Logistics along with combat and special-technical support is integral part comprehensive support for the combat operations of formations, units and subunits and an important component of their success in solving the assigned tasks.

Logistics is a very broad concept. In a specific case, in relation to the military level, logistics support is understood as a set of measures carried out by units and subunits of the military rear for material, engineering, airfield, airfield technical, medical, veterinary, commercial, residential, operational and financial support, aimed at maintaining combat formations, units and subunits in a state of constant combat readiness and creating conditions for the fulfillment of their tasks.

In order for the military rear to be able to successfully solve its tasks in modern combat, it must meet certain requirements, the most important of which are:

• 1. Full compliance of the combat readiness of the military rear with the level of combat readiness of the provided units and subunits. This is explained by the fact that the combat readiness of the rear is an integral part of the combat readiness of the troops, one of the main factors in its timely transfer from peacetime to martial law and the successful completion of tasks to provide units and subunits during combat operations.
• 2. The ability of the military rear for a certain time to perform tasks autonomously, i.e. with its available forces and means, especially in the case of incomplete deployment of the operational rear.

Great experience Patriotic War and subsequent exercises shows that in the operations of the initial period of the war, the main volume of tasks for the rear and technical support of units and subunits within a few days will have to be performed by the military rear, since operational rear will take time to deploy.

The need for autonomous operation of the military rear may also arise in the course of a war, especially when units and subunits operate in disparate directions, in isolation from the main forces, surrounded and in other conditions.

Having the established stocks of materiel, units and subunits of the military rear can conduct forced combat operations:

• 1 obmo - up to 5 days
• 1 rmo - up to 4 days
• 1 wob - up to 3 days
• 3. High mobility, like that of the troops provided, the ability to widely maneuver forces and means.

This is due to the fact that units and subunits of the rear must not only perform tasks in the field, but also move after the troops, both on roads and in their absence, over rough and difficult terrain.

• 4. Continuous development of the rear in order to:
  • - improvement of the composition;
  • - organizational structure;
  • - staffing and equipment.

Such a requirement corresponds to the general trend in the development of the Armed Forces, the regularities of the principles of logistics and logistics support services for units and subunits in battle.

• 5. Maintaining the technical equipment of the military rear at a high level. This means that the military rear should include a sufficient number of modern transport and evacuation equipment, technical equipment for refueling equipment, cooking, baking bread, loading and unloading operations, extracting water and picking material equipment with high productivity, simple in design. and control, reliable in operation with minimal energy consumption and efficient in operation.
• 6. Correspondence of the capabilities of the military rear to the volume of tasks that he will have to perform in conditions modern combat. A constant increase in the equipment of the troops and their rear in technical terms is ensured. Along with the growth of the technical equipment of the rear, its capabilities to provide troops in battle will also increase significantly. Even with minimal capabilities, the military rear must always be ready to carry out its tasks in full.

Taking into account the fulfillment of the above requirements, the military rear in its own organizational structure, technical equipment, availability of reserves, mobility and maneuverability, as well as in terms of methods of work, must be able to provide:

in a battalion - a company;

in the regiment - a battalion;

in a division - a regiment simultaneously within 2-3 hours, and gradually provide all personnel and all equipment within one day. Assessing the current state of the military rear, we can say that on the whole it meets the above requirements and is able to successfully fulfill its tasks in full to provide all-round support for units and subunits.

Speaking about the requirements for the military rear, we must not forget about them constant increase. Therefore, the search for rational ways of its development is a constant task of the theory and practice of the rear of the Armed Forces.

General intent sending troops to Afghanistan was to cross the state border in two directions, enter the territory of the country and, having made marches along the routes Termez - Kabul - Kazni and Kushka - Herat - Kandahar, encircle the most important administrative centers with a ring. It was planned to deploy troops along this ring garrison and thereby create conditions for ensuring the normal life of the peoples of Afghanistan.

Most of January 1980 was spent 40 armies relatively calm. Under the control of OKSV were all big cities Afghanistan, where the Soviet military garrisons and the main roads of the country are located. But in every village and small town, the population opposed Soviet troops. Propaganda against the "infidels" proved to be very effective.

Already at the end of January, Soviet troops were subjected to the first, though not regular and not very active shelling. Subsequently, clashes with armed opposition formations grew and became more and more violent.

In March 1980, Soviet troops began active combat operations against the most dangerous units of the armed opposition. All this happened at an increasing pace and scale, both in terms of the composition of the troops involved, and in the development of the conduct of hostilities, and subsequently operations. The main efforts of the troops were transferred from the northern to the southeastern part of the country. Characteristic of this period was the active use of tactical and airborne assault forces as part of a company - battalion. In the future, motorized rifle units and even formations were already involved in the conduct of hostilities.

By the summer of 1980, military operations against the rebels had already been deployed in almost the entire territory of Afghanistan.

At this time, the activities of the rear were constantly reflected in a separate section in the monthly reports of the 40th Army. An example of this is the section in the September 1980 Army report:

... In the directions, taking into account the army and district transport, 1565 vehicles, 736 trailers with a carrying capacity of 4400 tons of dry cargo, 6990 tons of bulk were working.

Total transported in September by car 29580 tons of materiel (15229 tons of dry cargo and 14351 tons of liquid cargo).

The total mileage of vehicles amounted to 1729980 km, including 886864 km with cargo.

As of 30.09, the stocks of material resources of the army were: gasoline - 4.86, diesel fuel - 5.86, T-1 - 24.8 refueling, food - 53 daily allowances, clothing property 5% of the staff, medical equipment - for 6 months.

Delivery and consumption of fuel for September 1980

In September, 352 wounded were treated in medical institutions, 4114 patients were hospitalized, including 2451 infectious patients. Evacuated to medical institutions district 2555 wounded and sick.

For the storage of potatoes and vegetables, 25 vegetable stores have been built, 14 are under construction, and 26 are under construction.

For heating personnel in the army, there were stoves POV - 4425 pcs., AG1SN - 655 pcs., Stocks were stored in its warehouses solid fuel: coal - 8990t, firewood 9400t.

Sending the Dead

The dead soldiers were sent through the collection and processing points created at the medical and sanitary battalions of the divisions. In September, 83 dead servicemen were processed and sent. The shipment was made to Tashkent by special aircraft allocated by the headquarters of the TurkVO at the request of the army headquarters. Sometimes the sending of the dead was delayed due to the lack of accompanying units, due to incorrect execution of the required documents ...

Commander of the 40th Army, Major General B. Tkach
Chief of Staff of the 40th Army, Major General V. Pankratov

The conduct of hostilities in Afghan conditions differed essential features. Opposition detachments avoided a direct confrontation with the Soviet troops. As a rule, they carried out sabotage and terrorist activities.

A special place in the tactics of the rebels was occupied by ambushes and conducting mine warfare, mainly on highways in order to inflict losses on convoys with cargo. Mining was also used on the approaches to dislocation points our troops, warehouses, field main pipelines and other facilities.

The combat actions of the Soviet troops, as a rule, were large-scale and were carried out in order to defeat powerful and especially dangerous groups of the armed opposition and liquidate their base areas.

During the years of their stay in Afghanistan, Soviet troops participated in 416 elective operations, most of which were large scale.

Unscheduled included local combat actions of formations and units, raid actions of reinforced battalions, ambush actions on caravan routes and routes of movement of armed opposition units within the country.

Since the spring of 1985, a gradual transition began from the active combat operations of our troops to the support of the Afghan military units Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units.

Since mid-1988, in accordance with the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan, 40 army practically did not carry out significant military operations.

After entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and their exit to the designated areas of the rear service, they began to carry out the tasks of both arranging and providing combat operations in the rear. The primary task was to create in the shortest possible time the established reserves of all types of material resources. In the initial period, the storage of material resources was carried out, as a rule, in the simplest shelters on the ground.

For the uninterrupted material support of the 40th Army, the most characteristic was the following content of stocks:

fuel:
gasoline- 6.3 requests, incl. in the troops - 4.5 orders; diesel fuel - 12.0 ref., incl. in the troops - 8.6 orders;
aviation fuel-19.0 requests, incl. in the troops - 13.5 orders;
food- 60 s / d, incl. in the troops - 40 s / d;
clothing property- 25%, incl. in the troops - 15%, on strength armies;
medical property- for 20 thousand wounded.

AT abrmo stocks were kept for 2-3 daily needs of the army, and as material resources were transferred to formations and units, their number was again restored to the established requirement.

The amount of materiel contained in the formations and units was not a constant value, but was largely determined by the varying intensity of the combat operations of the troops.

Logistic support for units and subunits participating in hostilities was carefully planned. The issues of organizing material and medical support were worked out in particular detail: the procedure and timing of replenishment of spent supplies, evacuation of the wounded and sick, issues of rear management and organization of interaction.

In preparation for hostilities, as a rule, additional stocks of materiel were created, and the personnel were provided with mountain equipment. At the same time, the following separation of inventories was practiced:

for personnel per person: 1 thousand cartridges, 4 grenades, 4 flares, 2 dry rations, 2 flasks of water, an individual first-aid kit, 20 pantacid tablets, an overcoat (jacket), a small sapper shovel. The total mass of equipment with weapons was 32 kg;

in combat vehicles: 2 - 2.5 rounds of small arms ammunition, 3 - 5 dry rations per crew, 20 liters of water in a TsV-4 tank;

in battalion transport: 2-3 rounds of ammunition of all types, up to 2 ref. fuel (of which up to 1.5 zap. with cars), 7-12 s / d food (including 4 s / d dry rations) and medical equipment per 100 wounded;

in the transport regiment: 1-1.5 rounds of ammunition of all types, 1-2 req. fuel, 3-5 s / d food.

Such reserves made it possible to ensure the conduct of hostilities for 5-10 days.

In Afghanistan, the troops were having difficulty with water supply. Therefore, careful reconnaissance of water sources, its extraction and delivery to each specific combat area was required. A separate engineer-sapper battalion of the division, as a rule, was reinforced by a field water supply platoon. The total water requirement for drinking and household needs per 1 soldier per day was 15-20 liters.

Note:
VKO Journal. 2010. No. 4. pp.96-103
V.M. Moskovchenko. Logistics separate army in the conduct of hostilities in the mountain-desert area. M. VAGSH. 1990, p. 32.
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation General Staff of the Armed Forces. The use of a limited contingent of Soviet troops to provide military assistance to the government of Afghanistan (December 1979 - February 1989). M. Military publishing house. 1993. S. 229, 300.

Methodical development

for special training

for VUS-250300; VUS-250400

“Military rear”

Topic #14“Features of logistic support in the conduct of combat

actions in special conditions”

Lesson #1“Features of logistic support in the conduct of combat

actions under special conditions”

Educational and educational goals:

to acquaint students with the features of logistic support in the conduct of hostilities in special conditions.

Time: 2 hours

Conduct method: practical lesson

Location: tactical field

Logistics:

Posters, stands.

Literature: 1. Instruction on the military rear, art.st.310-363

LEARNING QUESTIONS AND TIME CALCULATION

№__________Subject Questions ______________ ____Time (min)

IOrganization of the lesson
IIMain part
Features of logistics support for fighting in the mountains. Logistics organization. Placement of the rear parts (divisions) in the mountains, its features. Features of the use of supply routes and evacuation. Organization of material security, transportation of material funds. The procedure for ensuring protection, protection and defense of the rear
fighting in the deserts. Organization rear support. Peculiarities rear deployment in the desert. Peculiarities Transportation of material resources peculiarities. Providing troops with water and solid fuel. Peculiarities measures of protection, protection and defense
Logistic support of troops during the conduct fighting in the northern regions (in winter), in the forest and when leaving
IIIConclusion

Lesson progress

Organization of classes

Leader actions:

accept the report of the platoon duty officer;

check the availability of students, readiness for employment, material support;

conduct a quiz on the topic covered;

state the topic and purpose of the lesson.

INTRODUCTION

Logistic support is organized and carried out in all types of combat and in the daily activities of the troops. In this lecture, we will consider how logistics support is organized and carried out in special conditions.

Under the concept (term) special conditions, it is necessary to understand combat operations at night, in the mountains, in the desert, in winter in northern conditions, in the forest, in the waterless steppe. In addition, under these conditions, military operations can be conducted in winter, summer (in the heat), spring and autumn in muddy conditions, on the sea coast, in the city (settlements), in the "green zone", etc.

In these "special conditions", respectively, in matters of logistic support for units of the brigade (regiment), they will also have their own characteristics.

The main goal of logistics support remains, as in normal conditions, i.e. maintaining the units and the brigade (regiment) as a whole in a combat-ready state and creating the necessary (favorable) conditions for the fulfillment of the assigned tasks.

This means that it is necessary that the material, technical support for the rear services, medical, financial support meet the established standards, and there should also be close interaction with combat and other types of support.

In special conditions of combat operations, the basis for organizing logistics support is the decision of the brigade (regiment) commander, his instructions and instructions on the rear of the senior commander.

The brigade (regiment) commander is in charge of logistic support personally, through his headquarters, his deputy in charge of logistics, and the chiefs of arms and services (including logistic services).

It is important to remember that the main organizer of logistic support and under special conditions is the deputy brigade (regiment) commander for rear.

Regardless of the special conditions, the deputy commander of a brigade (regiment) is responsible for organizing the comprehensive preparation of the rear. He is obliged to coordinate and competently, depending on the prevailing situation, place and move in a timely manner (with the permission of the chief of staff of the brigade (regiment) of the logistics and technical support unit). The supply of all types of material resources (including water) must be uninterrupted.

The deputy brigade (regiment) commander for logistics is also responsible for the use of vehicle units, supply and evacuation routes, as well as material, medical, other types of logistics and technical support for subordinate services.

Special conditions will also have their own peculiarities in defense, protection, defense of the rear, organization of rear communications and rear management as a whole.

In mountainous terrain (mountains), logistic support of subunits in combat (offensive, defense) is organized and carried out taking into account the highly rugged terrain and the disunity of the lines of combat operations.

For example. In the mountains, the defense is built, as a rule, on a broad front in separate directions accessible to the enemy offensive.

Particular attention, respectively, and the concentration of the main efforts will be on the defense of tank-hazardous areas, wide gorges (roads), plateaus and the strong retention of passes (passages, tunnels), road junctions, dominant heights and other important objects and individual sections of the terrain by creating a system of company, platoon strongholds and individual positions of squads with all-round defense. These strongholds and positions should be in fire communication with each other and intercept approaches to passes, roads, trails and other accessible directions.

Ambushes, reconnaissance and patrols are organized between strongholds, various barriers are widely used (especially mine-explosive ones).

Those. units of the brigade (regiment) will be divided into many parts, and this complicates their logistics.

In an offensive in mountainous terrain, a brigade (regiment) will be affected by the limited number of roads and the difficulty of moving along them. A large abundance of dead spaces and hidden approaches will also adversely affect the offensive.

The enemy, on the other hand, will strive to create a layered, multi-tiered defense with a well-organized system of fire and obstacles, and will prepare landslides, blockages.

Of course, the stone ground itself, sudden changes in temperature (day and night), rarefied air, also negatively affect the actions of the attacker.

A brigade in the mountains, as a rule, advances in one direction, the rate of advance will be slower than under normal conditions.

When preparing and organizing military operations, military operations in the mountains, it is imperative to take into account the poor development of the road network, the complexity of preparation, maintenance of supply and evacuation routes, as well as landing sites for helicopters (army aviation). The movement of troops and the organization of the rear outside the roads is practically impossible, and the consumption of fuel and various technical equipment, water increases several times compared to normal conditions.

The conduct of offensive and defensive operations in several isolated directions, and sometimes at a considerable distance from each other, in wider than usual lanes, also negatively affects their rear support.

Offensive actions will be long in duration. For example, in Afghanistan in 1986. it took more than two months to overcome the gorge with a length of 17 km (Zara-Sharan province).

On the fighting brigade, as already mentioned, along with sharp and sudden changes in the weather, there may also be changes in the water regime of rivers (mudflows), the formation of blockages, snow falls, landslides and floods. In high-mountainous regions (over 3000 m above sea level), car engines lose power sharply, fuel consumption is high, adaptation of personnel is necessary (especially drivers fall asleep).

When located on the spot, it is very difficult to equip engineering structures to shelter forces and means of the rear, strong gas contamination, stagnation of explosive agents, shielding the effect of mountains on communications and electronic warfare (according to the experience of Afghanistan, repeater aircraft were always used, they constantly hung in the air, and this is very expensive pleasure). It can be seen from the foregoing that these and other conditions, specific to mountainous regions, make their own adjustments in particular to the logistic support of a brigade (regiment) in mountainous conditions.

The deployment of rear units and subunits in the offensive and defense, carried out in the mountains, is carried out, as a rule, at smaller distances from the front line (front line of defense) than under normal conditions. Rear services are located close to roads (along roads) and trails, if possible, in places that are not subject to mountain and snow collapses, blockages, landslides and floods, of course, taking into account the availability of water and fuel. At the same time, the forces and means of the rear of a brigade (regiment) can be deployed in 2-3 or more areas (in defense, as a rule, in 2 areas).

The brigade (regiment) is, if necessary, reinforced by the connection, and the battalions by the brigade rear, for the autonomy of their actions.

The movement of the brigade's rear in an offensive is usually carried out once or twice a day.

Existing roads and trails are used for supply and evacuation routes in the mountains. It is necessary to take measures to increase their throughput.

At the points of delivery, more sidings and parking lots are used and equipped than under normal conditions, additional control posts are set up, and, accordingly, a greater number of road signs and traffic controllers.

In areas where collapses and landslides are possible, systematic monitoring of the condition of roads is carried out, warning signs are put up, detours and safety fences are arranged. The duty of tractors is organized before steep ascents and descents (in defense, these sectors can be equipped with block devices and winches).

To eliminate blockages and restore destroyed sections, roads, by order (instruction) of the brigade (regiment) commander, the necessary forces and means are allocated. On the routes of supply and evacuation, if possible and necessary, gas stations, as well as medical stations, are organized. It is necessary to have rest points. Heating points must always be organized. The procedure for the use of roads, refueling, rest, heating, medical points is determined by the deputy commander of the brigade (regiment) for rear.

When organizing material support before the start of an offensive and especially combat operations in the defense, as a rule, increased stocks of ammunition, fuel, water, and other materiel are created.

The brigade (regiment) must be provided with mountain equipment, warm clothes, stoves for heating personnel, tents, fuel, and other materials specific to mountain regions.

Particular attention must be paid to brigade units operating in isolation from the main forces of the brigade (regiment). These are mainly subunits operating in bypass detachments; they are provided with material autonomy for the entire period of operations.

When organizing the delivery (delivery) of materiel in the military level, helicopters, tractors with trailers, tractors, horse-drawn and pack vehicles are used more widely than under normal conditions, and in defense and cable cars, in subdivisions for the delivery of materiel, allocated personnel (porters). These porters need to be covered and protected.

Give an example from the experience of combat operations in Afghanistan: June 1985. province of Aliheil. A team of "porters" of 22 people descended from the mountains (checkpoints) to the road for the brought materiel. The lack of their proper protection and cover by fire, as well as their lack of means of communication and the negligent attitude of the deputy battalion commander, who brought the materiel, unloaded them on the ground, he did not provide them (porters) with fire cover from the road, but immediately left. The group was ambushed by "dushmans". As a result, 20 people were irretrievably lost (killed).

To increase the cross-country ability, vehicles must be equipped with snow chains, mountain brakes (pads), and also have sand.

From the experience of military operations in Afghanistan. December 1985 province of Khost. Overcoming the pass "Narai". Without the influence of "dushmans". Snow cover on the road up to 30-50cm. Constantly snowing. A column of two battalions with stocks of materiel. In total - 120 units of various equipment (infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, URAL, tanks, self-propelled guns. Gaz-66 and mainly stocks of materiel for ZIL-130). The pass section is overcome within 4 (four) days. The width of the road on the pass section is 4 m with a slope towards the gorge. The wall of the gorge to the surface of the river is 50-80m. on the opposite side to the gorge there is a sheer wall. Steep ascent and descent. Literally every car was dragged from the pass by hand. At the same time, a tank, self-propelled guns, a tractor, various vehicles, mainly ZIL-130 (13 units), "left" into the gorge. Temperature - 24 0 C. On the pass, the snow turned into a "skating rink" after passing several cars. In order to get traction with the ground, from time to time the formed ice was poured with gasoline and set on fire, and 1-2 cars managed to pass through the "array", and so for 4 days.

Here it must be emphasized that before overcoming steep ascents and descents, it is necessary to carefully check the condition of the brakes on the equipment and the securing of loads.

When organizing technical support for rear services, it must be taken into account that in mountainous conditions there will be increased wear of components and assemblies of equipment, the evacuation of equipment due to the known special conditions of mountainous regions will be very difficult (often in Afghanistan, failed equipment, special teams, simply destroyed, undermined and burned).

When preparing rear equipment for work in the mountains, it must be carefully prepared, the frequency of maintenance should be more frequent in actions in the mountains than under normal conditions. In places of equipment failure, it is necessary to strive to restore its maximum amount.

When organizing medical support in a brigade (regiment), it is necessary to carry out sanitary-hygienic and anti-epidemic measures in advance. The medical posts of battalions operating in separate directions are, as a rule, strengthened at the expense of the forces and means of senior commanders. They must be equipped with special devices for removal (exportation by pack animals), drags, ice axes, "cats", etc.

It is necessary in the brigade and in battalions and companies to carry out special measures to protect personnel from mountain sickness, sunburn and snow blindness, as well as frostbite (especially in winter).

When evacuating the wounded and sick, it is necessary to have stocks of warm linen, sleeping bags and other property so as not to overcool and frostbite them.

Food (hot tea, sandwiches) should be provided at heating points, especially for the wounded and sick.

In the conditions of Afghanistan, Chechnya, helicopters were widely used to evacuate the wounded and sick, the dead.

Accordingly, for them in the areas of medical units it is necessary to prepare landing sites, to have air controllers with communications equipment.

Landing sites must be guarded and covered by fire, it is also necessary to have signal cartridges there, smoke of different colors.

Accordingly, we started talking about protection, protection and defense, this applies in general to all the rear structures of the brigade (regiment).

When organizing this issue, it is necessary to provide for: firstly, the placement of rear controls, rear units in safe places, if possible in existing caves, tunnels, mine workings and other shelters, outside the zones of possible long-term stagnation of contaminated air. Of course, it is necessary to strengthen the camouflage, protection and defense of the rear organs, supply and evacuation routes, as well as radiation, chemical and bacteriological (biological) reconnaissance, especially in the areas of deployment and operations of rear units.

During the battle, it is necessary to avoid the accumulation of forces and means of the rear, especially in gorges, mountain passes, pass areas, and gorges.

It is very important that cover is constantly organized and practically operated, both from the air and from the ground of the rear units (airborne assault forces and retreating detachments, RDGs, VTOs of the enemy will always search for and defeat our rear).

Management of the rear of the brigade and technical support units in the mountains should be organized taking into account the influence of the mountains on the operation of technical means of communication. In these (mountainous) conditions, vehicles (especially helicopters) will be used more widely than usual.

In the desert, the provision of offensive and defensive units is organized and carried out taking into account many features, in comparison with ordinary and other conditions.

In the desert, the road network is limited and of poor quality. Dune sands, especially "moving" dunes, make our directions of movement impassable, besides, wet salt marshes and separate rocky sections of roads. As you know, in the desert there is no water in large areas, also the lack of fuel and building materials, the limited local material and human resources, the increased consumption of fuel and various technical equipment for equipment complicate the logistics of brigade units in battle. In addition, the conduct of combat on a broad front in the offensive, and in defense in several directions, complicates our actions more.

The harmful effect of sand and dust on equipment limits the resource of its action.

For example, at one of the military exercises of the WKVO (1982, the month of July, a tank battalion of 38 tanks and 15 various trucks with supplies of materiel, received the task of making a march from Krasnovodsk, i.e. from the coast of the Caspian Sea to the Kyzyl-Arvat region Only 8 tanks and 9 trucks arrived in the designated area with a big delay in time. There are many reasons, but the main one is that the engines were "jammed" from the abundance of sand in the engine system, and besides, the engines were constantly overheating).

When the enemy uses weapons of mass destruction (especially nuclear weapons), there will be extensive zones of radioactive contamination of the area during ground and air nuclear explosions. The open nature of the terrain will make camouflage difficult. And large expanses of homogeneous terrain will complicate the orientation and shelter of rear units.

The deployment of rear units in battle, in these desert conditions, will also have its own characteristics. The distance from the rear troops will be more remote than under normal conditions. As a rule, rear areas will be located close to water sources.

In this case, the rear of the brigade (regiment) can be dismembered and deployed especially in the offensive in several areas. Battalions, especially units operating in advanced and outflanking detachments, will usually be reinforced in the rear by the brigade (regimental) rear.

In the preparation and maintenance of supply and evacuation routes, along with carrying out general activities, there will be features, such as the installation of stable and clearly visible road signs along the roads, especially indicators of directions to water sources, medical units and other rear facilities of the brigade (regiment), as well as signs indicating the boundaries of loose sands and salt marshes. To directly ensure the movement of marching columns, respectively, the rear units of the brigade (regiment) during their movement, as well as convoys during the supply of materiel and evacuation, as a rule, more often than under normal conditions, units with all-terrain vehicles (tractors), special and entrenching tools and prefabricated road surfaces.

When organizing material support in a brigade (regiment), before the start of hostilities (offensive, defense, march, meeting engagement, etc.), increased stocks of material resources (especially water, fuel, and ammunition) are created. The brigade (regiment) must be provided with various desert-specific materiel. For cooking, products are selected taking into account the lower consumption of water for their processing, meat can be taken in a living form (according to the experience of the war in Afghanistan or purchased from the local population). Canned food and concentrates are widely used. Products in order to avoid contamination (sand, dust) must be in sealed containers (packaging).

Of particular difficulty and concern for the commander and his deputy for logistics is the issue of providing subunits (regimental brigades) with water and solid fuel. (Along with the discovery of thickets of saxaul, by the decision of the commanders, its harvesting can be carried out). As a rule, water and solid fuels are harvested in advance, their maximum reserves are created. Exploration and extraction of water (if possible) is carried out in battle areas.

Strict rationing of water consumption is being introduced, medical control over water quality and compliance with the drinking regime is being strengthened. According to the experience of the war in Afghanistan, drinking water was prepared in advance, i.e. boiled water and made a "decoction" of camel thorn. The drink tones, quickly quenches thirst and has an antiseptic effect. For washing hands, water is abundantly chlorinated, otherwise dysentery or “jaundice” (a disease of dirty hands) threatens.

Provision of water for drinking and other needs is carried out according to a specially developed calculation, which is personally controlled by the deputy. on the rear.

Existing or discovered water sources are subjected to thorough examination, cleaning and, as a rule, are guarded by specially assigned units. Barriers are erected to protect springs from loose sands.

When organizing the delivery of materiel to brigade units, whenever possible, helicopters are used (upon request), as well as highly passable equipment, tracked tractors, tractors with trailers. Vehicles use off-road vehicles. The pressure in the tires of cars can and should be reduced to the required level in sandy areas, depending on the situation.

When organizing technical support for rear services, it is necessary to take into account the wear of equipment, its components and mechanisms from sand. The complexity of operation, as well as the frequency of maintenance, must be reduced.

When organizing medical support, it is necessary to take into account and remember the presence of natural focal diseases in these areas (plague, cholera, jaundice, etc.).

Sanitary-hygienic and anti-epidemic measures must be carried out carefully, with great responsibility.

It is necessary to carry out special measures to prevent personnel from sunstroke (thermal). It is necessary to know the action of the personnel in case of the threat of poisonous snakes (gyurza, cobra, arrow, karakurt, phalanx, scorpion, etc.).

Personnel must be provided with means of protection against midges, mosquitoes (pendyanka) and other insects. Necessary to take measures to protect the eyes and respiratory tract from sand and dust.

Particular attention should be paid in these matters to the wounded and sick, especially during their evacuation.

Medical units of advanced and outflanking detachments, tactical airborne assault forces are being strengthened vehicles for the evacuation of the wounded and sick, as well as medical equipment and personnel.

After providing first aid to the wounded and sick, they must be transferred to shelters that protect them from direct exposure to sunlight.

When organizing the protection, security and defense of the rear, in addition to general measures, provide for:

carrying out on a wider than usual scale of work to camouflage the rear units of the brigade (regiment) using service (camouflage nets), incl. smoke agents;

strengthening all types of reconnaissance (RCBZ), as well as security, defense of the rear, supply and evacuation routes;

A characteristic feature of modern combined arms combat is a large consumption of material resources, including fuel and food, ammunition and shells, clothing, medical and other property. The issues of creating stocks of material resources, their storage and delivery to the unit, providing personnel with food, clothing, medical and other types of property are solved by logistic support - one of the types of support for combat operations of the troops. A feature of logistic support is that it is carried out in full not only during combat operations and exercises, but also during the planned training of troops in peacetime.

Goals, tasks and content of logistics support

The purpose of logistics is to maintain units and subunits in a combat-ready state and create conditions for them to fulfill their assigned combat missions.

Logistics tasks are:

1. Providing units with fuel, food, clothing and other types of property.

2. Providing units with medical equipment, maintaining combat capability and improving the health of personnel.

3. Prevention and elimination of diseases of military animals.

4. Satisfying the needs of personnel in goods and consumer services.

5. Supply of troops with barracks, maintenance of buildings and premises for the accommodation of personnel in good condition.

6. Financing of military formations.

In accordance with the list of tasks solved by logistic support, it is divided into the following types:

1. Material.

2. Medical.

3. Veterinary.

4. Commercial and household.

5. Apartment-operational.

6. Financial.

Logistic support is organized and carried out in accordance with the tasks solved by the units and subunits, the formation order of battle troops and the conditions of the situation on the basis of the decision of the commander of the unit, instructions and orders of senior commanders (chiefs) for logistics.

Consider the content of the types of logistics support:

1. Material support is the main type of logistics support for an air defense unit. Its purpose is the timely and complete satisfaction of the unit's needs for fuel, food, clothing and other materiel.

2. Medical support organized in order to preserve and strengthen the health of personnel, prevent the occurrence and spread of diseases, provide timely medical care to the wounded and sick, evacuate them, treat them and quickly return to duty.

Medical support includes the organization and implementation of medical and preventive, sanitary and hygienic anti-epidemic measures, measures to protect troops from NBC weapons.

Medical assistance to the wounded and sick is divided into:

First medical aid, which can be provided by the military themselves or by a medical instructor;

First aid which the paramedic can provide close proximity from the place of injury;

First medical aid provided by doctors of the MPP (medical center of the regiment) or OMSB (separate medical and sanitary battalion);

Qualified medical care that can be provided by doctors of the OMSB, OMEDO (separate medical unit) or hospitals;

Specialized medical care, which can be provided in large specialized hospitals (the hospital of the Military Medical Academy, the Burdenko Hospital, etc.).

The provision of medical care is associated with the evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield.

The main measures of medical support in the air defense unit are:

Carrying out morning examinations, recording patients and presenting them to the MPP;

Carrying out preventive examinations of military personnel, and first of all, those related to work with microwave devices;

Carrying out medical vaccinations;

Providing military personnel with individual medical kits and others.

According to the state of wartime in anti-aircraft rocket battery There is a post of sanitary instructor.

3. Veterinary support organized in order to maintain the combat capability of personnel, to prevent diseases of military animals. Veterinary support is organized on a divisional scale and above. In the division, the veterinary service is represented by the head of the service and his assistant; there is a veterinary detachment in the district. Since the number of military animals (service dogs, pets of subsidiary farms and military state farms) is small, the main task of the veterinary service is to prevent the spread of animal diseases among the personnel. In this regard, the veterinary support units closely cooperate with the sanitary and epidemiological teams.

4. The purpose of commercial and consumer support is to timely and fully satisfy the needs of personnel in goods and consumer services. To achieve this goal, a network of shops, soldiers' canteens, hairdressers, baths, and laundries is being deployed in parts of the division. The commander of the regiment cannot organize commercial and domestic support on his own, therefore the main burden in this regard is borne by military trade units and rear units of the division (army, district), which perform their duties not only in peacetime, but also in war time.

5. Housing and operational support includes: the withdrawal and procedure for the temporary use of buildings, buildings, premises for the placement of units, units and the supply of troops with barracks and fire equipment, furniture, fuel and other types of services (electricity, water supply, sewerage, etc.). To solve these problems, the regiment has an apartment maintenance service, the head of which reports to the deputy regiment commander for rear services - the head of the rear of the regiment.

6. Financial support includes financial planning and financing. In the regiment, financial support is organized by the head of the financial service, who is personally subordinate to the regiment commander.

Successful solution of logistic support tasks is achieved by:

Clear organization and planning of logistic support;

The high readiness of the rear units of the regiment to ensure the combat operations of the units;

Concentrating the main efforts on providing units and subunits performing the main tasks;

Maintaining the survivability of the rear units during the preparation and during the battle;

The organization of reliable management of the rear units of the regiment in the course of hostilities.

SCIENCE AND MILITARY SECURITY No. 3/2006, pp. 51-54

Modern logistic experienceatvedeniafighting

UDC 623.355.6

Colonel A.A. RODIONOV,

Head of Department of the Research Institute

Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus

I.S. AVERIN,

senior researcher at the Research Institute

Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, candidate of military sciences

The article analyzes and summarizes the experience of organizing logistics support for federal troops Russian Federation(hereinafter - RF) during the first (1994 -1996) and second (1999 - 2001) military campaigns in the North Caucasus region. The combat operations of the federal troops had a number of characteristic features political, operational and tactical character. Therefore, the experience of logistic support of the troops may be of practical interest for the rear of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus).

Held government agency"Scientific Research Institute of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus" analysis of the organization of logistics support of the Joint Group of Forces of the Russian Federation (hereinafter - OGV) based on materials published by the Center for Operational Logistics Research of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, highlighted a number of problems, the solution of which will improve the organization of logistics support for the troops of the Republic of Belarus in operations.

At the initial stage of the operation, the operational (district) link of the rear of the North Caucasian Military District (hereinafter referred to as the North Caucasian Military District) could not fully participate in the support process due to the framed state of its main parts and institutions (automobile, road commandant, bridge). Their additional staffing with personnel, motor transport, road-technical means urgently and at great financial cost had to be carried out at the expense of the forces and means of other districts, as well as the rear of the Center.

Formations, units and subunits arrived in the OGV not only from the North Caucasian Military District, but also from other military districts and fleets with varying degrees equipment and readiness for future activities. Insufficient loading and unloading capacity of individual railway stations in the Volgograd-Mozdok direction (Betonnaya, Prudboy, Kizlyar) did not allow for the timely arrival of formations and units in the designated areas. They arrived at their destination with a delay of 1 - 2 days, which significantly reduced the time for preparing the rear. An analysis of the implementation of mass military transportation shows that insufficient attention was paid to training troops in transportation, instilling practical skills in placing and securing military equipment on railway rolling stock, as a result of which the time for loading trains was 34-38 hours, while the standard was 3-6 hours. In a number of cases, the equipment arrived at the loading station with a significant delay, and some of it was out of order. The data on the time of loading the echelons indicate that the troops did not fit within the established normative time. The same can be said about the unloading of echelons: with the standard indicator of 3-6 hours, military echelons were unloaded for 19-30 hours.

It was very difficult to maintain military roads in operational condition, to organize a road commandant service on them due to the lack of deployed (or at least a reduced composition) road commandant formations and units in the district rear. As a result, the maintenance of supply and evacuation routes, the restoration (building) of bridges over water barriers and on mountain passes was carried out by a combined detachment consisting of representatives of the road evacuation department, road and engineering troops, which were not enough. In this regard, it was often necessary to change the routes of movement of transport vehicles, delaying the delivery of goods.

Dispatching posts were completed at the expense of officers of road depots and other parts of the cadre of the road service of the North Caucasus Military District. The restoration of bridges across the Terek and Neftyanka rivers in the suburbs of Grozny was also organized by the officers of the dormitory (Pyatigorsk) and engineering troops.

An analysis of the supply and consumption of material resources revealed a problem in the organization and possibilities of transporting rear formations and units. Especially during the 1st Chechen campaign, the expenditure of materiel (excluding the maintenance of established stocks) (Fig. 1), as a rule, was not replenished with supplies (Fig. 2), and the leadership of the rear of the RF Armed Forces was forced to attract transport from other districts.

Despite the important role of road transport in the process of delivering materiel to the troops, it was not always effectively used (the coefficient of use of vehicles was 0.31). The reason for this is the untimely organization of the unloading of convoys, the unauthorized use (delay) of district vehicles by military commanders in their own interests, etc.

A significant shortcoming in the management of automobile convoys was that the regular means of communication of individual automobile battalions were morally and physically obsolete. Up to now, the state of automobile parts does not have technical assistance vehicles and wheeled tow tractors, without which it is almost impossible to organize a technical closure of the columns.

Parts airborne troops, having light-duty vehicles (GAZ-66) as part of the rear units, they were unable to independently ensure the maintenance and transportation of increased stocks of materiel, especially ammunition and fuel. It turned out to be impossible to keep part of the reserves on the ground, especially at the final stage of the operation, due to the frequent movements of troops and the constant influence of the enemy. To solve this problem, it was necessary to allocate additional vehicles from the reserve of the chief of rear services of the OGV, to the detriment of the interests of providing other formations and military units.

Such technical means of rear services as field kitchens, mobile bakeries, field facilities for washing personnel and washing linen, refueling equipment with fuel, transporting water and storing food, mounted on a base chassis of low cross-country ability, turned out to be ineffective, bulky and practically unprotected from the effects of mines, pomegranate and small arms. The design features of the GAZ-66, KamAZ, UAZ-452 vehicles, which are equipped with most units and subunits of the rear, lead to the fact that at the time of a car explosion on a mine, drivers receive severe injuries, often fatal. In off-road conditions, it was practically impossible to use vehicles and technical equipment of the rear, mounted on the basis of a low-cross-country chassis: KamAZ-5410 (-5320), MAZ-5337, as well as regular trailers.

An analysis of the provision of the OGV with bread in the field showed that the existing field bakeries developed in the 1950s do not meet the modern requirements of the troops, are morally and physically obsolete, have low productivity, a low degree of mechanization, are inactive and require considerable time to prepare for work (4 -5 o'clock).

The operation of trailer kitchens of the KP-125, KP-130 type and the PAK-200 automobile kitchen in a combat situation showed their unsuitability in terms of their design characteristics (low cross-country ability, low load capacity, insufficient reliability) in muddy and off-road conditions. Great difficulties were also caused by the use of trailer kitchens in the conduct of maneuverable combat operations at the final stage of the operation. Precipitation, dirt, dust storms(due to the impossibility of deploying food items at short stops using regular tents), which greatly complicated the working conditions of the cooks, and also contributed to the occurrence of food poisoning.

The problem of catering for drivers of motorcades and crews of military vehicles was not fully resolved. Leaving for a flight at 7-8 in the morning, drivers were on the road from 5 to 7 hours (and sometimes more) without taking hot food. The crews of combat vehicles did not have regular small-sized means for heating food, in particular, when using dry rations, which in certain periods had to be eaten for 3-7 days. A similar problem arose when preparing hot food from canned and concentrated foods. In addition, the units of the military rear lack modern technical means for storing perishable foodstuffs and bread.

The most acute was the problem of organizing the provision of military units and subunits with drinking water, in the solution of which engineering, chemical, medical and food services took part. Exploration of water sources and the deployment of water points (and subsequently water supply points) were not carried out by the engineering service in advance, and constant medical monitoring of water quality was not carried out. Possibilities of means of transportation drinking water in the rear units were clearly insufficient. Units stationed in the southwestern and southern regions Grozny, were forced to use open sources(due to insufficient number of equipped water sources). As a result, there were cases of hepatitis in servicemen.

For many years, the issue has been with the definition of a single body responsible for the exploration, production, purification and delivery of water. To date, there is an opinion that of all the services dealing with this problem, the food service is responsible for providing water, although it is only the customer of the technical means of storing and transporting water for drinking and cooking.

A lot of complaints from the personnel were caused by the currently used set of combat equipment for a serviceman. Separate samples of clothing and equipment that are on supply are obsolete, uncomfortable to wear, and bulky. So, a hat with earflaps is not worn with a steel helmet, which, moreover, is heavy and does not protect a soldier from a direct hit by bullets and shrapnel. It is almost impossible to put personal belongings, dry rations, ammunition, additional flasks of water, a set of underwear, footcloths and other items necessary for a soldier in a combat situation in a duffel bag. A heavy bulletproof vest from frequent contact with the armor breaks down within a month (plates fall out through wear), the sleeping bag is heavy, and in a folded position it takes up a lot of space. For the storage and transportation of felt boots, rubber boots, fur mittens and other additionally issued property, vehicles in the material support units are not provided by the states.

A serious problem turned out to be bathing and laundry services for personnel and a complex of anti-pediculosis sanitary and hygienic measures. The presence of numerous posts and outposts with personnel of 3-4 people and the frequency of their change once a week required the combined means of washing personnel, washing linen and repairing uniforms. As a result of intensive operation and use of hard water, the special equipment of the disinfection-shower car (hereinafter - DDA) failed within 2-3 months, and the clothing service did not have the strength and means to repair them. The supply of water for washing the personnel was carried out by APCs and automobile tanks for fuel AC-8.5-255B with faulty fuel equipment. When it was impossible to use DDA, boilers and other devices were used to heat water. The washing of personnel was carried out in empty buildings, basements and other premises suitable for these purposes, which made it possible to wash the personnel of one battalion in 8 days. The experience of Chechnya has shown that the facilities available at the military level for washing personnel are functionally, physically and morally outdated and do not meet modern requirements.

An important task entrusted to the rear of the Armed Forces is a set of measures for receiving, processing, identifying and sending the bodies of dead servicemen to burial sites. During the counter-terrorist operation in the Republic of Dagestan and the Chechen Republic (since August 9, 1999), the 522nd Center for the Reception, Processing and Dispatch of the Dead in Rostov-on-Don received, identified and sent to the burial places more than 250 bodies of the dead military personnel. Shipment was made by rail, air and road transport. All measures were taken to reduce the delivery time of the bodies of the dead to the burial sites. Experience has shown that there are many shortcomings in solving this issue.

The experience of actions of the authorities, units and institutions of the rear in the armed conflict on the territory of Chechnya made it possible to develop some scientifically based recommendations and proposals that can be used for their subsequent implementation in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus.

So, when determining the need for material resources for local operations, it should be taken into account that their actual consumption may significantly exceed the existing average daily consumption rates and differ significantly from the planned one. For example, the average daily fuel consumption during the period of hostilities was: for motor gasoline (AB) - 0.4 - 0.45 ref., for diesel fuel (DF) - 0.5 - 0.55 ref., at the rate of AB - 0.22 req. and DT - 0.27 ref. . The increased consumption of AB and DT was associated not only with difficult road conditions, but also with the fact that the engines of combat vehicles were often not turned off for many hours, primarily to heat the personnel, as well as for fear of failure to restart the engines (state batteries was extremely unsatisfactory). The methodology used in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus for calculating the allocated material resources for an operation does not take into account indicators that affect the accuracy of calculations, which in wartime can lead to a decrease in the combat effectiveness of troops. We propose to introduce the following indicators into the methodology for calculating the need for material resources for an operation:

season;

state of technology (degree of deterioration);

state of the battery park;

coefficient of losses and equipment failure.

An analysis of the transport support problems that have arisen in the RF Armed Forces in Chechnya indicates the need to revise the organizational and staffing structures of formations and material support units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus in the direction of increasing their ability to transport materiel, providing equipment with increased payload capacity for wartime and increasing the efficiency of its use. In addition, in the rear central subordination(Department of Transport Troops of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus) in peacetime, it is necessary to have one road commandant and bridge brigade (reduced) with full-time (appointed in advance) security units and appropriate means of communication. Combat formations and units of constant readiness must have a fully equipped rear, and parts of the mobile forces - their own powerful and mobile ground echelon of the rear of the type of combined arms.

Equipping formations and military units of the rear with R-142 (R-140) radio stations will allow organizing supply management, dispatching service and interaction with support units and subunits, traffic police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

It is necessary to take into account the experience of the RF Armed Forces in Chechnya when planning and organizing the transfer of troops and rear services to the conflict area. Units and subunits of the rear should arrive in the designated areas no later than the troops provided, and it is advisable to send representatives of the rear management bodies to these areas in advance, giving them the authority to resolve organizational issues related to placing units on all types of allowances, conducting reconnaissance of deployment areas and other tasks.

The weak point in the initial period of hostilities in Chechnya was the low level of training of junior logistics specialists. Most of them did not have the necessary theoretical knowledge and practical skills to work on special equipment, especially those removed from long-term storage. They had to be trained on the spot, although, as you know, it’s too late to teach in combat conditions, in battle you just need to improve your skills and gain experience. This circumstance requires the adoption of urgent measures to strengthen the training of this category of specialists in all military units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus.

In conditions of budget deficit, when there is practically no revenue new technology, it is necessary to protect the available technical means in every possible way, to extend their service life as much as possible. In the course of hostilities, the loss of rear equipment is inevitable. But everything possible should be done to minimize these losses and ensure the maximum recovery of damaged technical means. In this regard, the practice of creating mobile repair teams for rear services has proven itself to be positive. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus already have experience in the use of such brigades in peacetime.

Properly organized full nutrition of military personnel in any combat situation is one of the important tasks of the commanders of military units and subunits. Experience shows that catering in combat conditions traditional way(preparation of hot food in kitchens from fresh and canned products) should give way to progressive methods that provide for the issuance of individual and group rations. This, although it leads to an increase in the cost of food rations, is quite justified. On the one hand, individual and group food rations, which consist of canned, concentrated products and ready-made lunch dishes that do not require long-term heat treatment, but only heating, were highly appreciated by military personnel in Chechnya for their taste, nutritional composition and energy value. On the other hand, they are convenient for storage, distribution and transportation. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus are working on the production of dry rations of improved configuration for mobile forces and special operations forces at the 554th GTB in the city of Orsha.

It is necessary in the rear of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus to accelerate the creation and adoption of technical means of rear of increased reliability, adapted to difficult road conditions. For example, at present, the RF Armed Forces are developing a fundamentally new mobile bakery in containers with self-loading devices that allow them to be installed and transported by any means of transport. Such a bakery does not require preparatory operations for work, time for deployment and collapse.

In addition, in 2000, a new block-modular type kitchen was developed and accepted for supply to the Russian troops. The design of a block-modular kitchen allows you to cook food not only on kitchen equipment, but also on its individual blocks, using a multifunctional nozzle that runs on diesel fuel, gasoline, gas and - in their absence - on solid fuel. The presence of blocks in the kitchen provides hot food for three or four divisions (up to 50 people each). Thus, the issue of food delivery (from two to three kilometers) is excluded when it is currently cooked in trailer kitchens KP-125 and KP-130. In addition, the new kitchen has a retractable frame dining room in its design, which allows organizing a meal for command staff of units of up to 10 people. The use of similar technical means of logistics in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus will improve the efficiency of the food supply system for troops in peacetime and wartime.

The experience of combat operations in the Chechen Republic, especially when mastering settlements, showed that it is necessary to have life support structures in all military formations, including in the company-platoon link, with the crews of combat vehicles (in addition to the one available with a soldier). To provide the personnel of formations and military units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, it is necessary to introduce small-sized modules (sets) with a set of all life support elements. Provide for the development and inclusion in the timesheets for combat vehicle crews of standard sets of field household items (special tents, air mattresses and sleeping bags, small-sized cooking and kitchen sets, heating equipment and other necessary equipment).

The equipment of personnel deserves special attention: what is available today in the troops does not correspond to the conditions of modern combat. AT initial period The actions of the RF OGV in Chechnya revealed the problem of providing military personnel with such items of clothing as woolen sweaters and balaclavas, rubber boots, sleeping bags. As practice has shown, it is these items of clothing that make it possible to ensure a more comfortable stay of military personnel in the field, and in our opinion, all military personnel of the military units of the ARRB constant readiness should be provided with them.

The experience of the medical service in Chechnya has shown that in regions with a difficult epizootic situation, it is necessary to create additional carry-over stocks of disinfectants, and stocks of biological preparations (vaccines, serums) must be constantly refreshed. To carry out measures for receiving, processing, identifying and sending the bodies of dead servicemen to burial places, the efforts of pathologists, personnel and organizational bodies, lawyers, rear services and other specialists should be combined. All military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus must be provided with personal tokens in advance, it is necessary to create stocks of hygiene bags (fastening covers) for the transportation (transportation) of the bodies of the dead.

The engineering troops of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus should include field water supply units armed with modern facilities extraction and purification of water, and in all parts and organizations of material support - water supply units equipped with high-traffic water tankers of sufficient carrying capacity and providing mechanized discharge (bay) of water.

The experience of Chechnya has shown that the level of working out documents in the military level, the volume of their implementation is much lower than in the operational one. This is due to the fact that the deputy commanders and heads of the rear services are in a single person and, due to the heavy practical workload, are forced to work out the documents in theses and in fragments. It is impossible to fulfill academic requirements for the composition and volume of documents being worked out in real conditions of a combat situation. An analysis of the experience of the management bodies and officials of the rear of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus necessitates the adjustment of the list and forms of documents being worked out towards their simplification and reduction.

In the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, there is a need to integrate the efforts and unify the forces and means of logistic support of the Armed Forces and other power ministries and departments, as well as the relevant control bodies in order to increase the effectiveness of logistic support for formations and units performing combat missions.

The experience gained by formations, units and institutions of the rear of the federal troops of the Russian Federation is very important for the rear of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. The problems faced by the rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are doubly our problems, because technically we are lagging behind Russia. Recently, much attention has been paid to the issue of the development of equipment and weapons by the leadership of the state and the Armed Forces. By learning from the mistakes and miscalculations of our neighbors, we can to some extent compensate for this lag. It is necessary to prepare the rear in advance, in peacetime.

LITERATURE

1. Trunov P.I., Vasiliev Yu.S. Chechen conflict. Origins, development. Tactics of armed formations // Educational method, manual. - MSTU "Stankin": M., 2001.- S. 69.

2. Isakov V.I. Problems of logistic support for the actions of the OGV (forces) during the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation // Report of the VNK: M., 2001. - P. 18.

3. Batyushkin S.A. Actions of combined arms formations and units in armed conflicts // VAF: M., 1997. - S. 189.

4. Logistic support of the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya is spent monthly on 800 million rubles // General economic news: - M. - IA "FINMARKET". - December 10, 1999.

5. Second Chechen War//Independent military review. - M. - 2004. - December 24. - No. 49 (409).

6. Military lessons of the Chechen campaign // Independent military review. - M. - 1997. - No. 3, 5.

7. Kondratov A. The price of war // Arguments and facts. - 1999. - No. 42.

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