compliance with agreements on the quality of the goods supplied, maintaining the contract price, etc. But the rule is not mandatory - It may or may not work. The choice of action will depend on the presence of common values ​​recognized by the subjects of the transaction.

Following the rules is necessary condition preservation of the institution as the basis for maintaining order in the process of interaction. A rational choice can only be made using generally accepted rules that reflect the repetition and uniformity of being. If the rules are ignored, the simplest transactions are impossible.

concept "norm" this legalized rule implies the obligatory implementation and application of legal sanctions in case of deviation from it, i.e. how an individual should behave in various situations (voluntarily or in the presence of sanctions). The significance of norms is determined by their functions.

Norm functions:

1. Provides predictability of the subject's behavior. The norm becomes the basis for economic consent. Occur as a result of consolidation mutually beneficial relationship, the norm makes it possible for all participants in the transaction to understand the intentions of each party, it, as it were, informs others about the intentions of each.

2. Reduces the degree of uncertainty in the interactions of subjects. The norm reflects the stability, the repetition of individual moments in people's behavior, therefore, it increases the stability of relationships, as if explaining the mutual intentions of the participants.

3. Ensures the achievement of the goal. In fact, this is a legalized procedure for organizing a business. Conscious or unconscious violation of norms is a source of contradictions, which can have both positive and negative consequences. Separate violations of the norms by the individual are suppressed by the organization, or he is deprived of the opportunity to act as the face of the organization. An increase in the number of violations of the norms, or the number of persons violating the norms, leads to the destruction of the organization and the creation of a new form of it, with new norms and rules. So, guild workers, cooperatives, private entrepreneurs successively succeeded each other.

Since the goal of any organism, any association is its self-preservation, such an instrument as sanctions is introduced to comply with the norms. The use of sanctions transforms the norms from a voluntary agreement into a mandatory one, since the violation of the norms is followed by economic, legal and social punishments. The legitimization of the norm by the state allows it to control and direct the process of formation of new subjects of the institutional economy

Douglas North identifies formal and informal rules and the enforcement mechanisms that enforce rules.

Formal rules- rules created centrally, consciously and legally. Formal rules are written laws, such as criminal or civil code, a set of rules of the road. They change quickly enough, for this it is enough to issue a new resolution. The presence of such rules does not mean that citizens will necessarily comply with them, and does not mean that everyone will control the implementation of these rules by others. For this, special bodies are created or these functions are transferred to the management of enterprises. The probability of detecting violations of such rules is very low. Much depends on the control system. Control is also work that requires remuneration. Remuneration acts as an incentive for conscientious performance of their duties. If incentives are low, formal rules may be less rigid than informal ones.

informal rules- universally recognized, but not fixed centrally, not requiring external coercion mechanisms. These may include moral and ethical standards, customs, traditions that exist in society. They are controlled by virtually all members of the community, but this is unofficial control, the violation is noticed, but not corrected, and the perpetrator is not punished.

Formal and informal rules are interrelated: formal ones arise on the basis of existing informal ones, and informal ones can be a continuation of the formal ones. In principle, the relationship between formal and informal rules occurs in three ways.

1. A formal rule is introduced on the basis of a positively proven informal rule, i.e. it is formalized. An example is industrial gymnastics, which was common in the past.

2. A formal rule can be introduced as a counteraction to an informal one, if it is assessed negatively by society, i.e. the state intervenes in the existing way of life. An example of this is the ongoing anti-smoking campaign in Russia.

3. Informal rules displace formal ones when the latter generate unjustified costs without providing significant benefits to either the state or the subject. Formally, the rule has not been canceled, but it is no longer controlled and enforced.

Formal rules can be changed by the state, while informal restrictions change very slowly. Both formal rules and informal restrictions are ultimately formed under the influence of people's subjective worldview, which, in turn, determines the choice of formal rules and the development of informal restrictions.

Enforcement mechanisms in this case ensure compliance with the rules. Enforcement mechanisms - formal and informal sanctions for violation of the rules, as well as information about the presence of sanctions.

If we take the level of implementation of the rules as a criterion, then we can distinguish between global and local rules. Global - constitutional (political) and economic - form the institutional environment, local rules (contracts) ensure the functioning of individuals and individual subjects.

constitutional rules establish conditions for decision-making at various levels of government. They determine the hierarchical structure of the state, the procedure for making and monitoring state decisions. The main requirement for constitutional rules is consistency. They can be both formal and informal. Thus, the rules for the succession of power in a monarchy take the form of an unwritten custom or tradition, and the rules for voting in elections of a state body or president take the form of a clearly written law.

Constitutional rules can exist not only at the state level, but also at the level of individual organizations. These are statutes, various corporate codes, mission statements. From a legal point of view, these documents, of course, are not of a state nature, but in their meaning, significance for these organizations, they are fundamental, just like the constitution is the basic law for the state.

economic rules determine the forms of organization of economic activity. These include export and import quotas, the duration of patents and licenses, prohibitions on the use of certain types of contracts, marginal rates of return, costs, prohibitions on mergers, customs duties, i.e. in fact, they create the conditions for the emergence, exercise and change of property rights.

Institutions help a person save resources in a situation of choice, showing a certain path that others have already traveled before him. Institutions also act as norms of economic behavior arising from the interaction of individuals.

At the heart of the main market institutions (appropriation, hiring, management, etc.) are the relations of consent of the subjects included in the institution regarding the distribution of property objects, the conditions for the use of labor, the boundaries and forms of entrepreneurial activity. The recognition of this and the agreed obligation to comply with these restrictions is the condition and essence of the existence of institutions. That's why institutions can be represented as a system of stable relations regarding the coordination of forms of joint activities based on recognized norms and rules.

Various entities realize their needs for different forms through institutions that differ in different goals, values, means of achievement, which makes it possible to single out the common thing that they have functions. Function - this is an external manifestation of the properties of an object in a given system of relations. The function indicates the role that a particular phenomenon or process performs in relation to the general, to the whole.

Institutions are the framework within which people interact with each other. In pursuing their own interests, people bump into each other and cause harm to each other, so institutions can prevent this damage.

That's why first function of the institute - regulating the behavior of people in such a way that they do not harm each other, or that this damage is somehow compensated.

The second function of the institute- minimizing the efforts that people spend on finding each other and agreeing among themselves. The Institute is designed to facilitate both the search for the right people, goods, values, and the ability of people to agree with each other.

Finally, third function of the institute - organization of the process of information transfer, or training. This function is performed, for example, by higher education.

4. The main function of institutions is to ensure stability by smoothing out various changes. This institutional stability makes complex exchanges across time and space possible. These are the main functions of the institute, regardless of the scope of its activities. Institutions are some kind of restrictive framework that people have built so as not to collide with each other, to make it easier to get from point A to point B, to make it easier to negotiate and reach agreements, and so on.

Institutions reduce transaction costs (i.e., the costs of finding information, processing it, evaluating and specifically securing a particular contract) in the same way that technologies reduce production costs.

Mankind accumulates information about the surrounding reality and transmits it to economic entities in the form of norms and rules. Institutions, providing a person with information, create conditions for a more rational behavior of a person in a given situation. The planned economy has created in society the habits of non-monetary exchange, out of touch with prices and costs. And when the era of the market economy came, this exchange turned into barter, the institution of intermediaries in barter appeared.

5. The transformation of economic experience into a system of norms and rules necessary in given conditions is the content information function of the institute.

6. Within the framework of joint activities, the conflicting interests of the parties are coordinated, which allows them to realize common goal. The importance of such an agreement is reflected in the Russian proverb "even the wolf does not take the agreed herd." Following the general rules allows you to predict the actions of all counterparties, and reduces losses. This so-called function of coordination and coordination of interests.

7. In the system of institutions there is a certain subordination or subjugation. The institution of small private property becomes dependent on large-scale production in the process of development, the institution of labor becomes dependent on the institution of property, the institutions of catching up development try to copy the institutions of developed capitalist countries. The manifestation of this function is the formation of such an institutional structure in society, in which the institution of property determines the nature of labor and production, affects the content of all economic institutions.

8. development function. All individuals act in concert, on the basis of common norms and rules that determine their behavior. If everyone follows these rules, they can work in the so-called legal sector, in a transparent economy. If these rules harm individual subjects, involve significant additional costs, then individuals enter into additional agreements that provide for different behavior and form institutions that replenish the shadow economy. For example, massive tax evasion has led to the emergence of developers of evasion systems, special consultants who create and implement new schemes, distorted reporting, and corruption flourishes. Neglect of the established rules, their constant violation leads to the development of a negative attitude towards the foundations on which the institutions of the legal economy are built: traditions, national experience, culture, religion. As a result, an institutional algorithm appears, leading to the formation of a stable inefficient norm.

9. Accumulation function. Human needs develop along with society, with the system of production and education, which makes people change their habits, behavior, and such massive changes lead to the emergence of new institutions. At the same time, not all information is selected, but only that which allows the implementation of the optimal and most rational forms and methods of activity, and this is precisely what is transferred to another generation.

The interaction of individuals in certain institutional conditions is aimed at achieving the goal at the lowest cost. The totality of rules and norms, laws and restrictions, moral ideas create an environment in which an economic agent operates. Institutional environment - a set of game rules that limit the actions of agents and institutional agreements within the framework of these rules, which allow you to choose effective combinations of production and transactions.

In the course of actions, it is possible to destroy formal rules and ignore informal norms. If ineffective or selectively, chaotically applied sanctions are added to this, then a situation arises institutional vacuum - fragmentation or lack of basic generally accepted value criteria of activity.

In a single institutional system, a mismatch or clash of interests, and, consequently, of institutions, may begin. Conflicts begin leading to development institutional contradictions . Their resolution is possible either by developing agreed conditions for interaction, or by subordinating some behavioral norms to others.

Consolidation of ineffective norms of behavior and their reproduction generates institutional trap An attempt to get out of it is associated with a change in behavior, the use of other constraints and opportunities, and, as a rule, requires additional and often very significant costs. Therefore, often economic entities, by inertia, continue to work in the old fashioned way and resist the necessary changes.

The way out of such a trap is possible if significant benefits are obtained from the usual patterns of functioning. If the agent sees these advantages, he goes for changes, and receives them in the form of the so-called institutional premium, i.e. advantages associated with strengthening the position in the market, increasing economic power, reducing costs.

So, why do we need institutions in society, what tasks do they solve?

1. Institutions perform the main task of the economy - they ensure the predictability of the results of certain actions (primarily the social reaction to these actions) and thus bring stability to economic activity;

2. Institutions are inherited through their inherent learning process. Can be trained specialized organization;

3. Institutions have a system of incentives, without which they cannot exist. There is simply no institution unless there is a system of positive incentives (rewards for following certain rules) and negative ones (punishments people expect for breaking certain rules);

4. Institutions ensure the freedom and security of an individual's actions within certain limits, which is extremely highly valued by economic agents;

5. Institutions reduce transaction costs (i.e., the costs of finding information, processing it, evaluating and specifically securing a particular contract) in the same way that technologies reduce production costs.

Thus, we can conclude that it is the institutions and institutional structures that form the most important and inalienable element of the market economy, constituting its qualitative characteristics.

The concept of institution will be incomplete if it does not stop at the concepts of subject and agent. As an institutional subject, a firm (enterprise, organization), the state, and some integrated structures are usually considered. What they have in common is that their participants recognize the norms and rules governing their activities. The function of the subject in the final sense is the reproduction of himself, the subject exists only as long as he is able to perform this. Therefore, its goal is to preserve the institution, even if it is inefficient from the point of view of society (barter, offsets). Maintaining its status and performing a certain role, the subject transforms resources in order to meet needs more efficiently than an individual agent. Each member of the group does not bear all the costs, but only a certain part. This condition forces individual subjects, coordinating their interests, to make collective decisions. That's why institutional entity - this is a set of individuals united in an association on the basis of the agreed adoption and sharing of a number of requirements that limit the scope, forms and means of economic interactions.

An associated entity shares the basic norms and functions inherent in one institution. Institutional agent can participate in the activities of several institutions, since it is simultaneously the bearer of many values ​​and embodies many norms. Thus, in one spatio-temporal form, he acts as an agent of the institute of consumers and the institute of producers, the institute of the market and the institute of the firm, the institute of cooperation and the institute of the state, etc.

As a result, a variety of institutions can be reflected in one associated subject, since it simultaneously performs different institutional roles as an agent. If the subject takes a direct part in the functioning of the institution, determines the target function and methods for achieving it, then the agent carries out a delegated intermediary participation in maintaining the norms and rules. The selection of subjects and agents puts forward the problem of including an individual in an institution as a subject of relations, identifying the mechanism for using norms and rules in its activities.

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The main role that institutions play in society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (though not necessarily efficient) structure of interaction between people.

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All the functions that institutions perform in society can be conditionally divided into functions that characterize the activities of specific institutions, and functions that characterize the institutional environment as a whole (Fig. 2.14). Let's consider them separately.

Rice. 2.14. Functions of institutions and institutional environment

According to the type of rules underlying these functions, three main ones can be distinguished - functions coordination, cooperation, sharing and distribution of costs and benefits.

Coordination. Institutions that are called upon to solve coordination problems do this by creating an information infrastructure and providing access to it for all potential participants in relations. As for the system of coercion, these institutions do not need it, since following the rule is the dominant strategy of the participants in the relationship, i.e., these are self-sustaining institutions.

Cooperation. An example of an institution that promotes cooperation between participants in economic relations is contract law. It contains a set of rules and regulations that restrict their activities in a way that avoids socially inefficient outcomes.

Of course, real institutions are quite often aimed at solving problems of coordination and cooperation as a whole. So, in many situations, the rules of the road not only help to pass on a narrow road, but also limit the speed on certain sections of the road. In the second case, coercion is indispensable.

Sharing and distribution of costs and benefits. Having ensured the adoption of a specific decision on the coordination of the activities of the participants in relations, the institution thereby consolidates the inequality or equality between them. Note that only in rare cases do the participants in the relationship make no difference what kind of equilibrium will be established in the coordination game. Usually their preferences in this regard are different. So, in case of bankruptcy of an enterprise, different groups of its creditors are interested in establishing a different priority of payments. Another example: two firms want to switch to a single technological standard that will allow them to produce compatible products (Table 2.11). Production according to different standards brings zero profit to firms, so they are both interested in establishing either of the two equilibria. But firm 1 would prefer fixing standard 1, because then it will receive a larger profit than firm 2. Firm 2, for the same reason, would prefer standard 2 to be fixed.

Tab. 2.11. Selecting a technology standard

		Firm 2
		Production according to standard 1	Production according to standard 2
Firm 1	Production according to standard 1
	Production according to standard 2

Among the institutions that solve the problems of division and distribution, auctions (bidding) are of particular interest. Usually they are held according to clear, pre-agreed rules, binding on all participants, thereby rare example interactions within intentionally created rules. Ultimately, the effectiveness of auctions depends on this.

Some institutions put some players in a better position than others. Because of this, a group arises in society that seeks to preserve such an institution, and a group that seeks to reform it. Who will win in this struggle is determined not only and not so much by the effectiveness of this institution as by the negotiating power of the opposing sides.

Framework regulation. Institutions generally regulate the activities of participants in economic relations by limiting the set of available alternatives. This allows minimizing the number of conflict situations and achieving more effective coordination.

Ensuring predictability and stability. Institutions perform the most important task - they ensure the predictability of the results of a certain set of actions (that is, the social reaction to these actions) and thus bring stability to economic activity. Following this or that institution allows you to count on a certain result with measurable costs to achieve it.

Ensuring freedom and security. Institutions provide freedom and security of action within certain limits, which is extremely highly valued by participants in economic relations. The totality of formal institutions sets the framework within which each participant in the relationship is free to act, and he will not be punished by the law. Informal institutions define the framework within which the participant in the relationship is free to act, and he will not be punished by public opinion.

Minimization of transaction costs. It is in the interests of the participants in relations to minimize efforts to find partners, and institutions are designed to make this task easier for them. In addition, institutions contribute to the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the participants.

A typical example is the institution of paper money, which is entirely based on trust. Indeed, money, like paper, has no value of its own, and citizens use it as long as their trust in the state that issued this money is not lost. And when it is lost (as, say, it happened in Russia in the early 1990s), citizens switch to non-monetary relations - barter relations. Such relationships are associated with high costs, because it takes a long time to find the right partner. But if no one believes in money, barter is inevitable.

Another example is the institution of credit. A person who wants to get a loan to develop his own business knows that he needs to apply to the bank after drawing up a business plan. The bank, in turn, knows how to evaluate the plan of a particular borrower, and has mechanisms for monitoring and controlling its activities.

Knowledge Transfer. The transfer of knowledge occurs through formal or informal learning of rules. An Example of Formal Rule Teaching - Institute higher education(bachelor's, master's), whose main function is education, which is carried out in various forms through specific organizations (Moscow State University, State University Higher School of Economics, etc.). And an example of non-formal teaching of rules is the institution of the family, one of the functions of which is to ensure the initial socialization of the child (informal teaching of social norms accepted in society).

Institutions are inherited either in the process of learning within an organization specially created for this (for example, a university), or directly in the process of activity (for example, a company).