Memory of the people battle path 92 tank brigade

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Having failed in striking at Krymskaya from the northeast, our troops delivered the main blow around Krymskaya from the south. Reconnaissance of the enemy was successfully carried out by the forces of reconnaissance platoons of tank brigades, data from other branches of the military were processed. Commanders of all levels, up to tank commanders, worked out the issues of interaction with combined arms commanders on the ground. Spotters from the supporting artillery were assigned to all tank units.
The following tank units operated in the direction of the main attack of the 56th Army: 151 tank brigade, 62 reconnaissance brigade and 257 tank brigade, making up infantry direct support tanks (NPP); the success development group included Titov's tank group (5th Guards Tank Brigade, 63 Tank Brigade, 1448 SAP, 97th Garden and 97th Pontoon Battalion). 92 tank brigade and 1449 glanders operated in the auxiliary direction. AT
72
combat activity armored units SKF in May 1943
the grouping had 139 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns.
Combat activities of the 151st separate tank brigade and the 62nd separate tank battalion. 151 brigade and 62 brigade received the task: in cooperation with 32 brigade night actions from April 28 to April 29, 1943, to seize the railway embankment in the area of elev. 12.6, ensuring from the morning of April 29 the offensive of the units of the 11th guards directly to the Krymskaya.
But only at 20.00 on April 29, 151 brigade and
62 battalions began joint actions to seize the railway embankment. 151 brigade was advancing in the direction of svh. Pyatiletka, and 62 brigade in the direction of the southern outskirts of the temporary storage warehouse. Five-year plan. When approaching the embankment at 400 m, the tanks were met with heavy fire anti-tank guns and mortars. Infantry and sappers were cut off from the tanks. The enemy with intense fire from all types of weapons did not allow the infantry to overcome the embankment. The tanks, being in open areas, suffered heavy losses and were forced to withdraw, conducting a firefight from a place.
During April 30, as well as from May 1 to May 4, 1943, 151 brigade and 62 brigade took an active part in the battles for the capture of Krymskaya. But the offensive operations were not successful and the tankers were forced to conduct a firefight from a place, destroying firing points and manpower enemy on the railway embankment.
On May 4, 151 brigade, by order of the commander of the BTMV, the SKF handed over the combat-ready materiel of the 62 brigade and was withdrawn to the front reserve.
In the period from May 6 to May 8, 62 rebates fought for the capture of high. 141.7. On May 8, 9 tanks concentrated on their starting position on the eastern slopes of high. 141.7. 1-2 rifle squads were attached to each tank. After passing the tanks through battle formations their infantry rifle squads unanimously followed the tankers. The tanks surged forward, suppressing the enemy's firing points, clearing the way for the infantry. High 141.7 was captured by a swift attack.
On May 9, the battalion was withdrawn from the battle to put itself in order.
Combat activity of the 257th tank regiment. In connection with the successes of the 3rd Corps on the left wing of the 56th Army, by the decision of the commander of the BTMV of the North Caucasian Front, 257th TP was subordinated to the 3rd rifle corps. On May 4, the regiment concentrated in the area of high. 100.9. Night reconnaissance
by the decisive actions of 4 MZl tanks, the mark was established leading edge and the location of the German firepower in the village of Neberdzhaevskaya.
On May 5, the regiment received the task of cooperating with the 60th Rifle Regiment to reach the western outskirts of Neberdzhaevskaya. The attack started at
17.00. The tanks broke into Neberdzhaevsk-kuyu, went to the heights. 151.6, firing at firing points, which made it possible for units of the 60th Rifle Regiment to reach the northeastern outskirts of Neberdzhaevskaya.
At 15.00 on May 16, the regiment received the task: together with the 9th Rifle Division, to clear the southern outskirts of Neberdzhaevskaya and go to the area of height. 152.1. The regiment operated as part of 2 tank companies. Artillery did not suppress anti-tank weapons enemy, sappers did not clear mine minefields. Tanks during the attack came under heavy fire from anti-tank artillery. The infantry of the 9th Rifle Division was cut off from the tanks by mortar fire and lay down. The task of clearing the southern outskirts of Neberdzhaevskaya was not completed. On May 7, the regiment took up defensive positions west of the heights. 115.8 with the task of being ready to repel enemy counterattacks.
Combat activity of the 92nd separate tank brigade. On May 4, 1943, at 15.00, the 92nd brigade received an order: with the release of the tank group to the southern outskirts of Krymskaya, attack the enemy in the direction of Nizhne-Grechevskaya, Gorno-Vesely, Moldavanskoye. The immediate task was to capture Gorno-Vesely and later, by the end of May 4, to capture the settlement of Moldavanskoye. Under heavy enemy fire, the tanks of the brigade overcame the crossing over the river. Adagum near the Krasny farm. At 16.30 tankers reached the southern outskirts of Krymskaya. 63 brigade and 5 guards brigade remained in place until the morning of May 5, unable to cross the Adagum River. The communication of the commander of the 92nd tank brigade with parts of the tank group was broken, as a result of which the coordination of actions as a whole was also broken.
At 10.30 on May 5, the brigade advanced to attack in the direction of Nizhne-Grechevsky, Leninskaya, Moldavanskaya. The first tanks knocked down the advanced guard of the Germans with a strength of up to a company and broke into the trenches southeast of Grechevsky. The tank attack was supported by fire from open firing positions by a battery of anti-tank guns of the brigade. Infantry 97 joint ventures contributed to the advance of the tankers. Upon reaching the Nizhne-Grechevsky offensive

TANK UNITS OF THE 2ND BALTIC FRONT.

As a preface.
In the period October-December 1943, all armored units of the front suffered serious losses in offensive battles in the area of the so-called. Nevelskoy bag and Novosokolniki direction. At the end of December, all serviceable equipment of the 92nd tank brigade, 27th guards, 32nd, 65th, 82nd, 119th tank regiments was transferred to other tank units of the front, and the units themselves were put into reserve, and subsequently sent to the rear for recovery. In the remaining parts, the number of serviceable equipment was significantly lower than the payroll. Unlike the Leningrad Front, there were not enough repair and evacuation facilities in the zone of the 2nd Baltic Front and there was no powerful industrial center like Leningrad in the immediate rear to carry out a quick overhaul. The failed equipment remained in place, the evacuation was extremely slow due to the underdevelopment of the road network and difficult weather and natural factors.

29th guards, 78th, 118th tank brigades, 37th, 81st, 227th, 239th, 249th tank regiments, 1453rd, 1539th heavy self-propelled artillery regiments. Period 01/01/1944 - 06/01/1944

The regular structure of a tank brigade is two tank battalions, a total of 34 medium tanks, 20 light tanks. The regular structure of a tank regiment is four tank companies, a total of 39 tanks. The regular structure of the self-propelled artillery regiment is four batteries, the total number is up to 20 self-propelled guns. More details in the previous parts

Commander of the 29th Guards Tank Brigade Guards Colonel Yudin G.L. presents awards to distinguished tankers of the brigade, autumn 1943

29th Guards Tank Brigade

Oz brigade: unknown

As part of the 3rd Shock Army
according to the list 58 T-34 tanks, 1 T-70 tank, 8 T-60 tanks
January 11 in the ranks of 38 T-34 tanks, 3 T-60 tanks
January 12 battle PLESHAKOVO, loss of 1 T-34 tank, 1 T-60 tank
On January 14, 26 T-34 tanks, 1 T-70 tank, 2 T-60 tanks were in service. Attached 5 SU-152 out of 1539 tsap. Fight SVIBLO POGARY loss of 5 T-34 tanks
January 15-16 battle ALEKSANDROVO loss of 8 T-34 tanks
January 17 in the ranks of 17 T-34 tanks
On January 20, the brigade was transferred to the 10th Guards Army
January 29 in the ranks of 25 T-34 tanks, 1 T-70 tank, 2 T-60 tanks, 3 SU-152
On February 1, the battle of LUTOVO, 12 T-34 tanks and 3 SU-152 got stuck
February 2, GOLUBOVO battle, loss of 6 T-34 tanks, serviceable german tank KV-1
February 3 battle USADISCHE, loss of 3 T-34 tanks
February 4-5 battle SEEDS loss of 2 T-34 tanks
February 6 in the ranks of 4 T-34 tanks, 1 T-70 tank, 2 T-60 tanks battle GRIBOVO, losses of 1 T-34 tank and 1 SU-152
February 7-9 battle Smelkovo LUKINO BYKOVO RUNOVO loss of 6 T-34 tanks
February 10 in service 1 T-34 tank, 1 T-70 tank, 2 T-60 tanks,
for 01/31/44-09/02/44 27 people were killed. (including 4 officers), 58 people were injured. (including 16 officers)
On February 15, 22 T-34 tanks, 2 T-60 tanks were received from the repair bases of the front (mainly equipment of the 38th Guards Tank Brigade)
February 16 in the ranks of 7 T-34 tanks, 1 T-70 tank, 2 T-60 tanks
On February 19, 12 KV-1S / KV-85 tanks, 7 T-70 tanks, 2 T-60 tanks
February 26 in service 8 KV tanks, 10 T-34 tanks, 4 T-70 tanks, 3 T-60 tanks
February 27-28 battle MISHOVO, loss of 2 KV tanks, 3 T-34 tanks
February 29 in service 4 KV tanks, 5 T-34 tanks, 2 T-70 tanks, 3 T-60 tanks
March 1-2 battle MISHOVO, loss of 5 T-34 tanks
March 2: 3 KV tanks, 8 T-34 tanks, 2 T-70 tanks, 4 T-60 tanks
March 3 in service 4 KV tanks, 6 T-34 tanks, 4 T-70 tanks, 2 T-60 tanks
For the period 02/27/44-05/03/44, 55 people were killed. (including 5 officers), 118 people were injured. (including 11 officers), 28 people were missing. (including 7 officers)
March 6-9 battle STAND losses 2 T-34 tanks, 1 T-70 tank, 1 T-60 tank
On March 9, 5 SU-85s from 1453 SAPs were attached
On March 10, 4 KV tanks, 4 T-34 tanks, 2 T-70 tanks, 1 T-60 tank were in service.
On March 13-15, the battle of USADISCHE MAKSIMTSEVO marked the use by the enemy of a “silent rocket torpedo” - most likely a Panzerfaust / Panzershrek grenade launcher
On March 16, 1 T-34 tank, 1 T-60 tank, 2 SU-85 tanks were in service
On March 21, 2 KV tanks, 4 T-34 tanks, 1 T-60 tank, 3 SU-85 tanks were in service.
On March 30, the brigade was transferred to the reserve of the 3rd Shock Army
Until 06/01/1944, the brigade did not take part in hostilities

BRIGADE COMMANDER
Yudin Georgy Lavrentievich __.__.1911 / Guards. colonel /

COMMANDER OF THE 1st (55th) TANK BATTALION
Polivoda Alexey Vasilyevich __.__.1915 / Guards. captain /
COMMANDER OF THE 2nd (137th) TANK BATTALION
Isaikin Nikolai Andreevich __.__.1919 / Guards. captain /

COMMANDERS OF TANK COMPANIES, TANK PLATONS, COMMANDERS OF TANK AND SELF-PROPELLED GUNS OF ALL TYPES
Harutyunyan Azat Makarovich __.__.1922 / Guards. lieutenant / wounded 02/02/1944
Akhrimenko Ivan Lukyanovich __.__.1923 / Guards. ml. lieutenant /
Barbarin Vitaly Nikolaevich __.__.1922 / junior lieutenant / died 02/04/1944
Belyanin Ivan Grigorievich __.__.1908 / Guards. sergeant /
Vasilets Mikhail Ivanovich __.__.1921 / Guards. Art. lieutenant / wounded 02/02/1944
Elizarov Grigory Petrovich __.__.1916 / Guards. sergeant /
Zhuravlev Vasily Konstantinovich__.__.1913 / junior lieutenant / died 01/14/1944
Kaulin Mikhail Fedorovich __.__.1909 / lieutenant / died 02/03/1944
Kulevich Vladislav Fomich __.__.1922 / Art. lieutenant /
Lashun Ivan Vasilyevich __.__.1921 / Guards. Art. lieutenant / wounded 02/05/1944
Limansky Ivan Georgievich __.__.1923 / lieutenant / died 01/12/1944
Mazurov Rafail Vasilievich __.__.1923 / Guards. lieutenant /
Maksimov Alexander Andreevich __.__.1923 / Guards. ml. lieutenant /
Maksimov Mikhail Stepanovich __.__.1922 / lieutenant /
Mutter Vladislav Lazarevich __.__.19__ / ml. lieutenant / wounded 02/04/1944
Osipov Alexey Vasilyevich __.__.1923 / Guards. lieutenant / died 02/03/1944
Petrov Grigory Petrovich __.__.1916 / Guards. foreman /
Promtov Vladimir Ivanovich __.__.1924 / lieutenant / died 02/04/1944
Polyansky Nikolai Vasilyevich __.__.1915 / lieutenant / died 01/13/1944
Senin Lev Anatolyevich __.__.1924 / ml. lieutenant /
Suzdilovsky Alexander Grigorievich __.__.19__ / ml. lieutenant / wounded 02/04/1944
Filshin Vasily Dorofeevich __.__.1923 / Guards. lieutenant /
Fomenko Ivan Iosifovich __.__.1922 / lieutenant / wounded 02/03/1944
Fomenko Nikolai Antonovich __.__.1920 / Guards. lieutenant / wounded 02/03/1944
Chistilin Vasily Frolovich__.__.1922 / junior lieutenant / died 01/14/1944
Churin Alexey Merkulovich __.__.1922 / lieutenant /
Shakhnovsky Leonid Yakovlevich __.__.1911 / Guards. lieutenant / wounded 02/03/1944
Shchedrinov Petr Fedorovich __.__.1917 / lieutenant /
Yagodkin Viktor Ivanovich __.__.1924 / Guards. lieutenant /

1539th HEAVY SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY REGIMENT

OZ regiment: tower numbers are three-digit. Known numbers 186 and 200

As part of the 6th Guards Army
according to the list 2 tanks KV-1S, 21 SU-152, 1 SU-122
On January 13, the regiment was attached to the 29th guards brigade, 5 SU-152s were in service
13-18 battle LOPATOVO, MALAKHA, ZAMOSHIE ZHEGLOVO lost 2 SU-152
January 21 the regiment was transferred to the 10th Guards Army, in the ranks of 7 SU-152
January 29 in the ranks of 1 tank KV-1S, 12 SU-152
January 31-February 8 fight SEMENOVO LUTOVO IVASHKOVO
February 6 in the ranks of 5 SU-152
February 9 in the ranks of 3 SU-152
February 16 battle MAYEVO SIMYAGINO, in the ranks 2 tanks KV-1S, 5 SU-152
March 2 in service 1 tank KV-1S, 5 SU-152
March 8-9 fight PIMASHKOVO GRIGORKINO
March 10 in the ranks of 3 SU-152,
March 14 - 18 fight MAKAVEYTSEVO TIMONINO
March 21 in the ranks of 2 SU-152
On March 30, the regiment was transferred to the 3rd Shock Army
In April, 2 SU-152s were received from 78 brigade
May 30 according to the list of 17 SU-152

COMMANDER OF THE REGIMENT
Prokhorov Mikhail Pavlovich __.__.1906 / Guards. major /

COMMANDERS OF TANK COMPANIES, BATTERIES OF SELF-PROPELLED GUNS OF TANK PLATOONS, COMMANDERS OF TANK AND SELF-PROPELLED GUNS OF ALL TYPES
Baltsev Mikhail Ivanovich __.__.1923 / lieutenant /
Berezin Semyon Frolovich __.__.1915 / lieutenant /
Blazhievskiy Lev Konstantinovich__.__.19__/ lieutenant / died 02/01/1944
Borisov Ivan Mironovich __.__.1917 / lieutenant /
Voronchikhin Yuri Stepanovich __.__.1916 / ml. lieutenant /
Zhuravlev Vladimir Ivanovich __.__.1915 / captain / wounded 01/13/1944
Karakulov Tlenbergein Karakulovich __.__.1922 / lieutenant / wounded 03/17/1944
Kuzmichev Pavel Stepanovich __.__.1923 / junior lieutenant / died 02/01/1944
Lugan Petr Grigorievich __.__.1910 / art. lieutenant / died 02/01/1944
Lusak Petr Grigorievich__.__.19__/ senior lieutenant / died 02/01/1944
Nalimov (Nasimov) Alexander Matveyevich __.__.1913 / lieutenant / died 02/05/1944
Nogovitsyn Fedor Nikiforovich __.__.1912 / Guards. Art. lieutenant / wounded 02/05/1944
Osipov Ivan Ivanovich __.__.1913 / ml. lieutenant /
Rybchik Alexander Petrovich __.__.1917 / lieutenant / died 03/17/1944
Saitov Abdula Matveevich __.__.19_ / lieutenant / wounded 03/17/1944
Syutkin Pavel Pavlovich __.__.1922 / lieutenant /
Tyulekhov (Tyulikhov) Alexander Mikhailovich __.__.1916 / lieutenant / died 02/05/1944
Usatyuk Fedor Mikhailovich __.__.1922 / ml. lieutenant /
Cherepanov Petr Fedorovich __.__.1912 / Art. lieutenant / died 01/13/1944

Note - by the word loss of a tank (self-propelled guns, BA), I mean a vehicle that has failed for combat or non-combat reasons. The term "irretrievable losses" is rather arbitrary. The write-off of equipment to "irretrievable losses" reflects the transfer of faulty equipment for overhaul or factory repairs. Only front-level repair units or rear repair bases could determine the possibility of restoration or decommissioning. Combat units could reasonably be attributed to " irretrievable losses» only abandoned equipment in the territory controlled by the enemy.

SOURCES:
OBDPgN award lists of military personnel
OBDM information about the dead military personnel
ZhBD 29th Guards Tank Brigade for 1944 TsAMO f.3111 op.1 d.22, d.27, d.30
ZhBD 118th brigade for 1944 TsAMO f.3312 op.1 d.6
Documents of the 2nd Baltic Front TsAMO fund 239
Documents of the 1st Shock Army TsAMO fund 301
Documents of the 3rd Shock Army TsAMO fund 317
Documents of the 6th Guards Army TsAMO fund 335
Documents of the 10th Guards Army TsAMO fund 354
Documents of the 22nd Army TsAMO fund 376

The 92nd Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during a punitive operation in the Donbass

The 92nd mechanized brigade was created in 2000 on the basis of the 6th division of the national guard, which in turn was formed during the reorganization of the Soviet 48th motorized rifle division. The point of permanent deployment of the brigade is the city of Chuguev in Kharkiv region. In 2011, the brigade underwent a significant reduction. By 2015, the 92nd Motorized Rifle Brigade was planned to be liquidated, reorganized into a storage base military equipment. Plans to eliminate the brigade were interrupted by the events of the spring of 2014.

The brigade met the beginning of 2014 in an absolutely incompetent condition. The personnel of the compound slightly exceeded 500 people. The technology was in a terrible state. A feature of the 92nd Motorized Rifle Brigade was the fact that the mechanized battalions were armed with the BTR-70 instead of the BMP standard for other mechanized brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. About a hundred servicemen of the brigade had previously taken part in peacekeeping operations, but their small number could not affect the combat capability of the formation. The brigade began to be urgently understaffed at the expense of military personnel called up for mobilization. In the spring of 2014, the 92nd Motorized Rifle Brigade avoided being sent to the Donbass by taking up positions in their native Kharkiv region. The command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine explained this by the need to cover the border with the Russian Federation from a possible Russian invasion. In fact, several other factors played a key role in the cancellation of the shipment. Firstly, the available forces were not even enough to form one BTG, and secondly, the command was not confident in the reliability of the personnel of the brigade, the vast majority of which were called up from the Kharkov region, the population of which was traditionally pro-Russian.

The appalling state of technology created huge problems in the combat training of the brigade. Instead of training in combat training, the personnel were forced to repair military equipment removed from storage. In particular, for all the time the machine gunners managed to shoot from the KPVT only once, 10 shots each. The remaining time that the fighters could spend on training, they went on guard and on patrol around the military camp. Also, time was spent on formations with a check for the presence of OZK and gas masks. Shooting received minimal attention.

The catastrophic development of the situation near Ilovaisk at the end of August 2014 forced the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to transfer all available forces to the zone of the so-called ATO. In the 92nd Motorized Brigade, they urgently began to form a combined unit to be sent to the Donbass. As a result, there were not enough personnel and equipment even to form one full-fledged BTG. On August 25, a consolidated unit of 276 people, supported by four tanks, 3 self-propelled guns 2S3 "Akatsiya" and 12 armored personnel carriers and vehicles based on them, advanced to the so-called ATO zone. The movement of the column of over 30 armored vehicles and vehicles was organized extremely illiterately.

Equipment constantly broke down, (armored personnel carriers boiled), the order of movement in the convoy was not observed, the tasks for movement by the commander (call sign Sam) and the beginning. headquarters were not set. By evening, the batteries of the radio stations sat down in the column. There was nowhere to charge them. The column remained without communication. At about 19.45 in the evening, the unit came under mortar fire in the Voykovo area. After the first explosions, panic began, control was lost, the convoy mixed up, the outposts were pushed back by a fuel truck that had burst forward. Further, the fuel truck ran into dagger machine-gun fire and was hit, gasoline spilled along the road, equipment began to burn. The enemy began shelling from heavy machine guns and BMP cannons. In fact, the clash resulted in the beating of the consolidated unit. More than 40 servicemen were killed, all equipment was destroyed or went to the enemy as trophies. However, according to official figures, the loss in manpower amounted to 12 people killed, several more soldiers were missing (#LossNo). The surviving servicemen on foot went to the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The personnel of the defeated unit was morally broken and soon withdrawn from the Donbass.

In early September, a new BTG was formed as part of the 92nd brigade, transferred to the area of the city of Shchastya, Luhansk People's Republic. In this area, units of the 92nd Motorized Rifle Brigade conducted positional battles until the summer of 2016. On September 12, the LPR militia destroyed an armored personnel carrier of the 92nd OMBR. September 14 was blown up on a stretch and killed the chief of staff of the mechanized battalion of the brigade and one of the company commanders.

In the winter of 2015, tankmen of the 92nd brigade took part in the battles in the Debaltsevo direction. It was the tanks of the 92nd Motorized Rifle Brigade that provided support to the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which defended the Valera stronghold in the battle near Sanzharovka, where the tank battalion of the LPR suffered significant losses in August. In the battles for the settlement and its environs, the BTR-70 of the 92nd Motorized Brigade was lost, there are no data on losses in personnel. According to official data, during the fighting near Debaltseve, the brigade lost 2 people killed.

The events of January 2015 led to an aggravation of the situation in the area of the city of Shchastia, where the brigade lost a T-64 BV tank and an armored personnel carrier-70. In general, during the winter campaign at the beginning of 2015, the positions of the parties did not undergo major changes. On April 4, as a result of the use of anti-tank systems by the LPR units, the observation post of the brigade was destroyed, 4 servicemen were killed, including the deputy chief of staff of the 92nd OMBR.

On May 16, as a result of a clash with an enemy reconnaissance group near Shchastia, the soldiers of the 92nd Motorized Rifle Brigade captured the Russians Alexandrov and Erofeev, who were subsequently exchanged for Nadezhda Savchenko. During the collision, a soldier of the brigade was killed.

The command of the brigade was repeatedly accused of complicity in the smuggling of goods organized across the front line. In September 2015, servicemen of the brigade killed an employee of the SBU Galushchenko and an official of the state fiscal service Zharuk, who were investigating such frauds in the area of responsibility of the brigade. The chief military prosecutor of Ukraine, Matios, directly blamed the brigade commander, Colonel Nikolyuk, for the incident. Subsequently, two fighters of the reconnaissance company, who carried out the execution, were detained.

In the summer of 2016, the units of the brigade were withdrawn from the LPR for rotation. The losses of the brigade during the period of deployment near Shchastya amounted to at least 35 people killed. During the rotation period, 1 mechanized battalion of the brigade was partially re-equipped with the BTR-4, but the vast majority of armored vehicles were still obsolete BTR-70

In the fall of 2016, units of the brigade were transferred to the DPR, where they took up positions in the Krasnogorovka and Marinka regions, where they fought positional battles until October 2017, after which they were withdrawn from the Donbass for rotation. The loss of the brigade in this direction amounted to at least 24 people killed, in addition, in April 2017, an armored personnel carrier-70 of the 92nd OMBR was destroyed.

According to official figures, since August 2014, the 92nd brigade has lost 73 people killed, which looks like an underestimated figure, given the clearly incomplete data on losses during the defeat of the BTG brigade near Voykovo on August 27.

In general, the 92nd mechanized brigade turned out to be the worst among the mechanized formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as of 2014. The combat potential of the Soviet 48th motorized rifle division, which Ukraine got as a bonus, was lost during the years of independence. In fact, in the conditions of the outbreak of war, the brigade was unable to put even one fully equipped battalion on the battlefield.

The light image of St. Nicholas Victor Dmitrievich,
in the world colonel brigade commander of 92 brigade

At the heart of the 48 motorized rifle division.

Derived from Czechoslovakia.

Division management - in / g. Bashkirovka, Chuguev;

265th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment Bashkirovka, Chuguev;

1335th motorized rifle regiment (former 375th tank regiment) - c / g. Bashkirovka, Chuguev;

333rd motorized rifle regiment - Volgograd;

585th Artillery Regiment - first the entire regiment in the military. Bashkirovka, then part of the regiment moved to the Odessa region, the other to the city of Volgograd;

718th anti-aircraft missile regiment - Volgograd;

353rd separate training battalion;

31st separate reconnaissance battalion;

813th separate battalion communications;

88th separate repair and restoration battalion;

409th separate battalion of material support;

34th separate medical battalion;

99th separate engineering and sapper company (former 118th OISB);

348th separate company chemical protection.

92 Mechanized Brigade in ATO

one BTG (approx. 20 BTR-70/MTLB, ? tanks, ? self-propelled guns),

presumably the second, introduced in August, defeated in August, withdrawn for restoration, equipment lost.

For some time the military unit was in NG, probably, this broke it as a combat formation.

The brigade, to put it mildly, was not in the best shape, in general, it was planned to be disbanded for 15 years, its staff was significantly reduced in 2011, and in fact it was a base for storing equipment.

In fact, there were about 300 people in the brigade, of which 200 were in the 1st battalion, the rest were scattered among the units, some units consisted of only officers at all (2 and 3 battalions).

At the time of the Crimean confrontation, the "brigade" was able to field only an RTG-combined reinforced company ...

A feature of the brigade is motorized infantry on the BTR-70.

Apparently, a lot of BTR-80s in Ukraine were washed down into BTR-4s.

The brigade hastily began to be recruited from March 14 of the year, apparently realizing that there were few combat values from a unit numbering in a reinforced company deployed to the states of the brigade, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine kept the 92nd brigade in the "reserve", that is, it assisted the border guards "guarding" the border with the Russian Federation in Kharkiv region - that is, creating the appearance of a veil.

Battle path

Actually, the very participation of 92 brigades in the ATO at the moment was short and bright in its essence, when, without thinking at all, someone pointed a finger at the map

Contract soldiers served in the unit, many with combat experience. (in reality, 104 people from the brigade took part in UN missions) Of these, a battalion tactical group was formed: 16 tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, armored personnel carriers and trucks - about a hundred pieces of equipment up to a thousand fighters, with an engineering and sapper unit, a medical company.

On the 26th, the brigade began its heroic march across the Donetsk land -

Then the hellish confusion began. Nobody directed the column - the commanders themselves decided to move near Ilovaisk, for which it was necessary to return to the Donetsk highway, which was 10 kilometers away. At the fork in the Starobeshevskoe reservoir, scouts nailed to the column. We drove under periodic mortar fire and small arms, circled around some village ... A few kilometers later, the remnants of the 51st brigade nailed to the column - shabby, on beaten equipment.

The column was constantly in the zone of fire of the militia forces and practically the command of the brigade did nothing to escape from under it.

For five days of hell, the column moved forward about a hundred kilometers. No communication, no clear interaction with other units. Approximately 40 kilometers the soldier had to walk, getting out of the shelling.

As a matter of fact, the brigade commander, who personally participated in this campaign, gave the command "tick lads"

which confirms the story of a surviving soldier from the 92nd mechanized brigade, the fact that out of the entire composition of the battalion group (according to various estimates from 800 to 1200 people) only 200 remained, perhaps some part is still running around Komsomolsk-Starobeshevo

EEEEE, in fact, the battalion mechanized tactical group of the 92nd separate mechanized brigade, consisting of a reinforced tank company and a battalion on an armored personnel carrier with attached units, was completely defeated, lost all its materiel and equipment, not even having time to meet with the enemy, with any.

2. However, it's incredible - but it happens

some part of the 92nd brigade (apparently BTG) was transferred to the area of Shchastya, Luhansk region, where it serves at checkpoints (which is surprising) - most likely an artillery attack in the area of the settlement. Dmitrievka was very kosher, which had to involve a mechanized unit.

Pay attention to the armored personnel carrier lanes on the video part prepared for the Donetsk region - two lanes.

It's funny that this part of the 92nd brigade is commanded by the same Mr. Nikolyuk, who until recently managed to lose the BTG in the Komsomolskoye area.

On September 14, in the Luhansk region, the chief of staff of the mechanized battalion of the 92nd Specialized Motor Brigade, Major Vadim Leonidovich Demidenko, and the commander of the company of the 92nd Specialized Brigade, Captain Antoshin Ivan Mikolayovich, were killed - the official cause of death was an explosion on a "stretch" in a forest belt.

Loses tanks from ATGM shelling.

Looks like it's getting stronger =

All six T64BV tanks of the 1st BTG of the 92nd MBR are bloodied.
Young replenishment of the brigade

The brigade commander of the 92nd brigade is personally watching so that his fighters do not run away

3. The brigade is reinforced with equipment and personnel.

The 92nd separate mechanized brigade (OMB) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has received the first batch of restored and modernized T-64BV tanks, deputy commander of the 92nd mechanized brigade Alexander Vasilkovsky said, Interfax reports.

More: http://vpk-news.ru/news/21914

The 92nd separate mechanized brigade (village of Klugino-Bashkirovka, Chuguevsky district, Kharkov region) received the first batch of restored and modernized T-64BV tanks. This was announced to journalists on September 18 in Klugino-Bashkirovka by the deputy commander of the 92nd separate mechanized brigade (OMB), lieutenant colonel Alexander Vasilkovsky. At the same time, the deputy commander of the 92nd brigade did not disclose information about the amount of equipment already delivered and planned for delivery.

“Equipment comes to the territory of the unit, which was repaired at the plant. Malyshev and other factories. She is almost ready for combat missions. In general, I will say that we need equipment, first of all, armored personnel carriers and tanks,” said Alexander Vasilkovsky.

“The equipment that is in the Armed Forces today requires serious modernization. You all know that the T-64 tanks, which were mothballed in Ukraine, are now being re-mothballed. Accordingly, today military equipment is being delivered to both the Armed Forces and the National Guard. The running-in of tanks after mothballing takes from one week to a month,” said Vasily Khoma, deputy chairman, head of the HOCA apparatus.

On the this moment in the camp of the 92nd OMB with mobilized citizens who are from 22 to 60 years old, combat training, namely - fire, tactical, medical, engineering training. According to Alexander Vasilkovsky, these people are trained to perform combat missions in the ATO zone in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The training process (Young Fighter Course) takes 40 days. “90% of the mobilized citizens did military service back in the days of Soviet Union. There are people who took part in the fighting in Afghanistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, Iraq. And only a small percentage of people in our camp who did not do military service,” said the deputy commander of the 92nd OMB.

Oleksandr Vasylkovsky stressed that on the eve of the cold weather, the soldiers are in dire need of winter equipment (winter jackets, warm berets, hats, gloves), generators to provide electricity, heating stoves, coal, firewood, walkie-talkies and thermal imagers are also needed.

Speaking about the prospects for a long-term truce, Alexander Vasilkovsky noted that he did not believe in such a truce. “I don’t believe it for the reason that the second battalion tactical group, which is located in the ATO zone, over the course of yesterday deep night there was a mortar attack from Russia and militants," the deputy commander of the 92nd brigade emphasized.

Media representatives today got acquainted with the conditions of stay of the 92nd OMB mobilized in the camp, and also visited the training ground (tank director, military shooting range, tankodrome).

Butusov about battles, comrades
Natural 41 years old, the fighters have thrown their weapons and are ticking in civilian clothes.

The death of the company tactical group of the 92nd brigade in battle with Russian troops near Starobeshev is a tragic mistake.

Soldiers and commanders of the armed forces of Ukraine regularly contact me to discuss the tactics of combat use. Alas, my repeated appeals to the leadership of the General Staff and to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to carry out information and analytical work to generalize combat experience and disseminating it among the troops, organizing meetings of officers and sergeants of units and groups of troops for the exchange of experience do not receive any support. And the level of theoretical knowledge and combat training of the reserve staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard is very uneven. In the same unit, there are commanders and subunits with sharply different levels of competence.

When exchanging information with participants in hostilities, I try to analyze mistakes from which lessons must be learned. One of such resonant tragedies is the death of the company tactical group of the 92nd Kharkov mechanized brigade.

On August 27, in view of the dramatic development of the situation near Ilovaisk, I actively supported Semyon Semenchenko's call for a rally under the presidential administration. I informed the advisers of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about the reasons and the real situation - and in sector "B" and sector "D" I had personal contact with the military personnel of most Ukrainian units. They organized a meeting for me with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I informed Pyotr Alekseevich about the situation. I asked him for an order for the immediate withdrawal of troops from Ilovaisk, and a breakthrough from the ring. I knew that our command was pulling units of the 72nd mechanized brigade to the battlefield, but only the company-tactical group from the 92nd mechanized brigade was in full readiness for the attack. August 25-26 superior forces Russian troops defeated the battalion-tactical group of the 51st mechanized brigade in the area of Kuteynikovo-Starobeshevo. Information was received about heavy losses, heroic resistance, and this made it possible to assess the level and concentration of the enemy. It was obvious that scattered attacks without coordination and massive artillery support would not yield results. The President said that the ATO command assures him that there are forces to break through the corridor. There is no need to withdraw troops from Ilovaisk. I said that, according to my information, a breakthrough in the conditions of the numerical superiority of the Russian troops is impossible - we must use our forces to strike towards the encircled grouping only when it makes a breakthrough. A breakthrough is needed immediately.

When I spoke about the impossibility of releasing Ilovaisk, I proceeded, among other things, from an understanding of the real state of the troops. The 92nd mechanized brigade during the Yanukovych era was one of the weakest units in terms of combat training. Its staff was only 550 people. Therefore, the replenishment of the brigade during mobilization did not lead to a sharp increase in the brigade's combat capability. Although it should be noted that a significant core of competent and motivated officers and soldiers appeared in the brigade. Unfortunately, the command of the brigade was unable to place competent and patriotic officers and soldiers in command positions in the company tactical group, which was advanced to the Starobeshevo area.

This information was known to me, and it seemed obvious that the forces of one company alone could not break through the ring. But someone reported differently, and the command made a different decision. Obviously, it was the ATO command. The President authorized me to convey to the people who had gathered under the Presidential Administration that help would come to those surrounded in Ilovaisk, and that he was in full possession of the information.

Already after I left the president’s office and talked to people on Bankova Street, fighters from the 92nd called me and said that it was during those hours when the president was talking about a breakthrough with reference to the commander of the ATO Muzhenko, their group encountered superior forces Russian troops, and was completely defeated. More than 30 armored vehicles and vehicles were lost.

I asked one of the participants in the battle, a volunteer soldier, a true patriot, an active participant in the Kharkiv Euromaidan, to write a report on what happened. I bring to your attention fragments of this report.

"On August 25, the convoy moved along the railway to the ATO zone. On August 26, it unloaded at Chaplino station, Dnipropetrovsk region. After unloading, movement was started. commander (callsign Sam) and chief of staff were not assigned.

On the second day of the movement, 27.08, at about 19:45, mortar shelling of the column began. Immediately before the shelling, the command of the group, under the pretext of the need to speed up the movement, it was decided to remove the military guard of the column, and counter-ambushes were canceled (infantry fighting vehicles raids on the flanks). After the first explosions, panic began, control was lost, the convoy mixed up, the outposts were pushed back by a fuel truck that had burst forward. Further, the fuel truck ran into dagger machine-gun fire and was hit, gasoline spilled along the road, equipment began to burn. The enemy began shelling with heavy machine guns and BMD cannons.

In this situation, the tankers and gunners of self-propelled guns showed themselves in the best way. Tanks under the command of a tank platoon commander (Lieutenant Yaroslav Yarovoy, tank commanders - Art. s-t Nikolaev and foreman Bankovsky) suppressed several enemy firing points, destroyed 1 BMD (ammo explosion) and knocked out another enemy BMD. The tank under the command of Lieutenant Yarovoy withstood three hits, after the fourth hit the BC exploded, the crew in full force managed to evacuate, went to their own in Mariupol. The self-propelled guns went to work “direct fire”, worked on several firing points, were hit, the crews were evacuated (in the hospital). Battery commander lieutenant colonel Igor Metenko, senior officer captain Vladimir Tsarev, political officer major Fyodor Shevchenko, gun commanders Ivan Guzenko, Artem Zvonenko fired to the end, and fired until the enemy hit the car. Officers and sergeants were seriously injured, Artem Zvonenko and his crew went missing.

As a result of the clash, heavy losses were suffered in personnel (infantry), all the equipment of the column was lost. They went out in small groups, the main part of the personnel was withdrawn by a reconnaissance platoon.

Reasons for what happened:

● Both I and the direct participants in this situation see the main reason as the lack of knowledge and skills of movement in the column, the lack of a clear algorithm of actions and instructions in case of such a development of events. In turn, this was caused by the lack of time for training and for combat coordination. The brigade has never been trained to move in a column. The fighters spent most of their time restoring equipment that was inoperable - non-working hydraulic boosters of armored personnel carriers, rotted hoses, dead batteries. The fighters had to spend most of the two weeks allocated for training under equipment. For all the time, the machine gunners managed to shoot from the KPVT only once, 10 shots each. The remaining time that the fighters could spend on training, they went on guard and on patrol around the military camp.

The question is, what are our priorities? Also, time was spent on formations with a check for the presence of OZK and gas masks. Shooting received minimal attention.

● One of the main reasons for the lack of time was the dilapidation and malfunction of equipment. The need for constant requests and “knocking out” spare parts, it took a lot of time. Extremely poor supply of spare parts and consumables. On the part of the rear service (consciously, or out of stupidity) obstacles were constantly placed - every little thing had to be begged for, listening that “there is nothing”, as well as words in the spirit of “you came here to earn money, and I new technology gave, now you restore it.

● Lack of communication in the convoy, as well as communication with the leadership of the ATO. In the process of moving, negotiations were carried out on the radios, and by the end of the day the stations sat down. There was nowhere to charge them. absent charging device 24v/220v. (must be found and purchased).

● There was not enough information from the command about the location of the column, about the operational situation (where friends and foes), there were no maps, it was not set or specified combat mission during the movement of the column.

● The fighters have full confidence that someone deliberately spoils the equipment. For example, in the cylinders of engines, they find the remnants of piston rings that leave scuffs and reduce engine power. The rings themselves cannot get into the engine - pressure will squeeze them out from there. In order for them to appear there, they must be thrown there. There were also cases of impossibility to put the KPVT in its place in the APC, since this place was broken (with a hammer or a sledgehammer).

● Due to the short preparation time, it was not possible to test the weapons. Only at the beginning of the battle did it become clear that the KPVT of the BTR No. 207 was jammed and did not work.

I believe that the main responsibility for what happened lies with the command of the brigade, which did not create sufficient conditions for the training and combat coordination of fighters, and also does not give a damn about issues logistic support preparation for combat. Judging by the fact that the second group is now leaving, manned by Bassoons, from which no one has ever fired, conclusions have not been drawn."

This description of the battle was made by an ordinary soldier - with extensive experience in military service. He has excellent tactical thinking. I hope that the time will come when commanders in the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be appointed and dismissed based on the level of their tactical skills. I hope that the prosecutor's office will investigate the circumstances surrounding the deployment of the 92nd brigade company tactical group, and the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will draw the appropriate conclusions. We must finally begin to firmly correct the shortcomings during the operational pause, and sharply increase the combat effectiveness of the troops. Moreover, even during this battle, many officers and soldiers showed themselves heroically and fought well - tankers, gunners and scouts fought with dignity, and deserve a reward even for such a generally unsuccessful battle - for brave and worthy behavior. The Ukrainian army is alive - but it needs emergency personnel decisions, professional commanders, much more than anything else.

Another story
Combat-ready military units were sent to be shot - this is the impression left by the Ukrainian military volunteer who got out after the defeat of his unit in the Donbass. "Event" does not reveal the name of the interlocutor for reasons of his safety.

In the photo: nine soldiers who had been encircled near Ilovaisk for 18 days were taken out of the ATO zone by a representative of the Right Sector. They were brought home by the Dneprodzerzhinsk Auto-Maidanites. The guys went through all the circles of hell, and were even captured by the Russian army, from where they were released by representatives of the Red Cross. Soldiers of the 40th Kryvbas Battalion and the 51st Motorized Brigade Konstantin Koval, Vladimir Dyakov, Yuriy Lebed, Oleksandr Grebenyuk, Serhiy Orishchenko, Oleksandr Baklan, Oleksandr Gninenko, Right Sector representative and Automaidan supporters.

Ride to nowhere

“We were sent not to an anti-terrorist operation, but to a shooting range where we were targets!” - the soldier summarizes the events of August 23-28.

The soldier began his short combat path in the Kharkiv region, where he served under a contract in the 92nd separate motorized brigade, which covered the border guards.

Contract soldiers served in the unit, many with combat experience. Of these, a company tactical group was formed: 16 tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, armored personnel carriers and trucks - about a hundred pieces of equipment and 2.5 thousand soldiers. “It was a mini-army with an engineering unit and a medical company. There was a lot of ammunition, - the soldier describes his unit. - Courageous people served with me ... "

They were sent to the ATO zone on August 23: they put them on a train near Chuguev and took them into the unknown. They drove for a day through Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye. The soldiers did not know the purpose of the expedition: “There were bad feelings, dreams…” One of his colleagues signed his fiancée on the day she was sent to the ATO zone.

They began to unload at some half-station - unmanned aerial vehicles immediately appeared in the sky, someone said that they were Russian. They formed a column and set off in the direction of Novopavlovka, then turned towards Kurakovo: the soldiers were told that they were to cover the local thermal power plant and the reservoir.

Then incomprehensible three-day maneuvers began in the countryside. A war began in the Maryinka area: the column went to the positions of artillerymen, who from self-propelled guns and Grad rocket launchers exchanged fire with the enemy. They were shooting, they were being shot...

Blind and deaf

“The commanders didn’t have maps of the area, they bought some in the store,” the soldier says. Radio communication was useless: some of the radios were without batteries, others were discharged, and the power plants of the equipment gave a different voltage, so there was nowhere to charge the radios. Phones were ordered to be turned off - they attracted drones, and there was practically no coverage.

We rested in some kind of swamp, plowed up by explosions. We set off in the middle of the night. Fuel in the tanks of armored personnel carriers was 30 liters at a consumption of 100 liters per 100 kilometers. The equipment was untested, due to malfunctions and breakdowns, it was often necessary to stop.

The soldiers hardly slept from the moment the column began to move, fatigue was taking its toll.

After an indefinite winding along the roads at night, we stopped somewhere in the Volnovakha region in the landing.

So far, the column has survived a couple of "light mortar attacks" without loss, although they drove through scorched earth and met pieces of military ammunition.

under execution

The next morning we moved towards Donetsk - it was 20 kilometers away. Suddenly a Mi-8 helicopter flew in, an officer got out of it. He said that 7 kilometers ahead were the positions of the Russian Grads. We must quickly retreat, or rather, withdraw the column from the inevitable execution.

The column turned right and began to turn around in a cornfield. And then mortars and small arms hit from the landing. The column in motion answered at random, moved to the landing. There was a position of Ukrainian howitzers. “It turns out that we were shooting at our own people, and they were shooting at us!” - the soldier is perplexed. During the skirmish, one fighter from the column was killed.

Then the hellish confusion began. Nobody directed the column - the commanders themselves decided to move near Ilovaisk, for which it was necessary to return to the Donetsk highway, which was 10 kilometers away. At the fork in the Starobeshevskoe reservoir, scouts nailed to the column. We drove under periodic shelling from mortars and small arms, circled around some village ...

“Tears and snot flowed from the smoke and dust. The glasses did not help, many suffered from allergies, ”the soldier describes the condition of his colleagues.

The shelling of the convoy lasted for several hours, the fighters drove past their dead and broken equipment: "Medrota was covered with explosions before our eyes ...".

The commanders were lost in the confusion along with the armored personnel carrier. The tail of the column was "covered" by the volley of "Gradov" ...

A few kilometers later, the remnants of the 51st division nailed to the column - shabby, on beaten equipment.

The shelling did not stop - they hit howitzers and rocket launchers. From the stopped armored personnel carrier, the soldier had to transfer to the armor of the tank.

“We were shot from three sides in a square with a side of 30 kilometers,” says the soldier. - They beat us from a distance of 10-15 kilometers - we simply had nothing to answer. We were sent not to battle, but to the shooting range ... ".

The column crumbled. People abandoned equipment and ran away, fleeing from shells and rockets: “Have you tried running through sunflowers? ..”. Fields and plantings were burning all around.

The road to your

When it got dark, the fighters tried to gather. Three tanks, four armored personnel carriers, an ambulance and about two hundred soldiers were found blindly. There were commanders.

We decided, guided by the atlas, to make our way to the Donetsk-Mariupol highway. But at night the shelling began again, the group fled: "The equipment was not abandoned - if anything, they blew it up."

Again in the morning we managed to gather about fifty fighters. Everyone was exhausted and suffering from thirst. Broken and undermined equipment was on fire.

Then there was a wandering on foot through an unknown area, past abandoned farms and enemy positions. “They lured us under machine guns - they called us by the name of the commander, they called our call signs ...” - says the soldier.

Then a soldier with another soldier went forward to reconnaissance. When they returned, the rest of the group had gone somewhere.

“People have become like zombies because of fatigue and danger,” the soldier says. - When it's dangerous - the body does everything by itself, then you wonder - how ?!

Early in the morning we went to some store near a gas station, bought water and energy tonics, cookies. A car was stopped on the highway, in which a family with two children was traveling. The driver agreed to take the fighters to his own. We drove lying in the cabin, the children were sitting on top.

When the telephone connection appeared, the soldier called his military unit and informed the authorities about the defeat of the column. Soon the fighters arrived at a checkpoint in the Zaporozhye region, where they were given medical care. Then the fighter was helped to get to Dneprodzerzhinsk.

“When they got to their own, I cried,” the soldier admits.

For five days of hell, the column moved forward about a hundred kilometers. No communication, no clear interaction with other units. The soldier had to walk about 40 kilometers on foot, getting out from under the shelling: “I was blown off by an explosive wave from the armor a couple of times, I was stunned once ... But I didn’t lose consciousness!”

How many people still survived in this "dash", the soldier does not know: "No one wanted to give up."

“I am glad that I survived and was not captured. Glad I didn't kill anyone, says the volunteer soldier. “I don’t know what I will do next…”

AT last days a lot of materials and interviews about the Ilovaisk events appeared in the press, which highlight the position of mainly the leaders and representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The main leitmotif of these publications is that the Ilovai operation was carried out primarily by the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and some other “enthusiast” politicians, and the Armed Forces were involved in it “in so far as”. In addition, from these publications one gets the impression that the involvement of military units to help volunteer battalions was almost a private initiative of the commander of Sector B, General Ruslan Khomchak

August 2014. Ilovaisk. PART III. Attempt to unblock the "Ilovaisky boiler", 27 - 28 sickles

The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Colonel-General Viktor Muzhenko, in one of his interviews, claimed that an operation was being prepared for September 1-2 to unblock the Ilovaisky Cauldron by the forces of the 79th, 95th airmobile brigades. More precisely - a detachment with a total strength of one and a half battalions. This is - at best - 1000 soldiers. However, at the same time, for some reason, neither Muzhenko nor the others for some reason remembered the heroic attempt to release the fighters surrounded near Ilovaisk by the forces of the company tactical group of the 92nd brigade and the combined detachment of the 42nd territorial defense battalion.

Let's make an assumption: why is this story hushed up? The two above-mentioned units were in the reserve of the headquarters of the Anti-Terrorist Operation. And they went in the direction of Ilovaiskaya precisely on the orders of the ATO headquarters. This fact largely casts doubt on the assertions of some generals that the Ilovai operation and the subsequent attempt to unblock the encircled were almost a private initiative of the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the headquarters of sector B.

In fact, on August 26, the leadership of the ATO began to take measures to break through the encirclement of a group of Ukrainian troops concentrated between Ilovaisky and Mnogopolie. For this purpose, a whole brigade, the 92nd, was moving from the Kharkiv region, and the assault group of the 42nd battalion "Resistance Movement" from Kramatorsk. Some military men and journalists also claim that the battalion-tactical group of the 1st separate tank brigade (village Goncharovskoye, Chernihiv region) should have been involved in this operation. However, the entire combat strength of the brigade at that time was in the Luhansk direction. What a small unit of the 1st Panzer really went to the Ilovaiskaya area, and it could hardly significantly affect the situation.