Shooting from a machine gun. I don’t see, but I shoot: machine gun fire from closed firing positions. Shooting in low visibility conditions

the beauty

Red Army soldier Tyulenev Nikolai Vasilyevich. Born on February 25, 1921 in the village of Titovo, Ramensky District. Father Vasily Gerasimovich, mother Agrafena Yegorovna, her maiden name is indicated in the card of the prisoner - Grachkova (Graschkowa).

He was drafted into the Red Army on September 5, 1939. He served in the 407 Infantry Regiment 108 rifle division. According to the map of the prisoner on June 30, 41, he was captured near Slonim.

Before the war, the 407th rifle regiment was stationed in the Smolensk region. The division, on the other hand, belonged to the three thousandth rifle divisions, and as of October 22, 1940, its staff strength was only 3002 people. It's more of a quantity rifle regiment. Perhaps in this composition she met the war.

On June 22, 1941, the division was alerted and proceeded with a forced march to the old border near Minsk. West of this line, she did not conduct military operations and Tyulenev in the Slonim region, which is 200 kilometers west of Minsk, could not be captured. Most likely, the place of his captivity was either a collection point for prisoners somewhere in the Slonim region, or the “Slonim” direction. In this direction, Slonim-Baranovichi-Minsk, the 47th mechanized corps of the Germans was advancing, which was opposed near Minsk by the 108th division.

The division became part of the 44th rifle corps, who took up defense on the territory of the Minsk fortified area (UR), and there was no neighbor on the right, i.e. no one covered the flank of the corps itself from the north. Minsk SD had a front of 160 km and a depth of 1-2 km. It included 206 built long-term firing structures, but back in 1939 it was partially disarmed and dismantled.

This is how the chief of staff of the 108th division, Colonel Belyshev, assessed the possibility of using the UR: “It is not easy to use pillboxes, and many are completely impossible, since weapons and instruments have been dismantled; communication, ventilation and lighting do not function; there is no documentation on the fire system ... ". In addition, it was simply impossible to even get inside the firing points, because. they were closed with special locks. Some structures were still used, but this was not a well-thought-out system of firepower and control, which the SD implies. So the fighters had to build their defense again. Moreover, only two regiments of the division, the 444th and 407th, occupied the defense. The 539th regiment, which arrived later, was assigned to the operational group of the Western Front to eliminate enemy airborne assault forces.

From June 26 to June 28, the division resisted German tank attacks, was outflanked and, together with the remnants of the 64th division, fought in a 10-20 km encirclement until July 1. southwest of Minsk.

Apparently in these battles, Nikolai Tyulenev was captured. But it can be assumed, if the date is inaccurate, that he could have been captured even when breaking out of the encirclement. That's how it was.

By the evening of June 30 at command post The commander of the 3rd Army retreating from the border, Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov, arrived with several generals and colonels of the 64th division. They took over the command of the encircled divisions and the organization of their breakthrough from the encirclement. The breakthrough was scheduled for the pre-dawn hours of 1st to 2nd July.

By that time, the 108th division included the 407th rifle regiment, where Tyulenev served, (about 500 people), a detachment of border guards (about 120 people), a reconnaissance battalion of the division, 2 heavy guns on ChTZ tractors, several batteries of anti-tank guns, several detachments , formed from fighters and commanders of other units that entered the division's defense sector from the state border.

The 64th division was supposed to break through at the Volchkovichi junction, and the 108th division was a little to the south, at the station. Fanipol. Here is how a member of the Military Council of the 3rd Army, Army Commissar 2nd Rank Biryukov, recalled this:

“Together with V.I. Kuznetsov, we moved after the advanced units of the 108th Infantry Division. We reached the railroad line when it was already dawn. Parts of the 108th Infantry Division, ... with which we were going, were stopped by German aircraft. Having crossed the railway embankment at the crossing, V.I. Kuznetsov and I stopped at the highest point near the highway and watched the battle. In this area, the artillery of the division, which was insignificant in number, took up firing positions and supported the breakthrough of units of the 108th Infantry Division. Ammunition, as I already mentioned, was scarce, only 3 shots per gun. All this was quickly used up, and we saw how about 50 tanks deployed in battle formation near the railway, followed by armored personnel carriers with machine gunners. All this was no further than 800–1000 m from us.”

Other participants in those events also remembered. The first to come out was a reconnaissance battalion, which was obliged to stop the presence of the enemy on the highway near the Fanipol station, and if he was not there, then cover the column from the Dzerzhinsk side for the time it passed through the highway. A detachment of border guards moved behind the reconnaissance battalion. His task is to cover the column from Minsk. They were followed by units of the 407th regiment in 30 vehicles with two quadruple machine gun mounts and several anti-tank guns, heavy corps guns and after them consolidated detachments formed from soldiers of other units. In general, the column of the 108th division consisted of about 2,000 combat-ready fighters and commanders. The column approached the Dzerzhinsk-Minsk highway at dawn. The reconnaissance battalion, not meeting the enemy on the highway, turned towards Dzerzhinsk. The forward detachment of border guards approached the crossing. At this time, about 10 cars with submachine gunners appeared from Minsk. The forward detachment of border guards opened fire on them. 3 enemy planes appeared from Minsk. They walked at an altitude of 150-200 meters and, turning around sharply, opened machine-gun fire on the column.

When German planes appeared over the column and began to fire from machine guns, the Red Army opened fire on the planes. The column had already dismembered by this time. Something unimaginable happened here. The whole mass of people, leaving the cars, quickly rushed to the highway. Everyone who could only fired at enemy planes and vehicles. The first plane was shot down immediately. He fell on a meadow towards Minsk. I followed him with my eyes and then I heard a gun duel, explosions, a glow from Minsk. I realized that it was the 64th Rifle Division that entered the battle.

Cars with Germans coming from Minsk braked sharply: some reversed, others tried to turn back. Some, turning into a ditch, buried their noses in the slope of the recess. Soldiers fell off them like peas. They immediately fell slain by our fire, others started to run, hiding behind ditches, not even trying to shoot back. They were caught between two hurricanes. Our fighters rushed so swiftly, with such determination to quickly overcome this ill-fated highway, that no armor, no fire was able to delay them. There were no lagging behind, there were no last. Everyone was ready to break any obstacle with his chest. Even the wounded flew like birds. Hurricane fire riddled both enemy soldiers and enemy vehicles.

By this time, two heavy guns on trailers of ChTZ tractors had passed the crossing. Two horse-drawn guns immediately behind the crossing turned around at the side of the road. The calculation of each gun consisted of three people. They immediately set up guns and opened fire on the Germans. Two fascist tanks descended from the hill to the crossing and fired at artillery crews. The gunners noticed them, but managed to fire only one shot at a time and themselves died from fragments of enemy shells. However, they set fire to one fascist tank. Three more tanks appeared from behind the hill and opened fire on our heavy guns. One was destroyed along with the crew, and the second managed to turn around and open fire on the tanks. One caught fire, followed by a second tank, but soon the entire crew was put out of action along with the gun.

The column relatively easily overcame the highway and railway and only after the crossing did she stumble upon the tanks of the Nazis, ambushed behind a rye field. The main part of the column managed to leave in the direction of Samokhvalovichi. The last to depart were the fighters of the E.S. Leshchenko from the 407th regiment. About 1,200 people came out to their own two weeks later.

But Tyulenev was not lucky and he did not go out to his people. His fate was unknown and to this day he is listed as missing.

The map of the captured Tyulenev Nikolai Vasilievich is in the archives. He was registered in the prisoner of war camp Stalag-IVB Muhlberg (Muhlberg) near Dresden. His camp number is 111307. From the description, he is a short, 162 cm, dark-haired 21-year-old boy. Shoemaker by profession. He was not wounded during the capture.

The time of admission to the camp is unknown, but on August 8, 1941, he was vaccinated there against smallpox and possibly against typhus, dysentery or cholera. On August 15, he was transferred to Stalag-XIIIA Sulzbach-Rosenberg (Salzbach-Rosenberg), Bavaria, and on August 29 he was assigned to work team No. 306 Rosenberg. I have no information about this team, but he died in it on February 2, 1942.

In 1952, the burial places of prisoners of war in Bavaria were moved to Neumarkt. They were mostly Russians, Poles and Yugoslavs. Almost 4,000 people from 401 graves. Nikolai Tyulenev is on the list of those reburied.

407, 444 and 539 rifle regiment,
575 artillery regiment,
152 separate anti-tank battalion (since 25.1.42),
273 anti-aircraft artillery battery(458 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion),
- until 20.2.43,
220 reconnaissance company,
172 sapper battalion,
485 separate battalion communications (409 separate communications company),
157 medical battalion,
155 separate company of chemical protection,
188 (93) motor transport company,
278 field bakery,
153 divisional veterinary infirmary,
1548 field post station,
381 field cash desk of the State Bank.

Combat period
22.6.41-9.5.45

During the Great Patriotic War, the 108th Rifle Division had to participate in battles from June 26, 1941. to May 9, 1945
Before the war, the division was stationed in the Smolensk region, the headquarters of the division and special forces - in the city of Vyazma, rifle regiments of the 407th, 444th, 539th and 575th art. Regiment - in Dorogobuzh and Safonovo.
On June 22, 1941, the division was alerted, and proceeded with a forced march to the old border west of Minsk.
At the direction of the commander of the 44th Corps, which included the division in two regiments, the defense was taken up in the Krasnoe-Dzerzhinsk-Stankovo sector 40 km wide. One rifle regiment was assigned to the operational group of the Western Front to eliminate enemy airborne assault forces. From June 26 to July 2, 1941, the division held its defense sector, but was outflanked by the enemy and was forced to fight out of the encirclement. (Approximately 1200 people showed up).
After leaving the encirclement, having received replenishment, from the end of July to October 1941, the division fought defensive battles on the Vop River south of Yartsevo.
In October 1941, the division was again surrounded, in mid-November it left the encirclement (also about 1200 people), replenished and carried out defensive work in the Zosimova Pustyn-Narofominsk section.
On November 20, 1941, in connection with the breakthrough of the enemy on the near approaches to Moscow, the division was transferred to the 5th Army and took up defense in the Pavlovsk-Sloboda direction between the cities of Zvenigorod-Istra, having Front edge along the line Kotovo-Gorshkovo, Boriskovo-Ivashkovo. For 15 days, the division fought fierce battles with the enemy rushing towards Moscow and retreated 16 km. In these battles, mass heroism was shown by the personnel of the division. By the end of the defensive battles, 120-150 active bayonets remained in the regiments.
On December 5, 1941, the division as part of the 5th Army went on the offensive, participated in the liberation of the city of Mozhaisk, and in February 1942 reached the border of the Smolensk region. Here she was on the defensive for a year.
In February 1942, the division was withdrawn from the 5th Army, transferred to the left flank of the Western Front, for some time, as part of the 10th Army, it fought distracting battles in the area of the city of Zhizdra, and then in April became part of the 11th Guards. the army of General Baghramyan and until June 1943 took up defense at the Zhizdrensky bridgehead, having a front line at the line of Ozhigovo, Dretovo, Babikino (35 km south of Kozelsk).
The division began the Oryol-Kursk battle with an offensive as part of the 11th Guards. Army on the flank of the enemy's Oryol grouping. On July 17, units of the division at the Dolbilovo-Rudnevo line (15 km south of Orel) cut the Bolkhov-Znamenskoye highway, thereby creating a threat of encirclement of the enemy's Bolkhov grouping. Wanting to alleviate the situation of their troops, the German command inflicted an air strike on the combat formations of the division with forces of 1200 sorties, and then within 3 days, with the help of two divisions, supported by 100 tanks and aviation, they tried to knock down parts of the division from the highway. Parts of the division withstood this hardest battle in its cruelty.
In the battles of July 17-19, 1943, our losses amounted to about 3,000 people, the enemy lost about 7,000 people and 37 tanks. For these battles, the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
In September 1943, the division became part of the 50th army of General Boldin I.V. this army was advancing in a westerly direction north of Bryansk. During the offensive, the 2nd Cavalry Corps of General Kryukov broke through behind enemy lines, which occupied a bridgehead on the western bank of the river. Desna, was cut off from his troops and subjected to continuous enemy attacks.
In this setting 108 rifle division received an order from the commander from the line south of the city of Kirov ( Kaluga region) break through the enemy defenses and connect with the cavalry corps. On September 12, with an unexpected blow, the division broke through the enemy’s defenses, entered the encirclement, passed 35 km along enemy lines in a day, connected with cavalrymen, where for 3 days it repulsed the enemy’s fierce attacks.
On September 18, 1943, units of the division, together with the approaching army troops, went into pursuit and on September 19 captured the regional center Dubrovka, on September 22 they crossed the river. Ipath.
On September 26, the division completed an honorable task - it was the first to enter the land of Belarus and captured the regional center of Khotimsk.
By the end of October 2, parts of the division reached the river. Pronya (18 km south of Chausy), where she fought to capture and expand the bridgehead until November 20. On December 12, the division surrendered the defense zone and entered the second echelon of the army, where it put itself in order until January 2, 1944.
In January-February 1944, the division, continuing its offensive towards the Dnieper, on the night of February 21-22 crossed the river in the Lenivets-Adamovka sector (4 km north of Novy Bykhov). In pursuit of the retreating enemy, parts of the division took control of the Zolotoe Dno railway siding, thereby cutting off the Bykhov-Rogachev railway. At this turn, the division received an order to go on the defensive.
In the battle for Belarus, the division initially participated in the 3rd Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Gorbatov. The offensive began on June 24, 1944 from the bridgehead on the river. Drut north of Rogachev. By the end of June 26, units of the division reached the line of the river. Ola in the area of Pavlovichi-Shpilivshchizna.
On the morning of June 27, Commander 3 brought into battle the 9th tank corps under the command of Major General Bakharev, who had the task of reaching the Titovka, Zelenko, Babino line and thereby cutting off the escape routes across the Berezina River and completing its encirclement.
During the offensive, the 108th Rifle Division was ordered to leave its offensive zone and, taking advantage of the success of the 9th Panzer Corps, go through the rear of the enemy to the Velichki area, Clear Forest, Titovka. By the end of June 27, units of the division reached the indicated area and took up defense with a deployed front. One battalion 444SP was occupied by the bridge over the river. Berezina connecting Titovka with Bobruisk.
For two days, parts of the division fought with the enemy trying to get out of the encirclement. By the morning of June 29, the fighting on the entire front began to subside, many soldiers and officers, seeing their hopeless situation, began to surrender. The encircled enemy group was finished, the city of Bobruisk was liberated. In these battles, parts of the division inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, 4 thousand soldiers and officers were killed and more than 2000 were taken prisoner.
For these battles, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the division was given the name "Bobruisk"
After the Bobruisk operation, 108SD became part of the 46th Rifle Corps of the 65th Army, commanded by Colonel General Batov P.I., and the corps - Lieutenant General Erastov K.M. As part of this corps, the division participated until the end of the war.
From the line of Minsk, parts of the division continued their offensive in the direction of Slonim, Pruzhany, Sherduv, Semyatichi, on August 1 they reached the state border and crossed the Western Bug River in the Biruv area. On the territory of Poland, the division advanced in the direction of Medzna, Stochek, Vyshkow, on the night of September 6, crossed the Narew River and until September 12 fought fierce battles to expand the bridgehead. Then, until October 4, parts of the division led engineering work to create a strong positional defense.
From October 4 to October 9, 1944, a fierce defensive battle broke out on the Serotsky bridgehead. In terms of its strength, it was one of the most brutal battles for the 108th division in the entire Great Patriotic War. For 5 days, on a relatively small area (the 65th Army occupied a bridgehead along a front of 25 km and a depth of 8 to 18 km; in a section of 108 divisions 5x8 km), 20 rifle and tank divisions, more than 1000 tanks and about 4000 guns and mortars.
The enemy, who concentrated large forces of infantry and tanks, managed to press our units in the first days of the offensive, but by the end of October 9, having suffered huge losses (407 tanks and more than 20,000 killed), he was forced to go on the defensive, and on October 19, the troops of the 65th Army went on the offensive, as a result of which they not only restored the bridgehead, but also significantly expanded it, capturing Serock. For these battles, the division was awarded the Order of Lenin. The division remained at the Narew bridgehead until January 1945.
On January 14, the offensive operation of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, which included the 108SD, began to cut off the East Prussian grouping of the enemy with access to the lower reaches of the Vistula. At 12 noon a powerful artillery preparation, after which parts of the division took possession of the trench lines within a few hours. The offensive developed rapidly. On January 18, parts of the division, pursuing the retreating enemy, liberated the city of Plonsk, and on January 23, without a fight, entered the first German city in East Prussia - Bischowswerder. Continuing the offensive on January 25, they captured the city of Gornsee with battle, on January 26 they reached the Vistula River south of the city of Marienwerder. From this line, the division made a 50 km march to the area south of Graudenz, where the 105th Corps captured a bridgehead on the western bank of the river. Wisla.
Having crossed the Vistula units, on February 8, the divisions fought for the city of Shvets, by the end of the day on February 10 they completely broke through the German defenses and began pursuit in a northerly direction. Overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, parts of the division on March 9 approached the city of Zukau (15 km west of Danzig) and captured the city. The closer the division advanced to Danzig, the stronger the enemy resisted. The advance of units per day did not exceed 3 km. This is also explained by the large understaffing of rifle regiments. The division moved forward mainly due to direct fire artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns.
Parts of the division began fighting directly on the outskirts of Danzig on March 25, and the city was completely liberated on March 29.
After the liberation of Danzig, the division, as part of the corps, made a 350 km march to the Oder and concentrated in the Klutz area (10 km south of Stetin). Oder. On April 20, 1945, an army operation began to force the river. Oder. On the same day, units of the division landed on the western bank of the river. For 5 days, our troops broke through the enemy's defense in depth and on April 25, having finally broken the enemy's resistance, entered the operational space.
Continuing the pursuit of the broken parts of the enemy, the division captured the city of Glazov on April 26, on April 28 - Schönhausen, Treptow, on April 30 - Zarov, Beregov, on May 1 - Lindonhof, Forvern, on May 2 - Demin, Sylze.
On May 4, the division captured on its own combat way the last city of the Germans Barth and by the end of the day came ashore Baltic Sea east of Rostock.
Here by the sea for the 108th Bobruisk Red Banner Rifle Division of the Order of Lenin, the Great Patriotic War was over.
In July 1945, the division was redeployed to the Northern Group of Forces in the cities of Bolkenheim and Neisse. In the middle of 1946 it was disbanded. It should be added that in the fighting before the Great Patriotic War 108SD did not take part.
During the Second World War, the division was commanded by:
June-July 1941 - Major General Mavrichev A.I.
October 1941-March 1942 - Major General Birichev Ivan Ivanovich
May 1942-February 1943 - Major General Andrey Trofimovich Stuchenko
May 1943-May 1945 - Major General Teremov Petr Alekseevich
1. By order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade. Stalin No. 0181 dated July 5, 1944, the division was given the name "108 Infantry Bobruisk Division"
2. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 4, 1944, the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
3. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 19, 1945, the division was awarded the Order of Lenin.
For the steadfastness, courage and heroism shown during the war in the fight against the fascist invaders, 12294 soldiers and officers were awarded in the division, including:
Medal Gold Star 5 people
Order of Lenin 7 people
Order of the Red Banner 166 people
Order of Suvorov 2nd class 1 person
Order of Suvorov 3rd degree 9 people
Order of Kutuzov 2nd class 4 persons
Order of Kutuzov 3rd degree 17 people
Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 2nd degree 4 people
Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 3rd degree 50 people
Order of Alexander Nevsky 80 people
Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree 179 people
Order of the Patriotic War 2nd degree 731 people
Order of the Red Star 3863 people
Order of Glory 2nd degree 13 people
Order of Glory 3rd degree 432 people
Medal for Courage 4616 people
Medal for Military Merit 2127 people

Soldiers of the division remember
June 30, 1941 - July 1, 1941

After signing the order V.I. Kuznetsov, Biryukov and the 108sd command left for the 108sd defense sector
The 108sd at the time of entry included the 407th rifle regiment (about 500 people), a detachment of border guards (about 120 people), a reconnaissance battalion of the division under the command of Major M.N. Andreeva, 2 heavy guns of the 1st division of the 49th Red Banner Corps of the artillery regiment on ChTZ tractors, several batteries of anti-tank guns, several detachments formed from fighters and commanders of other units that entered the division’s defense sector from the west, from the state border.
The right column at 23.00 moved from its positions along the route Staroe Selo - Samokhvalovichi.
The first to come out were a reconnaissance battalion, which was obliged to stop the presence of the enemy on the highway near the Fanipol station, and if he was not there, then cover the column from the direction of Dzerzhinsk while it passed through the highway. A detachment of border guards moved behind the reconnaissance battalion. His task is to cover the column from Minsk. They were followed by units of the 407th Rifle Division in 30 vehicles with two quadruple machine-gun mounts and several anti-tank guns, heavy corps guns, and after them consolidated detachments formed from soldiers from other units. In general, the column of 108 SD consisted of about 2000 combat-ready fighters and commanders. The column approached the Dzerzhinsk-Minsk highway at dawn. The reconnaissance battalion, not meeting the enemy on the highway, turned towards Dzerzhinsk. The forward detachment of border guards approached the crossing. At this time, about 10 cars with submachine gunners appeared from Minsk. The forward detachment of border guards opened fire on them. 3 enemy planes appeared from Minsk. They walked at an altitude of 150-200 meters and, turning around sharply, opened machine-gun fire on the column.
“When German planes appeared over the column and began to fire from machine guns, the Red Army opened fire on the planes. The column had already dismembered by this time. Then something unimaginable happened. fired at enemy planes and vehicles. The first plane was shot down immediately. It fell on a meadow towards Minsk. I looked after him and then I heard a gun duel, explosions, a glow from the direction of Minsk. I realized that it was the 64th Rifle Division that entered the battle.
Cars with Germans coming from Minsk braked sharply: some reversed, others tried to turn back. Some, turning into a ditch, buried their noses in the slope of the recess. Soldiers fell off them like peas. They immediately fell slain by our fire, others started to run, hiding behind ditches, not even trying to shoot back. They were caught between two hurricanes. Our fighters rushed so swiftly, with such determination to quickly overcome this ill-fated highway, that no armor, no fire was able to delay them. There were no lagging behind, there were no last. Everyone was ready to break any obstacle with his chest. Even the wounded flew like birds. Hurricane fire riddled both enemy soldiers and enemy vehicles.
By this time, two heavy guns on trailers of ChTZ tractors had passed the crossing. Two horse-drawn anti-tank guns deployed at the side of the road immediately after the crossing. The calculation of each gun consisted of three people. They immediately set up guns and opened fire on the Germans. Two fascist tanks descended from the hill to the crossing and fired at artillery crews. The gunners noticed them, but managed to fire only one shot at a time and themselves died from fragments of enemy shells. However, they set fire to one fascist tank. Three more tanks appeared from behind the hill and opened fire on our heavy guns. One was destroyed along with the crew, and the second managed to turn around and open fire on the tanks. One tank caught fire, followed by a second tank, but soon the entire crew was put out of action along with the gun.
"The column of 108 SD relatively easily overcame the Dzerzhinsk-Minsk highway and railway and only at the crossing stumbled upon the Nazi tanks, ambushed behind a rye field. The main part of the column managed to leave in the direction of Samokhvalovichi. 407 SP Two weeks later, the fighters, commanders and political workers of the 108 SD made their way through the front line and continued to fight the enemy.
June 30, 1941.

"... border guards entered the battle. They defeated the enemy column in a short time: about 12 vehicles and 150 soldiers and officers were lost by the Germans in this battle.
An hour and a half later, artillery and mortar fire was opened on the quarries, then tanks appeared, accompanied by machine gunners. In a few days, Soviet soldiers determined that the Germans were adhering to one tactic ... And this time, after artillery fire, 10 enemy tanks, accompanied by about a battalion of submachine gunners, rushed to the quarries. Heavy hull guns and an anti-tank battery opened fire on them even at the distant approaches. A little later they were supported by regimental artillery. According to machine gunners with close range machine guns hit. Leaving 7 smoking tanks and half of the machine gunners on the battlefield, the Nazis were forced to retreat. Then, fascist planes dropped bombs on the positions of the soldiers of the 108th SD for half an hour. But even the bomb raid could not break the resistance of the Red Army.
Twice during the day on June 30 and three times on July 1, fascist vultures began to inspect the defense area of 108 and 64 rifle divisions (SD) from the air. However, the soldiers of the two divisions, having taken up all-round defense, held their positions ... "
"The Germans delivered the main blow with tank groups from the East: the villages of Mayukovshchina, Baranovshchina, Podyarkovo, Yarkovo, the farm Gumnishche. Here the Germans buried tanks in the ground and fired continuously at our battle formations. There was an order in the German units: by any means to prevent the Soviet divisions from breaking through the ring encirclement, force them to surrender. We maneuvered with our limited artillery. We used grenades against the enemy, used bottles filled with gasoline. "
July 1, 1941.

"At 23.00, units of the 108th division and other scattered units that joined it left the place of concentration southeast of Staroye Selo to the Fanipol station in order to immediately break through the station and go further east at three on the second of July. However, the units of the 407th regiment were lost together from the regimental commander, lagging behind even from the exit point. Tarasevich was instructed to find him, transfer the route of movement to the regiment commander and catch up with him in his passenger car, which he left for this purpose. It was possible to find the lost unit only at four o'clock in the afternoon. The wise man was seriously wounded by unknown persons. Tarasevich handed over the route of movement to the deputy regiment commander for the economic unit and went to catch up with the division commander, but he missed the division commander at 108, fell ill on the way. Then, in the second half of July, he stopped in the Klichevsky district, where he embarked on the path of partisan struggle. "
“I fought (in the 108th Rifle Division) from the beginning of the war. In the battles for the city of Dzerzhinsk for Minsk at the end of June 1941, I was surrounded, but the main backbone fought its way to its own ...
... 108 SD broke through in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Fanipol station. German aviation discovered the column, and tanks and infantry were put into action. The battle was fierce, although ours knocked out one plane and several tanks, but they themselves suffered heavy losses. In this battle, the following died: the commissar of the Khramov division, the chief of staff Olikhaver, the division commander Mavrichev, seriously shell-shocked, he lost consciousness and was taken prisoner. The head of the division Kartsev with a small group of fighters left the encirclement on June 25 - July 2.
July 1, 1941.

Junior Sergeant 407 SP 108 SD Leshchenko E.S. recalls:
"On the evening of July 1, our 407th regiment was replenished: 3 colonels and 4 lieutenant colonels came (apparently from the defeated or lost regiments) and, with our command, led a march-raid of a breakthrough from the encirclement. It was said: the enemy is 5 km away. Task regiment: covertly approach at night and strike at dawn, defeat the Germans and then the path to our own will be opened. Only about 1000 soldiers gathered, artillery pulled by tractors and horses. We walked 5-8-10 km, but did not reach the place. Artillery remained in the forest about 4 kilometers from the enemy, and the soldiers moved in dismembered formation to the village of Ptich.The village is in the lowland - the Ptich River flows there.The Germans were outside the village in the forest and saw that many Russians were walking.
Our artillery began to fire on the Germans, and the Germans began to fire on the forest where our artillery was located. The artillery preparation lasted about 30 minutes. Then the Germans began to fire mortars at the village where our infantry was. The command was given to go on the offensive, and everyone began to approach the forest in a belligerent way through the gardens. When there were 200 meters left to the forest, a battle began, which lasted 1.5 hours, but they could not move further towards the forest. Team - "Attack!" We got up. "Hooray!" But ours are being mowed down. By this time, our artillery was pulled up to the front line and it began to hit the forest where the Germans were. Everything was on fire, all fire. More than half of our people were killed or wounded. The battle began to subside, and the wounded began to be removed. Some villagers came out and began to help carry the wounded to the barns, and especially the heavy ones to the houses. The command was given to leave the battle, change direction and go to the neighboring forest. In the following days, we made our way at night to go out to our own people, but the front went far to the East.

Heroes of the 108 Infantry Bobruisk Division

Shtanko Philip Feofanovich, member of the CPSU. In the battle near Moscow, the chief of staff of the 444th rifle regiment with the rank of captain. Commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment of the 50th Infantry Division. Commander of the 50th Motorized Rifle Brigade. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded for the possession of a mountain range in the Carpathians, thereby opening the way for our troops to the central regions of Romania. Head of Human Resources 2nd mechanized army. Despite poor health, almost from the very beginning of the war, he went through a difficult military path. Awarded with 9 orders and 9 medals.

Volkov Mikhail Evdokimovich, member of the CPSU. For participation in the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River as a commander of a machine-gun platoon, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In these battles he was seriously wounded twice and had 7 bayonet jabs. In the battle near Moscow Volkov M.E. - Battalion commander of the 444th rifle regiment of the 108th rifle division, chief of staff of this regiment. Commander of the Infantry Regiment of the 126th and 159th Infantry Divisions. In 1944 he was seriously wounded. For participation in the battles from Moscow to the border with East Prussia, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

Kulikov Fedor Fedorovich, member of the CPSU since April 1943. Before the war he worked as a teacher. In 1939 he was called to Soviet army to the Moscow Proletarian Division. In the position of commander of a company of submachine gunners, he liberated the city of Bobruisk, for the battles he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the second degree. In 1944 he was appointed commander of a battalion of the 539th rifle regiment of the 108th rifle division. In Poland he was wounded. After being wounded, he commanded a battalion of the 407th Infantry Regiment, the battalion under his command was the first to break into the city of Danzig. For this fight he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. For crossing the Oderon River, holding a foothold on the western bank, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 29, 1946, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Sokolov Vasily Afanasyevich, member of the CPSU since 1919. Before the war, he entered the Frunze Academy. Deputy Chief of Staff in the Battle of Moscow from November 22, 1941. Commander of the 444 Infantry Regiment. The regiment withstood the onslaught of 252 for 15 days infantry division Nazis in the 4 regiments. And also withstood the battle in the Valley of Death, now the Valley of Glory - near the village of Oshchepkovo, south of the city of Gzhatsk. For participation in the battles in the Sviro-Petrozavodsk operation in 1944 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Participant in the defeat of the enemy in the Balaton operation in the Hungarian direction in the Great Patriotic War.

Titov Aleksey Fedorovich, commander of a machine-gun platoon of the 444th Infantry Regiment of the 108th Infantry Bobruisk Division. Participated in defensive battles on the West Bank of the Narew River. In 1944, an enemy outnumbered by infantry, with the support of tanks and artillery, attacked our positions several times. But Titov did not flinch, went out with his fighters and defeated the enemy. For 4 days of fighting, Lieutenant Titov, together with his fighters, destroyed 100 Nazis, 10 machine guns, repulsed 33 attacks, firmly held the positions entrusted to him. For courage and heroism, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously in 1944. Killed during the attack on East Prussia.

Zubov Leonid Dmitrievich, member of the CPSU. At the age of three he was left without parents and was brought up in an orphanage until 1933. In February 1933 he began his career. In 1940 he was drafted into the Soviet army. He met the Great Patriotic War in the 241st Smolensk Mining Artillery Regiment, in May 1943 he was wounded. From 1943 to 1946 he was in the 172nd separate engineer battalion of the 108th rifle division. When crossing the Oder River, he ensured the division's crossing and the defeat of the Nazis on the western bank. For military exploits, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

How can Russia defeat America? Markin Andrey Vladimirovich

I don’t see, but I shoot: machine gun fire from closed firing positions

In contrast to the army and SS troops, the armament and training of the parachute regiment made it possible to fire from heavy machine guns using sheltered firing positions, a factor that played its role positive role in the [Battle of Normandy].

Lieutenant Colonel Count Friedrich von der Heidte. "Battle of Normandy: View of the Vanquished"

It is widely known that in the pre-war years, machine gunners were trained to shoot from closed firing positions from the Maxim machine gun. Such firing was carried out with the help of a monocular machine-gun sight and a machine-gun protractor - a quadrant, which does not exist for the PK machine gun, which largely occupied the Maxim niche. The reason why, after the Great Patriotic War, they refused to supply machine guns with devices that allow firing from closed positions from machine guns is very simple. Practice has shown that there is no way to massively train machine gunners in such shooting. The rules for using instruments and the necessary mathematical calculations are quite complex, often the educational level of the soldiers simply did not allow them to be mastered with confidence. Despite the fact that in the vast majority of tactical situations the machine gun was used for direct fire, there was simply no point in trying to get the machine gunners to master the work with the quadrant goniometer. In this article, we will try to describe the methods of firing from closed firing positions from a machine gun using a conventional open sight and the simplest methods of aiming a machine gun, the development of which is not particularly difficult. Presumably, only such techniques can be of practical importance.

However, before proceeding to their presentation, it is necessary to answer the question why such shooting is needed at all. After all, for obvious reasons, it is less effective than conventional direct fire. In addition, there are mortars and automatic grenade launchers that can solve problems with fire from closed firing positions. Two factors can push its use: the use of long-range sniper rifles by the enemy and especially precision weapons. As the experience of recent wars, including the Anglo-Argentine war for the Falklands and the latest US invasion of Iraq, shows, infantry use ATGMs not only to destroy armored vehicles, but also to fire at enemy infantry. The expediency of such use of ATGMs can be questioned, but the fact of such use remains a fact. A side that has a sufficient stock of anti-tank missiles will try with impunity to shoot enemy firing points from afar with high-precision weapons. In connection with the growing distribution and cheapening of such weapons, the likelihood of a tactical need for firing machine guns from closed firing positions is increasing. The presence of mortars and automatic grenade launchers does not make it unnecessary, since in the general case one should strive to defeat the enemy simultaneously from the largest possible number of fire weapons.

It should be noted that a closure only 30-35 cm high, for example, the usual unevenness of the terrain, can already make the position for a machine gun closed from observation by the enemy from the front. And the simplest camouflage, for example, a cape on a frame, or even bunches of tall grass or bushes connected by a “house” can make a position hardly noticeable both from observation from helicopters and with the help of enemy unmanned aerial vehicles, at least in the optical range. The use of this method of firing can largely ensure the retention of the front slopes of the hills when building defenses on the reverse slopes.

Consider two situations when firing from machine guns from closed firing positions: when there is time for preliminary zeroing and when it is not.

The sighting of lines and landmarks is carried out as follows. First, the bullets are hit in the ridge of the closure, thus determining the position of the machine gun, which does not allow the bullets to fly over the closure. Then the barrel of the machine gun is slightly lifted up and the places where the bullets fall on the other side of the closure are observed, thereby determining the dead zone behind the closure, which the machine gun cannot shoot through. After that, the position of the machine gun is fixed. Fixing methods will be discussed below. In the future, the shooting of lines and landmarks located outside the dead zone is carried out. After it turns out to lay the bullets in the area of the landmark or line, the position of the machine gun is also fixed and marked (recorded).

It should be pointed out that, in principle, we can think of such a method of zeroing in lines and landmarks, when the position of the machine gun sight does not change. In this case, sighting is achieved exclusively by experience, by raising and lowering the machine gun barrel. But this method should be avoided, as it does not allow any further adjustments to be made. It should not be forgotten that the difference between the aiming angle when firing at a range of 100 meters and 1500 meters from a PC bullet with a steel core (9.6 g) is just over 2 degrees. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to introduce any amendments “by eye”. Therefore, the body of the machine gun should be placed horizontally with the help of a simple plumb line or by eye, and then zeroing in, setting the sight corresponding to the distance to the boundary or landmark. So, if necessary, it will be possible to introduce a range correction using the sight.

In general, zeroing in lines and landmarks when firing from closed positions is similar to the rules for zeroing in when shooting in conditions of limited visibility (at night, in fog or with artificial smoke), which are indicated in the manuals on shooting.

In order not to reinvent the wheel, we will quote the governing documents.

“When preparing for firing in advance ... a chute is cut out in the parapet so that the machine gun (machine gun) placed in it is directed towards the line probable occurrence adversary."

And yet “during advance preparation for firing ... the position of the machine gun is fixed in the firing position with the help of improvised means. For this purpose, when shooting from a bipod with pegs, the lateral movement of the legs of the bipod and butt is limited. The position of the machine gun in height is fixed by a layer of turf (dense snow, a board with cutouts, etc.) placed under the pistol grip. When firing from the machine ... the legs of the machine must be secured with pegs. After that, direct the machine gun with the sight settings corresponding to the range to the lines or landmarks at which fire is being prepared, mark at the aiming point clearly visible at night, limit the dispersion limits along the front and record the settings.

The procedure for marking the aiming of a machine gun, I believe, should not be stated here. Let's point out that the aiming point can be a closing crest or a milestone placed at a distance from the machine gun. When using a milestone, it should be installed at a distance of no closer than 15 meters to the machine gun so that the angular dimensions of the milestone can be neglected. It is also possible to use shooting at an auxiliary point, which is either in line with the target or close to it and above the target, for example, the top of a tree. When firing at such an auxiliary aiming point, the machine gun can be installed not far from the closing crest. After that, the machine gunner lies down behind the machine gun and rises approximately to the height of his head above the machine gun. If the terrain ahead is not visible, then the machine gun, flashes of shots and pulsating wisps of smoke when firing from it will not be visible to the enemy.

At each position, if there are several of them, the same actions are carried out for shooting lines and landmarks, after which the places of the coulters and the butt are accurately marked with pegs.

The second situation to consider is shooting from closed positions without zeroing in first. Actually, the main idea of this method is very simple.

An observer who sees a target behind the closure sets a milestone(s) that directs the machine gun to the target. After that, the machine gun-milestone (milestones) - the target crawls to the side from the line, and tells the machine gunner the distance to the target. If necessary, corrects the range, indicating how much the machine gunner needs to increase or decrease the scope. Correction in direction, as a rule, is not carried out, but a command is given to conduct fire with dispersion along the front. When transferring fire to another target, the milestone (s) are rearranged.

For safety reasons, the machine gun must be unloaded at the time of installation of milestones.

Of course, this method has limitations in its use. First of all, it should be borne in mind that the maximum distance from the machine gunner to the observer, at which the latter is actually able to adjust the fire, is about 100 meters. It is almost impossible to shout or swear at a great distance with your hands. Of course, if there is radio communication between the machine gunner and the gunner or a field telephone is laid (which, in the general case, one cannot count on), this problem is removed. It should also be taken into account that the distance is limited by the visibility and distinguishability of the milestone. At least one of the milestones is installed in the immediate vicinity of the closing crest. If we take into account that in the general case a wooden stick is used as a milestone, and not very thick, then it should be understood that from a certain distance it can merge for the machine gunner with the surrounding background of the area. In addition, in order to maintain controllability of the unit, the removal of machine gunners over long distances may hardly be appropriate.

The specified 100-meter distance predetermines the presence of restrictions on maximum height closures and firing ranges and, as a result, by the type of terrain on which shooting from closed positions without preliminary zeroing in can be used.

If we turn, for example, to the table of excess of average trajectories over the aiming line for a Kalashnikov machine gun, we will see that at a distance of 100 meters the average trajectory manages to rise above 30-35 centimeters (this is the minimum height of the mask that can hide a machine gun) only when driving shooting at a distance of more than 500 meters. Considering that the most actual machine gun fire is achieved at ranges up to 1000 meters, this means that the closing height cannot exceed about 1.4 meters. At a distance of 600 meters, the closing height should be less than 50 cm, 700 meters - 70 cm, 800 meters - 90 cm, 900 meters - 1.10 cm. That is, shooting from closed positions without preliminary shooting is possible only on flat open areas. Moreover, the consumption of ammunition with such a fire is, of course, higher, and the effectiveness of such fire is lower than when firing at a distance of up to 500 meters. Therefore, this method of firing is tactically not very convenient and can actually be used only when circumstances compel it.

For reference, we will give the depths of the affected zones (they can be determined from the tables of the excess of average trajectories over the aiming line and dispersion characteristics). When firing at 500, 600, 700 and 800 meters, the flatness of the trajectory provides a deep affected area. For example, when shooting at 700 meters (sight 7), the average trajectories are exceeded at a distance of 500 m - 1.7 m, 600 m - 1.1 m, that is, for a growth target of 1.7 m, the entire distance from 500 to 700 meters is included in the affected area. When shooting at 900 meters (sight 9) for a growth target of 1.7 m, the affected space will be from about 825 m to 900 meters, and when shooting at 1000 meters (sight 10), the affected space will be from about 940 m to 1000 meters. The depth of the affected space can be roughly calculated from the proportion: the ratio of the height of the target to the height of the excess of the average trajectory and the ratio unknown depth of the affected space to the distance from the range point, at which the excess figure was taken, to the point of fall (zero excess).

Having determined the minimum (500 m) and maximum (1000 m) range for firing machine guns from closed positions using a conventional open sight, you can indicate a non-sighting method for determining whether bullets will hit the closing comb. Having chosen the sight according to the range to the target, without changing the position of the machine gun in space, reduce the sight by one (as if reducing the range by 100 meters), if at this moment the aiming line passes above the closing, then the bullets will not touch the closing crest.

Now about the procedure for aiming the machine gun at the target in the direction.

If, for tactical reasons, it is undesirable to move the machine gun, then the machine gunner needs to slightly move away from the machine gun in the direction opposite to the direction of fire, rise until he sees the target behind the closure, stand on the “machine gun - target” line (you can put a milestone in the place of his position) and indicate to the observer, located next to the crest of the closing, where to set the milestone. Moreover, the point of standing of the machine gunner, the machine gun itself, the milestone at the closing crest and the target should be on the same line. After that, the machine gunner lays down behind the machine gun and fires in the direction of the milestone installed by the gunner at the closing crest. We emphasize that at the moment of aiming, both the observer and the machine gunner see the target. The machine gunner does not see the target only during firing.

In principle, in tense moments of the battle, a soldier who is somewhat behind the machine gun, who (the soldier) rises in order to see the target and the results of the shooting through the closing crest, can carry out aiming in the direction. This soldier tells the machine gunner how much clockwise or counterclockwise he needs to turn the machine gun in order to aim it in the direction of the target. True, this method increases the danger of firing in this way, since part of the head of such a soldier is visible to the enemy due to the closure.

A few words about range guidance. It should be understood that at ranges of 500-1000 meters it is very difficult to see the places where bullets fell. The exception is cases when there are sighting and incendiary bullets that give a bright flash when they hit the surface, but do not leave a trace visible to the enemy, like tracer bullets. In the general case, observation is possible only if the bullets raise dust (splashes) upon impact about the surface. Examples would be shelling the canvas dirt road, dry arable land, shallow snow, brick wall, etc. Indirectly, information about the place where bullets fell can be obtained from the enemy's reaction to shelling. But in the most common cases - when shooting at a field overgrown with grass or at enough deep snow It is extremely difficult to see where the bullets fell. Tracer bullets, if the enemy is observing, cannot be used, as they will give out the approximate location of the machine gun. Given that when shooting at a distance of 500 - 1000 meters, only six positions of the sight (5,6,7,8,9,10) can be used, and what was said above about the affected area at such ranges, it can be recommended to fire by "combing". First, it is determined whether the target is closer to 500 meters or to 1000. In the first case, sight 7 is used, in the second 8,9,10 (a long burst is made at each sight setting, and then the setting is changed).

To facilitate the adjustment of fire by the gunner, a number of simple hand signals should be set indicating numbers, as well as the main instructions of the observer to the machine gunner: “sight so much”, “increase / decrease the sight”, “to the right”, “to the left”, “fire”, “ cease fire”, “attention”, “I don’t see”, etc.

In conclusion, we emphasize that the considered method of shooting is far from always convenient, but in a certain situation it may be the only possible one. Therefore, it will not hurt to know it, and mastering it does not constitute any special difficulties and will not take much study time.

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This method was actively used in WWI and WWII. Moreover, if in the first case everything was clear, the Maxim machine gun was considered practically artillery, and the used parabolic trajectory for shooting it suggested itself, then during the Great Patriotic War this method of use carried a residual principle.
The reason for this was simple. For firing from a machine gun along a hinged trajectory (because of the reverse slope of the hill, from a closed position, above the orders of the advancing troops), a monocular machine gun sight and a machine gun goniometer - a quadrant were used.
And practice has shown that there is no way to massively train machine gunners in such shooting. The rules for using devices and the necessary mathematical calculations are quite complex, often the educational level of soldiers recruited from poorly educated, and often from uneducated segments of the population, simply did not allow them to master them confidently. Despite the fact that in the vast majority of tactical situations the machine gun was used for direct fire, there was simply no point in trying to get the machine gunners to master the work with the quadrant goniometer.
Well, in the future, when switching to a PC, i.e. on the Kalashnikov machine gun, they simply forgot about such devices as a quadrant and a monocular sight. niche this use a machine gun, or rather, to defeat enemy manpower and firepower located outside shelters, in open trenches (trenches) and behind natural terrain (in hollows, ravines, on reverse slopes of heights), the AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher began to be used. However, this carried its drawbacks.

At rostislavddd I saw an interesting calculation that speaks for itself.
In short:
The AGS has a mass of a box with a tape for 29 shots - 14.5 kg.
The mass of the AGS with a machine tool and a sight is 31 kg.
Calculation 2 people.
Ammunition - 3 tapes, 87 shots.

PKS with different machines weighs from 12 to 16.5 kg. tape for 200 rounds in a box -8 kg.

We consider. Loaded AGS-45.5 kg + 2 boxes with ribbons. Another 29. Total 74.5 kg.
PKS on the Stepanov machine with 200 cartridge belts and a panorama that does not exist in the post-sovka - 25 kg. We look at how many rounds will fit in 49.5 kilograms, if the mass of the tape for 100 shots is about 3 kg (without a box).
1650 rounds.
Okay, let's throw out 900 grams of 100 ammo boxes so that the machine gunner does not have to worry about skew when using a machine gun without a machine tool on transitions, or even 1,8 kg, so that everything is fair. 3 and 3 boxes.
47.7 kg. 1590 rounds in tapes. Let's round up to 2000.
We end up seeing
2000+200+100+100=29+29+29. Or 2400 machine gun rounds against 87.

Highly. Very early, our army abandoned this method of firing.
And Her Majesty was not forgotten in the armed forces.

In this case, Her Majesty's soldiers are preparing to fire at the maximum distance. The fact is that indirect fire allows you to fire quite accurately for two or more kilometers.

In conclusion, I will quote about the organization of indirect fire without the above devices.

Consider two situations when firing from machine guns from closed firing positions: when there is time for preliminary zeroing and when it is not.

It should be pointed out that, in principle, we can think of such a method of zeroing in lines and landmarks, when the position of the machine gun sight does not change. In this case, sighting is achieved exclusively by experience, by raising and lowering the machine gun barrel. But this method should be avoided, as it does not allow any further adjustments to be made. It should not be forgotten that the difference between the aiming angle when firing at a distance of 100 meters and 1500 meters from a PC with a steel core bullet (9.6 g) is just over 2 degrees. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to introduce any amendments “by eye”. Therefore, the body of the machine gun should be placed horizontally with the help of a simple plumb line or by eye, and then zeroing in, setting the sight corresponding to the distance to the boundary or landmark. So, if necessary, it will be possible to introduce a range correction using the sight.

In order not to reinvent the wheel, let's quote the guiding documents:
“During advance preparation for firing ... a chute is cut out in the parapet so that the ... (machine gun) placed in it is directed towards the line of the probable appearance of the enemy.” Fire training, M .: Military Publishing House, 2009, p. 264

And yet “during advance preparation for firing ... the position of the machine gun ... is fixed in the firing position with the help of improvised means. For this purpose, when shooting from a bipod with pegs, the lateral movement of the legs of the bipod and butt is limited. The position of the machine gun in height is fixed by a layer of turf (dense snow, a board with cutouts, etc.) placed under the pistol grip. When firing from the machine ... the legs of the machine must be secured with pegs. After that, direct the machine gun with the sight settings corresponding to the range to the lines or landmarks at which fire is being prepared, mark at the aiming point clearly visible at night, limit the dispersion limits along the front and record the settings.
Manual on shooting, Moscow, military publishing house, 1987, pp. 491-492

Instead of a layer of turf, you can use wooden tabs (a set of planks stacked one on top of the other). These tabs are best stored near the peg that marks the direction of fire, so that in the confusion of battle you don’t confuse which peg which tabs belong to. When zeroing in a line, the right and left edges of the line and its middle are marked. At each position, if there are several of them, the same actions are carried out for shooting lines and landmarks, after which the places of the coulters and the butt are accurately marked with pegs.
Majors Kokosov B.V. and Romanovsky I.D., “Combat actions of troops in conditions of smoke”, M .: Military publishing house of the People's Commissariat of Defense, 1943, pp. 23-26

The second situation to consider is shooting from closed positions without zeroing in first. Actually, the main idea of this method is very simple.

An observer who sees a target behind the closure sets a milestone(s) that directs the machine gun to the target. After that, the machine gun-milestone (milestones)-target crawls to the side from the line, and tells the machine gunner the distance to the target. If necessary, corrects the range, indicating how much the machine gunner needs to increase or decrease the scope. Correction in direction, as a rule, is not carried out, but a command is given to conduct fire with dispersion along the front. When transferring fire to another target, a milestone (milestones)
are rearranged.

For safety reasons, the machine gun must be unloaded at the time of installation of milestones.
Of course, this method has limitations in its use. First of all, it should be borne in mind that the maximum distance from the machine gunner to the observer, at which the latter is actually able to adjust the fire, is about 100 meters. It is almost impossible to shout or swear at a great distance with your hands. Of course, if there is radio communication between the machine gunner and the gunner or a field telephone is laid (which, in the general case, one cannot count on), this problem is removed. It should also be taken into account that the distance is limited by the visibility and distinguishability of the milestone. At least one of the milestones is installed in the immediate vicinity of the closing crest. If we take into account that in the general case a wooden stick is used as a milestone, and not very thick, then it should be understood that from a certain distance it can merge for the machine gunner with the surrounding background of the area. In addition, in order to maintain controllability of the unit, the removal of machine gunners over long distances may hardly be appropriate.

The specified 100 meter distance predetermines the presence of restrictions on the maximum closing height and firing ranges and, as a result, on the type of terrain on which shooting from closed positions without preliminary zeroing in can be used.

If we turn, for example, to the table of excess of average trajectories over the aiming line for a Kalashnikov machine gun, we will see that at a distance of 100 meters the average trajectory manages to rise above 30-35 centimeters (this is the minimum height of the mask that can hide a machine gun) only when leading shooting at a distance of more than 500 meters. Considering that the most actual machine gun fire is achieved at ranges up to 1000 meters, this means that the closing height cannot exceed about 1.4 meters. At a distance of 600 meters, the closing height should be less than 50 cm, 700 meters - 70 cm, 800 meters - 90 cm, 900 meters - 1.10 cm. That is, shooting from closed positions without preliminary shooting is possible only on flat open areas. Moreover, the consumption of ammunition with such a fire is, of course, higher, and the effectiveness of such fire is lower than when firing at a distance of up to 500 meters. Therefore, this method of firing is tactically not very convenient and can actually be used only when circumstances compel it.

For reference, we will give the depths of the affected zones (it can be determined from the tables of the excess of average trajectories over the aiming line and dispersion characteristics). When firing at 500, 600, 700 and 800 meters, the flatness of the trajectory provides a deep affected area. For example, when shooting at 700 meters (sight 7), the average trajectories are exceeded at a distance of 500 m - 1.7 m, 600 m - 1.1 m., That is, for a growth target of 1.7 m., the entire distance from 500 up to 700 meters is included in the affected area. When shooting at 900 meters (sight 9) for a growth target of 1.7 m, the affected space will be from about 825 m to 900 meters, and when shooting at 1000 meters (sight 10), the affected space will be from about 940 m to 1000 meters.

Having determined the minimum (500m) and maximum (1000m) ranges for firing machine guns from closed positions using a conventional open sight, it is possible to indicate a non-sighting method for determining whether bullets will hit the closing comb. Having chosen the sight according to the range to the target, without changing the position of the machine gun in space, reduce the sight by one (as if reducing the range by 100 meters), if at this moment the aiming line passes above the closing, then the bullets will not touch the closing crest.

Now about the procedure for aiming the machine gun at the target in the direction.

As mentioned above, it is carried out along a milestone set by the observer close to the closing crest. The problem is that one observer cannot place a milestone on the machine gun line in a closed position - the target without making some mistake, since it is not possible to see the target and the machine gun at the same time, being between them. And when shooting at ranges of 500 meters and above, such errors lead to significant misses. Therefore, the second soldier - as a rule, the machine gunner himself - helps the observer to aim the machine gun at the target. To do this, he is at a greater distance from the closing crest than the observer. He takes a position so that he can see the target from behind the closure. Further, two situations are distinguished. If the machine gun is not tied to a specific point on the ground (a trench or a camouflaging local object, for example, a bush), then the machine gunner simply stands up, or rather stands up or rises slightly, on the line, the milestone set by the observer at the closing crest is the target. Sets up a second milestone (still deep enough into the ground so that the bullets don't cut it off) and then carries the machine gun
to a place located in the alignment of two established milestones. If, for tactical reasons, it is undesirable to move the machine gun, then the machine gunner needs to slightly move away from the machine gun in the direction opposite to the direction of fire, rise until he sees the target behind the closure, stand on the machine gun-target line (you can put a milestone in the place of your standing ) and indicate to an observer near the close crest where to place the pole. Moreover, the point of standing of the machine gunner, the machine gun itself, the milestone at the closing crest and the target should be on the same line. After that, the machine gunner lies down behind the machine gun and fires in the direction of the milestone installed by the gunner at the closing crest.

A few words about range guidance. It should be understood that at ranges of 500 - 1000 meters it is very difficult to see the places where bullets fell. The exception is cases when there are sighting and incendiary bullets that give a bright flash when they hit the surface, but do not leave a trace visible to the enemy, like tracer bullets. In the general case, observation is possible only if the bullets raise dust (splashes) upon impact about the surface. Examples include shelling a dirt road, dry arable land, shallow snow, a brick wall, etc. Indirectly, information about the place where the bullets fell can be obtained from the reaction of the enemy to the shelling. But in the most common cases - when shooting on a field overgrown with grass or on fairly deep snow, it is extremely difficult to see where the bullets fell. Tracer bullets, if the enemy is observing, cannot be used, as they will give out the approximate location of the machine gun. Given that when shooting at a distance of 500 - 1000 meters, only six positions of the sight (5,6,7,8,9,10) can be used, and what was said above about the affected area at such ranges, it can be recommended to fire by "combing". First, it is determined whether the target is closer to 500 meters or to 1000. In the first case, sight 7 is used, in the second 8,9,10 (a long burst is made at each sight setting, and then the setting is changed).
We also note that when choosing a sight, one should take into account the distance from the machine gun to the position of the observer, who sees what is behind the closure.

It is recommended even when preparing to fire from closed positions, nevertheless, to equip a trench with a parapet in order to be protected from enemy fire leading along the closing ridge.
Lieut.-Colonel brevete Arendt, Aide-memoire de l'officier de reserve d'infanterie, Edition Delmas, Bordeaux, 1945, pages 158-159.

In conclusion, we emphasize that the considered method of shooting is far from always convenient, but, in a certain situation, it may be the only possible one. Therefore, it will not hurt to know it, and mastering it does not constitute any special difficulties and will not take much study time.

Michael HORNET 31-03-2015 18:46

I read Shumilin Vanka-Company.
Memoirs of an eyewitness who fought from 1941 to 1944, 1942 fell on the command of a machine gun company
There is very often mentioned shooting from closed positions, a canopy or from a single slope of a hill, or through a fence, etc.
Accordingly, Maxim was used for this with his guidance system, like a gun
Single machine guns without a machine cannot do this, and on a modern machine, in my opinion, there are no guidance mechanisms at all
The question is - was such shooting from closed positions used after WWII and who thinks about it

From the development of the discussion

The trick is that the bend is located at about a hundred meters, and there must be a MANDATORY DIFFERENCE in HEIGHT, the sight is set for a hundred, after the bend, the bullets over which are just like, and the trajectory begins to fall

This will make it possible to minimize the distance of "firing from a semi-closed position", since the position of the machine gun barrel will be as horizontal as possible, which gives a noticeable reduction -

Drive into Senior’s BC and watch the decline yourself, the height of the hill of four or five meters completely makes the position not visible even from a tank, while the firing distance is within 700-800 m

As for machine-gun shooting from closed positions, the author of the craft has complete ignorance of the ballistics of a machine-gun cartridge and a lack of familiarity with at least instructions on a machine gun, which read:
"Remember: from closed positions, heavy machine guns can shoot no closer than 1500 meters."
http://www.rkka.msk.ru/rbp/rbp12.shtml
Let me remind you in the work that cases of firing from distances of 400-500 meters are described.
Complete unfamiliarity with weapons, coupled with the desire to cut the dough on "revelations".

Concerning modern application fire from closed positions, it is not claimed for the following reasons:
1 - A different arrangement of troops in the depths of positions - it is now difficult to meet an infantry battalion standing in a square a kilometer from you or a dismounted Cossack hundred, or its horsemen with horses. Everyone is disguised and dispersed as a rule - where to shoot something? Machine gun fire from a closed position is basically square fire, no matter what the author of the above-mentioned memoirs fantasizes about.
2 - Progress in means of observation and reconnaissance. You will be quickly discovered and covered with mines, in the midst of these exciting activities.
3 - Saturation with mortars. Which do the same thing faster and more reliably.
4 - most post-war conflicts are variants of colonial wars waged by contingents of parties unequal in mass and capabilities. The rather narrow specificity of mounted machine-gun fire is not in demand by any side of such conflicts.

inoks 31-03-2015 23:31

I have practiced this method quite often.

2 methods can be used
1. Gravitational, when gravity wraps a bullet behind an obstacle.
2. Wind when the bullet wraps the wind.

you need to be aware that you can not hit the target on
walking a meter from an obstacle (need distance).
and that not every obstacle is not in all weather conditions
you can throw a bullet.

I tried a lot to shoot like that for the uninitiated is shocking.
Although everything is considered quite simple.

so there is nothing complicated in this case for a machine gun.
the main thing is to know where the target is and what is the distance from the target
to the obstacle and what is the height of the obstacle or the width.
in order to calculate the bullet will be able to fly around this obstacle.

VladiT 01-04-2015 12:01

quote: Shooting at targets behind an obstacle can be carried out not only from a machine gun, but also from a sniper rifle.
I have practiced this method quite often.

At what distance? Is it really 400-500 meters, as described by Shumilin? Moreover, so that the bullets hit under the bottoms of the tanks, ricocheted off the ground and hit the foot soldiers behind the tanks?

inoks 01-04-2015 12:06

And so for the fence, even from a distance of 300m

inoks 01-04-2015 12:08

As for the bottom of the tank, I didn’t try it, unfortunately I don’t have a tank.

And for a fence at 400-500m, it’s easy, given that the fence, say, on
300m is located and the target is 400-500.
Both from the side and through the top of the mona.

Michael HORNET 01-04-2015 09:13

Well, where he described shooting through the fence - there didn’t seem to be a very large slope - just a machine gun stood at a distance of about 500 m from the fence, and even at this distance the bullet quite has a slide (about two meters) in order to go around the top of the fence and hit at waist level, especially since there was right through the fence (through the boards). It's only a matter of terrain conditions and fine-tuning of the trajectory
It is more difficult to understand how it was at the height at which the tanks were advancing - there, for the "reverse slope" from the height of the tank, there should have been a rather large elevation difference. On the other hand - at 500 m with a sight of 100, the decrease in a heavy 11.3 g machine-gun bullet is about 200 cm - a two-meter drop quite pulls on a "reverse slope"
Here it is only necessary to accurately calculate

I don’t see anything fantastic in the ricochet from the ground under the bottom of the tanks - shoot at the ground and see for yourself
Therefore, there is some doubtfulness, there are also blunders ("we were given 500 cartridges every day and we shot from morning to evening" - somewhere at least one zero is missing), but in general, so far it seems to be holding on
A practical question for skeptics - a drop of two meters - does this already, in their opinion, pull on a reverse slope? And at six hundred meters - after all, the fall is already 340 cm, and at seven hundred - 530 cm, and at 710 meters - already 5.5 meters
The height difference is five and a half meters by seven hundred - well, it’s quite drawn to “shooting from a reverse slope”

And about the displacement of this feature with mortars and heavy grenade launchers - I agree, they are more convenient for a dispersed target
VladiT - special thanks for the links! That's exactly what I wanted to read, I'm reading it now

kodec 01-04-2015 10:09

quote:

have you tried?
or just don't see

Michael HORNET 01-04-2015 10:14

I know that bullets from the ground will ricochet like crazy. Tried
Here, of course, you need to look at the angles of incidence, the effect is good only at less than 15 degrees

In general, I liked the opinion expressed by VladiT in that, for some reason, closed topic
To save money, I reproduce it here
written on 13-1-2011 14:41 VladiT's profile Click here to email VladiT
In my reading, I got to the episode where the Germans with anti-aircraft guns (apparently something Oerlikon-like) shot a Russian military unit lying in the snow.
And it became strange to me.

Well actually:

There are 800 infantrymen on the field and at least two Maxim machine guns. Before them unfolds the following oil painting:
"The Germans on caterpillar tractors dragged anti-aircraft guns to the village.

One, two, four! - I think. Here are four more and four creeping out from behind the edge of the top. There was movement in the chain of our soldiers. The soldiers, raising their heads, looked at the anti-aircraft guns. The first tractors were already crawling into the village, and along the road, the engines were still grumbling and blowing black clouds of smoke behind them. The first battery crawled out between the houses. The tractors were uncoupled, the guns turned around, and everyone froze in place. The rest roared their engines and, without haste, spread through the village.

Let's pause here and ask a question:
And why, looking at all this luxury, eight hundred rifles and two maxims "... raising their heads, looked at the anti-aircraft guns" and "lying, not moving"?

The term "watched" is used. From this, and a number of other points, it is clear that somewhere at a distance of 400-500 meters maximum, from 800 rifles and 2 Maxims "... The Germans were in no hurry." and "everything was done according to science."

These anti-aircraft batteries, according to the description, are several Oerlikons on open machines.

I almost physically see what exactly can be done at 400 meters with the "slow" Oerlikon crews - with the help of eight hundred rifles and two Maxims.

Of course, the author is not alien to a critical approach, and defines the state of the Russian fighters as follows:
"They lie like idiots and wait to be shot point-blank."
I again draw attention to his own words "point blank", explaining the real distance from 800 rifles and two maxims - to Oerlikons.

But the author's criticism about "idiots" turns out to be just that they should lie, but not "like idiots" - but in some other way. For immediately the author gives the command to lie down:
"I told him to lie down, but he didn't listen to me." The disobedient is also described as an idiot, and it becomes quite clear that for the author, idiots are everything, and who is lying - and who is running. When he writes about himself: "I was lying under a tree and looked around," i.e. in order not to be an idiot - it turns out that it is necessary to lie down and look around, that's the feature.

But, excuse me, from which oak do you have to fall in order for the Oerlikon crews that appeared in the firing sector to “attack” 800 rifles and machine guns?
Why attack them, because lying down is more convenient to shoot at them?

And why is it imperative and immediately to "retreat" from the Oerlikons on the hill? Why are Oerlikons more terrible than machine guns for infantry?

That's just it, that in this particular situation, without any retreats or offensives, the Oerlikon crews are just stupid suicide bombers against 800 rifles and two Maxims. All you had to do was just lay down and shoot.

At the same time, the author, who a few pages earlier showed a "master class" in shooting from a rifle at 300 meters, in this case prefers not to abuse his skills personally, but simply to lie down, well, perhaps "not like an idiot", but simply:
"I lay under a tree and looked around, what was going on around. I lay and did not move."

The description clearly shows that the author is dissatisfied with the situation and is worried:
"The shell hit him in the head and broke his skull in two, threw his iron helmet up, and the headless body thudded into the snow. From somewhere above, a sleeve with a bare brush flew in. The mitten, like in children, dangled on a cord. The fingers moved. The torn off arm was still alive."

Again, dissatisfaction with the behavior of their soldiers:
“Everyone who tried to flee or rush in a panic fell into the optical sight. I looked at the anti-aircraft guns, at the soldiers falling in agony, at the machine gunners, who with their “maxims” buried themselves in the snow. The machine gunners lay and did not move. "For a moment, the shooting stopped. Now no one was running across the open snowy field. The Germans fumbled with their eyepieces across the field, trying to snatch another victim from the background of snowdrifts. And now a new blow broke the barrel and shield of an easel machine gun wrapped in gauze and a piece of sheet."

It is worth recalling here that the Oerlikon, when shooting at the "next victim", is far from being as convenient as a simple machine gun, I think those present do not need to explain that how effective the hit of the anti-aircraft "cucumber" in the body is, it is so difficult compared to machine gun shooting.

Imagine a "duel" between Maxim and Oerlikon in an open field?
I think Oerlikon will have time to fire a couple of shells, no more. and then there are two hundred rifles for each Oerlikon - well, what are the chances, in general?
Especially given the fact that ours could still shoot at only unfolding calculations?

Now back to the beginning of the episode. The author describes his actions when several tractors with Oerlikons appear in his sector of fire as follows:
“Call the battalion!” I shouted to the telephone operator. The telephone operator, wide-eyed, feverishly twisted the handle, he began to knock on the valve of the handset, but the phone did not answer.

It is not entirely clear what he wanted "from the battalion." Even if artillery - then it could not be sent in the next five minutes. And if he wanted a fire raid, say, a howitzer, then the distance to the Germans was not enough for this and he would have been covered with his own shells.

And why artillery?

The Germans "unhurriedly turned" the Oerlikons, open to all winds, and 800 rifles and two machine guns looked at them. What is this?

There are doubts about the episode.
In terms of impact and results, the author rather describes the unpunished destruction of a unit by mortars (a very common situation, unfortunately, in 1941-42). Yes, lying down infantry cannot do anything if they are covered with mines, this is true.

And here - some kind of anrial is described, I can’t find other words.

p/s
I highly doubt that for anti-aircraft shells the fuse works when it hits the human body.
However, I do not approve, because I am not special.

kodec 01-04-2015 10:23

quote: I know that bullets from the ground will ricochet like crazy. Tried

sorry, I meant the bottoms of the tanks

quote: In the ricochet from the ground under the bottom of the tanks, I don’t see anything fantastic at all

personally, did you try to get under the bottom of a moving tank?

what others have written, we leave it on their conscience

respectfully

VladiT 01-04-2015 10:43

Now I went over the Shumilin topic on the Internet again, and noticed that the main site of Shumilin's son was closed. There was a powerful forum where supporters of the work gathered and praised. Now it is written that somewhere since 2010 the forum is "read-only".
http://nik-shumilin.narod.ru/
Nobody knows what happened?

My opinion:
Apparently, perestroika was a golden time for relatives of front-line soldiers who left scattered and unformed memories. Like Zhukov's relatives, they got the opportunity to "process" the source material in accordance with the political situation.

So the "new truth about the war" appeared.

If you read carefully, you can see that too often the "authors" make a mistake on the small details of military operations and the situation. Which could not be if real front-line soldiers wrote. The calculation is simple - most of the people know about weapons and hostilities not much more than these relatives-handlers. And everything works, especially for offenders.

But objectively, one must understand that these creations are no closer to the truth than the ever-memorable memoirs of Soviet military leaders in the processing of polytupr. Only with the opposite sign, but for the truth, any signs are bad, what are the pluses - what are the minuses.

Schaman161 01-04-2015 11:23

We take a 7.62x54 cartridge. We put in the calculator the sighting range of 1m, the height of the sight is 0.0cm. And look:
when shooting, the bullet drops by 200m = 33cm, by 220m = 41cm ... At short distances, it turns out by 10m = 0.1cm by 20m = 0.3cm, by 50m = 1.8cm Only by 160m = 20cm, and by 200m = 33cm

VladiT 01-04-2015 12:31

In my opinion, we must also take into account the difference between a decrease in BC and a real excess in live fire. If I understand the matter correctly, then the BC considers the shot fired strictly horizontally (throw angle = 0), and gives a fall.

In reality, they shoot with a certain angle of throw, which should compensate for the fall in the trajectory. In this case, the term "exceeding the trajectory" is used, and it is important that the "excess" will be somewhat less than the "decrease" that we get from the BC. This is because at a positive angle of throw, the bullet has not only a descending trajectory, as when shooting strictly horizontally, but also an ascending section, where, due to overcoming gravity, an additional decrease occurs.

That is, the army "excess" is not equal to the "decrease" in BC.

smith_SVP 01-04-2015 12:50

quote: And it became strange to me.

Damn, when I read this episode, I don’t even understand why they didn’t shoot.
Of course, I’m not a military man, and I don’t know all their troubles, but IMHO, with such a sharp and sudden change in the situation, it is necessary to make a decision on the spot, at your own peril and risk. For this, in principle, the commander is needed.
The fact that they are silent on the phone is normal phenomenon. Simple practice. Nobody wants to take responsibility.
But here the alignment is absolutely clear - it is necessary to open fire to suppress anti-aircraft guns while still on the rise, when they climbed up. The way is not to be destroyed, but at least to be suppressed, to shoot down the sight, to give the soldiers the opportunity to either retreat or advance. Otherwise, everything will be as described in the book.
Why was there no order? Why did the company commanders not take responsibility and order the soldiers to open fire on anti-aircraft guns? Why didn't the soldiers, or at least the machine gun crews, open fire when the anti-aircraft guns started firing?
Don't know. But the author also did nothing to prevent this massacre from happening. IMHO.

smith_SVP 01-04-2015 13:07

quote: And it became strange to me.

A similar case already from our time. 1995, Budenovsk.
There is no order to open fire, but the operational situation has suddenly changed, and the officer makes a decision on the spot:
"Why a machine gun?
-Nada. - I answered, trying to portray Vasily Alibabaevich from "Gentlemen of Fortune", and then added in a normal tone: - Just in case.
- Don't shoot without command! - Markusin made it clear that, despite my possession of a machine gun, it was he who would give the order to open fire.
...
Somehow it appeared city Hospital, constructed in the form of a reverse letter "G". The short wing of this building was facing right at us. Below, everything seemed peaceful and calm, and there were no even faint signs of the forcible seizure of this medical institution. Personally, I could clearly see both the end of the short wing of the building and the inner facade of the long main building of the hospital.
Our board had not yet caught up with this building, which remained noticeably to the right of me, when sharp and sudden shooting was heard from below. Again, just in case, I threw back the metal bar, after which I rested the butt of the machine gun on my shoulder and confidently grabbed the handle. Battalion commander Markusin tried to look down from behind me.
- Well, what is there? The doctor's voice came from behind.
I was about to look down, when directly in front of us in the black opening of the attic window, sparkling lights appeared, as if powerful electric welding was working there.
- "DShK!" - an idea flashed instantly, but the hands themselves turned the barrel of the machine gun a little to the left in advance, and the finger spontaneously pulled the trigger.
My machine gun fired short bursts one after another. The enemy DShK also fired at us in bursts, which made the three dazzlingly bright fire bells at its muzzle brake seem to me deadly eternal. The distance between us was some hundred meters, and knocking out our helicopter from such a good position, and even from the DShK, was a simple and terribly simple matter. I was on a flying Mi-8 and my machine gun did not have a special aviation sight. Under such conditions, it was very difficult, if not impossible, to get from my RMB to a moving target. Therefore, in desperation, all I had to do was take a slight lead to the left and, making small circular movements with a machine-gun muzzle for a fan-shaped scattering of bullets, fire burst after burst into this enemy heavy machine gun sparkling with frantic lights.
Suddenly, the DShK fell silent and I, in no way believing my eyes, abruptly broke away from my machine-gun sight and immediately looked at the empty nests machine gun belt hanging from the left of the receiver. During these few minutes of desperate skirmishing, I used up a little more than half the tape. But it was too early to relax...
- There is a sniper on the TV tower. It's hitting us. - the deafening cry of the battalion commander was heard above the ear.
"Blya" - I just had time to automatically think, but my eyes were already habitually looking for a new and dangerous target. Behind and to the left of the hospital building was an openwork television mast with repeater dishes mounted on it. These concave metal bowls were clearly visible to me and, moreover, from the side. The two upper plates, directed in opposite directions, turned out to be "clean". From our side, the profile of these repeaters was clearly visible. Between the other two, located somewhere at half the height of the tower, there was something dark. Taking the same lead, I began to water the suspicious target from the machine gun until the cartridges ran out in the tape. Dry clicked the empty bolt and I quickly lifted the receiver cover and took a new tape from the machine gunner. While I was loading the machine gun and the TV tower and the hospital itself shifted to the left under the tail of the helicopter, which is why they fell out of the machine gun's firing range. For the next five minutes, we listened with particular tension to see if the militants would follow us in a queue and if our helicopter would catch these bullets with its hull.
- Oh_et! I exhaled with wild joy, straightening up from the machine gun.
Now we flew a long enough distance and it was possible to rest. A new belt hung from the machine gun. On the floor were empty fragments of spent tape and empty cartridge cases, which rolled into different sides depending on the roll of the turntable.
From the opening of the cockpit of helicopter pilots, the battalion commander looked at me with the same joyful mine on his face:
-Well done. A little more and we would have come pi_dets. "
Zaripov A.M., "Farewell to my courage", http://artofwar.ru/z/zaripow_a/text_0560.shtml

Schaman161 01-04-2015 14:08

quote: That is, the army "excess" is not equal to the "decrease" in BC.
I could be wrong, but that's how I understand the question.

What kind of theory are you putting forward. What for then BC? It was created for this - to calculate corrections for the firing range.

VladiT 01-04-2015 14:18

quote: Originally posted by Schaman161:

What kind of theory are you putting forward. What for then BC? It was created for this - to calculate corrections for the firing range.

Perhaps I expressed myself incorrectly. I will clarify:

chievs 01-04-2015 14:51

guys - a machine gun is a necessary thing in the household - do not argue
but about who shoots how and where it hits, this is a different conversation

kodec 01-04-2015 15:13

quote: The reduction indicated in the tables will not be equal to the actual excess of the trajectory

Of course it doesn't matter.
Only for a machine gun, a Mosin cartridge and firing a canopy behind a concrete wall, as well as a ricochet under the bottom of the tank, this will not be essential. IMHO

the main thing is that the cartridges would be brought up on time

pornographer 01-04-2015 15:28

quote: Of course, I’m not a military man, and I don’t know all their troubles, but IMHO, with such a sharp and sudden change in the situation, it is necessary to make a decision on the spot, at your own peril and risk. For this, in principle, the commander is needed.

so, you first ask yourself a simple question - why put people in the snow in the first place. those. "800" walked and walked to carry out a certain order, and all at once just lay down and lay down until they fired. figs with him with the order.
and in half an hour the Hans will no longer need any machine guns, because no one will get up anyway ...

Schaman161 01-04-2015 17:59

quote: The reduction indicated in the tables will not be equal to the actual excess of the trajectory if the table is compiled for the throwing angle "zero".
#19
P.M.

Well, calculate for yourself:
score, for example, 7.62x54 400 meters to zero with a sight height of 3.85 cm, then the trajectory will be exceeded by
30m=5cm, 60m=16cm, 100m=26cm.
Accordingly, for a 500 meter distance 30m=10cm, 60m=24cm, 100m=39cm.
For 600m distance 30m=15cm, 60m=33cm, 100m=54cm.

This is for a 3.85cm sight height. At the Maxim machine gun, I am Kh.Z. I saw that the sight there was pulled up very strongly, respectively, the height of the trajectory at these lines: 30/60/100m will decrease.

Michael HORNET 01-04-2015 21:23

VladiT - so yes, the fall of the trajectory is not equal to the excess of the trajectory with an increase in the angle of throw
Therefore, EVERYTHING depends on the scheme, and the height difference will give the greatest effect
P-f posted pictures

The trick is that the bend is located at about a hundred meters, there must be a HEIGHT DIFFERENCE, the sight is set for a hundred, after the bend, the bullets over which are just like, and the trajectory begins to fall
At the same time, the use of the words "reverse slope" is probably inappropriate here, since here the whole effect of the "half-closed position" (see the bottom figure) is precisely the height difference (and the machine gun should obviously be buried in the trench, which, perhaps, is additionally masked). Shooting is carried out with a heavy bullet, as having a steeper trajectory (like 11.7 g)
This will minimize the "shooting from a closed position" distance as much as possible, since the position of the machine gun barrel will be as horizontal as possible, which gives a noticeable decrease (look at the BC for yourself)
bullet speed about 760 m / s, bq \u003d 0.455 approximately
Drive into Senior’s BC and watch the decline yourself, the height of the hill of four or five meters completely makes the position not visible even from a tank, while the firing distance is within 700 m

VladiT 01-04-2015 22:32

The main "invention" from Shumilin's book is not shooting from closed positions, as such, but AIMED shooting from a closed position.

Initially, firing from close was used, but it is important that it was used to defeat concentrated combat formations in the near rear of the enemy. This is, for example, a battalion standing in readiness in World War 1, Cossack units at the time of preparation. It’s strange for us today to hear this, but in the First World War it was possible, firstly, to really catch a whole regiment standing stupidly for hours, and secondly, this regiment continued to stand under fire, such was stupid courage. And the officers precisely controlled the "morale" so that they would not scatter even under shrapnel.

This is the beginning of the century, the last one is World War I. Then they no longer toiled with such nonsense. And in such a situation, the mounted fire of a machine gun from a closed position made sense for some time. I repeat - as long as at a distance of 1.5 km. from the front line, one could expect the presence of a concentrated manpower, which they hit with FIRE ON THE SQUARE.

But not aimed, and not from 500 meters. As described by Shumilin. I think the veteran's memory got confused - what he dreamed about and what was in reality. Shumilin was a very young guy, about 20 years old. Uma chamber there. He apparently nurtured to himself or even suggested such an "innovation" - as aimed shooting from a closed position. He was justifiably sent with this nah. And either he himself confused reality and non-existence, or he told his son, and he decided to "do it in a literary way" without understanding the rage. Well, how else can he specify the technical details - if the soul is eager to give out "revealing", while it can still be popular ...

He most likely was not allowed to do this, but after many years he confused reality with his shooting offers.
This is all well hawala housewives on the Internet. But we have a rather unusual situation here. We are interested in completely objective technical things - cartridge ballistics, machine gun design, weapons details.

We do not have political tasks - to refute the nature of the war, all that shit that pours in pounds from the pages of the "new truth about the war."

But we cannot ignore obvious illiteracy - it's just that technical literature on a machine gun is available, and it, and not us, speaks of the fantasy of Shumilin's descriptions.
BK exercises are good today in civilian life. But in a combat situation, one cannot engage in such filigree adjustment to within centimeters - guarantees are needed. Therefore, the excess is taken with a margin, so that there is a battle, and not a circus of immortal concrete characters.

Let's go even simpler:
There is a work by Shumilin, which states that a machine gun can be fired from a close at 400 meters accurately.
And there is, for example, a MANUAL for an INFANTRY FIGHTER, Chapter 12:
SERVICE OF THE MACHINE GUN.
Published by the Combat Training Directorate of the VIK RKKA

Which says:
"Remember: from closed positions, heavy machine guns can shoot no closer than 1500 meters."

It remains only to find out who is lying. Probably, the Leadership is lying - after all, it is known, written by the Stalinist satraps to increase the killing of their soldiers in the coming battle between the two totalitarian regimes.
And tov. Shumilin brought them to clean water. Well, not stupid?

Michael HORNET 01-04-2015 22:51

So this is what the Manual means - shooting with a canopy in an open area, over the head of your troops
Here - shooting from a height difference - from a height to a lowland, in which a decrease in the trajectory with an almost horizontal barrel significantly reduces the distance of such fire, while the machine gun itself remains truly invisible
The illustrations themselves - sketches were drawn
With which one can agree - with very a high degree clumsy description of the action by a rifleman, completely unacceptable for a military man with education

Here is from the instruction on shooting from the machine gun of the Red Army

11. SHOOTING FROM HALF-CLOSED AND CLOSED POSITIONS
WHAT A MACHINE GUNTER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT INDIRECT FIRE
With direct fire, the gunner sees the target. To shell it, it is enough to install a sight and a rear sight, aim a machine gun with direct fire at the indicated point and open fire.
When firing indirect fire, the gunner does not see the target. He directs the machine gun at the target on the commands of the platoon commander separately, in two steps. Horizontal aiming is carried out according to the goniometer (goniometric scale optical sight), a vertical aiming- on a quadrant or on an aiming scale and a scale of elevation angles of the target of an optical sight. The necessary calculations are made by commanders using tables, formulas, or special instruments.
For such shooting, machine guns are located in a closed position, and the platoon leader is usually at some distance at an observation post. Communication is established between the observation post of the platoon commander and the firing position. One of the machine guns is called the main one. Before the target appears, it is directed by the commander to the main landmark, and the rest of the machine guns are installed parallel to this machine gun, or, as they say, they build a parallel fan.
The goniometer and sight (setting the quadrant), obtained at the mark after constructing a parallel fan, are called the initial data for shooting.
the platoon commander directs machine guns at the target, using the commander's protractor - quadrant; machine guns are aimed at the target by an optical sight. The goniometric divisions of these devices are the same, as are the divisions of the quadrant and the elevation angle scale of the target of an optical machine-gun sight.
In these devices, the circle is divided into 6,000 parts. Numbers are placed every 100 divisions. This results in 60 large divisions. Each major division has 100 minor divisions. In order to remember better, let's agree: large divisions - "rubles", small ones - "penny". Large divisions ("rubles") are set by turning the head of the optical sight, and small ones ("penny") - by rotating the drum. On the protractor - quadrant for this purpose are the target line and an additional pointer. One goniometric division at a distance of 1,000 meters is equal to 1 meter, 2,000 meters - 2 meters, 3,000 meters - 3 meters, etc.
With the same settings of these devices, they show the same angular values.

IMPACT OF EXTERNAL CONDITIONS
In order to hit the target, it is not only necessary to correctly calculate the initial data and accurately set the instruments, it is also necessary to take into account how wind, cold and heat, and air pressure affect the flight of a bullet. Weather information is provided by the meteorological service. Commanders, on the basis of this information and their own observations, make changes to the initial data, called amendments. Amendments are made based on the firing tables.

VERTICAL AIM
When firing indirect fire, the machine gun is leveled horizontally. The commander calculates the scope and level or quadrant setting. When the gunner makes the indicated settings and displays the level bubble again, the machine gun barrel will rise to the desired elevation angle.
The elevation angle is made up of three quantities:
from the aiming angle for firing at a target at a given distance (taken from the firing table);
from the elevation angle of the target from the machine gun to the target (measured and calculated by the platoon leader);
from corrections, taking into account external conditions, i.e. tailwind or headwind, cold or heat, Atmosphere pressure(the amendments are determined and taken from the firing tables by the platoon commander).
The target elevation angle is added if it is measured from the horizon up, and subtracted if it is measured from the horizon down.
It is impossible to measure the elevation angle of the target from the machine gun to the target from a closed position because the target is not visible from the machine gun. Therefore, the platoon leader measures from his observation post the elevation angle of the target to the target and the elevation angle of the target to the machine gun. Then, calculations determine the elevation angle of the target from the machine gun to the target.
When the platoon leader has received the elevation angle necessary for shelling the selected or indicated target, he does not immediately transfer it to the machine guns, but first finds out the value of the smallest sight. If the elevation angle is less than the smallest sight, which was determined from the machine gun to the most highest point closing the crest, then it is impossible to fire from this position at this target, since the overlapping crest will intercept the bullets.

HORIZONTAL AIM
When the barrel of the machine gun is given an elevation angle, the bullets should reach the target. It remains to decide how the gunner will direct the machine gun at the target if he does not see it.
Machine guns are directed at the target by the platoon commander from his observation post. He will indicate to the gunner the installation of the goniometer. When the gunner aims the machine gun with this setting at the specified aiming point, the machine gun will be aimed at the target.

THE SIMPLEST WAYS TO SHOOTING FROM A CLOSED POSITION
In order to apply the simplest methods of firing, the machine gun must be installed not far from the closing crest. In this case, the place for installing the machine gun is found as follows: the machine gun chief lies down on the selected point and rises so that his head is approximately at the height of the machine gun shield. If the terrain ahead is not visible at the same time, then the machine gun can be installed in this place, it will be covered from enemy observation by a ridge (grass, bushes, building, fence, etc.).
The smallest sight is measured after the machine gun is in position.
Shooting from a half-closed position can be carried out using the commander's goniometer and the auxiliary aiming point.
Shooting at an auxiliary point. Such shooting is possible if there is a clearly visible point in the target range or close to it (when firing with an open sight no more than 10 goniometric divisions to the side) and above the target, which the gunner sees while lying behind the machine gun (Fig. 229).

To determine the installation of the sight and rear sight, a machine-gun line is used. The head of the machine gun or gunner acts in this order: determines the distance to the target in meters (for example, 1200), then rises above the machine gun so as to see both the target and the auxiliary aiming point. The scale of the sights of the machine gun ruler is removed from the eye by 50 centimeters and the ruler is placed vertically. Division 12 combines with the goal. Without changing the position of the ruler, it looks at which division the auxiliary point fell against, for example 8. Then it determines how many goniometric divisions (on the scale of goniometric divisions of the machine-gun ruler) the target is from the aiming point along the front (for example, 4 divisions to the left).
Adjusts for wind, heat or cold according to the shooting tables.
Gives a command (machine gun chief) or the gunner independently sets the sight and rear sight found on the machine gun.
In our case, the command: "Below spruce machine gun, 8, rear sight 4 to the left, aim at the top of the spruce."
After executing this command, the machine gun will be aimed at the target in a lateral direction and in height.

VladiT 01-04-2015 22:57

quote: Here - shooting from a height difference - from a height to a lowland, in which a decrease in the trajectory with an almost horizontal barrel significantly reduces the distance of such fire, while the machine gun itself remains, indeed, invisible

They figured that out too. The bottom line is that the illustrations in the books deliberately exaggerate the parabolic nature of the trajectory. To look at them - it seems that after flying two-thirds of the distance, the bullets drop beautifully and go where they need to.

This is done for printing purposes, otherwise the illustration simply will not fit on the book page. In reality, the trajectory is far from being so "parabolic". And the bullets won't come down so fast past the closure.

I gave in the discussion a picture adjusted more realistically, here it is-
And the fact that the enemy is in the lowland will only give that the bullets will pass higher, and nothing else.

And an energetic decline in the trajectory occurs - but it is at distances starting from a kilometer. But not closer. There is already a loss of energy and the curvature is progressively increasing. That is why such shooting is unrealistic closer - the nature of the DECLINE is different at 500 meters and at one and a half kilometers. This is what was changed in Shumilin's examples - he describes shooting at 400-500 meters, and takes a trajectory from shooting for one and a half kilometers.

It is clearly seen that he studied a book on a machine gun with traditional illustrations, but did not fully understand the features of the trajectory dictated precisely by the energy of the bullet at different distances.

smith_SVP 01-04-2015 23:06

IMHO, there is an inaccuracy in Shumilin's book.
He writes about 510 m from the fence to the machine-gun position, and he himself determines the distance from the mill by angular values. Judging by the description, the machine gun stood behind the mill, in the depths of the defense. It was from her that the reverse slope came.
If we assume that the author corrected the fire from the mill, and the machine gun was 150..200 m further, then the distance is already about 700 m - it is quite feasible in terms of the steepness of the trajectory if the enemy does not observe from positions above 2 m. And possibly more It was.
At 700..800 m, it’s not a problem to get in a line from the loom along the growth line.
Another thing is that everything turned out so beautifully. And the Germans were stupid. And there were no adjustments from the upper floors, or from the roofs of houses.
As for tanks, ricochets from the road are quite possible.
According to Filatov, at distances up to almost 1 km, about 80% or more of bullet ricochets from dense ground are observed. So just "where God will send" - why not? A bullet will jump under the bottom - well, it will not jump - well, to hell with it. 1..2 defeats from under the bottom are enough for the infantry to stop hiding behind the tanks.
Ricochet shooting from the asphalt under the bottom of the car as a whole is quite often used in order to get the enemy behind him.
Of course, the efficiency is high, but I personally did not conduct such experiments, so I can’t say how plausible this is.

VladiT 01-04-2015 23:17

quote: Assuming that the author is from the mill

Attempts to find a white cat in a black room would be commendable if Shumilin did not have a bunch of glitches throughout the book. Yes, we try to respect the front-line soldiers and we can understand one or two, well - three inaccuracies. It's understandable, memory failed, years.

But when there are almost technical glitches in almost every chapter, when the author, claiming his experience with Maxim’s machine gun, but at the same time describes Maxim’s reloading as follows:
"Paramoshkin opened the shutter cover with a click, dragged the end of the new tape into the receiver, slammed his fist on the top cover, twitched the shutter handle and said: - You can start!" - it is impossible to believe in the acquaintance of the writer with a machine gun of this brand.
And when his fallen PPSh starts firing in bursts, and then he finds out that the "machine gun is working" - it's hard to believe that the writer is also familiar with the main infantry weapon in that war.

And so it goes, throughout the book. Just read on and "watch your hands" as they say...

Michael HORNET 01-04-2015 23:36

Well, you, VladiT, somehow freely handle the data of the ballistic calculator of Senior, do not believe in him at all?
The decrease in the trajectory by 500 m is 2 meters, that is, we have such a head start in terms of the height of the "half-closed position". Quite taller
There it was said about the lowland, and even the fence blocked the view, although, apparently, the head and shoulders were visible from behind the fence to the observer from the mill
That is, technically no science fiction has been written, but not everything is smooth in the description - one cannot disagree with this, which is why we are discussing it. There and open lids Maxim when charging (he couldn’t help but know that you don’t need to open the lid, that this procedure is not related to charging in any way, but it is mentioned that in the context of changing the belt in a machine gun. But perhaps this episode belongs to the pen of his son, who all knowledge about military affairs scooped from TV
Compare the descriptions of the war by Vasily Zaitsev - there are much more subtle details described CORRECTLY. Here, yes - a blunder on a blunder. It would be understandable - if it were a translation of a foreign text by a blonde girl, they would also remember about the sight in the barrel, etc. But SO to describe some things, indeed, a front-line soldier-military cannot by definition, or it was not written by him, but by his son and passed off as the original
But in terms of shooting from a closed position, or rather, half-closed, it’s not so much that he lied

pf 01-04-2015 23:37

quote: If we assume that the author corrected the fire from the mill, and

so you can also guess how long it took the Hans to calculate and cover the spotters. they were taught the basics.
http://lib.ru/PROZA/BEK/volokola.txt
“I went up the winding stairs to the bell tower. Kubarenko was already there.
Sitting down, he watched through binoculars from behind the stone railing. The telephone operator attached
wire to the device.
- How far to the right? I asked.
Kubarenko looked surprised, then understood.
“Zero five,” he said.
I turned to the telephone operator:
- Soon you?
- At the moment, comrade battalion commander.
Kubarenko handed me the binoculars. Correcting his eyes, catching sharply
advancing, at once brightened jagged line of the forest, I led the windows
lower - and suddenly, clearly, as if in fifty steps, I saw the Germans. They were standing
stood freely, but already lined up. could be discerned battle formations:
groups, probably platoons, separated by small gaps, were
arranged as follows: in front of one compartment, behind, with wings, two. At
officers, who also put on helmets, have already unfastened their parabellum holsters, which
- I first saw it then - they are worn on the left on the stomach. So here they are, those
that approached Moscow - "professional winners"! Now they wade
will go across the river.

Ready! the telephone operator said. - Communication, comrade battalion commander, is.
- Call the fire department...
And finally, finally, the command was uttered, restored
broken phrase.
- More than one sight! Zero five to the right! Two shells, rapid fire!
I gave the binoculars to Kubarenko.
No longer distinguishing the Germans, I peered into the edge with the naked eye,
anxiously waiting for breaks. It flashed in the trees, then two stood next to each other
haze. I did not dare to believe, but it seemed that the target was hit.
- Exactly! - said Kubarenko, lowering the binoculars; his face is speckled
earth, smeared in some places, with a swollen scratch across the forehead, there was
shining. - Now we...
Without listening to the end, I grabbed the phone and ordered:
- Of all the guns, eight shells each, fragmentation, rapid fire!
Kubarenko willingly, proudly handed me the binoculars.
I watched. Sighting shells, apparently, someone was wounded. In one
place, with their backs to us, several Germans bent over someone, but the ranks
stood.
Well, pray to your god! In the rumble and rumble that the ear has stopped
notice, we heard: our guns spoke. Leaning forward through
railing, I saw through binoculars: on the edge of the forest, where the Germans concentrated,
flames flashed, the earth heaved, trees fell, machine guns flew up and
helmets.
Kubarenko pulled me back with force.
- Lie down! he shouted.
We've been discovered. With a deafening disgusting rumble near the bell tower
swept "humpback". He fired a machine gun. Several bullets hit
quadrangular pillar, leaving blind holes. The plane flew by
close enough that I could make out the angry face facing us. The moment we
looked into each other's eyes. I knew I had to fall, but I could not force
himself, did not want to lie down in front of the German. Pulling out a gun, glaring
at the enemy, I pulled and pulled the trigger until the clip ran out.
The plane left in a straight line. They began to beat on the bell tower from guns. One projectile
landed below us in a reliable masonry. The air was covered with shallow
brick dust creaking on the teeth. But it seemed: the shells of the enemy did not
real, they are torn, as if on a movie screen, - nearby, but in a different world, - not
what is ours: ours smash, shred the body. Again flew "humpback". Again
bullets clicked. I took cover behind a stone riser. The telephone operator groaned.
- Where are you? Will you get down?
- I'll get there, comrade battalion commander.
Picking up the phone, I called Ponomarev.
- The telephone operator is injured. We went to the bell tower of another.
Before I finished speaking, I heard my strangely loud voice.
Everything is quiet. There was a terrible, eardrum-pounding silence.
Only very, very far away, from the rear, came the hooting of guns. They fought there
our; there, with a new wedge, the Germans prepared to rush through our barrier.
I ordered Kubarenko:
- Control the fire! Seki, seki, if they climb.
- Yes, comrade battalion commander!
Now down two steps, now rather into the company. "(C)

PS in the same place, by the way, and about the results of firing a battalion of 700 untrained fighters in one salvo at 4 training targets. they evaporated.

smith_SVP 01-04-2015 23:54

quote: http://lib.ru/PROZA/BEK/volokola.txt

Recommend?

pornographer 02-04-2015 06:48

inoks 02-04-2015 08:13

The trajectory of 54 rounds is not so flat.
At 600m it's about 3m at 700 about 4.5 at 800- 6 at 900-8.5
1000-12m.

Divide by 2 to get the height in the maximum ordinate.

At the corners, it turns out that at 1000m you need to lift the trunk approximately
at 45 arc minutes.
That is, there is no 1 degree. at 1500m it will be about 2 degrees
That is, in principle, the values are small relative to the sizes
shelters.

That is, if you shoot precisely from behind cover, it turns out that
yes, you need no closer than 1500m further, the elevation angle is growing rapidly.
By two kilometers it is already about 5 degrees.
at 2500m - it will be already 16.5 degrees

So if we give an elevation angle of 5 degrees
and move away from the shelter by 5m, then we can throw it over
shelter measuring 45cm high.

This is how gentlemen can now draw conclusions.
If they move away from the shelter by 50m, then the shelter can already be 4.5m high.
If at 100m, then the shelter can be 9m high, in principle, you can actually shoot from the ravine.

Michael HORNET 02-04-2015 09:31

That is why in all the pictures illustrating shooting from a closed position, the so-called. "Half-closed position", which uses a vertical drop and shooting from a hill to a valley - to use only and exclusively the trajectory of the descent with a horizontal shaft, and not an attempt to "go around the obstacle" on a horizontal section
And distances of 500-800 m, when a bullet can still hit a single or weak group target

In general, as Gleb suggested - using the wind to blow a bullet over an obstacle, especially coupled with a descent - aerobatics worthy of being captured in some kind of film, but not in the style of Bekmambetov's action movie, but quite a serious military film, with calculations, speed measurements wind and all things
For example, a height difference of 5 meters on the ground, the task is to remove the enemy sentry inside the guarded base behind a high fence
the machine gun stands in a camouflaged position 100 m from the cliff, at the top, the sentry cannot see it from the height of its growth
At the bottom, at 200 m, a high fence begins (from the building) (enemy base).
The base is equipped with opening gates
Initial data - heavy bullet 11.7 g, speed 760 m/s, bullet bq 0.46
The decrease in the trajectory by 600 meters will be 347 cm (with sight 1 - zero per hundred meters), which gives a hit on a bio-target 1.8 m high in the chest area
A strong wind of 15m/s will give a horizontal drift of the trajectory no less than 390 cm at 600 m
The gates are opened to allow VIPs to pass, the queue - the bullet drops and at the same time blows around the corner of the building, through the open gates, and eliminates the sentry

kodec 02-04-2015 10:27

quote: the task is to remove the enemy sentry inside the guarded base behind a high fence

sentries are usually cut with a knife
firing a machine gun at a sentry standing behind a fence has no practical meaning.

Would you go to the army, Mikhail, with your irrepressible energy to theoretical knowledge, you can rise to the rank of general, at some kind of headquarters

sorry.
respectfully

VladiT 02-04-2015 10:30

quote: For example, a height difference of 5 meters on the ground, the task is to remove the enemy sentry inside the guarded base behind a high fence

Why kill the sentry if the base is still behind the fence and guarded, what did he do to you?

Mikhail, with all due respect to your ingenuity, this is "in the style of Bekmambetov." And it will always be so, if all sorts of circus tricks are taken as the basis for reasoning, from throwing a hand-held fighting monkey with a catapult to using a tornado as a bullet trajectory corrector.

Seriously, any shooting from a closed position has a minus reduced hit accuracy. What enters into an insoluble contradiction with the efforts with which such shooting is organized. It's easier - the game is not worth the candle exactly since the combat formations of the opponents have become camouflaged and dispersed.

I have already said that mounted shooting appeared in a temporary combination of two factors that quickly disappeared:
1 - A machine gun has ALREADY appeared
2 - STILL used battle formations from Napoleonic Wars, concentrated formations of masses of infantry in the near rear.

Similar unique combinations of factors do occur—for example, in civil war in the United States, a rare variant happened when the range of destruction of rifles turned out to be greater than the range of artillery. On the battlefield, there were already modern combat rifles with artillery from muzzle-loading "unicorns" in the style of Borodino-Austerlitz.

But very soon such lafa became a thing of the past, and everything got upside down again. Leaving only a notch in the brains of the unfortunate amers about some gigantic role of a rifle in life and death, from which the unfortunate still suffer from illusions.

The same with mounted machine guns. An exceptionally temporary phenomenon, gone with the disappearance of the sum of the two premises outlined above. That is, the machine gun remained, but the masses of manpower, reachable by mounted fire, disappeared. Everyone began to disguise themselves and no longer act as heroes under shrapnel, but behave adequately.

Without this - mounted shooting with a machine gun can only be considered as a senseless circus. I repeat the reasons - the extremely low accuracy of such fire, which makes its very organization unreasonable. Moreover, saturation with mortars, as already mentioned, solves this matter much better.

inoks 02-04-2015 11:18

From sniper rifle It's pretty accurate, I can assure you. At 1400m, shooting from 12.7, seeing only the antenna
we confidently got into the car 10 out of 10 in the chest, well, about
1 out of 3 with 3-4ms wind

we only knew exactly where relative to the antenna and at what height the target was.

Michael HORNET 02-04-2015 11:42

In addition to machine guns taken for the purpose of firing from the machine, one can also talk about firing from hand weapons in a sniper style, having, as Gleb says and they write in the NSD, exactly that the vertical target reference point and a clear distance from the aiming point along the vertical reference point to the target below it (calculated by triangulation or simply knowing the height) - since a machine with a protractor for hand weapons is not provided , but in general a simple goniometer level is completely included in the sighting system (attached to the body of the sight)
Trajectories silent weapons under 9x39 (Vintorez) or 12,7x55 (Exhaust) from the initial 290 are very steep, and there are no questions about the canopy at all, and the wind drift is such that you can blow it out here and the ranges can be much closer, at which the hit accuracy is determined only by the accuracy of the calculation and measurements

Our response to Bekmambetov with Angelina Jolie
And the need to eliminate this particular person in the plot is easy to come up with.

kodec 02-04-2015 11:46

quote: we knew for sure

i.e. in static

quote: hit the car 10 out of 10

i.e. the car somehow did not react to what was happening

quote: thoracic, approx.
1 out of 3 with 3-4ms wind

and the chest also picked her nose

quote: From a sniper rifle it turns out quite accurately, I dare to assure you. At 1400m shooting from 12.7

at the present level of merger developed!!! hardware and software, no one will argue with this.

That is, THIS is simply possible, but !!! given initial conditions

But then everything was mixed in a heap, and the Maxim machine gun, and Senier, the bottoms of the moving tanks, the infantry running behind them, the sentries standing behind the fence and who, if he wants to live until the end of the shift, generally should not sleep, but walk around the perimeter.
And most importantly, they do not see any problems in this.

inoks 02-04-2015 12:51

What was mixed is not for me.
I'm only stating the facts of what is really possible based on my own experience.

The story about the car and chest is about training shooting
for statistics in order to understand the probability and dispersion parameters.
For further more accurate and calculated shooting.

For a 9x39 cartridge, the wind speed is not as big as you think
in addition, a firing range of 300m (based on the maximum
scattering).

The BC of the bullet is quite large, about 0.6 in terms of sensations, although I have never counted it reliably.

They will not allow you to use this method with wind blowing a bullet.
The drifts are very small. But the trajectory is quite steep.

pf 02-04-2015 17:41

citation: An exceptionally temporary phenomenon that has gone into the past with the disappearance of the sum of the two premises outlined above. That is, the machine gun remained, but the masses of manpower, reachable by mounted fire, disappeared. Everyone began to disguise themselves and no longer act as heroes under shrapnel, but behave adequately.

Well, if we consider the 30-mm 2A42 cannon as a machine gun, then there were cases of deliberate use of it for effective mounted shooting in the mountains at an organized ambush kakbe. moreover, as far as is known, the adjustment for a distance of about three km was made very quickly.

smith_SVP 02-04-2015 18:34

quote:

Started reading. The first impression is very good. On business.

Gets 02-04-2015 19:00

in order to check in, or maybe it’s easier and in the book they just missed one in front of 500 meters? although while reading he was also perplexed, the authority of the Red Army fighter outweighed.

quote: Originally posted by pornographer:
Recommended last time

Thanks. rare emotional book.

VladiT 02-04-2015 19:20

Then they made a mistake several times in the same thing.
“Now it was necessary to determine the distance from the machine gun to the fence. I decided to measure the width of the walkway in steps. The Germans walked along the walkway and measured the steps, and I counted them. 18, 17 and 16. One fat German with short legs walked the walk in 20 steps. I took the average value of 17 and calculated the width of the walk. I got 12.75 m. Using the formula D = B * 1000.n, I got: machine gun to the fence - 510 meters.
A bullet flies a distance of 500 meters in 0.7-0.8 seconds."pf 10-04-2015 21:45

quote: What does he write there? Tell me in a nutshell Pi-Fch?

who? Genattulin, as a direct participant, is artistic about trench truth. skulls burst from the explosion and slow death, quick death from fear, execution of Hans, cavalry, etc. without savoring the chernukha and all sorts of bul-bul. There is, in my opinion, a somewhat controversial story about the Hans sniper, who worked on the author.
Karpov - also about himself. more literary. zone, penal company, reconnaissance, combat exits behind the line, tongues, deep rear in golden epaulettes, post-war. something like that. (C)
Sobsno at Karpov all books about the war are worth reading. including "The Generalissimo" part 1.

VladiT 29-04-2015 23:40

Now I'm reading a book by Peter Andreev
"I was buried alive. Notes of a divisional scout" -
http://www.litmir.info/br/?b=208069
In terms of genre, the book is very reminiscent of Shumilinskaya, but so far I don’t see glitches with equipment and weapons that are annoying for a front-line soldier, with the same degree of frankness and showing the hardships of war and the shit that is inevitable with a large crowd of warring people.
The influence of the personality of the author and processor on the final product is very noticeable. Here it is, in contrast to Shumilin's book, positive.

I advise you to read for comparison, although the book is large and in the narrative it overwhelms even pre-war times. By the way, many interesting details of the pre-war army training and the situation in the personnel of the Red Army, which I had not met anywhere before.

An0n 04-05-2015 23:36

Maybe Shumilin mixed shooting over the heads of his advancing infantry and shooting from closed positions?

Vit200977 05-05-2015 11:35

The book "From the Arctic to Hungary" Peter Bograd, lieutenant - major general. Describes indirect fire on the defensive. In one case, he does not indicate the distance, in the other he writes distances of 1500-2000 meters.