2. GERMAN INFANTRY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

There is no doubt that of the two largest land powers of the period of the last war - Russia and Germany - the German land army both at the beginning and at the end of the war, it had the most combat-ready infantry. However, on a number of important issues of combat training and armament, the Russian infantry, especially at the initial stage of the war, was superior to the German. In particular, the Russians were superior to the Germans in the art of night combat, combat in wooded and swampy areas and combat in winter, in the training of snipers and in the engineering equipment of positions, as well as in equipping the infantry with machine guns and mortars.

However, the Germans were superior to the Russians in the organization of the offensive and the interaction between the military branches, in the training of junior officers and in equipping the infantry with machine guns. During the course of the war, the opponents learned from each other and managed to some extent eliminate the existing shortcomings.
In the following, we will try to establish whether the German side has exhausted all possible means in order to provide the infantry with maximum striking power.

Armament of the German infantry

The self-loading rifle was invented in Switzerland in 1903. In 1923 the first automatic rifle.

In the 1920s in Germany there were, of course, progressive infantry officers who remembered the lessons of the First World War and sought to take them into account in their work. So, in one infantry regiment, known for its rich traditions, an officer served, who back in 1926. advocated the re-equipment of the infantry with new types of melee weapons and especially the introduction of the machine gun as the main weapon of the shooter. But a considerable time passes from the moment a decision is made on rearmament to the arrival of new weapons in the troops. The rapidly developing armament of Germany required the release a large number weapons. Decommissioning of the 1898 model rifle and the adoption of a new automatic manual firearms would require a radical restructuring of the military industry. Therefore, in the interests of maintaining mass production, manual automatic weapons had to be sacrificed.

As a result of this, the German infantry in 1939. entered the war with weapons that had been in service since 1898, adopted at that time on the basis of the experience of the campaigns of 1864, 1866 and 1870/71.
The fact that by the beginning of the war neither Russia nor America had a better model small arms, is only weak consolation. Created during the Second World War, the German assault rifle could not enter the troops in time and in sufficient quantities. Its introduction into service was delayed due to the need to produce new ammunition.

The machine gun of 1942, which was in service with the German army, was the best example of this weapon in the world. At the end of the war, it was significantly modernized. The weight of the machine gun was reduced from 11 to 6.5 kg, and the rate of fire was increased from 25 to 40 rounds per second.
However, by the end of the war, there were only three models of this machine gun suitable for use in combat conditions and ready for mass production (MG-42v or MG-45).

The lack of assault guns that proved their worth in battle was explained by reasons beyond the control of the army. The number of tanks in the armored forces was also far from sufficient. At the same time, at the end of the war, infantry counterattacks, not supported by a sufficient number of assault guns, were doomed to failure in advance.

Anti-tank defense is without a doubt the saddest chapter in the history of the German infantry. The path of suffering for the German infantry in the fight against Russian T-34 tanks goes from the 37-mm anti-tank gun, nicknamed the “mallet” in the army, through the 50-mm to the 75-mm mechanically driven anti-tank gun. Apparently, it will remain completely unknown why within three and a half years from the moment the T-34 tank first appeared in August 1941 until April 1945, an acceptable anti-tank weapon infantry. At the same time, excellent tanks "Tiger" and "Panther" were created and transferred to the front. The creation of the Offenror anti-tank reactive rifle and the Panzerfaust dynamo-reactive grenade launcher can only be regarded as a temporary measure in resolving the problem of infantry anti-tank defense.

By the end of the 30s, almost all participants in the coming world war had formed common directions in the development of small arms. The range and accuracy of the defeat was reduced, which was offset by a greater density of fire. As a consequence of this - the beginning of the mass rearmament of units with automatic small arms - submachine guns, machine guns, assault rifles.

The accuracy of fire began to fade into the background, while the soldiers advancing in a chain began to be taught shooting from the move. With the advent of airborne troops, it became necessary to create special lightweight weapons.

Maneuvering war also affected machine guns: they became much lighter and more mobile. New varieties of small arms appeared (which was dictated primarily by the need to fight tanks) - rifle grenades, anti-tank rifles and RPGs with cumulative grenades.

Small arms of the USSR of the Second World War

The rifle division of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War was a very formidable force - about 14.5 thousand people. The main type of small arms were rifles and carbines - 10420 pieces. The share of submachine guns was insignificant - 1204. There were 166, 392 and 33 units of easel, light and anti-aircraft machine guns, respectively.

The division had its own artillery of 144 guns and 66 mortars. The firepower was supplemented by 16 tanks, 13 armored vehicles and a solid fleet of auxiliary automotive and tractor equipment.

Rifles and carbines

The main small arms of the infantry units of the USSR in the first period of the war was certainly the famous three-ruler - 7.62 mm rifle by S. I. Mosin, model 1891, modernized in 1930. qualities, in particular, with an aiming range of 2 km.

The three-ruler is an ideal weapon for newly drafted soldiers, and the simplicity of the design created huge opportunities for its mass production. But like any weapon, the three-ruler had flaws. A permanently attached bayonet in combination with a long barrel (1670 mm) created inconvenience when moving, especially in wooded areas. Serious complaints were caused by the shutter handle when reloading.

On its basis was created sniper rifle and a series of carbines of the 1938 and 1944 model. Fate measured the three-ruler for a long century (the last three-ruler was released in 1965), participation in many wars and an astronomical "circulation" of 37 million copies.

In the late 1930s, the outstanding Soviet weapons designer F.V. Tokarev developed a 10-shot self-loading rifle cal. 7.62 mm SVT-38, which received the name SVT-40 after modernization. She "lost" by 600 g and became shorter due to the introduction of thinner wood parts, additional holes in the casing and a reduction in the length of the bayonet. A little later, a sniper rifle appeared at its base. Automatic firing was provided by the removal of powder gases. Ammunition was placed in a box-shaped, detachable store.

Sighting range SVT-40 - up to 1 km. SVT-40 won back with honor on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. It was also appreciated by our opponents. historical fact: having captured rich trophies at the beginning of the war, among which there were quite a few SVT-40s, the German army ... adopted it, and the Finns created their own rifle, Tarako, on the basis of the SVT-40.

The creative development of the ideas implemented in the SVT-40 was the AVT-40 automatic rifle. It differed from its predecessor in the ability to conduct automatic fire at a rate of up to 25 rounds per minute. The disadvantage of AVT-40 is low accuracy of fire, strong unmasking flame and a loud sound at the time of the shot. In the future, as the mass receipt of automatic weapons in the troops, it was removed from service.

Submachine guns

The Great Patriotic War was the time of the final transition from rifles to automatic weapons. The Red Army began to fight armed with a small amount of PPD-40 - a submachine gun designed by the outstanding Soviet designer Vasily Alekseevich Degtyarev. At that time, PPD-40 was in no way inferior to its domestic and foreign counterparts.

Designed for a pistol cartridge cal. 7.62 x 25 mm, PPD-40 had an impressive ammunition load of 71 rounds, placed in a drum-type magazine. Weighing about 4 kg, it provided firing at a speed of 800 rounds per minute with an effective range of up to 200 meters. However, a few months after the start of the war, he was replaced by the legendary PPSh-40 cal. 7.62 x 25 mm.

The creator of the PPSh-40, designer Georgy Semenovich Shpagin, was faced with the task of developing an extremely easy-to-use, reliable, technologically advanced, cheap-to-manufacture mass weapon.

From its predecessor - PPD-40, PPSh inherited a drum magazine for 71 rounds. A little later, a simpler and more reliable sector carob magazine for 35 rounds was developed for him. The mass of equipped machine guns (both options) was 5.3 and 4.15 kg, respectively. The rate of fire of the PPSh-40 reached 900 rounds per minute with an aiming range of up to 300 meters and with the ability to conduct single fire.

To master the PPSh-40, several lessons were enough. It was easily disassembled into 5 parts, made using the stamping-welded technology, thanks to which, during the war years, the Soviet defense industry produced about 5.5 million machine guns.

In the summer of 1942, the young designer Alexei Sudaev presented his brainchild - a 7.62 mm submachine gun. It was strikingly different from its "older brothers" PPD and PPSh-40 in its rational layout, higher manufacturability and ease of manufacturing parts by arc welding.

PPS-42 was 3.5 kg lighter and required three times less time to manufacture. However, despite the quite obvious advantages, he never became a mass weapon, leaving the palm of the PPSh-40.

By the beginning of the war, the DP-27 light machine gun (Degtyarev infantry, cal 7.62mm) had been in service with the Red Army for almost 15 years, having the status of the main light machine gun of infantry units. Its automation was driven by the energy of powder gases. The gas regulator reliably protected the mechanism from pollution and high temperatures.

The DP-27 could only conduct automatic fire, but even a beginner needed a few days to master shooting in short bursts of 3-5 shots. The ammunition load of 47 rounds was placed in a disk magazine with a bullet to the center in one row. The store itself was attached to the top of the receiver. The weight of the unloaded machine gun was 8.5 kg. Equipped store increased it by almost 3 kg.

It was powerful weapon with an effective range of 1.5 km and a combat rate of fire up to 150 rounds per minute. In the combat position, the machine gun relied on the bipod. A flame arrester was screwed onto the end of the barrel, significantly reducing its unmasking effect. DP-27 was serviced by a gunner and his assistant. In total, about 800 thousand machine guns were fired.

Small arms of the Wehrmacht of World War II

The main strategy of the German army is offensive or blitzkrieg (blitzkrieg - lightning war). The decisive role in it was assigned to large tank formations, carrying out deep penetrations of the enemy defenses in cooperation with artillery and aviation.

Tank units bypassed powerful fortified areas, destroying control centers and rear communications, without which the enemy would quickly lose combat capability. The defeat was completed by motorized units ground forces.

Small arms of the infantry division of the Wehrmacht

The staff of the German infantry division of the 1940 model assumed the presence of 12609 rifles and carbines, 312 submachine guns (machine guns), manual and easel machine guns- respectively 425 and 110 pieces, 90 anti-tank rifles and 3600 pistols.

Small arms of the Wehrmacht as a whole met the high requirements of wartime. It was reliable, trouble-free, simple, easy to manufacture and maintain, which contributed to its mass production.

Rifles, carbines, machine guns

Mauser 98K

The Mauser 98K is an improved version of the Mauser 98 rifle, developed at the end of the 19th century by the brothers Paul and Wilhelm Mauser, the founders of the world-famous arms company. Equipping the German army with it began in 1935.

Mauser 98K

The weapon was equipped with a clip with five 7.92 mm cartridges. A trained soldier could accurately fire 15 times within a minute at a distance of up to 1.5 km. Mauser 98K was very compact. Its main characteristics: weight, length, barrel length - 4.1 kg x 1250 x 740 mm. The indisputable merits of the rifle are evidenced by numerous conflicts with its participation, longevity and a truly sky-high "circulation" - more than 15 million units.

The G-41 self-loading ten-shot rifle became the German response to the mass equipping of the Red Army with rifles - SVT-38, 40 and ABC-36. Its sighting range reached 1200 meters. Only single shots were allowed. Its significant shortcomings - significant weight, low reliability and increased vulnerability to pollution were subsequently eliminated. The combat "circulation" amounted to several hundred thousand samples of rifles.

Automatic MP-40 "Schmeisser"

Perhaps the most famous small arms of the Wehrmacht during World War II was the famous MP-40 submachine gun, a modification of its predecessor, the MP-36, created by Heinrich Volmer. However, by the will of fate, he is better known under the name "Schmeisser", received thanks to the stamp on the store - "PATENT SCHMEISSER". The stigma simply meant that, in addition to G. Volmer, Hugo Schmeisser also participated in the creation of the MP-40, but only as the creator of the store.

Automatic MP-40 "Schmeisser"

Initially, the MP-40 was intended to arm the commanders of infantry units, but later it was handed over to tankers, armored vehicle drivers, paratroopers and special forces soldiers.

However, the MP-40 was absolutely not suitable for infantry units, since it was an exclusively melee weapon. In a fierce battle in the open, having a weapon with a range of 70 to 150 meters meant for a German soldier to be practically unarmed in front of his opponent, armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles with a range of 400 to 800 meters.

Assault rifle StG-44

Assault rifle StG-44 (sturmgewehr) cal. 7.92mm is another legend of the Third Reich. This is certainly an outstanding creation of Hugo Schmeisser - the prototype of many post-war assault rifles and machine guns, including the famous AK-47.

StG-44 could conduct single and automatic fire. Her weight with a full magazine was 5.22 kg. In the sighting range - 800 meters - "Sturmgever" was in no way inferior to its main competitors. Three versions of the store were provided - for 15, 20 and 30 shots with a rate of up to 500 rounds per minute. The option of using a rifle with an underbarrel grenade launcher and an infrared sight was considered.

It was not without its shortcomings. The assault rifle was heavier than the Mauser-98K by a whole kilogram. Her wooden butt could not stand sometimes hand-to-hand combat and just broke. The flames escaping from the barrel gave away the location of the shooter, and the long magazine and sighting devices forced him to raise his head high in the prone position.

The 7.92mm MG-42 is quite rightly called one of the best machine guns of World War II. It was developed at Grossfuss by engineers Werner Gruner and Kurt Horn. Those who have experienced it firepower were very frank. Our soldiers called it "lawn mower", and the allies - "Hitler's circular saw."

Depending on the type of shutter, the machine gun accurately fired at a speed of up to 1500 rpm at a distance of up to 1 km. Ammunition was carried out using machine gun belt for 50 - 250 rounds. The uniqueness of the MG-42 was complemented by a relatively small number of parts - 200 and the high manufacturability of their production by stamping and spot welding.

The barrel, red-hot from firing, was replaced by a spare one in a few seconds using a special clamp. In total, about 450 thousand machine guns were fired. The unique technical developments embodied in the MG-42 were borrowed by gunsmiths in many countries of the world when creating their machine guns.

Blitzkrieg: how is it done? [The secret of the "blitzkrieg"] Mukhin Yuri Ignatievich

German attack

German attack

So - the Germans did not attack with their infantry? They attacked, but only by attack they didn’t mean running with rifles at the ready in order to run up and stab the enemy with a bayonet or hit with a shovel, but something else (more on that later), but such attacks, as planned by the generals of the Red Army, they remained in history of the First World War.

To begin with, I suggest just remembering everything documentaries and photographs of World War II. Soviet "documentary" films and photos, I think, in 95% of cases were filmed in the rear during exercises, but this does not matter in this case. What does an offensive look like? Soviet troops? The tanks go on the attack, and behind them the Soviet infantry runs in chains or in a crowd at the enemy shooting at them. Or this infantry runs on the enemy to attack on its own. But now there are a lot of photographs and film frames of German newsreels, so, are there any similar shots of the offensive of German troops in it? Completely absent!

Interestingly, even a glance at the infantryman showed a difference in tactics. In Russia and the USSR, an infantryman has always been called a "private" - one who goes on the attack along with his other comrades. That is, the fact that he is in the ranks, from the position of Russian and Soviet generals, is the most important and valuable thing in him. And for the Germans, it was a "shutze" - a shooter. That is, from the position of the German army, the most valuable thing in an infantryman was that he shoots. The Germans taught their foot soldiers a lot, but they just didn’t teach bayonet fighting - it was unnecessary for those who knew how to shoot.

A little about it. We have military theorists from the Suvorov slogan "A bullet is a fool, a bayonet is well done!" they made a fetish, turning Suvorov into a cretin. Firstly, in the time of Suvorov, the bayonet was still a real weapon, and secondly, Suvorov insistently demanded that the soldiers learn to shoot, he even persuaded them, assuring them that lead was cheap and that a soldier in peacetime would not incur large expenses for training firing. In addition, Suvorov taught the soldiers to shoot accurately and warned that although he was counting on a battle of 100 rounds per soldier, he would flog the one who shot all these rounds, since such a number of rounds in a real battle is shot only with non-aimed fire.

Yes, of course, it's not bad if a soldier knows how to operate with a bayonet, but with the rate of fire of weapons of the 20th century, who will let him in at a bayonet strike distance?

And I continue to be convinced that the point was, in fact, not in the bayonet, but in the fact that the bayonet was, as it were, the meaning and justification of the tactics of attacks with manpower on the enemy's defenses. Tactics that dramatically simplify the service of officers and generals, tactics that do not require extensive knowledge from them and reduce their work to primitive commands at the level of the 18th century.

But back to what the Germans considered an attack and an offensive.

The Intelligence Directorate of the 16th German Army in September 1941 translated the article "Peculiarities of offensive operations of the German infantry in a maneuver war" from Volume 1 "West" of the Soviet reference book on the Armed Forces of the border states. The book was captured in the band of the German 39th Army Corps. Let's read this article, omitting the ideological introduction.

“The experience of the war that Germany is waging in Europe and Africa allows us to draw some conclusions about the features of offensive tactics, which are generally close to the truth.

Until now, fascist German troops have dealt with an enemy who could not resist them.

The fighting with the Polish, French, and especially with the Yugoslav and Greek troops led to a drop in military discipline in the Wehrmacht, inattention to the elementary requirements for camouflage and self-digging. Self-confidence, as a consequence of "victories", results in inattention to what is happening on the battlefield.

The facts show that the "victories" of the Wehrmacht were not achieved by the stubbornness of the infantry in overcoming the barrier zone or in breaking through the fortified positions of one or another enemy. These "victories" were achieved mainly due to the premature abandonment of the fortifications by the defenders as a result of the massive (in comparison with the Polish, French, Yugoslav or Greek armies taken separately) the use of artillery and aviation.

It should be noted that by mocking quoting the word “victory”, the Soviet military theorists who wrote this article, the massive action of German artillery and aviation on the enemy - the main principle of victory in battle - was brought to the weakness of the German infantry, massive fire on the enemy - to the lack of tactics!

“German infantry rarely goes into bayonet charges. In many cases, she seeks to avoid such actions. In the event of strong enemy resistance, the German infantry, as a rule, avoids attacking such positions. In each such case, the commander of any German unit or unit (platoon, company, battalion or regiment) is looking for a solution in a maneuver. Feeling the flanks and outflanking them is a common tactic of the German commanders.

A position that is steadfastly defended is subjected to artillery fire, bombardment and, according to the situation, dummy tank attacks. At the same time, the infantry (subunits and units), leaving minimal forces to pin down the enemy, the main forces and reinforcements perform a maneuver aimed at hitting the enemy flank.

We note the described complexity of the work of a German officer. Instead of shouting "For the Reich, for the Fuhrer!" to send soldiers into a bayonet attack, the officer must study the terrain and intelligence, be able to change both the direction of the attack and the combat formation of the troops entrusted to him if the enemy puts up stronger resistance than expected. The German officer needs to organize communication with all branches of the military, know how and when they need to be used, be able to issue target designation for artillery and aviation, and be able to maneuver his units on the battlefield.

“Experience shows that this German tactics will apply in the future.

With careful observation of the battlefield, such a maneuver would be discovered and used against the Germans.

If we read the introductory article PP-36, we will see that it says: an adversary bypassing or surrounding is himself in danger of being surrounded. Therefore, one must strive to oppose the enemy's maneuver with one's own counter-manoeuvre. Leaving at the front of a platoon, company or battalion such a quantity of fire weapons as is minimally necessary, the main forces attack on the flank of the bypassing enemy.

This is an effective method in the fight against such an enemy as the German fascist troops, ”- the Soviet theorist did not miss the opportunity to say a clever banality, which looks especially wild against the backdrop of the tragedy of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.

“Special mention should be made of the rapid maneuver in the offensive of motorized artillery, both individual guns and entire batteries. The battle that the Germans are waging is distinguished by the roar created by the fire of artillery, machine guns, and the howl of aircraft. Fiery jets of flamethrowers, puffs of black smoke create the impression of an attack sweeping away everything in its path.

Undoubtedly, all this is aimed at undermining the morale of the enemy. Morality, the will to resist must be suppressed. Cowards and alarmists are morally crushed.

This appearance of clear superiority is created, first of all, by artillery fire ( anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns), as well as tanks.

Why "visibility"? When shells of all types of weapons that the Germans had are flying at you, when tanks are driving at you, to which you cannot inflict any damage with your weapons, what is this - "visibility"?

“When the infantry takes up initial positions, motorized artillery fires from guns of all calibers at all objects on the front line. Infantry support is carried out jointly with tanks, often by direct fire, without the organization of reliable communications and adjustments, which are organized only in the event of an expansion of the battle.

Through the massive use of guns of all calibers, including 150-mm guns, the Germans seek to assure the enemy of the numerical superiority of the advancing forces and the approaching artillery.

Such a rapid concentration of artillery, characteristic of oncoming battles, the Germans try to use in the offensive in each case.

Another feature of offensive battles is the use of a short artillery preparation, during which the infantry seeks to get close to the enemy. During the war with Poland, France, Yugoslavia and Greece, this method was widely used when attacking field fortified positions, and in exceptional cases when attacking long-term fortified lines.

Let's take a typical German company attack as an example.

The rifle company takes initial positions from 800 to 900 meters, depending on the terrain, after which it receives the direction of attack (sometimes- advance lane). Normal order of battle- two platoons in the first line, one platoon in reserve. In such a battle formation, the company, combining fire and maneuver, moves at a speed of 600-800 meters per hour to the area of ​​​​concentration.

So, the German infantry advanced to the line (from which the Soviet infantry usually rises in a bayonet attack), maneuvering from cover to cover, and already at this distance firing at the enemy from their own heavy weapons. But since the Germans' own fire had to be accurate, it also took time to find the target, install weapons (machine gun, mortar, infantry or anti-tank guns), zeroing in and destroying targets. As a result, as you can see, the advance to the line of the actual attack proceeded at a speed of only 600-800 meters per hour (infantry in a marching column moves at a pace of 110 steps per minute, that is, about 5 kilometers per hour). The Germans, as you can see, were in no hurry to get a bullet from the defending enemy, they first did everything to destroy him from afar.

"When an attack (of a battalion, regiment) begins, the artillery shells the front line of the enemy for 15 minutes." Note, not an hour, as in the per hectare calculations of Soviet generals, but only 15 minutes.

“The company, as a rule, is reinforced by a machine-gun platoon, as well as a platoon of infantry guns (mortars). The latter are used from the beginning of the attack to the assault, changing positions if necessary. Here we are not talking about breaking through long-term fortifications, since the Germans in these cases create assault groups consisting of engineering, infantry and artillery units. Artillery preparation in this case is carried out according to a special plan. After 15 minutes of artillery preparation, the fire is transferred to the flanks of the breakthrough and to the rear objects. At the same time, the front line is bombarded by aircraft and fired upon by infantry guns and mortars.

From the defending enemy, in theory, there should be nothing left. And only after that the infantry begins what the Germans call an assault.

"The attack continues in rolls of 15-20 meters." That is, even here the Germans did not run to the enemy trenches, putting forward their bayonets, but moved in the direction of the enemy from cover to cover, or rather, from one position for firing to the next. And from these positions, rifles and light machine guns continuously aimed fire at the enemy, preventing him from leaning out of the trench to fire at the attackers. And they approached the enemy’s positions in this way until the distance was reduced to throwing a hand grenade, with which they finished off the enemy in his shelter if the enemy did not give up.

“If the starting positions are reached, then the company opens fire on the front line of the enemy from all available fire weapons. At this point, as a rule, flamethrowers and hand grenades are used. Anti-tank guns receive special tasks, namely: shelling of observation slots and embrasures of fortifications, as well as identified firing positions. The task of escort guns and assault guns- suppress machine-gun nests and mortars.

That's what the German attack was like.

“Before the company goes on the attack, the decisive moment comes for the defenders. By this moment, you need to carefully prepare, you need to unleash the full power of the fire system on the enemy. Fire maneuver, the use of wandering guns and dagger machine guns (such machine guns that unexpectedly open fire at point-blank range) can turn the tide in favor of the defenders.

Experience shows that the German infantry, under fire from machine guns and mortars, lies down and waits for the support of escort artillery. This favorable moment must be used. After the massive use of flamethrowers, mortars and hand grenades it is necessary to go over to a surprise bayonet attack on the flank of the attacking enemy with the forces of a squad, platoon or company, attacking individual groups of the enemy, especially at a time when artillery is not firing at the forward edge. This will reduce your own losses.

It often happens that a short bayonet attack, carried out decisively, develops into a general counteroffensive.

While the Germans are in open space, approaching the defending enemy units, they are very vulnerable to fire from all types of artillery. There is a general conversation about the power of the “fire system”, but when it comes to clarifying what kind of “fire system” it is, it is clarified that this is the fire of nomadic (individual and constantly changing positions) guns and it is not known how machine guns put forward at close range to the approaching Germans . There are no requirements to develop a system of barrage and concentrated artillery fire, there are not even requirements to simply cover hectares with artillery. Where is the advice to call on the Germans attacking and in open space the fire of regimental, divisional and corps artillery? After all, she was! But no, as you can see, such advice for the Soviet generals was prohibitive in terms of its military complexity, and their favorite bayonet attack, even if it was a squad, was their answer! Not fire, but a bayonet - that's the main thing that will repel a German attack!

The German General E. Middeldorf, in the book “Russian Campaign: Tactics and Weapons” written by him after the war, compares the Soviet and German infantry:

“There is no doubt that of the two largest land powers of the period of the last war- Russia and Germany- the German land army, both at the beginning and at the end of the war, had the most combat-ready infantry. However, on a number of important issues of combat training and armament, the Russian infantry, especially at the initial stage of the war, was superior to the German. In particular, the Russians were superior to the Germans in the art of night combat, combat in wooded and swampy areas and combat in winter, in the training of snipers and in the engineering equipment of positions, as well as in equipping the infantry with machine guns and mortars. However, the Germans were superior to the Russians in the organization of the offensive and the interaction between the military branches, in the training of junior officers and in equipping the infantry with machine guns. In the course of the war, the opponents learned from each other and managed to some extent eliminate the existing shortcomings.

Let us note that, in the opinion of this general of that war, our infantry was strong where it could take cover from German fire. Even when he praised the equipment of our infantry with machine guns and mortars, he did not praise the fact that our infantry enjoyed this advantage. And he did not say a single commendable word about our bayonet charge as our advantage.

And since Middeldorf mentioned snipers, I'll digress a little more on the advantages of well-aimed fire and German tactics.

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From the book Soldier's Duty [Memoirs of a Wehrmacht general about the war in western and eastern Europe. 1939–1945] author von Choltitz Dietrich

ATTACK “Shoot rarely, but accurately, if hard with a bayonet. The bullet will miss, but the bayonet will not. The bullet is a fool, and the bayonet is well done! The Polish confederates revived not by chance. In 1770, the main hostilities shifted from Khotyn, which stood near the border of the Commonwealth and the Ottoman

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German lair for the "mole" The beginning of 1944 was marked by new victories for the Red Army. Almost three-quarters of the occupied Soviet land was liberated from the enemy. Our army finally buried the plans of the Wehrmacht to keep the eastern front on the "blue line"

German soldiers The Second World War was often portrayed, both during the war and over the following decades, as dull, brutal, and unimaginative. In Hollywood movies and popular American TV shows, the self-confident, talented and tough American G.I. for many years they have been opposed to the stupid, cynical and cruel Germans.

"Propaganda is an inevitable ingredient in modern conflicts," said British journalist and historian Max Hastings. "During the Second World War, it was considered necessary that the peoples of the Allies be convinced of the qualitative superiority of their fighters over the enemy. One [American] infantryman or one [British] Tommy was worth three thick-headed Fritz. Hitler's robots could never be compared with the imagination and initiative of the Allied soldiers on battlefield..." Famous American war movies portrayed German soldiers as dumb. Hastings notes that in the decades following the war, "the spirit of military narcissism fueled by films such as The Longest Day (about the Normandy landings), A Bridge Too Far (the battle in Holland), and The Battle of the Bulge" perpetuated the mythical images of the Allied and German armies."

In keeping with the prevailing propaganda image of the enemy, the British Prime Minister was dismissive of German soldiers and officers. In a 1941 radio address, Winston Churchill spoke of "the Nazi war machine, with its roaring, dapper Prussian officers... [and] the dumb, trained, submissive, brutal masses of Hunnic soldiers, zealous as a swarm of locusts."

Like so much else that was told to the public about the Second World War, this humiliating image has nothing to do with reality. Specialists military history who studied this issue concluded that the soldiers of the German Armed Forces - the Wehrmacht - combined unsurpassed ability and resourcefulness over almost six years of conflict.

Trevor Dupuis, a well-known American military analyst, US Army colonel, author of numerous books and articles, studied the effectiveness of World War II soldiers. "On average," he concluded, "100 German soldiers were the equivalent of 120 American, British or French soldiers, or 200 Soviet soldiers." Dupuy wrote that: "German infantry invariably inflicted 50% more casualties than the British and American troops opposing them. under any circumstances [emphasis added in original]. These proportions were observed both in attack and in defense, and when they were superior in numbers and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had superiority in the air, and when they were not, when they won and when they lost. "

Other reputable military historians such as Martin Van Creveld and John Keegan have given comparable estimates. Max Booth draws a similar conclusion in his detailed study, "War Made New". “Face to face,” writes the military historian, “the Wehrmacht was probably the most formidable fighting force in the world until at least 1943, if not later. German soldiers were known for showing more initiative than those of democratic France, Britain, and the United States.

Another scholar, Ben H. Shepard, author of several books and lecturer in history at the University of Glasgow in Scotland, in his recent detailed work, "Hitler's Soldiers: The German Army in the Third Reich", debunks the myth of the German military being supposedly obedient zombies." in fact, the Wehrmacht encouraged such qualities as flexibility, audacity and independence", and "Nazi ideology gave great importance qualities such as courage, endurance, resourcefulness, strength of character, and camaraderie." Shepard also writes that "the German army was superbly organized. At all levels, the German army was more effectively organized than all the armies opposing it ... "

Describing the 1940 campaign in France, Shepard writes: "... It was the Germans' own strength that allowed them to triumph so spectacularly. Among other things, they benefited from their creative and daring operational plan. At all levels, the Germans possessed such qualities as courage and adaptability, and also had the ability to respond to a rapidly changing situation on the battlefield ... The qualities of a German soldier, as well as the ability of commanders at all levels to think and act independently and effectively, were indeed the key to German victory ... "

"Even after the tide of the war turned," he writes, "the German troops fought well." "The German army achieved its initial success due to the high level of training, cohesion and morale of its troops, and also due to excellent coordination with the Luftwaffe [Air Force].... In the Normandy campaign [June-July 1944], much of the qualitative superiority of the German soldier was preserved. An exhaustive analysis of the [German] troops in Normandy concludes that, other things being equal, 100 German soldiers win a battle against 150 Allied soldiers.”

“As a result of all this,” says Shepard, “the German army units showed great restraint in defense [that is, in last years war]. They also showed great resourcefulness and flexibility... Beginning in 1943, the German army fought with unprecedented tenacity, against the increasingly formidable Red Army in the East, as well as against the Western Allied coalition, which was increasingly supplied with the economic and military power of the United States ."
Max Hastings, in his study "Overlord" of the 1944 Allied landings in northern France and the campaign that followed, writes:

"The Allies in Normandy faced the best army this war, one of the greatest the world has ever seen... Of great importance was the quality of the weapons of the Germans - primarily tanks. Their tactics were masterful... Their junior commanders were much better than the Americans, and possibly the British as well... Throughout the Second World War, wherever British or American troops met the Germans on more or less equal terms, the Germans prevailed. victory. They had a historical reputation as formidable soldiers. Under Hitler, their army flourished."

In addition, Hastings points out that the Germans fought with equipment and weapons that were usually better than those of their opponents. "The quality of weapons and tanks, even in 1944, was significantly ahead of the Allied models in every type of weapon, except for artillery and transport," he writes. Even in the last years of the war, "German machine guns, mortars, anti-tank weapons and armored personnel carriers were superior to British and American ones. Above all, Germany had the best tanks."

"Throughout the war, the performance of German soldiers remained unsurpassed ... The Americans, like the British, never matched the extraordinary professionalism of the German soldier," writes Hastings. "...German soldiers had an uncanny ability to transform themselves from butchers and bank clerks into real tacticians. One of the most absurd propaganda clichés was the image of the Nazi soldier as a dull-witted performer. In fact, the German soldier almost always showed much more flexibility on the battlefield than his allied counterpart... it is an undeniable truth that Hitler's Wehrmacht was the pre-eminent fighting force of World War II, one of the greatest in history."

After the war, Winston Churchill made a more truthful comment than in 1941. In his memoirs, he compared the actions of British and German forces in the Norwegian campaign of April–June 1940, the first time soldiers of the two nations had faced each other in combat.

"The superiority of the Germans in planning, management and energy was quite ordinary," wrote Churchill. "In Narvik mixed German units scarcely six thousand forces held the bay for six weeks from twenty thousand allied forces, and although they were driven out of the city, a little later the Germans saw how they [the allies] were evacuated ... Seven days later the Germans crossed the road from Namsus to Mosjøen, which the British and French declared impassable ... We, who had naval superiority and could land anywhere on the undefended coast, were taken out of the game by the enemy, who moved over land for very long distances with serious obstacles. In this Norwegian campaign, some of our elite troops, the Scots and the Irish Guards, were bewildered by the energy, enterprise and training of the Hitlerite youth.

The top British military leaders were also amazed at the skill, tenacity and audacity of their opponents. "Unfortunately, we are fighting the best soldiers in the world - what guys!" wrote Lieutenant General Sir Harold Alexander, commander of the 15th Army Group in Italy, in a March 1944 report in London. One of General Montgomery's top staff officers, Brigadier General Frank Richardson, later said of the German soldiers, "I have often wondered how we ever defeated them."

Similar views were shared by other participants on both sides of the conflict. The Italian artillery lieutenant Eugenio Conti, who took part, along with units of other European nations, in fierce battles on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1942-43, later recalled: "I ... asked myself ... what would become of us without the Germans. I reluctantly I had to admit that alone we Italians would have ended up in the hands of the enemy ... I ... thanked heaven that they were with us there in the column ... Without a shadow of a doubt, as soldiers they have no equal. US Army officer , who fought in Belgium in late 1944, Lieutenant Tony Moody, later spoke of how he and other American G.I.s characterized their opponents: "we felt that the Germans were much better prepared, better equipped, and were a better fighting vehicle than we ."

Even in recent weeks war, when the prospects were indeed bleak, the Nazis continued to fight with surprising strength - as a Soviet intelligence report of March 1945 admitted: "Most German soldiers realized the hopelessness of the situation after January came, although some still express faith in a German victory. However, there is no sign of the opponent's morale collapsing. They still fight with stubborn persistence and unbending discipline."

Milovan Djilas was an important figure in Tito's partisan army and served in high positions in Yugoslavia after the war. Looking back, he recalled the resilience and skill of the German soldiers, who slowly retreated from difficult mountainous areas in the most difficult conditions: “the German army left a trail of heroism ... Hungry and half-naked, they cleared mountain landslides, stormed rocky peaks, cut through detours. the allies used them as slow moving targets. ... Eventually they passed, leaving a memory of their military prowess."

No matter how excellent the training, devotion and resourcefulness of the German fighters, and no matter how high the quality of their tanks, machine guns and other equipment, this was not enough to compensate for the great numerical superiority of their opponents.

Despite limited resources, and especially the constant shortage of oil, as well as other serious problems, the German nation and its leaders showed exceptional organizational ability, ingenuity and adaptability in 1942, 1943 and 1944 in using the available manpower and material resources for a sharp increase in the production of high-quality weapons and equipment. But in the same period Soviet Union and the United States used its much richer natural resources and manpower reserves to obtain far more weapons, ships, bombers, fighters, tanks, and artillery.

First of all, the major allied powers had much more people, who could be sent to war, and even more people who could be used at home in the rear to provide everything necessary for their troops. It was the numerical superiority that ultimately became decisive. Second World War in Europe was the victory of quantity over quality.

Although their country endured even more devastating deprivation, destruction and suffering, as their cities were increasingly destroyed, the German soldiers at the front, supported at home by their people, showed great dedication, discipline and resourcefulness, defiantly withstanding the quantitative superior forces of huge enemy powers.

This point was emphasized in the last gloomy communiqué of the German armed forces, issued on May 9, 1945: “The German Wehrmacht, in the end, submitted with honor to the far superior forces of the enemy. German soldiers, true to this oath, served their people and will forever be remembered compatriots. Until the last moment, the motherland supported them with all its might, in the most difficult conditions. History will later pass its fair and impartial verdict and will appreciate the unique merits of the front and the population of the country. The enemy will also be able to appreciate the exploits and sacrifices of German soldiers on land and at sea and in the air."

Bibliography:

Max Hastings, "Their Wehrmacht Was Better Than Our Army," The Washington Post, May 5, 1985. The popular weekly American TV show Combat! (1962-1967), small division american soldiers, deployed in France in 1944, routinely and easily killed large groups of German troops. In every episode of the popular American television sitcom Hogan's Heroes (1965-1971), the Germans, and especially the German military, were portrayed as timid, stupid, and cowardly, while Allied soldiers, especially the Americans, were always smart, resourceful, and creative.
. Churchill radio address of June 22, 1941. Quoted in: Winston Churchill, The Second world war, volume 3/ “The Grand Alliance” (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 371.
. This assessment by Trevor Dupuis first appeared in A Genius for War: The German Army and the General Staff, 1807-1945 (1977), pp. 253-254. An updated summary of his work on the subject in: Trevor N. Dupuy, David L. Bongard and R. C. Anderson, Jr., Hitler's Last Gamble (1994), Appendix H (pages 498-501). This quotation of Dupuy is given in: Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: 1984), pp. 184, 326 (n. 30); John Mosier Stalin, 1941-1945 (Simon & Schuster, 2010), pp. 443-444 (note 48);
. Max Boot, War Made New (New York: 2006), p. 462. See also pp. 238, 553.
. Ben H. Shepherd, Hitler's Soldiers: The German Army in the Third Reich (Yale University Press, 2016), pp. 524, 87, 396, 525.
. Ben H. Shepherd, Hitler's Soldiers (2016), pp. 87, xi.
. Ben H. Shepherd, Hitler's Soldiers (2016), pp. 87, 437.
. Ben H. Shepherd, Hitler's Soldiers (2016), pp. 533,xiii.
. Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: 1984), p. 24, 315-316.
. M. Hastings, Overlord (1984), p. 24; M. Hastings, “Their Wehrmacht Was Better Than Our Army,” The Washington Post, May 5, 1985.
. M. Hastings, “Their Wehrmacht Was Better Than Our Army,” The Washington Post, May 5, 1985.
. Winston Churchill, The Second World War, volume 1/“The Gathering Storm” (Boston: 1948), pp. 582-583.
. Max Hastings, Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945 (NewYork: 2012), pp. 512, 520.
. M. Hastings, Inferno (2012), p. 312. Source cited: Eugenio Conti, Few Returned: 28 Days on the Russian Front, Winter 1942-1945 (1997), p. 138.
. M. Hastings, Inferno (2012), p. 572.
. M. Hastings, Inferno (2012), p. 594.
. M. Hastings, Inferno, pp. 586-587. Source cited: Milovan Djilas, Wartime (1980), p. 446.
. Final German OKW armed forces communique, May 9, 1945.

The holiday of the Great Victory is approaching - the day when the Soviet people defeated the fascist infection. It is worth recognizing that the forces of the opponents at the beginning of World War II were unequal. The Wehrmacht is significantly superior to the Soviet army in armament. In support of this "ten" small arms soldiers of the Wehrmacht.

1 Mauser 98k

A German-made repeating rifle that entered service in 1935. In the Wehrmacht troops, this weapon was one of the most common and popular. In a number of parameters, the Mauser 98k was superior to the Soviet Mosin rifle. In particular, the Mauser weighed less, was shorter, had a more reliable shutter and a rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute, against 10 for the Mosin rifle. For all this, the German counterpart paid with a shorter firing range and weaker stopping power.

2. Luger pistol

This 9mm pistol was designed by Georg Luger back in 1900. Modern experts consider this pistol the best at the time of the Second World War. The design of the Luger was very reliable, it had an energy-efficient design, low accuracy of fire, high accuracy and rate of fire. The only significant defect of this weapon was the impossibility of closing the locking levers with the design, as a result of which the Luger could become clogged with dirt and stop firing.

3.MP 38/40

This "Maschinenpistole", thanks to Soviet and Russian cinema, has become one of the symbols of the Nazi military machine. Reality, as always, is much less poetic. Popular in media culture, the MP 38/40 has never been the main small arms for most units of the Wehrmacht. They armed drivers, tank crews, detachments of special units, rear guard detachments, as well as junior officers of the ground forces. The German infantry was armed for the most part with the Mauser 98k. Only sometimes MP 38/40 in a certain amount as an "additional" weapon were transferred to assault squads.

4. FG-42

The German semi-automatic rifle FG-42 was designed for paratroopers. It is believed that the impetus for the creation of this rifle was Operation Mercury to capture the island of Crete. Due to the nature of the parachutes, the Wehrmacht troops carried only light weapons. All heavy and auxiliary weapons were landed separately in special containers. This approach caused heavy losses on the part of the landing force. The FG-42 rifle was a pretty good solution. I used cartridges of caliber 7.92 × 57 mm, which fit into 10-20 piece magazines.

5. MG 42

During the Second World War, Germany used many different machine guns, but it was the MG 42 that became one of the symbols of the aggressor in the yard with the MP 38/40 PP. This machine gun was created in 1942 and partially replaced the not very reliable MG 34. Despite the fact that new machine gun was incredibly effective, it had two important drawbacks. First, MG 42 was very sensitive to contamination. Secondly, it had an expensive and labor-intensive production technology.

6. Gewehr 43

Before the outbreak of World War II, the Wehrmacht command was least interested in the possibility of using self-loading rifles. It was believed that the infantry should be armed with conventional rifles, and for support have light machine guns. Everything changed in 1941 with the outbreak of the war. The semi-automatic rifle Gewehr 43 is one of the best in its class, second only to the Soviet and American counterparts. In terms of its qualities, it is very similar to the domestic SVT-40. There was also a sniper version of this weapon.

7.StG44

The Sturmgewehr 44 assault rifle was not the best weapon of the Second World War. It was heavy, absolutely uncomfortable, difficult to maintain. Despite all these shortcomings, the StG 44 was the first modern type of assault rifle. As you might guess from the name, it was already produced in 1944, and although this rifle could not save the Wehrmacht from defeat, it revolutionized the field of handguns.

8. Stielhandgranate

Another "symbol" of the Wehrmacht. This hand-held anti-personnel grenade was widely used by German forces in World War II. It was a favorite trophy of the soldiers of the anti-Hitler coalition on all fronts, in view of its safety and convenience. At the time of the 40s of the XX century, the Stielhandgranate was almost the only grenade completely protected from arbitrary detonation. However, it also had a number of shortcomings. For example, these grenades could not be stored in a warehouse for a long time. They also often leaked, which led to wetting and deterioration of the explosive.

9. Faustpatrone

The first single-shot anti-tank grenade launcher in the history of mankind. In the Soviet army, the name "Faustpatron" was later assigned to all German anti-tank grenade launchers. The weapon was created in 1942 specifically "for" the Eastern Front. The thing is that the German soldiers at that time were completely deprived of the means of close combat with Soviet light and medium tanks.

10. PzB 38

The German Panzerbüchse Modell 1938 anti-tank rifle is one of the most obscure types of small arms from World War II. The thing is that it was discontinued already in 1942, as it turned out to be extremely ineffective against Soviet medium tanks. Nevertheless, this weapon is a confirmation that such guns were used not only in the Red Army.

In continuation of the weapon theme, we will introduce you to how shooting balls from a bearing.