Well, friends, I have to admit that the pre-war rhetoric of our leaders has become routine and habitual and smoothly transformed into military rhetoric: During yesterday's meeting "on the situation in the military-industrial complex of Russia and the development of the Armed Forces," Darkest said the following:

"References to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear missile threats [within the framework of the US creation of a global missile defense system] only cover up the true plans, and their true goal is to neutralize Russia's strategic nuclear potential. And thus the desire to gain decisive military superiority with all the ensuing consequences" ( With)

Regarding the response to the aggressive actions of the United States, Putin spoke very clearly:

"We will work on the system missile defense, but at the first stage we will work on strike systems that are able to overcome any missile defense systems "(c)

It would seem that nothing new, Putin has paid attention to this topic before, for example, at the Valdai Forum:

“Recently, the first US missile defense tests were carried out in Europe. What does this mean? We, and the whole world, were once again deceived: under the pretext of protecting Europe from the nuclear missile threat from Iran, the fundamental basis of modern international security, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense, was destroyed. defense", from which the United States withdrew unilaterally. "(c)

An important addition. To realize the extreme importance of the topic, one must understand what global missile defense is in general, and what is the global missile defense "Aegis" in particular. I'll put the explanation under the spoiler, because it takes up a lot of space:

First, the theory.

The insoluble problem of creating a global missile defense system by one of the potential adversaries is that, while protecting the territory of the state deploying the specified system ( groups of Mrs.), strategic missile defense paradoxically lowers the level of its (state) security, since it inevitably entails the possibility of an escalation-upgrade of any conflict to a nuclear war.

The mechanism of this paradox works as follows:

1. The missile defense system cannot be absolute: there is always a possibility that a certain number of warheads will overcome missile defense.
2. The fewer missiles launched by the enemy, the higher the effectiveness of missile defense.
3. Thus, in the event of a confrontation, the side that first created an effective missile defense system has an incentive to strike first and disable the maximum number of enemy missiles before they are launched.
4. A side that does not have anti-missile defense, but is aware of the enemy's existence of such, takes it into account in its plans and calculations.
5. The side that does not have a global missile defense system understands that the enemy (see paragraph 3) is tempted to strike first.
6. Accordingly, the side that does not have missile defense also has an incentive to strike first in order to get ahead of a possible preventive strike by the enemy.
7. As a result of this logical cycle, the likelihood of any conflict escalating to a global nuclear war is greatly increased due to mutual distrust and mutual fears of a first strike by the enemy.
8. Thus, the creation by one of the parties of a global missile defense system undermines the foundations of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction - deterrence from aggression by the realization that the attacked one will still be able to respond with a powerful nuclear strike.

Now the harsh reality:

Despite this mortal danger, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the "non-development of global missile defense agreement" and, at the moment, has actually built and deployed the global Aegis missile defense system.

What is the AEGIS global missile defense system?

The Aegis global missile defense system was designed and built (deployment and debugging of the system components is currently being completed) with one goal - to intercept Russian retaliatory ballistic missiles that were not destroyed by a US preventive nuclear strike, thereby making it impossible for the United States to inflict "unacceptable damage" on a US preventive nuclear strike. .

Again. The technical feature and essence of the global Aegis missile defense system is that it will work effectively and successfully only in one case - when America launches a preventive nuclear strike against Russia.

The main part of the Aegis missile defense system is located on the warships of the US Navy.

Ticonderoga-class URO cruiser with Aegis anti-missiles on board:

More than 100 US Navy ships and their satellites are equipped with Aegis system components. For example, one cruiser URO type "Ticonderoga" has 120 cells for launching missiles (missile defense and others).

The naval component of missile defense is complemented by ground-based systems.

According to the "European missile defense plan", the first Aegis missile defense systems (Standard SM-3 Block IB antimissiles) will be deployed in Romania in the current 2015. The second complex, with advanced missiles, is planned to be deployed in Poland by 2018. Since January 2012, an American missile defense radar has already been operating in Turkey.

Important. Ground components of the Aegis missile defense system are a dual-purpose combat system: in addition to performing the declared "anti-missile tasks", it can be (and WILL be) used as a high-precision weapon for delivering a first strike on the territory of the European part of Russia, the missile's flight time to Moscow is 10 minutes.

Thus, by 2018 the Aegis system will be deployed in full, and the Evil Empire for some time (about 2 - 5 years, subject to the existing dynamics of financing and development of the military-industrial complex + Russian Armed Forces) will have a very great temptation to test its capabilities in real conditions ...

Conclusion.

Perhaps no one is aware, but all normal people who can analyze the situation and understand the signals very clearly - the deployment of the AJIS system, sooner or later, but inevitably, will lead the world to a global nuclear war, and the demonstrative tests of the AJIS system at our borders significantly shift the point of no return to side "early" ...

I hope now you, friends, realize why the Darkest One does not share the so-called. brainless jingoistic patriots that AEGIS is a meaningless, mock prodigy for sawing Amer's budget and why our President expresses serious concern about the US deployment of a global missile defense system ...

So, I return to yesterday's theses of Putin.
It's only at first glance that the Dark One didn't say anything new. In fact, unlike his previous general and, I'm not afraid to use the word, enlightening statements on this and related topics, this time the President SET A SPECIFIC TASK to his subordinates.

For those in the tank. I understand all these numerous signals and statements in such a way that the long-term "quiet" talks on US missile defense did not produce positive results, and Putin made some FINAL decision.

What can Russia oppose to the US global missile defense Aegis?
Of course, there is no analogue of such a system - this is impossible for many reasons.
The answer, without options, will be a quantitative build-up of hard-to-kill highly mobile ICBMs (Poplar, YARS, Rubezh, in the long term BZHRK "Barguzin", etc.) - this will keep hot Washington heads in the cold.

And this means that the carefully hushed term "arms race" is once again relevant to us. And, which is typical, we, as has already happened in recent history, once again have no money for the "arms race".

Therefore, I am afraid that by the time the Aegis system and other American nishtyaks are fully deployed, the mentioned means of our retaliatory strike will not be produced and put on the database enough to cause "unacceptable damage" to the United States, which attacked us according to their favorite concept of "disarming strike".

Therefore what? Therefore, logically, we (without waiting for the complete depletion of our resources) may well be the first to launch a nuclear strike on the United States, which will negate all the advantages gained by the United States through the deployment of Aegis missile defense system, because this system is expected to work well only in the event of a strike against Russia "disarming strike". If anything, our new military doctrine provides for such a development of events.

Just do not, calming yourself, squeal and yell that "this is impossible, and we will never do this."
The logic of war, friends, often dictates very cruel and unpopular decisions.
Believe me: no one will sit on their ass evenly and indifferently watch how "grinning, approaching you with knives" (c).
Putin is definitely not going to sit...

So, friends, you can, of course, persuade yourself and pray that everything will be fine. But, the harsh reality dictates: it is better not to relax and prepare for a nuclear cataclysm.

PS. To be honest, I don’t understand the delight of Russia’s enemies about all these really deadly maneuvers by the United States - after all, our enemies mainly live in Europe, and the AEGIS missile defense system, despite assurances of “European security”, is focused solely on protecting the United States, certainly not not Europe. Europe, with a nuclear batch, will be burned to the ground, despite the missile defense points ...

So, friends, the password is the same: we hope for the best, we prepare for the worst.

At present, strategic weapons are understood as a system of weapons consisting of three components (triad). Ground grouping(NG) are intercontinental (ICBMs) with nuclear warheads and a firing range of over 5500 km. Maritime grouping(MG) are ballistic missiles of submarines (SLBMs) ​​with nuclear warheads and any firing range. Aviation group(AG) are heavy bombers (TB) with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) with nuclear warheads and a range of over 600 km or with nuclear bombs.

Professor of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Doctor of Technical Sciences, laureate of the USSR State Prize Yury Grigoryev talks about the relationship of these three components and their difference from conventional weapons.

Modern strategic weapons

Exist five key differences strategic weapons from conventional weapons.

1. Conventional weapons are designed for warfare. Strategic weapons are designed not to conduct, but to prevent nuclear war.

2. The performance characteristics of conventional weapons are a state secret and are carefully hidden from foreign states so that in peacetime a potential enemy could not take the necessary measures to counter these characteristics in a timely manner in the event of a war, and at the beginning of the war they would come as a complete surprise to him.

The tactical and technical characteristics of strategic nuclear weapons, on the contrary, are brought to public attention so that the potential adversary clearly understands what awaits him if he unleashes a nuclear war. The only secret is the technology of manufacturing strategic nuclear weapons.

3. In informational materials about conventional weapons, various kinds of legends are sometimes used, aimed at disorienting a potential enemy in terms of tactical and technical characteristics, numerical strength, locations and other parameters of our conventional weapons. Such disinformation is categorically unacceptable in information materials about strategic weapons, since it can lead to an inadequate reaction of the opposing side, which can result in unpredictable consequences.

4. In peacetime, military experts carefully study possible theaters of military operations, on the basis of which they draw conclusions about the types and types of conventional weapons needed to conduct combat operations in these regions. With regard to strategic weapons, such studies are meaningless, since, in view of the intercontinental firing range, the entire globe is the sphere of possible use of strategic weapons.

5. From the standpoint of conventional wars, politicians and military experts in peacetime predict possible options development of political and economic situations in order to determine the most likely enemy for the near future, assess its military potential and take all necessary measures to strengthen its defense capability in the event of a military clash.

From the standpoint of the concept of nuclear wars, such forecasting is meaningless. In the development of strategic weapons, we must always orient ourselves as a standard towards the state with the most powerful nuclear potential, regardless of what kind of relations we have with it at the present stage. It is currently the United States of America.

This does not mean at all that we constantly regard the United States as an enemy, and, moreover, it does not depend on what the presidents, politicians or experts say or sign. If tomorrow the most powerful strategic weapons are suddenly at People's Republic China or, for example, some South American state, then we will have to immediately reorient ourselves to this new standard.

Ways to use strategic weapons

Exist three ways of possible global use of strategic weapons.

1. First nuclear strike , the purpose of which is the destruction of all strategic weapons of the enemy, in order to exclude, thereby, any possibility of their delivering a retaliatory nuclear strike.

But a major nuclear power that has been attacked will always retain some of its strategic weapons to strike back, after which the aggressor side will find itself in approximately the same position as its victim.

Therefore, only a madman can deliver the first nuclear strike against a state possessing nuclear weapons. But in 1945, US President G. Truman demonstrated to the whole world how to easily and simply deliver a nuclear strike on a non-nuclear state, when he ordered nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, since he firmly knew that there would be no retaliatory strike from the Japanese side.

Who knows what our fate would have been if the leadership of the USSR had not taken emergency measures to create nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Pentagon had quite a few plans for a nuclear attack on the USSR in those years, but the appearance of strategic weapons in our country prevented a war.

2. Counterstrike , which is produced when a signal is received from the missile attack warning system (SPRN), i.e. during the alleged flight of enemy missiles, but before the moment when the explosions of their nuclear warheads actually began.

At the same time, it is assumed that our missiles will launch and leave the positional areas before the enemy warheads approach these areas, and the enemy, who has actually fired at the already empty launch silos, receives almost simultaneously a nuclear strike on his military and industrial facilities.

This is an extremely dangerous concept, since the signals of a nuclear attack from the early warning system can simply be erroneous as a result of technical failures in the system, and the leadership of the country that has been subjected to a nuclear attack has clearly not enough time to make a decision.

So, if the enemy struck ballistic missiles ground-based, it's only about 25 minutes, which will be distributed approximately as follows:

- 5 minutes to trigger the early warning system (EWS);
- 5 minutes for the analysis and assessment by the military of the reliability of the information received from the early warning system and a report to the highest official of the state - the President;
- 10 minutes for consultations of the President with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense;
- 5 minutes for the President to issue a command to conduct a retaliatory strike.

But if the enemy strikes with sea-based missiles located not far from our shores, and if these missiles also fly along flat trajectories, then the flight time will be reduced to 15 minutes, and the President simply will not have time to give any orders to launch a retaliatory strike.

But the most important thing is not in this, but in the fact that the President cannot be one hundred percent sure of the reliability of the information received from the early warning system. Thus, according to the US Center for Defense Information, from 1977 to 1984, US missile attack warning systems generated 20,784 false signals about an attack on the United States.

Most of the false alarms were routine and easily brushed aside, but some of them were serious enough from the American point of view to start prelaunch preparations. According to von Hippel et al. (Scientific American), similar situations occurred in Russia, which was the subject of consideration in the US Congress.

If the information from the early warning system turns out to be false, then the President's order to launch a retaliatory strike automatically turns into an order to launch the first strike, but not against the mines, as it should be with a normal first strike, but against the cities, since the mines are considered empty .

What happens next does not require much explanation. A state that did not attack us turns into nuclear dust, and the retaliatory strike of all its surviving missiles launched in a retaliatory strike turns us into the same nuclear dust.

Thus, although the technical level of modern strategic weapons, in principle, allows a retaliatory strike, but the concept of such a strike puts the country's top leadership in an extremely difficult position before having to make a decision of an unusually high level of responsibility in the face of an acute shortage of time and possible technical malfunctions in the early warning system or errors operators.

This does not exclude the possibility of an inadequate assessment of the situation by the head of the allegedly attacked state and the adoption by him of a decision leading to a worldwide catastrophe. Therefore, any kind of reasoning about the power of our strategic weapons in a retaliatory strike is meaningless and dangerous.

3. A retaliatory strike on the cities and industrial centers of the aggressor inflicted by ICBMs and SLBMs, preserved after the first nuclear strike by the enemy. At the same time, the decision on retaliatory actions should be made even during the flight of enemy missiles, but the retaliation strike itself should begin only after the first explosion of the enemy warhead, which eliminates the danger of an accidental war due to a false warning.

The technical basis for an effective retaliatory strike is, first of all, the high survivability of strategic weapons, which ensures that the combat capability of such a number of missiles after an enemy attack is sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy.

All efforts should be directed towards technical support the possibility of realizing a guaranteed powerful retaliatory nuclear strike in any development of the situation, with any means of attack by the aggressor. And any aggressor must be firmly aware of this.

Any concealment of our capabilities to ensure the survivability of our strategic missiles in the face of a nuclear or any other attack, allegedly in the interests of preserving state secrets, is categorically unacceptable, just as any unconfirmed advertising of some supernatural capabilities of our missiles is unacceptable.

The enemy must know our capabilities, and they must be preserved. Only this will keep him from ill-conceived decisions. In case the leaders of the state, who have the right to order a retaliatory strike, are destroyed or isolated by the first strike of the enemy, or government communication channels are disrupted, a backup system was created in the USSR called, which in the Western press is called "dead hand" (" dead hand).

This system makes it possible to guarantee retaliation even in the event that an enemy attack put our leadership out of action before it had time to issue an order for retaliatory action. The Perimeter system is designed to automatically and autonomously deliver a combat order to start in retaliation to ground-based missiles, strategic missiles and strategic bombers.

The structure of this system includes highly protected mines with command missiles placed in them, as well as equipment for analyzing the situation. A transmitter is installed in the head part of the command missile, which transmits commands to start during the flight of the head part, and corresponding receiving devices are mounted on the mines of combat missiles, ships and aircraft.

The decision to launch a command rocket and bring the team to the launch to the rockets is made by the Perimeter system independently based on the results of a comprehensive analysis of information coming from numerous sensors. The first launch of a command rocket with the equivalent of a transmitter was successfully carried out on December 26, 1979.

In the course of flight tests, the developed complex algorithms for interfacing all systems involved in the launch were tested, the possibility of providing the rocket with a given flight path for the rocket warhead with transmitters, the operation of all service systems of the warhead in the normal mode, and the correctness of the adopted technical solutions was confirmed.

Flight tests of the command rocket were successfully completed in March 1982. In January 1985, the Perimeter system was put on combat duty. Thus, each side is trying to have such a structure and level of protection of strategic nuclear forces that, in the event of an enemy nuclear missile attack on its launchers and position areas, such a number of strategic missiles are guaranteed to survive and maintain combat readiness, which is sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor.

Survivability of strategic missile systems

The survivability of missile systems is their ability to maintain their performance characteristics in the face of enemy action. There are four fundamentally possible directions for ensuring the high survivability of strategic missile systems, which ensure a guaranteed retaliatory strike.

1. Ensure the survivability of stationary silo missile systems by increasing the strength of the launch silo, improving the missile shock absorption system, installing protection against penetrating radiation, electromagnetic radiation and other damaging factors nuclear explosion.

But there are objective limits to such improvements. With a ground explosion of a nuclear charge with a capacity of 0.5 megatons, a funnel with a diameter of about 300 meters is formed, so that with the accuracy of firing enemy missiles commensurate with the radius of the funnel, no improvements will help.

2. Deprive the enemy of reliable knowledge of the exact coordinates of targets, which can be done in the following four ways:

- mix launchers with combat missiles among a large number of false launchers with missile simulators and constantly change the location of real launchers among false ones, but such a scheme cannot be implemented, since the number of launchers and their coordinates are stipulated by the current Treaties

- move mobile launchers according to a random law in camouflaged zones, for example, underground tunnels, thereby forcing the enemy to consider the entire zone (tunnel) as a target, i.e. forcing him to switch from shooting at points to shooting at areas, but this is a very expensive scheme

- relocate missile systems according to a random law, placing them on mobile, for example, unpaved or railway vehicles. This scheme was implemented in our ground-based mobile (railway and soil) based missile systems.

- constantly move missile systems, placing them, for example, on surface ships or submarines. Placement on surface ships is prohibited by the current Treaties, and placement on submarines is implemented (USA, Russia, France, Great Britain, China)

3. Get out of the way safe distance, i.e. change the location of mobile launchers with missiles after the launch of enemy missiles upon receipt of a signal about this from . In principle, one can imagine a ground-based mobile launcher that, along a good road at high speed, goes to a safe area, but the huge costs of building an extensive network of first-class unpaved or railways, bridges and other engineering structures make this option unrealistic.

It is most expedient to use an aircraft for this purpose, which, together with the missiles placed on it, would be at the airfield in a state of high combat readiness and, a few minutes after receiving a signal from the early warning system, would be able to take off and leave for a remote safe zone, where it would stay for long time, waiting for further developments of the situation.

The main advantage of this option is insensitivity to possible errors of the early warning system, since the launch of missiles from the aircraft is carried out only after additional analysis of the real situation and receipt of the appropriate command, and if the alarm turns out to be false, the aircraft simply returns to the airfield. This significantly reduces the possibility of erroneous actions and makes it possible to transfer the right to make a decision on the take-off of aircraft with missiles to lower authorities.

In the United States, to confirm the possibility of launching ballistic missiles from an aircraft, several full-scale launches were carried out, in which the ballistic missile was removed in a horizontal position from the aircraft parachute system and, after the rocket took a vertical position, the first stage engine was started, the parachute fired back, and the rocket continued its normal flight.

We also carried out the necessary research, but this direction - the creation of air-to-ground ballistic missiles (ASGM) - did not receive further development, since it was prohibited by the SALT-2 and START-1 treaties. However, at the present time, due to the expiration of these agreements, all paths to the creation of the SKRM are open.

4. Intercept most of the enemy's missiles or their warheads on their flight paths and destroy or deflect them from their intended aiming points, thereby retaining a significant portion of one's own missiles sufficient to deliver an effective retaliatory strike. The interception of strategic missiles and warheads on their flight paths is the task of the missile defense system.

conclusions

1. Strategic stability is ensured not by the numerical equality of strategic weapons, but by the equal opportunities of the parties to guarantee the infliction of unacceptable damage on the enemy in a retaliatory strike in any development of the conflict.

2. Strategic stability is based on two specific human traits: distrust of another person and fear of retribution. The world has been balancing on these two pillars for decades, maintaining the so-called strategic balance.

3. Only absolute confidence in the inexorable inevitability of one's own death as a result of a retaliatory nuclear strike is guaranteed to keep any aggressor from delivering a first strike and save the world from nuclear madness.

4. Making the main bet on a retaliatory strike is unacceptable, and none of the sane specialists makes such a bet. Otherwise, why then are we building highly protected mines and creating mobile missile systems? With a stake only on a retaliatory strike, missiles could be installed directly in an open field, without any protection.

5. All our efforts should be aimed at creating strategic weapons that remain combat-ready under conditions of a nuclear and non-nuclear attack by the enemy and capable of delivering a guaranteed powerful retaliatory strike in any development of the situation, including when the aggressor has a deployed missile defense system.

A single nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States will kill between 70 million and 82 million people in the United States, The National Interest reported, based on data from a book by Georgetown University professor Matthew Kroenig. At the conclusion of his work, the scientist noted that Washington should not reduce the number of warheads, because such a step could increase the number of victims. "Storm" understands how many Russians can suffer from a nuclear strike from the United States, and also whether such calculations make sense at all.

Among American scientists dealing with issues of nuclear disarmament and mutually assured destruction, the concept of "second strike" has become quite popular. It states that the United States, in the event of the inevitability of a full-scale war with the use of weapons mass destruction must first strike at military installations and infrastructure. If the enemy launches nuclear missiles at cities in response, the US should have enough warheads to counterattack. That is why scientists, including Professor Kroenig, are calling for no reduction in the United States nuclear arsenal.

In the United States, 34 people live in an area of ​​one square kilometer. More than 80% of the population lives in cities, concentrated mainly in the eastern part of the country. Not surprisingly, in the event of a nuclear attack, the United States could lose a third of its population.

In the case of Russia, everything seems to be different: the population density in it is 8.58 people per square kilometer. However, the Russian Federation and the United States are more similar to each other than it seems. In Russia, the bulk of the population is concentrated in the west of the country, about 75% live in large cities. Potential targets that American missiles can fly to are distributed throughout the territory. It is unlikely that at least one region will remain without “attention”, but the main blow will fall on the European part. All this will lead to numerous losses, and this is known to all nuclear powers.

“I can’t say what models the author used (Matthew Kroenig. - Note. “Storm”). If we extrapolate his data and take into account that the population in the Russian Federation correlates with the United States approximately in a proportion of one to two, the numbers are likely to be similar, ”Nikolai Kostikin, an expert at the Bureau of Military-Political Analysis, told Storm.

Thus, it is possible to estimate very roughly and approximately the number of victims from a nuclear strike: from 35 to 49 million Russians will die. About 78% of the population is concentrated in the west of the Russian Federation. Even in the "best" case, this part of Russia will lose more than 27 million people: the population of 12 largest cities in the European part of the country combined. in Siberia and Far East almost eight million people will die.

Image: © Daily Storm

Of course, the victims will not be distributed among the largest cities, because the main goal of the first nuclear strike is not to kill as many people as possible, but to destroy the very possibility of a retaliatory or second strike. “Here it is more correct to speak not about the quantity, but about the quality of the victims. All means of application have priority goals. These are primarily missile launch silos, military objects , big cities, large industrial enterprises, dams. If power engineers, military, governing bodies die, if they are destroyed objects of generation and transmission of electricity - the state will be destroyed irreversibly,” Kostikin noted.

More and more victims will not only be due to radiation and climate change after such terrible pollution of the atmosphere. Lack of electricity in the event of, for example, falling into a nuclear power plant can lead to the loss of food supplies, because the industrial refrigerators where they are stored will stop working.

Image: © Daily Storm

After the radioactive dust settles, the survivors will be in for the last unpleasant surprise, because of which it will become useless to count the number of victims. “An exchange of nuclear strikes on such a scale is likely to lead to the so-called nuclear winter effect, that is, such pollution of the atmosphere that the sun's rays will no longer reach the Earth's surface in an amount sufficient to heat it. There will come a global ice Age, which will kill all living things, and evolution will begin anew. Perhaps again from the simplest organisms, ”said Kostikin. Experts from the Bureau of Military-Political Analysis added that tectonic changes should also be expected. For example, hitting a supervolcano located in Yellowstone Park in the USA can cause large-scale and strong earthquakes on the planet, which will also lead to death of people.

Colonel-General Viktor Esin, ex-head of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, told Storm about the same. “Reputable scientists, including laureates Nobel Prize, they say that when more than a thousand nuclear charges are detonated on each side, life on Earth may stop,” the military said. In the arsenals of both Russia and the United States, there is such a quantity, and even more.

“In the event of a full-scale nuclear exchange, neither the US nor Russia will no longer exist. Calculating how many cities will suffer and there will be victims is a thankless task. After nuclear strikes, it will be impossible to exist on this earth - neither on the territory of the United States, nor on the territory of Russia, ”Esin noted.

An alternative opinion is offered by the American entrepreneur Allen Hall, who has worked for almost 30 years in the rocket and space industry. When asked in 2017 about the consequences of a nuclear war, he explained that the calculations of the “nuclear winter effect” were made taking into account the fact that the charges would explode with a yield of more than one megaton of TNT. In addition, it was taken into account that there are many flammable objects in cities. Now, according to Hall, there is neither one nor the other. The entrepreneur also denies the very concept of "mutual assured destruction", because after the reduction of armaments under the START-1, START and START-3 treaties, Russia and the United States have an insufficient number of nuclear charges left.

Since mid-2017, more and more publications have appeared that the United States should withdraw from international treaties on nuclear disarmament. Moscow is increasingly accusing Washington of non-compliance with the terms of the INF Treaty and START-3. The rhetoric gets tougher every time.

However, all this is nothing more than words. Treaties on the reduction of offensive arms are needed not only to reduce the number of nuclear warheads. Under the terms of the agreements, Moscow and Washington constantly exchange information about each other's arsenals. The parties do not want to refuse this. “Uncertainty will arise, which is not beneficial for us or the United States. The risk of an unintentional unleashing of a world war is increasing. The latest US nuclear policy review states that they are ready to extend START-3 until 2024 if the other side agrees,” Colonel General Yesin told Storm.

Photo: © flickr.com/Michael Kotter

However, Nikolai Kostikin, an expert at the Bureau of Military-Political Analysis, believes that articles about the US nuclear arsenal are published in the interests of entrepreneurs in the military-industrial sector. “Shots in the temple can be at least one, at least two, at least three. The result will be the same. Most likely, the frequency of such statements indicates that large orders for the American military-industrial complex are being lobbyed,” Kostikin noted.

There is no need to fear the cancellation of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. However, it is impossible to stop talking about the consequences of a nuclear war. Publications like the article in The National Interest will still appear, and this is good: if both sides know how many victims the conflict can turn into, hardly anyone will dare to allow it.

Mexico0 23-08-2013 02:52

Kind everyone..

In the ward, we often discuss how to fight off sadomite aliens, whether an asteroid will fly past when global cooling / warming comes, we tell our dreams about a nuclear war, but we don’t always imagine what can be said at all nearby, there is a danger no less terrible, no less global , more real for all of us as residents of one country, one state, one people.

We read in science fiction books about nuclear wars, but how often do we imagine figures, scales, data even remotely close to reality?

In this topic, I will show you a small part of one document, namely, some calculations and plans, calculations made not during the Cold War, but quite recently.
Which of our cities are possibly planning / planning to strike, at what time, what losses and based on what they calculate.
I think it will be interesting, especially considering recent events in the world.

My translation, do not throw stones, translated as far as time, patience and strength allowed.

Immediately a huge request to all those living in the cities that have been mentioned and not mentioned in this document, not to write, not to argue, not to discuss, not to spread about how, where, when, what production, civil defense, utilities, various objects, social AND ECONOMIC, CRIMINOGENIC LEVEL ARE, IN WHAT STATE AND OTHER OTHER EVEN SEEMS TO YOU HAVE NO VALUE, VALUE? THINGS AND DETAILS.

ALL THIS CAN BE USEFUL TO OUR POTENTIAL "FRIENDS".

US ATTACK ON RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR FORCES.

Calculation of an attack scenario on Russia using land-based and sea-based strategic missiles to deliver from 1124 to 1289 warheads with a capacity of 294.9 and 320.6 megatons,
depending on the time of year, shows that the use of 1289 warheads will result in a number of casualties from 11 to 17 million people, including 8 to 12 million dead.

As of mid-2001, Russia has 360 operational ICBM bunkers and 52 interconnected command and control bunkers distributed across six zones: Kozelsk, Tatishchevo, Uzhur, Dombarovskiy, Kartalay, and Aleysk.
These zones line up in a 3700 km arc from the west of Moscow to the east of Siberia.
We, Russia, will have to dismantle many of these bunkers according to agreements within the framework of START.

Figure number and comments go BELOW the picture.

Figure 4.1
360 active (red) and 711 dismantled (blue) missile silos in Russia and the former Soviet Union. Some were in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

US military analysts have calculated that to seriously damage a Russian bunker, an overpressure explosion of 10,000 to 25,000 pounds per square inch may not be enough.

The fortress of Russian bunkers has a significant impact on the planning of the war by American nuclear forces.

While ground explosions provide a higher chance of destroying bunkers, they also have a wider impact. Achieving a significant probability of destroying a bunker requires at least one MX warhead, or one W88, in the bunker, especially for SS-11/19 III-G type MOD mines. To increase the likelihood of serious damage, two of these warheads per bunker are required.

Figure 4.3 Double hit of W87 and W88 warheads on the Russian SS-18 and SS-11/19 mine depending on the height of the explosion.

Figure 4.4
A strike on all of our active ICBM launchers. This takes into account the calculation of winds typical for June. Radiation doses are given for the first two days after an attack on an unprotected population.
Total losses of 16 million fatalities.
More than 175,000 square kilometers will be contaminated with radioactive fallout to such an extent that the probability of death of the unprotected population is 50%

Figure 4.7
Monthly dynamics of losses upon impact on our ICBM bunkers. Wind speed and direction are taken into account.

W87 warheads for each of the ten SS-24 and 20 SS-27 silos (also assuming they are type III-G MOD), and a combination of W87 and W88 (Trident II) warheads for 180SS-18 silos (assuming they apply to type III-F).
US strikes on Russian mines use 500 W87 warheads (all available) and 220 W88 warheads (with a total yield of 250,000 kilotons).

They calculated that 93% of the SS-19, SS-24 and SS-27 mines would be severely damaged (167 out of 180 mines) and 94% of the SS-18 mines (169 out of 180 mines) would also be severely damaged.
Only 24 mines will not be seriously damaged.
The attack uses 500 W87 warheads, equivalent to all MM III missiles, converting to W87 monoblock missiles, with improved accuracy to 91 meters.
The attack also uses about half of the available W88 warheads - slightly more than the maximum number of warheads that can be deployed on board a single Trident.

Figure 4.8
Monthly dynamics of losses upon impact on our ICBM mines. Achievement of the targets of 80% of warheads and shelters in the form of typical residential buildings is taken into account. Wind speed and direction are also taken into account.

Figure 4.9
Victims as a result of a combination of strikes on cities:
Aleysk - 28.5 megatons; Dombarovskiy-31.2 megatons; Kartaly - 26.6 tons; Kozelsk-36 tons; Tatishchevo - 72 megatons, Uzhur - 49.4 megatons.

Figure 4.11
Kozelsk. Calculated for the month of June. The estimated dose is given for the unprotected population. Total loss of 16,100,000 people, 13,300,000 of which were fatal.

Mine strikes pose a far greater threat to Russian civilians and the environment than attacks on the other seven categories of targets that make up Russia's nuclear forces.

Figure 4.4 shows the results of MAO-NF strikes on all active Russian mines, assuming the most likely winds in June and a 50 percent shot split for all weapons.
The fallout has spread over 175,000 square kilometers and threatens some 20 million Russian civilians.

Recall that the purpose of the attack is to destroy 360 Russian missile silos.
Our conclusions about losses from radioactive fallout depend on weather conditions, shelter of the population, and division of warheads.
To evaluate these changes, we calculated 288 possible attack scenarios:
For twelve months of the year, 83 weather conditions, 94 types of shelter. 288 calculations for each of 360 mines.

The number of victims from radioactive fallout ranges from 4.1 million to 22.5 million.[
people in the absence of shelter, and from 1.3 to 15.1 million if all
affected people could remain inside residential or high-rise structures for at least two
days after the attack (see Figure 4.5).

Calculations using the assumption that there is no shelter illustrate the total number of civilians at risk.
Assuming no shelters, the death toll from radioactive fallout ranges from 3.2 million to 17.6 million.
If all victims can remain inside residential or high-rise structures for at least two days after the attack, then the death toll drops to between 0.8 million and 3.8 million (see Figure 4.6).

A large difference in the number of victims at a given level in the shelter depends primarily on the monthly change in wind direction and speed.

Figure 4.7 shows this change in losses per month under conditions of a 50 percent split rather than sheltering the population, and fig. Figure 4.8 shows this loss change per month assuming a split between 80 percent and residential shelters.
We find the maximum number of victims in the month of June (see figures 4.7 and 4.8).

This month, fallout winds blow from the Kozelsk zone directly towards Moscow.

Figure 4.8. The death toll in June is not much higher than for other months, as the assumption of a residential shelter limits the deadly area to just outside of Moscow.
The numbers 4.9 and 4.10 show how the number of casualties and casualties depends on the specific area of ​​the missile attack.

While significant seasonal fluctuations exist, an attack on two zones in European Russia (Kozelsk and Tatishchevo) will result in more casualties, orders of magnitude more than an attack on Siberia, due to the larger population and density.
The numbers 4.11 and 4.12 show close-up the consequences of attacks on the Kozelsk zone near Moscow and the Tatishchevo zone, as well as missiles on the Volga.

Figure 4.13 provides a close-up of the aftermath of a model attack on Siberia, showing the infestation of large areas of Kazakhstan.

Figure 4.12.
Tatishchevo. Calculated for December. Doses are calculated for the population sheltered in multi-storey buildings. For these inputs, the total loss is 450,000, including 270,000 fatalities.

Figure 4.13
Kazakhstan. Attack on missile silos in Dombarovskiy and Kartaly. This calculation takes into account winds for February. The dose is calculated for the unprotected population. For these input parameters, the total casualties are 977,000, including 745,000 dead.
Population density, shown in grey, overlaid on Fallout models.
60.000 square kilometers Northern Kazakhstan will be contaminated with radioactive fallout to such an extent that half of the unprotected people will die.

Quantitative estimates of damage and casualties depend on weather conditions and our assumptions regarding the shelter of the population and the division of US warhead shares.
To assess these weather conditions and uncertainty, we conducted 288 calculations for each of the SS-25 bases and garrisons.
The number of victims depends on the proximity of the targets to major cities. To illustrate the changes, we compare attacks using W76 warheads on the Nizhny Tagil SS-25 Teikovo base.

Figure 4.20 shows the impact of twelve ground strikes against the SS-25 base in Nizhny Tagil.

As shown in Figure 4.21, a W76 attack on an SS-25 base/garrison at Teikovo would result in lethal conditions in the city of Ivanovo (1,989,481,000 population).

Figure 4.20


dividing the shares of 80 percent.

Figure 4.21
Twelve Warhead attacks on Teikovo SS-25 garrisons and bases.
In the month of December, assuming the insecurity of the population and the warhead division of the proportion of 80 percent.
The total number of victims is 804,000 people, of which 613,000 are fatal.

Figures 4.22 and 4.23 show the range of casualties and casualties due to seasonal changes in wind speed and direction depending on population shelter and fractionation warhead for an attack of 100 W76 warheads on 50 SS-25 targets.

The figures show that the extent of total casualties or deaths depends more on the shelter of the population than on the proportion of warhead fission. The total number of casualties is between 344,000 and 2 million if shelter is not available, and between 142,000 and 757,000 if all affected individuals can remain inside residential or high-rise structures for at least two days after impact.

If shelter is not included in the calculation, the fallout death toll ranges from 244,000 to just over one million.
If all affected people could remain inside residential or high-rise structures for at least two days after the attack, then the death toll drops to between 105,000 and 527,000.

Figure 4.24 shows how the monthly change in winds affects the number of victims.

Figure 4.25 shows the maximum losses for individual bases/garrisons for four cover values.
For most SS-25 bases / garrisons, in particular Irkutsk and Novosibirsk, by sheltering the population in the residential sector during the first two days after the attack, the estimated number of victims from the consequences will be drastically reduced.

Figure 4.22
Summary of data on the victims of the attack on the SS-25 garrisons. Losses are plotted taking into account population shelter, fission warhead, seasonal fluctuations, most likely wind speeds and direction.

What, without going into the philosophical and political flood, ordinary Prepper, comrade Ganzovets, can draw useful, practical conclusions from this topic?

1. The month most likely for a nuclear strike and dangerous in terms of consequences for the MSC and the nearest regions is JUNE.

3. The number of warheads that, in the event of nuclear weapons, will have to fall on Kozelsk and its environs - it will be much more than what will fall on Moscow and its environs. Just because there are dozens of mines, and you can only hit them with a direct hit. And most importantly, the explosions will be GROUND, so they will be accompanied by the release of a huge amount of radioactive soil into the atmosphere.

Moreover, you won’t have to guess “will it fly in or not fly in” - in the event of any war with the USA, it will fly there GUARANTEED, because the pendos also want to live, and for this they need to take out all our missiles with a guarantee. Well, how many can fly to Moscow and its environs? At best, a dozen warheads, most of them airborne. And more than a hundred will fly to Kozelsk, and all of them will be land-based.

That is, if you estimate the amount of radioactive rubbish in the atmosphere, which will later fall out in the form of radioactive fallout (the notorious fallout) - one attack on Kozelsk will give MUCH more than all the other explosions in the region (including what could hypothetically fall on Moscow in the worst scenario) .

4. When choosing a drape / shelter / jokerville route, you should try to be as far as possible from Kozelsk and the Kaluga region in general. For there, in the case of JV, it will bake well, very unchildishly.

5. When evacuating in the event of a nuclear explosion, you need to monitor the wind, watch where it will carry radioactive fallout and choose the route accordingly. So: in the calculations it will be necessary to take into account not only and not so much the nearest mushrooms as Kozelsk. And if you are already on the leeward side of Kozelsk, then you need to throw it to the side even if there is no danger in the immediate vicinity. And the sooner the better.

To be continued..

P.S. Thanks to BAU member.
The document has an important continuation, where at the end the authors call for a reduction in the number of warheads, an end to the development of missile defense systems, the declassification of nuclear strike plans, the deactivation of flight missions in carriers, and other pacifist appeals to the Pentagon.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Fortunately there are better options. We recommend the following.
1. Unilaterally reduce U.S. nuclear forces and challenge the Russians to do the same.
As a first step, we should unilaterally reduce the U.S. strategic arsenal to a few
hundred survivable nuclear warheads, and challenge the Russians to do the same.
The United States would still have a more than adequate nuclear deterrent while we
waited for Russia to act. Regardless of our actual targeting policy, under their worstcase planning assumptions, our friends in Russia would know that our weapons
hold millions of people at risk.
2. Clarify the U.S. relationship with Russia and reconcile declaratory and employment
policy. We also recommend a step that derives directly from our findings in this
report. We stress the fact that the act of targeting an individual, a group, or a
nation defines it as an enemy. It is this first step that we must reverse. We do not
target friends or allies-Canada, Britain, Italy, for example-but we do target
Russia, China, and several others. The United States still seems to be confused
about our relationship to Russia. In his speech at the National Defense University,
President Bush said, "Today's Russia is not our enemy." But our actions with
regard to nuclear war planning project the exact opposite implication and assumption. If our words and our actions are to correspond, then it is obvious that changes
must take place in the way the United States postures its forces and plans for their
use. Having a permanent war plan in place that demands widespread target
coverage with thousands of weapons on high-alert is a recipe for unceasing arms
requirements by the Pentagon and a continuing competition with Russia. It is
for this reason that we conclude that the overambitious war plan is the key source
of the problem.
3. Abandon much of the secrecy that surrounds the SIOP and reform the process. A
corollary problem with the war plan is the high level of secrecy that surrounds it.
Because the guidance and the SIOP are so closely guarded, no one can question the
assumptions or logic. The fact that USSTRATCOM has responsibility for drawing

Taraz999 23-08-2013 08:10

broke my head over this card
I absolutely don’t understand why Nizhnevartovsk and Yakutsk are on it

tigershark 23-08-2013 08:30

For that matter, the most likely time of impact is winter.

Botany Bay 23-08-2013 08:31

Komrad, what year is the report? According to START-3, that we, that ams, should have no more than 1.5K warheads per database.
Not long ago, infa slipped through, about the minimum number of targets and which ones in the Russian Federation need to be covered in order to cause irreparable damage to it. Obamka ordered such a study to his experts. There are only 50 goals in the answer (though without goals for the nuclear triad and the country's leadership). Indirect confirmation of this is also the fact that the Obama administration wants an even larger reduction in nuclear weapons. To have less than a thousand charges on each side.
In total, as an option, it seems to me that now the concepts have changed a lot. No one is going to harass the population under the root bombardment of nuclear weapons. It will die out on its own from starvation, disease and radiation.
That's why I would dance. Those. if a loaf has not flown into your city, this does not mean that you are lucky. On the contrary, all the fun is just beginning.

Pivnic 23-08-2013 08:42

Nuclear war is too cool, scary, expensive and environmentally unsafe) Enough of the price tag of 8 ye for oil.

Botany Bay 23-08-2013 08:42

quote: Originally posted by tigershark:
Discovered America. This plan is over 10 years old. At the moment it is irrelevant, because. U.S. war doctrine has changed and revised several times. That's why it's made available to the public.
For that matter, the most likely time of impact is winter.

Autumn.
The fallout and the fuel problem won't allow the harvest... and then winter will come. Without heat, fuel, clean water and food.

Botany Bay 23-08-2013 08:44

quote: Originally posted by Pivnic:
Nuclear war is too cool, scary, expensive and environmentally unsafe) Enough of the price tag of 8 ye for oil.

You first lower it to such a level all over the world and don’t die yourself at the same time ...

Lovecraft 23-08-2013 09:00

US ATTACK ON RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR FORCES

What for? Bring in UN troops and appoint a new administration. Putin to The Hague.

Renegad 23-08-2013 09:09

Don't be ridiculous... UN troops... we'll shower them with hats, hats.
And what will he do there, in this Hague? Maybe it's better in Gaga? In defiance of Kabaeva?

sauer 23-08-2013 09:26

quote: Originally posted by Taraz999:
broke my head over this card
I absolutely don’t understand why Nizhnevartovsk and Yakutsk are on it

Most likely due to the fact that in those days the troops of the Strategic Missile Forces howled inside and near the city.

The settlement of Vladimirovka, military unit 29408, is the Vega complex (trajectory measurement station), which was part of the Plesetsk cosmodrome, as a measuring point IP-9. Disbanded November 1, 1997.
People often call this unit - military unit 16519. In fact, military unit 16519 is OKIK-17 "Hercules", which is on the DSC.
The confusion occurred because at the military points above Vladimirovka (where, in addition to the military unit itself, there were points: towers and "green platforms") there were and in some places remained iron sheets with a list of cities: Sverdlovsk (this city was definitely written). .. Yakutsk ... and the designation of military unit 16519. Apparently, "Vega" was subordinate to "Hercules"? But again, confusion. The system of trajectory measurement stations, which included the Vega complex, included the following six cities: Yakutsk, Vorkuta, Severodvinsk, Norilsk, Baikonur, Kapustin Yar. Sverdlovsk is not. Maybe they confused the adversary with those iron sheets? However, "Vega" was subordinate to "Hercules".
In the winter of 1993, there was a major fire on our Vega at a technical position in the central control building. They flooded the fire with a huge amount of water - a huge ice hill was formed. Part of the equipment that had not yet burned down was damaged. The complex collapsed. But by inertia, it lasted another four years.
A signalman who served in YARVK swore that the Vega had definitely had anti-aircraft missiles.

Now everything is abandoned, everything is taken out and the mines are filled up.

Taraz999 23-08-2013 09:28

quote: Most likely due to the fact that in those days

Yes, I already understood that the card is at least 15 years old

dima745511 23-08-2013 10:45

Non-nuclear - much more likely.

However, it is foolish to completely discount the nuclear threat. As long as the potential adversary has nuclear missiles, the probability of a strike on our territory remains. And there are plans for such strikes, including modern and owls. secret.

Vovchik MD 23-08-2013 11:02

As long as the potential adversary has nuclear missiles, the probability of a strike on our territory remains. And there are plans for such strikes, including modern and owls. secret.

The use of nuclear weapons may well be implemented if the "controlled war" becomes uncontrollable. And, as you know, everything that can go wrong will go wrong.

Nespjashiy 23-08-2013 11:04

quote: Originally posted by dima745511:

A nuclear strike is unlikely, especially on such a large scale.

Vovan Lawer 23-08-2013 11:11

Better think about why they rebuilt part of their strategic nuclear boats, which were created under ICBMs, under Tomahawks. The war of the future in their understanding is a massive launch of missiles without nuclear warheads, or with low-yield warheads. No one will turn the territory of Russia into an uninhabitable desert. Do not rely on air defense, the entire North is open. That is why they want to bring the old MIG-31s ​​back to life, but how many of them are left?

Paraglider 23-08-2013 11:18

quote: Originally posted by Mexico0:

The garrisons and bases of Nizhny Tagil (1989 439,500 population) are located only 22 km from the nearest SS-25 garrison, several small towns lie in the path of the downfall, and the computer casualty model for the unprotected population (and assuming a fractional division of 50 percent) ranges from 47,000 to 171,000 dead, between 45,000 and 113,000 depending on the month.
If, in the unlikely event that fallout goes to Nizhny Tagil, the death toll would be four to six times higher.

nothing in this text bothers you?

ah few casualties? Then here are the other numbers:

quote: Originally posted by Mexico0:

Twelve Warhead attacks on Nizhny Tagil SS-25 garrisons and bases
For the month of November, assuming an unprotected population and warheads
dividing the shares of 80 percent.
The total number of victims is planned to be 162,000,
132,000 of which were fatal.

IMHO it was all written by ordinary non-professional journalists to order. It is not difficult to guess who the customer might be.
In general, you just need to follow the recommendations of the Ministry of Emergency Situations in this case. Here they are interesting to read. where, where and how to evacuate.

Malakhov 23-08-2013 11:25

http://lurkmore.to/Third_world_war

Nespjashiy 23-08-2013 11:35

quote: Originally posted by Malakhov:

Bunker from a sea container. Stayed 2 weeks. Odel OZK took the PM and hit the road ...

Come on - if you really dream, then do not deny yourself anything: a three-level deep underground bunker on shock-absorbing supports with multi-layer anti-nuclear protection and an autonomous life support system. In a month or two it will be possible to leave without OZK.

dima745511 23-08-2013 11:38

quote: Originally posted by Vovchik MD:

"If in the first act there is a gun hanging on the wall, then in the last it will go off"
The use of nuclear weapons may well be implemented if the "controlled war" becomes uncontrollable. And, as you know, everything that can go wrong will go wrong.

Most likely, you are right: they consider nuclear weapons as "reserve", in case of failure in a "conventional" war. And as for "not so" ... Somehow I doubt that this "not so" will be large-scale. As practice shows, even Russian army capable of conducting operations without large jambs (the Georgian war is an example of this) ....

dima745511 23-08-2013 11:43

quote: Originally posted by Vovan-Lawer:
Better think about why they rebuilt part of their strategic nuclear boats, which were created under ICBMs, under Tomahawks. The war of the future in their understanding is a massive launch of missiles without nuclear warheads, or with low-yield warheads. No one will turn the territory of Russia into an uninhabitable desert. Do not rely on air defense, the entire North is open. That is why they want to bring the old MIG-31s ​​back to life, but how many of them are left?

Nespjashiy 23-08-2013 12:02

quote: Originally posted by dima745511:

They want to place them at a completely unusable island airfield in order to allegedly cover the North, and even without AWACS aircraft, without air defense, without a garrison marines... Like a pimple out of the blue. I’m already silent about the living conditions there for the flight technical staff ...

Where are the firewood from? I have other information.

Why so loudly hysteria and mislead others?

http://www.izvestia29.ru/economy/2013/02/04/3441.html
The Ministry of Defense abandoned the idea of ​​​​permanently basing an air group of long-range MiG-31 interceptor fighters on Novaya Zemlya.

High-ranking source in the main command Air force told Izvestia that the proposal to Sergei Shoigu was prepared at the end of last year and has now been approved by the minister.

The offer was made after a comprehensive analysis by our specialists, - the interlocutor emphasized.

According to him, the former leadership of the Ministry of Defense decided to transfer the air group to the Novaya Zemlya airfield Rogachevo last fall as part of the development of a general concept for the defense of the Arctic.

http://lenta.ru/news/2013/04/04/mig31
The crews of a new air group of MiG-31BM fighter-interceptors took up combat duty for the air defense of industrial facilities in the Novosibirsk Region. It is reported by RIA Novosti with reference to the press service of the Ministry of Defense.

"The deployment of additional duty forces and means is connected with the strengthening of the aviation group responsible for the security of the airspace of Siberia," the Defense Ministry said in a statement.

Where the MiG-31BM will be based is not specified. In all likelihood, we are talking about the Kansk airfield in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, which is subordinate to the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Command. In December 2012, six modernized MiG-31BM fighter-interceptors arrived at the airfield.

dima745511 23-08-2013 12:13

quote: - The offer was made after a comprehensive analysis by our specialists, - the interlocutor emphasized.

Nespjashiy 23-08-2013 12:21

quote: Originally posted by dima745511:

Yes, to understand the absurdity of deploying these aircraft on Rogachevo, you need to be a major specialist ... I already began to be proud of myself

dima745511 23-08-2013 12:27

In comparison with those goofballs that just recently ruled the Ministry of Defense - any SA reserve sergeant is a specialist

And what, were they shot or sent to logging? Maybe without pensions, at least they were fired?

diamond_d 23-08-2013 12:29

quote: Originally posted by Nespjashiy:

quote:
Originally posted by dima745511:

A nuclear strike is unlikely, especially on such a large scale.

Of course, because the Pindos have long pissed away their nuclear weapons, removed the nuclear stuffing from the warheads and let it into nuclear fuel for reactors. And the rest of the world continues to be misled by their "large nuclear arsenal." However, amers are no strangers to lies, an example of this is SDI and the "gold reserve" of the Nazi states of America.

a799da 23-08-2013 12:38

MiG-31 is an AWACS aircraft and an interceptor in one bottle, just don’t mention the nonsense of Khramchikhin and Ivashov about 100500.

Boatman61 23-08-2013 12:43

quote: Originally posted by Nespjashiy:

In comparison with those goofballs that just recently ruled the Ministry of Defense - any SA reserve sergeant is a specialist

Strongly said.

Nespjashiy 23-08-2013 12:43

quote: Originally posted by diamond_d:

Throw a link on this issue comrade. Something I have not heard that they pissed away all their nuclear weapons.

FSE slander like the Kushkins, but am I, Aivazovsky, am I not allowed?

If without jokes, there was an article on the Eye of the Planets, will I find it, the question is ...
It was said there that the real number of nuclear weapons carriers with nuclear warheads on combat duty was greatly exaggerated. As well as the number of nuclear charges in storage is exaggerated. Let's just say that there are big and justified doubts. It's just that the Americans are great deceivers, they fool the whole world not only with the dollar. Once forcing the world to think that they are a great nuclear power - in the absence of the USSR, who will climb to check?

tonyweiss 23-08-2013 13:11

I wonder if they fall into one of the "seven categories of goals" mentioned by the authors of the map.

dima745511 23-08-2013 13:21

quote: Originally posted by tonyweiss:
When I was in the military, I met with colleagues from the railroad troops (I don’t know if such troops still exist or not) who talked about trains with ballistic missiles disguised as a freight train.
I wonder if they fall into one of the "seven categories of goals" mentioned by the authors of the map.

No, BZHRK (http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%...%EF%EB%E5%EA%F1) is no more. Therefore, they cannot be mentioned as targets.

Mexico0 23-08-2013 13:22

Relate.

------------------
Sincerely, Yaroslav. autokanal.com

dima745511 23-08-2013 13:27

Ah, well, yes ... These plans are up to 2005 ...

Strannik888 23-08-2013 14:36

It is unlikely that the United States will start such a campaign against Russia. It is impractical, it is time for them to bomb the countries of the Middle East.

dima745511 23-08-2013 15:16

quote: Originally posted by Strannik888:
It is unlikely that the United States will start such a campaign against Russia. It is impractical, it is time for them to bomb the countries of the Middle East.

Everything has its time...

plombir 23-08-2013 15:51

quote: Originally posted by dima745511:

I completely agree! It's not even a "bell", it's Christmas trees, sticks, just some kind of bell! How deaf do you have to be to not hear such an alarm?!

With those moments, by the way, they are also in the spirit of the times ... They want to place them at a completely unusable island airfield in order to allegedly cover the North, and even without AWACS aircraft, without air defense, without a marine garrison ... Like a pimple out of the blue. I’m already silent about the living conditions there for the flight technical staff ...

Well, still dima745511 would not "agree" with Vovan-Laer

As for "they place it in the wrong place and not enough" - be sure to write to Sportloto! "Like a pimple out of the blue!" - write like that, they will understand there, there are also THE SAME strategists ...

It's good that you bring up the right topic. In general, it is true (especially since I wrote some of it myself), but there are a couple of clarifying points.

quote: 1. The month most likely for a nuclear strike and dangerous in terms of consequences for MSCs and nearby regions is JUNE.

2. For at least two days after the impact, you must be in shelter.

1. June is the most severe month in terms of consequences, but not the most probable. The date of the start of the war (if it happens) will be determined by the political situation and only by it. At the same time, the situation can develop very rapidly, crossing out any preliminary plans and dictating "inevitable" decisions to politicians (as in 1914, google "August guns"). The time of year, and even more so the nuances of radioactive contamination in this scenario will not play any role.

Accordingly, there is no need to write about June, it’s more correct not to relax throughout the year and keep your nose to the wind.

2. ERROR! Under than such, that can cost many lives. Why?
Yes, because there is a problem of Kozelsk and the warheads aimed there. The cloud from there will not reach Moscow in 3 hours, but when it gets there, it will fry everything very thoroughly.

Accordingly, the first days can and should be used to get the radioactive cloud out of the way as far as possible. If there is a relatively small local infection (one or two strikes in Moscow and / or Moscow region), it may turn out that it is better to neglect receiving some dose and evacuate than to wait for Kozelsky precipitation.

In any case, there is no "universal" solution. A specific decision should be made on the basis of an analysis of a number of factors: the wind rose, the distance from the epicenter of local explosions, measurements of the "background", etc. And only in this way. Stupidly following a pattern can be fatal.

I propose to fix it.

AT general view, strategic weapons are systems capable of delivering warheads (usually nuclear) to targets located at an intercontinental distance from the launch site, i.e. launch a nuclear attack.

So it is known that there are three ways of possible global use of strategic weapons.

Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Yuri Grigoriev tells about the ways of possible use of strategic weapons on the pages of the IA "Arms of Russia".

nuclear explosion

The results of the nuclear bombing

Pilots who carried out the first nuclear bombing

First (preemptive) nuclear strike, the purpose of which is to destroy, first of all, all the strategic weapons of the enemy, in order to exclude, thereby, any possibility of them delivering a retaliatory nuclear strike.

When, in 1945, American President Truman ordered a nuclear attack on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he was well aware that there would be no retaliatory strike and therefore demonstrated a kind of heroism in conditions of complete impunity.

Moscow and others were identified as subsequent targets. Largest cities The USSR, however, the rapid creation of an atomic and then a hydrogen bomb in the USSR put everything in its place - fear of retribution cooled hot heads.

It became clear to everyone that real life the attacked nuclear power will retain some of the strategic weapons to strike back, after which the aggressor side will be in approximately the same position as its victim.

Therefore, inflicting a nuclear strike on a state possessing nuclear weapons is tantamount to suicide, since a devastating retaliatory nuclear strike will turn the largest cities of the aggressor into nuclear dust.

Russia is developing a new ICBM in a high-security mine

Retaliation (punishment, intimidation) inflicted by missiles that have survived after the aggressor delivered the first nuclear strike.

The technical basis for an effective retaliatory strike is, first of all, the high survivability of strategic weapons, which ensures the combat capability of such a number of missiles after an attack by an aggressor that is sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on it.

With all the reductions, the USSR had the most important parameter of strategic weapons - the thrown weight was 2.8 times greater than that of the United States, which guaranteed a crushing retaliatory strike against the aggressor in any development of the situation.

Thrown weight is understood as the total weight of everything that the rocket is capable of bringing to the trajectory of the maximum firing range.

This is the weight of the last stage of the missile, which carries out the operation of breeding warheads, means of overcoming anti-missile defense, engines, fuel, control system equipment and structural elements inseparable from this stage.

Thrown weight is the main and main parameter that determines combat effectiveness rockets.

Mobile missile systems - basic combat means retaliatory strike

Mobile ground missile system (PGRK) "Yars"

Combat railway missile system

Reciprocal strike is applied upon receipt of a signal from the missile attack warning system, while our missiles must launch and leave the position areas before the aggressor's warheads approach these areas, and the aggressor, who has actually fired at the already empty launch silos, receives almost simultaneously a nuclear strike on his military and industrial objects.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Defense of the USSR Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov

Discussions about the priority of these three types of nuclear strikes began long ago, back in the USSR, and they were conducted at the highest level. Then some of the highest military officials reported to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU D.F. Ustinov, who coordinated the work of all institutions of the military-industrial complex, that there is no urgent need to increase the security of silo launch complexes, because a retaliatory strike can be used, and then our missiles will leave the silo structures even before the arrival of the aggressor's warheads, which makes increasing their security useless.

At the same time, the director of the Head Rocket and Space Institute (TsNIIMASH), Lieutenant General Yu.A. Mozzhorin,

relying on the deep research of the Institute, he reported to D.F. Ustinov that in 10 minutes it is unrealistic to make a decision and press the button to launch nuclear missiles based on the report of some general looking at the cloudy radar screen. What if it's a mistake? After all, hundreds of millions of human lives, including women and children, and above all citizens of the Soviet Union, stand behind it, because in the event of a mistake, this will be followed by the retribution of a potential enemy provoked by us. Missiles will not return. And if it is radio interference or a provocation?

Our institute, he said, worked out in detail and modeled all cases of combat use missile and nuclear weapons in the conditions of preventive (first) and retaliatory strikes. In these cases, victory is impossible to achieve.

in the report Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Yu.A. Mozzhorin told Brezhnev that the defense doctrine was interpreted by some major military leaders, at times, freely and ambiguously. Briefly substantiated that only the doctrine of guaranteed retaliation will deter aggression and ensure stability and peace. He showed that the doctrine of a pre-emptive (first) strike against an aggressor that is ready to attack or a retaliatory missile strike does not provide the defense of the country and only leads to the mutual destruction of the conflicting states.

He also substantiated his point of view at the Defense Council, which took place at the end of July 1969 in the Crimea, at Stalin's former dacha near Yalta. When the commander in chief missile forces Marshal of the Soviet Union N.I. Krylov said that the military was not going to sit and wait until they were hit, but would use missiles first or, in extreme cases, in a retaliatory strike, then he received a serious reprimand from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin.

At this Defense Council, the doctrine of a guaranteed retaliatory strike - the doctrine of deterrence - was approved by the highest political and state leadership of the USSR. The priority of nuclear missile strikes was firmly established: only a crushing retaliatory strike, as a means of preventing nuclear war, as a means of deterrence.

Russia's strategic arms structure

Strategic nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles

Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN)

Russian strategic aircraft

The entire structure of strategic arms of the USSR was formed to ensure a guaranteed retaliatory strike. Submarines armed with ballistic missiles were built, which in those years were out of the control zone in the ocean expanses.

Mobile ground-based ground and railway missile systems were deployed, the location of which was impossible with the help of then-existing satellites with optical control equipment.

The security of stationary missile silos was increased, and the missiles themselves were improved so that they could launch under conditions of a nuclear attack on a positional area.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated April 21, 2000 No. 706, states that Russian Federation retains the status of a nuclear power to deter (prevent) aggression against it and (or) its allies.

United States President Ronald Reagan

The United States gradually came, finally, to a similar decision. As early as February 26, 1986, US President R. Reagan, in his address to the country, formulated his position as follows: "Our aim must be to deter and, if necessary, repulse any attack without recourse to nuclear weapons." .

In 2013, the United States Secretary of Defense, acting on behalf of the President of the country, sent Congress "Report on the strategy of the use of nuclear weapons of the United States".

The purpose of nuclear weapons is defined in report 4 in this form. The US Congress in August 2013 approved this strategy for the use of nuclear weapons.

Everything seems clear, but in our means mass media various discussions about the priority of missile strikes constantly appear, which are conducted, however, not at the highest level, but at the level of generals and so-called experts.

Of course, in the 21st century the situation has changed in many ways, but these changes should be taken into account reasonably, without blindly repeating all the dogmas of the last century, since the world is changing quite quickly, but without denying everything that has been achieved before.

PGRK "Yars" takes up combat duty

As stated in source 1, mobile ground-based missile systems, together with sea-based ballistic missiles, due to their high stealth and ability to disperse, ensure a retaliatory nuclear missile strike, when the command to start is given only after fixing the fact of a massive enemy nuclear missile strike on the territory of their country , i.e. already after the fall of the warheads on the target.

A similar statement in relation to ground-based mobile missile systems was true in the 20th century, when these complexes were controlled by space systems that operated in the optical range and were not able to see through clouds and fogs.

At that time, our mobile soil and railway complexes were really invulnerable and suitable for delivering a devastating retaliatory strike. For example, our railway rocket system, capable of moving thousands of kilometers, could be under the clouds about 80% of the time and be inaccessible to space control.

However, in the 21st century, with widespread use space systems of all-weather radar reconnaissance, any missile system of a mobile ground-based unpaved or railway-based is no longer able to remain invisible, and therefore it turns from a retaliatory strike weapon into a weapon that can only be used in a first or retaliatory strike, and therefore becomes unnecessary for us, and its production and installation on combat duty is meaningless.

Over the years, as the systems of cosmic and other control systems improve, this senselessness will become more and more obvious.

massive missile attack

Many understood this, but made strange conclusions. So Source 3 states: “Now the task of putting the first regiment of a mobile soil complex with unified missiles on combat duty is being solved. The task is very difficult, because this is also the first year of mass production of this weapon. But in general, the national defense will win, which will have one of the components of strategic weapons, which has greater survivability in the face of a retaliatory strike.

Source 1 also states that silo-based missiles in protected launchers operate in a retaliatory strike, when the decision to launch is issued by the political leadership after fixing a mass launch of missiles from enemy territory, even before the bulk of warheads reach their targets .

It is impossible to agree with such statements, but it is also impossible to imagine that such statements of the authors are simply the result of their illiteracy. Of course, they understand everything, but, apparently, they see no other way to justify the huge costs of deploying new mobile missile systems, and therefore they are silent about their original purpose for delivering a retaliatory strike, to which they are currently, and even more so in the future, not suitable.

Therefore, they offer a retaliatory strike, which can lead to a worldwide catastrophe. Of course, the technical level of modern strategic weapons, in principle, makes it possible to carry out a retaliatory strike, but the concept of such a strike puts the top leadership of the state in an extremely difficult position before having to make a decision on an unusually high level of responsibility in the face of an acute shortage of time, possible technical malfunctions in the missile early warning system. attacks and operator errors.

Russia is testing a new ballistic missile

The flight time of missiles from another continent is about 30 minutes, and when launching missiles flying along flat trajectories from submarines located not far from our territory, no more than 10-15 minutes. Under these conditions, it is unrealistic to implement a retaliatory strike, and besides, it is dangerous, because in such a turmoil, various kinds of errors are not ruled out both in determining the reliability of the very fact of the launch of enemy missiles, and in the implementation of a retaliatory launch.

This does not exclude the possibility of an inadequate assessment of the situation by the head of the attacked state and the adoption by him of a decision leading to a worldwide catastrophe. The Americans have repeatedly reported various kinds of malfunctions and errors in their early warning systems, we also had similar cases, but they were not reported, but such information is available in foreign sources.

For example, Source 2 states that on September 26, 1983, shortly after midnight, equipment at a nuclear attack early warning center near Moscow issued a warning that the United States had fired five ballistic missiles into the Soviet Union.

However, the operational duty officer did not believe the new automation, he contacted his superiors and reported a false alarm. The subsequent investigation of such an act by the operational duty officer confirmed the correctness of his actions, and he was awarded. Any kind of reasoning about the power of our strategic weapons in a retaliatory strike is meaningless and dangerous.

And what will we achieve when delivering a retaliatory strike? We will not be able to somehow reduce, let alone eliminate, the destructive force of the aggressor's first nuclear strike with our retaliatory strike. It will be exactly the same as with our orientation to retaliate. Of course, in a retaliatory strike, more of our missiles will reach targets on the territory of the aggressor, and the nuclear dust there will be smaller than in a retaliatory strike, but can this really matter in the light of the death of civilization.

Beginning of negotiations on the reduction of strategic offensive arms

Accepted in the USSR, and now in the USA, the priority of methods of delivering nuclear strikes must remain unchanged in our time: only a crushing retaliatory strike, as a means of preventing nuclear war, as a means of deterrence, a means of deterrence.

Orientation for a retaliatory strike does not mean that in this case we do not need early warning systems for the launch of aggressor missiles. On the contrary, we certainly need such systems, but not so that the leadership would have time to give the order to launch our missiles in a retaliatory strike, but so that it could have time to give the order to take the necessary measures to strike back after a nuclear explosion. charges of the aggressor on our territory.

We must develop a structure of strategic weapons and implement it in a short time that is capable of delivering an effective retaliatory strike in any situation, including if the aggressor has effective anti-missile defense systems. For this, it is urgent to develop and deploy missile systems with air-to-ground ballistic missiles (ASGM) reported in source 5 and source 6, since heavy bombers with cruise missiles with nuclear warheads or with atomic bombs unsuitable for retaliation.

Aircraft with BVRZ, on a signal from early warning systems, will be able to leave the permanent airfield in a few minutes and, once outside the affected area, wait for either an order to retaliate or return to base if the early warning system signal turned out to be erroneous.

The creation of the ASBM was prohibited by the SALT-2 and START-1 Treaties, however, at present, due to the expiration of the said treaties, this prohibition has become invalid.

It is also possible to use non-aerodrome aircraft of the EKIP type for missile placement, the fundamental principles of which were developed under the guidance of Professor Lev Shchukin. Such an apparatus with a carrying capacity of up to 100 tons is capable of not only flying like an airplane, but also moving near the surface of the earth and water in the ekranoplane mode.

It is also necessary to create heavy liquid strategic missiles with a large throw weight, capable of launching in retaliation, for which the positional areas of these missiles must be covered with effective missile defense systems of the S-500 type to intercept aggressor missiles, as well as engineering structures that protect missile silos from high-precision non-nuclear weapons.

We live in an era of strategic stability, which is based on two specific traits of the human character: distrust of another person and fear of retribution. The world has been balancing on these two pillars for many decades, maintaining the so-called strategic balance. Only absolute confidence in the inexorable inevitability of one's own death as a result of a retaliatory nuclear strike is guaranteed to keep any aggressor from delivering a first strike and save the world from nuclear madness.

Used Books:

1. The commander of the Strategic Missile Forces spoke about the structure of the nuclear shield.

http://ria.ru/analytics/20111216/518396383.html

2. The Russian who prevented a nuclear war.